Turner v. Sims CA1/2

Filed 10/26/26 Turner v. Sims CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO STEPHEN TURNER, Plaintiff and Appellant, A172219 v. GREGORY SIMS, (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG11574935) Defendant and Respondent. Former California parolee Stephen Turner brought a claim under the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Bane Act; Civ. Code, § 52.1) against parole agent supervisor Gregory Sims, alleging Sims “made a criminal threat against [Turner] stating that ‘bad things are going to happen to you’ unless [Turner] immediately dismissed his lawsuits against” Sims and other parole department employees. Following a jury special verdict, judgment was entered in favor of Sims. On appeal, Turner contends our decision in a prior appeal in this case had the effect of reducing his burden of proof under the “law of the case” doctrine and consequently the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the elements of a Bane Act claim. He also raises another claim of instructional error and argues the trial court abused its discretion in making various evidentiary rulings. We affirm. 1  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Background In 1984, Turner was convicted of misdemeanor indecent exposure. The arrest report indicated he exposed himself to two girls who were around 10 and 12 years old. In 1993, Turner was again convicted of misdemeanor indecent exposure. In 2006, Turner was convicted of grand theft and unauthorized practice of medicine, and he was sentenced to seven years, eight months in prison. He was incarcerated from February 2006 until January 2010, and he was on parole from January 2010 to January 2014. When he was released on parole, Turner was required to register as a sex offender as a special condition of parole because of his prior convictions for indecent exposure. He was assigned to a GPS parole unit and wore an ankle monitor while on parole. Turner was considered a high-risk sex offender,1 and he was subject to additional special conditions of parole.2 1 Turner’s parole agent explained that for parolees designated high-risk offenders, agents “have to see them more often [than other parolees] to monitor their behavior.” 2 Turner’s special parole conditions based on his sex offender status included requirements that he not live within 2,000 feet of any public or private school and park where children regularly gathered; submit to electronic monitoring; not view pornography; register as a sex offender; not have contact with minors without prior approval; not be within 100 yards of the perimeter of places where children congregated without prior approval; inform his agent about any contact with a minor; not socialize or be romantically involved with anyone with custody of a minor without prior written approval from his parole agent; and not leave Alameda County without his parole agent’s approval. These were in addition to his general parole conditions, which included requirements that he report to his parole agent following his release from prison; obey his agent’s instructions; and not 2  Parole agent Smith was Turner’s parole agent from January 2010 to September 2012. Defendant Sims was Smith’s supervisor. Turner violated parole about eight times under Smith’s supervision.3 In May 2011, Turner initiated the current lawsuit. He sued several parole department employees, including Sims, seeking damages of $30,000,000 for “illegal parole conditions.” Also in 2011, Turner sued the same defendants in federal district court complaining about the same alleged conduct. Turner claimed (among other things) that, in December 2011, parole officers “threatened that ‘bad things’ would happen if he did not drop pending lawsuits or refrain from filing new ones.” (Turner v. Smith (N.D.Cal. 2017, No. 11-CV-5176 CRB) 2017 WL 897333 [nonpub. opn.] (Turner I), affd. (9th Cir. 2018) 734 Fed.Appx. 460.) In the federal case, the district court in 2017 granted summary judgment against Turner as to all his federal claims and found it lacked supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. The district court rejected Turner’s assertion that Sim’s alleged threat about “ ‘bad things’ ” constituted “a stand-alone First Amendment claim that survives summary judgment.” The district court explained that, since there was no showing of “actual chilling effect on his speech,” Turner would have to show that Sims intended to interfere with his First Amendment rights and that Sims’s conduct caused Turner to suffer “an actual [legal] injury.” The court travel more than 50 miles from his residence without his agent’s prior approval. 