Full Opinion

THIRD DIVISION DILLARD, P. J., GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be received no later than 4:30 pm on the 10th day after the decision was issued to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules October 28, 2026 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A1345. MORTON et al v. EAGLE RANCH FOUNDATION, INC. et al. DILLARD, Presiding Judge. Eagle Ranch provides services and support to children with behavioral and emotional issues. Toward that end, the children live on a campus in homes with staff members and their families. Sarah and Jeffrey Morton were employed by Eagle Ranch as staff members and lived on campus with their two young sons. After their five-year- old son T. M. II was sexually assaulted by the nine-year-old son of another staff couple, the Mortons filed suit against Eagle Ranch, asserting several claims of negligence and a claim for breach of contract. In doing so, they sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Eagle Ranch moved for summary judgment as to all of the Mortons’ claims, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the Mortons contend the trial court erred, arguing that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment as to their negligence claims, their breach-of-contract claim, and their demand for punitive damages and attorney fees. They also claim the court abused its discretion in limiting the scope of discovery as to prior instances of sexual abuse at Eagle Ranch and prohibiting discovery of a mental- health evaluation of the child who assaulted T. M. II. For the following reasons, we reverse the grant of summary judgment as to most of the Mortons’ negligence claims and as to their demand for punitive damages and attorney fees; affirm the grant of summary judgment as to their breach-of-contract claim; reverse the order restricting discovery of prior instances of abuse; and vacate the order prohibiting discovery of the child’s mental-health evaluation.1 Viewed in the light most favorable to the Mortons (i.e., the nonmoving parties),2 the record shows that Eagle Ranch is a nonprofit child-care institution licensed under Georgia law and located in Flowery Branch, Hall County. As noted above, Eagle Ranch 1 Oral argument was held on June 9, 2026, and is archived on the Court’s website. See Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia, Oral Argument, Case No. A26A1345 (June 9, 2026), available at https://vimeo.com/1200809264. 2 See, e.g., Swanson v. Tackling, 335 Ga. App. 810, 810 (783 SE2d 167) (2016). 2 provides services and support to children experiencing relational crises, behavioral difficulties, and emotional issues. In addition to children with “mild to moderate” behavioral issues, Eagle Ranch also provides services for children with severe behavioral issues, including those exposed to trauma and even abuse. All participating children—“Ranch Kids”—reside on a campus with employee-parents—“House Parents”—while participating in counseling, education, and religious programs. The House Parent model is a defining feature of Eagle Ranch’s program and entails married couples living full-time on campus in residential homes with Ranch Kids assigned to their care. As part of that model, House Parents are encouraged to have their own children—“Staff Kids”—live on campus as well, with the goal of demonstrating healthy family relationships to the Ranch Kids. As a result, Staff Kids and Ranch Kids live in close proximity, and they regularly interact within the homes where they reside, on playgrounds, in the recreational facilities, during religious activities, and in other shared spaces. Indeed, according to Eagle Ranch, this integration of Staff Kids and Ranch Kids is essential to the program’s identity. Sarah and Jeffrey Morton began working as House Parents at Eagle Ranch in April 2020, residing in one of the homes on campus with their two sons, seven-year-old T. M. and five-year-old T. M. II, as well as several Ranch Kids. L. R. and S. R. were 3 also employed as House Parents, and they resided in another home on campus with their three children, which included nine-year-old J. R. As Staff Kids, J. R. and T. M. II often interacted; but J. R. had a reputation for allegedly bullying younger children, including T. M. II. In fact, Eagle Ranch leadership were aware that J. R. had intimidated T. M. II in the past. And in one instance, J. R. punched T. M. II in the nose hard enough to cause a nosebleed. Even so, Eagle Ranch took no formal measures to address these issues. As part of the House Parents’ responsibilities, Eagle Ranch required attendance at regular training sessions