People v. Pollard CA1/3
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA171385
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Pollard CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171385
v.
JERRY POLLARD, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. HC816031)
Defendant and Appellant.
Jerry Pollard appeals from an order of the trial court denying (1) a
motion for relief under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA) (Pen.
Code,1 § 745); (2) a motion for postjudgment discovery under section 1054.9;
and (3) a request for appointment of counsel contained in the prayer for relief
of Pollard’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. We conclude the order is
nonappealable and dismiss the appeal.2 The dismissal is without prejudice to
any new and appropriate motion under sections 745, subdivision (d), and
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Although Pollard requested oral argument in response to the court
clerk’s standard oral argument waiver notice, the right to oral argument
extends only to an appeal that is “ ‘considered on the merits and decided by a
written opinion.’ ” (Moles v. Regents of University of California (1982) 32
Cal.3d 867, 871.) Because we dismiss the appeal without reaching the
merits, there is no right to oral argument, nor is it necessary to our dismissal
of the appeal.
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1473, subdivision (e)(2), that Pollard may file in the trial court in light of
recent legislation. (Assembly Bill No. 1071 (AB 1071) (Reg. Sess. 2025–2026);
Stats. 2025, ch. 721, § 3, eff. January 1, 2026.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Conviction and Prior Appeals
For convenience, we note the underlying facts of Pollard’s conviction
are set forth in detail in Pollard v. White (9th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 1430, 1431–
1432. For our purposes, it suffices to say that in 1986, a jury convicted
Pollard of first-degree murder with an enhancement for personal use of a
firearm, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 32 years to
life in state prison. On appeal, the judgment was reversed due to
instructional error on the element of premeditation. (People v. Pollard (Sept.
6, 1988, A035094) [nonpub. opn.].) However, rehearing was granted, and a
new opinion was issued reducing the conviction to second degree murder.
(People v. Pollard (Dec. 29, 1988, A035094) [nonpub. opn.].)
At the resentencing hearing in June 1989, Pollard submitted a petition
for writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court summarily denied, explaining
that it had no discretion to do anything on remand other than modify
Pollard’s sentence to reflect the applicable term for second degree murder.
When the court asked if there was any legal cause why sentence should not
be imposed, Pollard protested, and the court stated to defense counsel, “If
there is any motion to be made, . . . I am sure you can make it in proper form,
writing to advise the Court as to what’s going on. It does seem this is taking
on somewhat of a circus atmosphere now, and it seems to me we are shucking
and jiving, but I could be wrong.” The court resentenced Pollard to an
aggregate term of 22 years to life in prison. Pollard again appealed, and the
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judgment was affirmed. (People v. Pollard (Jun. 29, 1989, A046686) [nonpub.
opn.].)
B. RJA Filings
Effective January 1, 2021, the Legislature enacted the RJA.
(Stats. 2020, ch. 317; see Assembly Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.).)
In April 2024, Pollard, acting in pro per, filed the following documents
in the trial court: (1) a “Motion for Relief Due to Discrimination” under the
RJA; (2) a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging violations of the RJA;
(3) a motion for discovery under section 1054.9; and (4) a notice of lodging of
exhibits.
In his habeas corpus petition, Pollard alleged that the traffic stop
leading to his arrest in March 1985 was racially motivated; that his trial
counsel exhibited racial animus by refusing Pollard’s request to move to
suppress evidence; that the trial judge and defense counsel were motivated
by racial bias when they refused to allow Pollard to testify at trial; that
Pollard was charged with a more serious crime and received a harsher
sentence than similarly-situated non-Black defendants; that the erroneous
jury instructions given at Pollard’s original trial were the result of racial bias
by the prosecutor and judge; and that the Court of Appeal’s decision to reduce
Pollard’s conviction to second degree murder rather than remand for retrial
reflected racial bias. In the prayer for relief, Pollard requested that the court
appoint counsel to represent him.