3 The violations included socializing with a person who had custody of a minor; having possession of pornographic material; pimping and pandering, unauthorized practice of law and failure to follow the rules; being within 100 yards of where children congregate; and tampering with his GPS device by removing it. 3 concluded that the defendants in the federal case, including Sims, were entitled to summary judgment because Turner failed to “offer enough admissible evidence for a reasonable jury to find that he suffered an injury as a result of” Sims’s alleged threat. Our Prior Appellate Decision in this Case In the current lawsuit, Turner filed the operative fifth amended complaint in August 2020. Defendants (Sims, Smith, and other parole department employees) moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion on the ground Turner’s claims were barred by Government Code section 845.8, subdivision (a). On appeal, we agreed with the trial court that all of Turner’s claims other than those under the Bane Act were barred by statutory immunity. We also agreed with defendants that Turner’s cause of action under the Bane Act that was premised on allegations defendants falsely arrested him on December 12, 2011 (allegedly in retaliation for reporting Sims’s threats about “bad things” and for refusing to dismiss his lawsuits) was barred by the district court’s findings in the federal action under the doctrine of issue preclusion.4 Turner alleged a separate cause of action under the Bane Act based on his allegation that, on December 7, 2011, Sims threatened “bad things” would happen unless Turner dismissed his lawsuits. As to this claim, we determined defendants did not establish either that statutory immunity or issue preclusion barred the claim or that there was no triable issue as to any material fact concerning the claim. We reversed the judgment and observed, “[T]o prove his threat cause of action under the Bane Act, Turner will have to 4 In Turner I, Judge Breyer held, as to the December 2011 arrest, “ ‘no reasonable juror could find from the undisputed facts that Defendants acted in retaliation for [Turner]’s First Amendment activities.’ ” 4 prove that by threat, intimidation or coercion, Sims attempted to interfere with Turner’s right to pursue his lawsuits. (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subds. (b) & (c).)” (Turner v. Smith (Apr. 26, 2023, A164194) 2023 WL 3088193 [nonpub. opn.] (Turner III).) Jury Trial and Verdict on the Remaining Bane Act Claim A jury trial on Turner’s single Bane Act claim began in October 2024. Evidence showed the following. On December 6, 2011, the managers of the motel where Turner was staying told his parole agent, Smith, that they were afraid of Turner because he had sued them for over $500,000 over a $10 fee they had charged him. Smith explained to the motel managers that she could not “kick [Turner] out” of the motel because filing a lawsuit wasn’t a violation of parole. The next day, the motel managers met with Smith and her supervisor, Sims, and again talked “about kicking Turner out of [the motel].” Later the same day, December 7, Turner went to the parole office to meet with Smith for a drug test. Before Turner met with Smith, Sims spoke to Turner in the lobby. According to Turner, Sims was “very angry” and yelling; he “said, Turner you’re really pissing me off. . . . You’re suing motels. You’re suing us. Those are frivolous lawsuits; do you understand?” Turner testified that Sims “blurted out, Turner if you don’t drop your lawsuits bad things are going to happen to you,” and Turner “knew right away that [he] . . . received a serious threat.” Turner then met with Agent Smith and submitted a urine specimen for drug testing. As he left the building, Turner saw Sims again. Turner testified that Sims approached him and said, “Everything crosses my desk. I get things from the DA that you don’t know. Just listen to me, things are going to be very unpleasant. Don’t burn your bridges.” Turner took Sims’s 5 statements to be a threat of violence and “was afraid for [his] safety and [his] life.” Sims denied threatening Turner and specifically denied that he said “bad things would happen” if Turner pursued lawsuits against parole department employees. Sims explained there were only two hotels or motels in Alameda County that would accept the probation department’s payments to house sex offenders. According to Sims, he spoke to Turner about Turner’s lawsuit against the motel because he had just had a meeting with the motel managers. Sims testified, “I was trying to prevent Mr. Turner from being transient in the community. . . . [W]hen I found out that . . . he was doing some litigation against the hotel, I wanted to kind of talk to him and see if there is a better way we can handle this. Because I wanted to try to prevent him from being transient.”5 Sims remembered telling Turner that he “did not think it was a good idea to go forward with lawsuits against this particular motel” and that it was “only going to make it more difficult for [Turner] to find a place to stay.” Sims was not aware that Turner had sued him, Smith, and the probation department at that time.6 On October 24, 2024, the jury began deliberation at 11:21 a.m. and reached a verdict at 1:00 p.m. The first question on the special verdict form was, “Did Gregory Sims make a threat of violence against Stephen Turner?” The jury answered, “No.” Since the first answer was no, the jury was instructed to stop and notify the clerk it reached its verdict. 5 Turner himself testified there were periods when he was homeless while he was on parole. 