on campus. And while House Parents could bring their children to those sessions, Eagle Ranch provided free childcare for the attending parents. On October 18, 2021, the Mortons and other House Parents were scheduled to attend such a session, so Eagle Ranch arranged for their two sons to join a babysitting group—which also included J. R. and a three-year-old girl, T. H. Two babysitters from Eagle Ranch’s approved list were hired, 17-year-old Ellie and 16-year- old Zahara; and, in fact, the Mortons had hired Ellie to babysit their two boys. That morning, the Mortons dropped off their boys with the babysitters at the Girls’ Wellness Center. After about an hour of playing in the gym, the babysitters took the children outside. J. R., T. M. II, and his older brother went to the playground, 4 while Ellie—who was wearing a walking boot because of an injury—and Zahara stayed with T. H. near the basketball court. At some point, J. R., T. M. II, and T. M. started playing in a hammock near the playground where they were obscured from the babysitters’ view. While there, J. R. started a “game” in which he offered T. M. II treats if he exposed himself. Not wanting to participate, T. M. went back to the basketball court. And after his departure, J. R. touched T. M. II’s penis and buttocks, made T. M. II do the same to him, and told him not to tell anyone what happened. A few minutes later, both boys returned to the playground. Ellie could tell something was wrong with T. M. II because he seemed quiet and frustrated, so she asked if he was okay, and he responded “yeah.” Just a bit later, Sarah Morton picked up her two sons; and as they were driving away from the playground, T. M. II told her what took place with J. R. and asked to wash his hands because he felt dirty. Sarah immediately called her husband to tell him what happened, and he in turn told Eagle Ranch’s Home Life Manager, who then relayed the incident to Eagle Ranch’s Senior Director of Programs. Jeffrey Morton also contacted J. R.’s father to tell him about the incident; and when confronted by his father, J. R. admitted to the actions T. M. II disclosed. But despite being aware of the incident, no one within Eagle Ranch’s senior-staff structure reported J. R.’s conduct 5 to Hall County law enforcement or the Georgia Division of Family and Children Services purportedly because they did not believe J. R.’s actions constituted sexual abuse. At first, the Mortons were unsure of how best to handle the matter. But after speaking with the pastor at the church they attended, the Mortons reported the incident to the Hall County Sheriff’s Office. A few days later, an investigator with that office contacted them and recommended that T. M. II undergo a forensic interview. The Mortons agreed, and during that interview, T. M. II recounted J. R.’s actions. Based on T. M. II’s description of the incident, both the investigator and forensic interviewer believed J. R.’s conduct could be characterized as predatory and abusive. Even so, county authorities ultimately decided against prosecuting J. R. or his parents (largely because of J. R.’s age). In the months that followed, the Mortons’ frustrations with Eagle Ranch increased, as they believed J. R. had not faced sufficient repercussions for his conduct and Eagle Ranch was doing little to ensure T. M. II’s safety. By December, the relationship between the Mortons and Eagle Ranch was untenable; and so, Eagle Ranch presented the Mortons with the choice to either remain employed under heightened supervision or resign in exchange for a severance package. The Mortons 6 decided to resign (as did J. R.’s parents), and they ultimately left Eagle Ranch in early January 2022. But for the reasons discussed below, the proposed severance package was never executed. On June 14, 2022, the Mortons—individually and jointly on behalf of T. M. II—sued Eagle Ranch, asserting that its failure to (1) properly screen and supervise the children under its care, (2) properly train its employees, and (3) keep its premises safe constituted negligence that resulted in J. R. sexually assaulting T. M. II. The Mortons also claimed that Eagle Ranch’s failure to comply with state statutes and regulations regarding childcare constituted negligence per se. Additionally, the Mortons contended that the emails they exchanged with Eagle Ranch regarding the severance package amounted to a contract that it breached. In light of these allegations, the Mortons’ complaint sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Eagle Ranch filed an answer, and a lengthy and contentious discovery period then ensued. Specifically, in various