6 Sims testified he became aware of a lawsuit in 2012 when Smith told him she had been served with a lawsuit. At that time, Smith raised the issue that Turner would have to be transferred to another parole agent to avoid a conflict of interest. 6  Judgment was entered for Sims, and Turner timely appealed. DISCUSSION A. Claims of Instructional Error Turner claims our prior appellate decision in this case had the effect of deleting some of the language of the Bane Act in this case and therefore the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the Bane Act. He also argues the trial court erred in not giving his proposed jury instruction. These claims lack merit. 1. The Bane Act and the Jury Instruction Given “The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation or coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.” (Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 883.) Civil Code7 section 52.1, subdivision (b), describes a claim under the Bane Act,8 and subdivision (c), creates a private right of action.9 7 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code. 8 It provides in relevant part: “If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city attorney may bring a civil action . . . .” (§ 52.1, subd. (b).) 9 “Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as described in subdivision (b), may institute and 7  Section 52.1, subdivision (k), specifies that “[s]peech alone is not sufficient to support an action brought pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c), except upon a showing that the speech itself threatens violence against a specific person or group of persons; and the person or group of persons against whom the threat is directed reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be committed against them or their property and that the person threatening violence had the apparent ability to carry out the threat.” Thus, to prevail on a claim under the Bane Act, a “plaintiff must show ‘the defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with the plaintiff's legal right by threatening or committing violent acts.’ [Citations.] Speech is insufficient to establish the requisite threat unless it includes threat of violence.” (Julian v. Mission Community Hospital (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 395, italics added.) The trial court in this case instructed the jury with Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI) No. 3066 on the “Bane Act— Essential Factual Elements (Civ. Code, § 52.1).” In accordance with section 52.1, subdivision (k), the court also gave the jury the following instruction: “Bane Act – Speech Alone – The Threat Must Be of Violence [¶] Speech alone is insufficient to support a Bane Act violation except upon a showing that the speech itself threatens violence against a specific person, the person against whom the speech is directed reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be committed against them or their property, and that the person threatening violence has the apparent ability to carry out the threat.” prosecute in their own name and on their own behalf a civil action for damages . . . and other appropriate equitable relief . . . .” (§ 52.1, subd. (c).) 8  2. Our Prior Appellate Decision Did Not Change the Statutory Elements of a Bane Act Claim Based on Speech Alone As we have mentioned, in a prior appeal in this case, we reversed the grant of summary judgment on Turner’s claim arising from Sims’s alleged “bad things” threat. Even though the federal district court found that Turner failed to offer enough admissible evidence for a reasonable jury to find that he suffered a legal injury as required to prove a federal constitutional tort, we held this did “not bar Turner’s Bane Act cause of action against Sims, because defendants have failed to show that the Bane Act requires that Turner prove that Sims’s threat caused injury.” We concluded our discussion on why the district court’s decision did not bar Turner’s Bane Act claim by noting, “To sum up then, to prove his threat cause of action under the Bane Act, Turner will have to prove that by threat, intimidation or coercion, Sims attempted to interfere with Turner’s right to pursue his lawsuits. (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subds. (b) & (c).)” Because we cited subdivisions (b) and (c) of Civil Code section 52.1, Turner now claims those subdivisions alone “governed [his] Bane Act claim” under the law of the case doctrine, so he was not required to prove Sims’s words to Turner “threatened violence” as required under subdivision (k) for conduct that involves speech alone. Turner argues, “That the Appellate Court was silent as to the relevance or applicability of the Bane Act’s other subsections, including subsection (k), renders them considered and rejected.” Turner is mistaken.10 “Under the law of the case doctrine, when an appellate court ‘ “states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle 10 We review de novo whether our prior decision established law of the case as Turner claims. (Leider v. Lewis (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1121, 1127.) 