discovery requests, the Mortons sought information on prior instances of sexual abuse between children at Eagle Ranch. The Mortons also requested information on a psychosexual evaluation of J. R. conducted at Eagle Ranch’s direction after the incident with T. M. II. Eagle Ranch objected to these requests and moved for a protective order. Following a hearing, the trial court issued 7 a series of orders limiting discovery of prior instances of sexual abuse to only instances in the five-year period preceding the incident involving J. R. and T. M. II; between children under the age of 14; and in which at least one Staff Kid was involved. The court also denied the Mortons access to the psychosexual evaluation of J. R. on the ground that it was protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. After discovery closed, Eagle Ranch filed six motions for summary judgment, addressing all of the Mortons’ claims. The Mortons filed responsive motions, and the trial court held a hearing in which the parties provided argument on all outstanding issues. At the end of the hearing, the court stated that it was granting Eagle Ranch’s motion for summary judgment as to the Mortons’ negligence per se claim but would take the remaining issues under advisement. But over the course of the next month, the court issued three orders granting summary judgment for Eagle Ranch as to the Mortons’ remaining claims. This appeal follows. Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 8 to a judgment as a matter of law.”3 Importantly, if the movant meets this burden, the nonmovant “cannot rest on its pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue.”4 And speculation which “raises merely a conjecture or possibility is not sufficient to create even an inference of fact for consideration on summary judgment.”5 Moreover, if summary judgment is granted, it enjoys no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56(c) have been met.6 Significantly, in conducting this de novo review, we are charged with “viewing the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the 3 OCGA § 9-11-56(c). See Swanson, 335 Ga. App. at 811 (explaining that summary judgment is appropriate when “the moving party can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” (punctuation omitted)). 4 Handberry v. Manning Forestry Servs., LLC, 353 Ga. App. 150, 151–52 (836 SE2d 545) (2019) (punctuation omitted). 5 Id. at 152 (punctuation omitted). 6 See Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 624(1)(a) (697 SE2d 779) (2010) (“Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56(c) have been met.”). 9 nonmovant.”7 With these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to the Mortons’ claims of error. 1. The Mortons first contend, generally, that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to their claims of negligence, as well as their claims for punitive damages and attorney fees. Within that enumeration of error, the Mortons separately address the court’s rulings as to each claim. Our analysis of these issues will follow that format. (a) Foreseeability. The Mortons argue the trial court erred in finding that the abuse of T. M. II was not foreseeable as a matter of law. We agree. To recover for injuries caused by another’s negligence, a plaintiff “must show four elements: a duty, a breach of that duty, causation[,] and damages.”8 And these same elements are required to recover on a negligence claim, including premises 7 Benefield v. Tominich, 308 Ga. App. 605, 607(1) (708 SE2d 563) (2011) (punctuation omitted). Accord Swanson, 335 Ga. App. at 810. 8 Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J. B., 300 Ga. 840, 841(1) (797 SE2d 87) (2017) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Johnson v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 276 Ga. 270, 272(1) (578 SE2d 106) (2003). See Stanley v. Garrett, 356 Ga. App. 706, 709(1) (848 SE2d 890) (2020) (explaining that to have a viable negligence action, a plaintiff “must satisfy the elements of the tort, namely, the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant, a breach of that duty, causation of the alleged injury, and damages resulting from the alleged breach of the duty” (quotation marks omitted). 