9 or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout [the case’s] subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal. . . .” ’ ” (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 246.) “In order for the doctrine to apply,” however, “ ‘ “the point of law involved must have been necessary to the prior decision [and] the matter must have been actually presented and determined by the court.” ’ ” (Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union High School Dist. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 47, 62, italics added.) Here, the question whether Turner was excused from complying with section 52.1, subdivision (k), in proving his Bane Act claim based on Sims’s speech alone was not an issue actually presented and determined by the court in Turner III. Turner did not argue in his prior appeal that he should not have to show Sims’s alleged “bad things” statement “itself threaten[ed] violence against a specific person or group of persons,” as required by section 52.1, subdivision (k), and we certainly did not decide in our prior decision that Turner—unlike any other plaintiff bringing a claim under the Bane Act—would not need to meet all the applicable provisions of the statute on remand. We therefore reject Turner’s argument that our prior appellate decision had the effect of deleting a provision of the Bane Act for purposes of his claim against Sims. It follows that Turner’s claim of instructional and special verdict form error fails because it is based on the faulty premise that section 52.1, subdivision (k), does not apply to his Bane Act claim against Sims. 3. The Instruction on Speech Alone Requiring Threat of Violence Turner proposed a jury instruction on speech alone as follows: “The Bane Act expressly provides that ‘[s]peech alone is not sufficient to support an action brought pursuant to [§ 52.1] except upon a showing that the speech itself threatens violence [¶] - Plaintiff seeks to add: ‘or is a nonviolent threat 10 with severe consequences.’ ” The trial court did not accept Turner’s proposed addition phrase. Instead, the jury was instructed on the “Bane Act – Speech Alone – The Threat Must Be of Violence” as quoted above. On appeal, Turner argues the trial court erred in rejecting his proposed additional language on nonviolent threats. He asserts the CACI use notes provide for such a modification, but the current “Directions for Use” for CACI No. 3066 on the Bane Act do not support his claim.11 To the contrary, the directions state, “The Bane Act provides that speech alone is not sufficient to constitute a violation unless it involves a credible threat of violence. (Civ. Code, § 52.1(k).) This limitation would appear to foreclose a claim based on threats, intimidation, or coercion involving a nonviolent consequence.” (Italics added.) In this case, the issues at trial were whether Sims said what Turner testified he said on December 7, 2011, and, if so, whether that speech “itself threaten[ed] violence against a specific person or group of persons; and the person or group of persons against whom the threat [wa]s directed reasonably fear[ed] that, because of the speech, violence w[ould] be committed against them or their property and that the person threatening violence had the apparent ability to carry out the threat” as required by section 52.1, subdivision (k), for Bane Act claims involving speech alone. We see no basis in the law to support Turner’s proposed instruction that speech alone may violate the Bane Act even if that speech does not itself threaten violence. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court declining to give the proposed instruction. 11 Turner cites the “2025 edition” of CACI. The version of CACI approved at the Judicial Council December 2025 meeting does not contain such language, however. 11 B. Claims of Evidentiary Error Turner contends the trial court abused its discretion in (1) admitting evidence of his prior bad acts, sex offender status, and special parole conditions, (2) excluding his proposed expert witnesses, and (3) excluding other defense evidence. We find no abuse of discretion. 1. Admission of Evidence of Turner’s Special Conditions of Parole and Prior Bad Acts In motions in limine, Turner sought to exclude any reference to his special parole conditions, including that he was required to register as a sex offender, and to exclude any mention of his prior bad acts, including his arrests while on parole and his prior convictions. He argued the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the probability its admission would create undue prejudice, confuse the issues, and necessitate undue consumption of time. The trial court denied these motions in limine. It found Turner’s felony convictions from 2005 were admissible for impeachment under Evidence Code section 78812 and his repeated violations of the terms of his parole between January 2010 and December 2011 were relevant. The court noted that the sex offense convictions (indecent exposure in 1984 and 1993) “form the basis of Turner’s special parole conditions” and ruled “Sims is not foreclosed from referring [to] the sex offense convictions as foundations for those conditions.” As to the admissibility of Turner’s sex offender status and related special parole conditions, the court explained: “It is clear from the record presented that Turner’s sex offender status and attendant special parole conditions are highly relevant to the salient issues to be presented to the jury. As a threshold matter, it bears noting that the FAC specifically alleges 12 Turner does not challenge the trial court’s ruling in this regard. 