10 liability arising from third-party criminal conduct.9 Importantly, the foreseeability of the criminal act informs whether the defendant’s “duty of ordinary care owed ... encompasses the duty to keep invitees safe from third-party criminal conduct.”10 Indeed, under longstanding precedent, if the proprietor has “reason to anticipate a criminal act, he or she then has a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against injury from dangerous characters.”11 But without foreseeability that a criminal act will occur, “no duty on the part of the proprietor to exercise ordinary care to prevent that act arises.”12 That said, the difficulty arises in determining “which criminal acts are foreseeable.”13 9 See Ga. CVS Pharm., LLC v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718, 721(II)(A) (890 SE2d 209) (2023) (explaining that, “[a]s a general rule, in order to recover on a premises liability claim arising from third-party criminal conduct, a plaintiff must present evidence of a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages”). 10 Carmichael, 316 Ga. at 722(II)(A). 11 Id. (quotation marks omitted). See Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785, 786-87 (482 SE2d 339) (1997) (holding that a defendant has a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against injury from foreseeable criminal acts). 12 Carmichael, 316 Ga. at 722(II)(A) (quotation marks omitted). See Martin v. Six Flags Over Georgia (II), L.P., 301 Ga. 323, 328(II) (801 SE2d 24) (2017) (explaining that a defendant’s duty extends only to foreseeable criminal acts). 13 Walker, 267 Ga. at 786 (quotation marks omitted). Accord D. L. v. St. Francis Health, LLC, 369 Ga. App. 314, 316 (893 SE2d 444) (2023). 11 In Ga. CVS Pharmacy v. Carmichael,14 the Supreme Court of Georgia sought to clarify this aspect of tort law, explaining that the “relevant question” is whether the totality of the circumstances establish reasonable foreseeability such that the proprietor has a duty to guard against that criminal activity. While evidence of substantially similar prior crimes—crimes with a likeness, proximity, or other relationship to the criminal act at issue that give a proprietor reason to anticipate such an act occurring on the premises—may often be one of the most probative considerations in answering that question, it is not a required consideration, and other circumstances may be relevant, too. And unless the court determines that no rational juror could disagree on the answer, that question is one for the jury.15 Put more simply, the question of reasonable foreseeability in this context is “generally a question for the jury to decide.”16 14 316 Ga. 718. 15 Carmichael, 316 Ga. at 732(II)(C). Accord St. Francis Health, 369 Ga. App. at 316–17. 16 Carmichael, 316 Ga. at 725 (II)(B). See Walker, 267 Ga. at 786 (“[T]he question of reasonable foreseeability of a criminal attack is generally for a jury’s determination rather than summary adjudication by the courts.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); St. Francis Health, 369 Ga. App. at 317 (explaining that foreseeability is generally a matter for the factfinder to resolve through case-specific consideration of the totality of the circumstances). 12 The Carmichael Court also cautioned that there is no “bright-line rule that only certain, specific kinds of evidence must be shown to establish foreseeability.”17 In fact, evidence of prior crimes is not necessary to establish foreseeability. That said, if such evidence is presented, it may be more probative of foreseeability if the prior crimes “(1) happened closer in proximity to the subject premises, (2) happened closer in time to the criminal conduct at issue, (3) happened more frequently, and (4) were more similar to the act that is the subject of the litigation[.]”18 Here, the Mortons presented testimony from Dr. Stephanie Dallam, a nationally recognized expert on child sexual abuse and the proper industry standards and safeguards within childcare facilities for the prevention of such abuse. She reviewed Eagle Ranch’s training policies and found them wanting. More precisely, Dallam explained that residential childcare environments housing children with behavioral challenges are at a high-risk for peer-on-peer sexual abuse, especially when children of different ages interact. Even so, she noted that Eagle Ranch failed to implement 17 Carmichael, 316 Ga. at 728(II)(C). Accord St. Francis Health, 369 Ga. App. at 317. 18 Carmichael, 316 Ga. at 728(II)(C) (punctuation omitted). Accord St. Francis Health, 369 Ga. App. at 317. 13 adequate safeguards, particularly with its training of House Parents and the babysitters it hired. Given these circumstances, Dallum opined that sexual abuse of a younger child by an older child was foreseeable.19 Additionally, and despite the limitations placed on the scope of their discovery requests, the Mortons presented evidence that—in the three-year period before the incident involving T. M. II and J. R.