12 Sims stated that ‘bad things are going to happen to [Turner]’ if he did not ‘stop protesting and litigating his parole conditions.’ (FAC ¶ 20, emphasis added.) Thus, Turner himself opened the door to discussing his parole conditions by virtue of the allegations in his pleadings. “The above notwithstanding, Turner’s sex offender status and his special parole conditions directly bear upon what transpired at the December 7 meeting. Because he is a registered sex offender, Turner was restricted in terms of where he could reside. Although Turner was able to find housing at some hotels in Alameda County, Turner kept filing lawsuits against the hotels, resulting in his eviction. According to Sims, the December 7 meeting was focused on his ongoing concerns about Turner’s problematic housing situation. Information regarding Turner’s status and special conditions are thus appropriate to provide the trier of fact with a more complete understanding of what is alleged to have transpired and the events leading to their conversation. To exclude evidence of or reference to Turner’s special parole conditions and sex offender status would result in a skewed and inchoate presentation of the parties’ respective positions on what actually transpired.” The court concluded that “[a]ny potential prejudice from the admission of evidence or reference to Turner sex offender status and attendant special parole conditions can be ameliorated by an appropriate limiting instruction, if requested.” On appeal, Turner argues the evidence of his prior sex convictions, sex offender status, special probation conditions, and his numerous parole violations was not relevant. But “[t]he trial court has broad discretion to determine the relevance of evidence [citation], and we will not disturb the court’s exercise of that discretion unless it acted in an arbitrary, capricious or 13 patently absurd manner.” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 947.) We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s relevance determination. As the court explained, the challenged evidence was relevant to provide context for the interaction between Sims and Turner on December 7, 2011. Turner’s sex offender status and related special probation conditions were relevant to show how limited his housing options were and why Sims would be concerned about Turner risking being evicted from one of the two motels in Alameda County that would accept the probation department’s payments to house sex offenders.13 In a similar vein, Turner’s many parole violations were relevant because, as Sims argued below, they “demonstrate[d] Turner’s inability to comply with his [parole] conditions, and his need for Sims and Smith to provide him additional oversight and counseling.” The trial court “ ‘ “enjoys broad discretion” ’ in determining the admissibility of evidence under Evidence Code section 352.”14 (People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 687.) Turner fails to show the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence under Evidence Code section 352. 13 Evidence that the prior sex convictions were for indecent exposure involving young victims, in turn, was relevant to show the reasons for some of the special probation conditions. Further, admission of evidence that Turner was convicted of misdemeanor indecent exposure was not prejudicial given that the jury would have learned that he was a registered sex offender in any event. 14 Under Evidence Code section 352, the trial “court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” 14  2. Exclusion of Proposed Defense Experts Turner designated two witnesses as experts in police procedures. One of the proposed expert witnesses was expected to testify “that Sims should have been investigated and terminated for telling Turner ‘bad things’ would happen; that his conduct was egregious; that Sims should have reassigned himself after he made his comments”; the proposed witness would further testify “regarding best practices for parole agents, supervisors, maintenance of professionalism, creating a working relationship with parolees, etc.” The other proposed expert would “testify regarding best supervisory practices and regarding internal affairs investigations in general.” Sims moved to exclude these witnesses, arguing the “standard of care is not at issue” and the proposed expert testimony was not relevant to whether Sims violated the Bane Act by allegedly telling Turner “bad things” would happen. The trial court granted the motion, finding the proposed expert testimony was “neither necessary nor helpful” and was likely to result in the undue consumption of time and confuse the issues. Turner argues this was an abuse of discretion.15 However, we agree with the trial court that the proposed expert testimony was not relevant to the disputed issues at trial. An expert witness may offer an opinion “[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion . . . would assist the trier of fact” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a)), but a discussion of best practices for parole agents would not help the jury decide 15 “The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit or exclude expert testimony [citation], and its decision as to whether expert testimony meets the standard for admissibility is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 426.) “ ‘[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” (Id. at p. 430.) 15 whether Sims made a threat of violence against Turner. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in excluding Turner’s proposed expert witnesses. 3. Exclusion of Other Defense Evidence Finally, Turner claims error in three evidentiary rulings at trial. We find no abuse of discretion. First, the trial court did not permit Turner to testify about what a different parole agent said to him in August 2011. Turner was permitted to testify about filing a lawsuit against a motel in August 2011.16 The jury heard that, the day after Turner filed the complaint against the motel, “a swarm of parole agents” searched his motel room; Turner was handcuffed and placed in a chair in the hallway, which was “extremely embarrassing.” Turner then began to testify about what a parole agent (not Sims or Smith) told him during the August 2011 search, and the trial court sustained a defense objection on relevance grounds. On appeal, Turner argues this evidence would have been relevant to show (1) what parole agents knew about his lawsuits against the parole department and its employees and (2) “that [Turner] was reasonably in fear when [Sims] told him to stop suing motels, that his lawsuits would in fact continue to result in punitive retribution to him by the agents of the parole department.” But Turner fails to show the trial court abused its discretion in finding the evidence irrelevant. What another agent allegedly told Turner in August 2011 is not probative of what Sims knew about Turner’s lawsuits against him in December 2011; nor would Turner’s testimony about another agent tend to 16 This was a different motel from the one he sued in October 2011 for “alleged fraudulent billing practices.” 16 show that Sims made the statements Turner claims he did or that, if he did, the statements constituted a threat of violence. Second, when Turner’s counsel asked him whether he was arrested on December 12, 2011, the trial court sustained a defense objection under Evidence Code section 352, stating the December 12 arrest was “not an issue in this case.” The court explained that in the federal lawsuit, Judge Breyer “found there was no retaliation in regard to the arrest. So that claim is gone. And I believe that allowing the plaintiff to explore the arrest would be unduly prejudicial and substantially outweighing any probative value, because it creates the danger that the jury will believe mistakenly that the arrest is somehow is relevant to this case or plaintiff’s request for damages.” On appeal, Turner argues evidence of his arrest on December 12, 2011, was relevant “to show that [Turner] was scared enough from [Sim]’s threats, to resist and be hospitalized because he thought the parole department was arresting him” (although it was not the parole department that arrested him that day). This is unpersuasive as an argument for relevance and does not show the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352. We agree with the trial court that evidence of Turner’s December 2011 arrest risked confusing the issues and misleading the jury. Third, after Turner testified he filed a federal lawsuit against the parole department and Sims in October 2011 and the U.S. Marshall Service served the complaint by mail, his counsel offered two documents that appeared to show proof of service of his original complaint and an amended complaint. Defense counsel objected to admitting the documents; as to the second document, counsel observed, “This doesn’t say what was served and who it was served on.” The trial court sustained the objection, citing issues of foundation, chain of custody, and lack of relevance. On appeal, Turner fails 17 to show this evidentiary ruling was erroneous, and, in any event, we discern no prejudice since the jury learned from Turner that he had his complaint and amended complaint served by mail and the excluded documents apparently would show no more than that. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. _________________________ Sweet, J.* WE CONCUR: _________________________ Stewart, P. J. _________________________ Richman, J. A172219, Turner v. Sims * Judge of the Marin County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 18