—other instances of child-on-child sexual abuse involving Ranch Kids occurred at Eagle Ranch. Indeed, one such incident allegedly occurred in the home where J. R. resided; but despite its awareness of these incidents, Eagle Ranch did not change its policies regarding training or supervision. Moreover, the Mortons presented evidence that J. R. bullied other children, including previous incidents involving T. M. II, and that Eagle Ranch was aware of this behavior and took no formal action in response to it. Yet, in finding that the incident between J. R. and T. M. II was not foreseeable as a matter of law, the trial court discounted evidence that Eagle Ranch failed to implement adequate safeguards for a childcare facility, as well as evidence of other 19 See Brookview Holdings v. Suarez, 285 Ga. App. 90, 96(2) (645 SE2d 559) (2007) (noting that even though summary judgment may not be granted to a plaintiff based solely upon opinion evidence, opinion evidence presented by the respondent to a motion is sufficient to create a jury issue). 14 instances of child-on-child sexual abuse. In doing so, the court found that such evidence only applied to Eagle Ranch’s duty to Ranch Kids and was too dissimilar to apply to Staff Kids. The court also discounted evidence of J. R.’s past bullying, finding it distinguishable from the incident involving T. M. II. But in Carmichael—controlling precedent not mentioned in the order below—our Supreme Court strongly cautioned courts against being “too rigid” and “too quick to exclude, as [a] matter of law, past crimes as relevant to the foreseeability analysis based on certain differences from the criminal act at issue ... without considering whether crimes that were not identical might still put the proprietor on notice of a hazardous condition.”20 This admonition is especially relevant here. Indeed, we find Eagle Ranch and the trial court’s distinction between Ranch Kids and Staff Kids unpersuasive. As discussed above, Eagle Ranch encourages House Parents to have their children reside with them on campus; and far from being segregated, the Staff Kids and Ranch Kids live together, worship together, and play together. So, to say that peer-on-peer sexual abuse solely between Ranch Kids should have no bearing on the foreseeability of such abuse involving any of the children living on campus strains credulity. We are also similarly 20 Carmichael, 316 Ga. at 735(II)(D)(2) (quotation marks omitted). Accord St. Francis Health, 369 Ga. App. at 318. 15 unpersuaded by the court’s distinction between J.R.’s bullying and the incident at issue, as both arguably involved intimidation and coercive behavior. Given the totality of these circumstances, a jury could conclude that the incident involving J. R. and T. M. II was foreseeable, and the court erred in ruling otherwise.21 (b) Negligent screening. The Mortons next argue the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on their claim that Eagle Ranch’s negligence in failing to screen Staff Kids and implement policies to safeguard against sexual abuse resulted in the incident between J. R. and T. M. II. In granting summary judgment as to this claim, the court ruled that no genuine issue of material fact remained because none of the evidence of prior instances of abuse involved Staff Kids. In essence, the court, again, determined that the harm to T. M. II was not foreseeable as a matter law. But given our 21 See Carmichael, 316 Ga. at 732–33(II)(D)(1) (holding that facts that two armed robberies were committed in store (rather than in the parking lot), were committed against employees (rather than customers), and did not involve the discharge of a weapon did not show, as a matter of law, that they were so dissimilar as to make them improper for consideration when determining whether third-party criminal conduct was reasonably foreseeable by store in action brought by patron who was shot in store’s parking lot); St. Francis Health, 369 Ga. App. at 317–18 (reversing grant of summary judgment on ground that evidence of five other complaints made to defendant of sexual misconduct that occurred inside the hospital within a few years of plaintiff’s alleged rape were similar enough to create jury issue on foreseeability). 16 holding in Division 1(a), that the court erred in this regard, it similarly erred in granting summary judgment on this claim.22 (c) Negligent training. The Mortons also argue the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to their claim that inadequate training of staff and the babysitters resulted in T. M. II being subjected to sexual abuse. We agree that genuine issues of material fact remain in this regard. Under Georgia law, to establish a negligent-training claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “inadequate training caused a reasonably foreseeable injury.”23 And here, as discussed above, the Mortons’ expert (Dr. Dallam) raised a genuine issue of material fact as to this claim with her testimony that Eagle Ranch’s training policies for its House Parents and approved babysitters were inadequate to safeguard against potential peer-on-peer sexual abuse. The trial court’s order grounds its grant of summary judgment on this claim based on its previous determination that J. R.’s abuse of T. M. II was not foreseeable and that any training—even if inadequate—was only 22 See supra note 21 & accompanying text. 23 Advanced Disposal Svcs. Atlanta, LLC v. Marczak, 359 Ga. App. 316, 319(2) (857 SE2d 494) (2021). Accord Friendship Enter., Inc. v. Hasty, 368 Ga. App. 7, 11(5) (889 SE2d 137) (2023). 17 relevant as to Ranch Kids. But again, we rejected this reasoning in Division 1(a), and we do so again here.24 (d) Negligent supervision. The Mortons also contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on their claim that Eagle Ranch failed to exercise ordinary care in the supervision of T. M. II. Again, we agree. Generally, a person who undertakes the control and supervision of a child—even without compensation—has “the duty to use reasonable care to protect the child from injury.”25 But such a person is “not an insurer of the safety of the child.”26 Instead, he or she is required only to “use reasonable care commensurate with the reasonably foreseeable risk of harm.”27 Here, the trial court granted summary judgment to Eagle Ranch on this claim based on its determination that the babysitters watching T. M. II and J. R. on the day 24 See supra note 21 & accompanying text. 25 Herron v. Hollis, 248 Ga. App. 194, 195(1) (546 SE2d 17) (2001) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Wallace v. Boys Club of Albany, 211 Ga. App. 534, 535(1) (439 SE2d 746) (1993). 26 Herron, 248 Ga. App. at 195(1) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Wallace, 211 Ga. App. at 535(1). 27 Herron, 248 Ga. App. at 195–96(1) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Wallace, 211 Ga. App. at 535(1). 18 of the incident exercised reasonable care as a matter of law. But the Mortons’ expert (Dr. Dallam) testified that Eagle Ranch did not adequately train the babysitters and also opined that they should not have allowed the boys to venture into an area that was not only out of their line of sight but also—as importantly—was far enough away that they would be unable to hear voices for sounds of fear, anger, or distress. Given these circumstances, there was at least enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether T. M. II was negligently supervised.28 Alternatively, the trial court ruled that Eagle Ranch could not be held liable for any negligence by the babysitters because they were independent contractors rather than employees of Eagle Ranch as a matter of law. We disagree. The statutory test as to whether someone is an independent contractor for liability purposes is delineated in OCGA § 51-2-5(5), which provides that an employer 28 See Bull St. Church of Christ v. Jensen, 233 Ga. App. 96, 99–100(1) (504 SE2d 1) (1998) (holding that trial court properly denied defendant church’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, when evidence that church had duty to supervise four-year-old child attending class on premises but allowed child to roam free in church, resulting in child being sexually assaulted by another child); Wallace, 211 Ga. App. at 536–37(2) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim when evidence showed defendant allowed young child to wander off premises resulting in child being sexually assaulted and that such harm was reasonably foreseeable). 19 is liable for the negligence of a contractor “[i]f the employer retains the right to direct or control the time and manner of executing the work or interferes and assumes control so as to create the relation of master and servant ... .” In this respect, the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained that [t]he test to be applied in determining whether the relationship of the parties under a contract for the performance of labor is that of employer and servant, or employer and independent contractor, lies in whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, manner and method of executing the work, as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in conformity to the contract.29 Significantly, whether the relationship is “one of employer/employee or employer/independent contractor is generally a question of fact to be decided by a jury.”30 29 Golosh v. Cherokee Cab Co., 226 Ga. 636, 637 (176 SE2d 925) (1970) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Atkins v. MRP Park Lake, L.P., 301 Ga. App. 275, 279(1)(b) (687 SE2d 215) (2009). See RBF Holding Co. v. Williamson, 260 Ga. 526 (397 SE2d 440) (1990) (“The right to control the time of doing the job means the right to control the hours of work.”). 30 Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. LogistiCare Solutions, LLC, 374 Ga. App. 208, 213(1) (912 SE2d 91) (2025) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Webster v. Campbell, 375 Ga. App. 715(1) (917 SE2d 381) (2025). 20 Here, the Mortons presented evidence that on the day of the incident, Eagle Ranch selected and scheduled the two babysitters to watch the Mortons’ children and two other children, including J. R., during the mandatory staff meeting and designated the general area where they would work. The babysitters did not set their own schedule or contract directly with the parents that day, but relied on Eagle Ranch to assign them their work. They also had no written independent contractor agreement or other indicator that they were operating an independent business. In addition, they were paid directly by Eagle Ranch at an hourly rate and submitted time sheets requiring them to sign in a space labeled “Employee Signature.” Eagle Ranch also retained the right to discharge the babysitters’ employment at will. Given these circumstances, there is—at the very least—a jury question as to whether the babysitters were employees of Eagle Ranch, and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.31 31 See Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool, 374 Ga. App. at 213–15(1) (reversing trial court’s grant of summary judgment to transportation broker on question of whether transportation provider was an independent contract despite contract designating provider as such in light of evidence broker had the right to control the time, manner, and method of the performance of provider’s work); Atkins, 301 Ga. App. at 279–81(1)(b) (reversing summary judgment based on evidence that when one is employed generally to perform certain services for another, and there is no specific contract to do work according to specifications for a stipulated sum, it is inferable that the employer has retained the right to control the manner, method and means of the performance of the contract, and the employee is not an independent contractor); 21 (e) Premises liability. The Mortons also contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on their premises-liability claim. Yet again, we agree. In its order, the trial court determined that the premises liability claim failed as a matter of law given its earlier determination that the incident between T. M. II and J. R. was not reasonably foreseeable. But again, given our holding in Division 1(a), the court erred in this regard.32 (f) Negligence per se. In their enumeration of error concerning the grant of summary judgment as to all of their negligence claims, the Mortons include the trial court’s ruling on their negligence per se claim. But while their brief mentions statutory mandatory reporting requirements pertaining to child sexual abuse within the context Davis v. Beasley Timber Co., Inc., 241 Ga. App. 706, 708(1) (527 SE2d 221) (1999) (explaining that although there was evidence to support the conclusion that driver was an independent contractor, i.e., method of payment and ability to make personal stops, there was also evidence to support the conclusion that employer maintained sufficient control over the driver such that he was an employee, i.e., instructions regarding company policies and direction regarding timing and destination of hauls, and thus, summary judgment was improper). 32 See supra note 21 & accompanying text. In its appellate brief, Eagle Ranch argues that T. M. II was a licensee, and so it owed him a lower standard of care than it would to an invitee. See OCGA § 51-3-2(b) (“The owner of the premises is liable to a licensee only for willful or wanton injury.”). But the trial court reserved ruling on this issue, and therefore, we will not address it. 22 of training Eagle Ranch staff and babysitters, they do not directly address the court’s order as to the negligence-per-se claim. More precisely, they fail to address the court’s conclusion that the reporting requirements do not create a private right of action against those who fail to abide by them.33 As a result, the Mortons have abandoned this claim of error.34 (g) Punitive damages and attorney fees. The Mortons also maintain the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to their claims for punitive damages and attorney fees. The court dismissed these claims solely because of its grant of summary 33 See Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App. 282, 286–87(2)(a) (643 SE2d 814) (2007) (explaining that OCGA § 19-7-5 does not create a private civil cause of action against those professionals who violate the reporting requirement; rather, those who violate the requirement are subject only to criminal liability). 34 See Jones v. Ga. Ports Auth., Case No. A26A1190, 2026 WL 2873295, at *2 (Ga. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2026) (holding that “an appellant must support enumerations of error with argument and citation of authority, and mere conclusory statements are not the type of meaningful argument contemplated by our rules” and result in the abandonment of those claims of error because “they are unsupported by relevant authority and meaningful argument,” and “this matters because an appellant who abandons his claims of error cannot satisfy his burden of showing that the trial court erred.”) (citation modified); Morton v. Macatee, 345 Ga. App. 753, 757(1)(a) (815 SE2d 117) (2018) (deeming a claim of error abandoned when the appellant failed to provide sufficient citation to legal authority). We add that even if this argument had not been abandoned, we are skeptical that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to this claim. See supra note 33 & accompanying text. 23 judgment on the Mortons’ substantive claims of negligence, as they are derivative of those claims. But given that we reversed the court’s ruling as to the majority of those claims, we also reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the Mortons’ claims for punitive damages and attorney fees.35 2. The Mortons also argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Eagle Ranch as to their breach-of-contract claim. More precisely, they contend that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Eagle Ranch’s email outlining the terms of the severance proposal amounted to an offer that they accepted. We disagree. A party asserting the existence of a contract, of course, has “the burden of proving its existence and its terms.”36 And to constitute a valid agreement, there must be “parties able to contract, a consideration moving to the contract, the assent of the 35 See Cleveland v. Team RTR2, LLC, 359 Ga. App. 104, 110(3) (854 SE2d 756) (2021) (holding that derivative claims for punitive damages and attorney fees also survive summary judgment given the reversal of summary judgment as to underlying tort claims); Stephen A. Wheat Trust v. Sparks, 325 Ga. App. 673, 682(7) (754 SE2d 640) (2014) (same). 36 Toll Bros., Inc. v. Larkabit P’ship, L. P., 375 Ga. App. 567, 571(1) (916 SE2d 785) (2025) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Barnes v. Martin-Price, 353 Ga. App. 621, 624(1) (838 SE2d 916) (2020). 24 parties to the terms of the contract, and a subject matter upon which the contract can operate.”37 Relevant here, Georgia contract law requires “a meeting of the minds of the parties, and mutuality, and in order for the contract to be valid[,] the agreement must ordinarily be expressed plainly and explicitly enough to show what the parties agreed upon.”38 So, in determining whether the parties mutually assented to all essential terms, the “circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, such as correspondence and discussions, are relevant in deciding if there was a mutual assent to an agreement.”39 And in deciding whether there was mutual assent, Georgia courts 37 Hunter v. Lowndes County Health Servs., LLC, 355 Ga. App. 367, 369(1) (844 SE2d 261) (2020) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Hunt v. Thomas, 296 Ga. App. 505, 509(2) (675 SE2d 256) (2009). 38 Bedsole v. Action Outdoor Advert. JV, LLC, 325 Ga. App. 194, 198(1) (750 SE2d 445) (2013) (quotation marks omitted). See Sidhom v. Boutros, 358 Ga. App. 432, 434–35 (855 SE2d 426) (2021) (“A valid contract requires mutual assent, and if such assent is lacking, the contract is not enforceable.”). 39 Bedsole, 325 Ga. App. at 198(1) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Frickey v. Jones, 280 Ga. 573, 575 (630 SE2d 374) (2006). See Sidhom, 358 Ga. App. at 435 (explaining that “[i]n determining if parties had the mutual assent or meeting of the minds necessary to reach agreement, courts apply an objective theory of intent whereby one party’s intention is deemed to be that meaning a reasonable [person] in the position of the other contracting party would ascribe to