The RJA motion incorporated the allegations of the habeas corpus
petition
In his discovery motion, Pollard requested all material evidence in
defense counsel’s trial file; all material to which Pollard would have been
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entitled at the time of trial under section 1054.9; and any physical evidence
to which he would have been entitled under section 1054.9.
C. Trial Court’s Decision
In June 2024, the trial court issued a written order denying Pollard’s
habeas petition for failure to state a prima facie case for relief, finding
Pollard made only conclusory allegations and “present[ed] no evidence that
any of the alleged conduct was motivated by [Pollard’s] race, ethnicity, or
national origin.”
After denying the habeas petition, the trial court turned to the RJA
motion and concluded such a motion is “available only when there are
pending criminal proceedings before the court. [Citation.] The motion is not
an independent remedy; it is ancillary to an on-going proceeding. [Citation.]
Because the judgment became final in 1989 [citation] and the Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus has been denied here, there is nothing pending to
which the motion may attach.” As to the discovery motion, which the court
construed as falling under the RJA, the court similarly concluded that
“[b]ecause there are no on-going criminal proceedings before this Court, a
motion pursuant to Penal Code 745(d) is not the proper procedural method by
which to obtain the documents or the information sought. [¶] The Motion is
therefore DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.”
On July 28, 2024, Pollard filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s
denial of the “Motion for Relief Due to Discrimination and Motion Pursuant
to 1054.9 for Writ of Habeas Corpus Discovery.”
DISCUSSION
Pollard, who is now represented by appellate counsel, contends the trial
court erroneously concluded it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the discovery
motion after denying the concurrently-filed habeas corpus petition, and that
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good cause was shown for the requested discovery. Pollard further contends
the court had a mandatory duty to consider his request for appointed counsel
based on a review of the factual allegations of the habeas corpus petition
before conducting a prima facie review of Pollard’s entitlement to habeas
relief.
The People contend the appeal must be dismissed because it is taken
from a nonappealable order. We agree.
A. Relevant RJA Provisions and Recent Legal Developments
“[T]he RJA added section 745 to the Penal Code (Stats. 2020, ch. 317,
§ 3.5) and amended sections 1473 and 1473.7 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, §§ 4, 5) to
allow defendants whose judgments are final or who are no longer in custody,
respectively, to seek relief for RJA violations.” (In re Pride (2026) 122
Cal.App.5th 997, 1008.) The RJA precludes the state from seeking or
obtaining a criminal conviction or sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or
national origin, and “provides remedies upon proof of a violation for
defendants in ongoing criminal prosecutions, and also for convicted
defendants whose convictions are already final if they are eligible to seek
relief under the application provision of the statute.” (People v. Hodge (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 985, 999 (Hodge).)
Section 745(a) sets forth four categories of conduct that violate the RJA,
which we briefly summarize as follows: (1) bias or animus against
defendants based on their race, ethnicity, or national origin exhibited by the
judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer in the case, an
expert witness, or a juror (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)); (2) use of “racially
discriminatory language” by the above individuals during the trial, in court,
and during the proceedings (§ 745, subd. (a)(2)); (3) disparities in the severity
of charges and convictions based on the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or
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national origin (§ 745, subd. (a)(3)); and (4) sentencing disparities based on
the race, ethnicity, or national origin of the defendant or victim (§ 745,
subds. (a)(4)(A), (B).)
The RJA “informs defendants how to seek relief during various stages
of a criminal proceeding.” (People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 810.)
The available procedural avenues set forth in the statute are as follows: by
“motion” in the trial court “in ongoing criminal prosecutions” (§ 745,
subds. (b), (c)); Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 999); on direct appeal
from a conviction or sentence (§ 745, subd. (b))3; by postjudgment petition for
writ of habeas corpus (§ 1473, subd. (e)); and by motion to vacate the
conviction or sentence (§ 1473.7) if the movant is no longer imprisoned or
restrained.
“In any proceeding alleging a violation of [section 745, subdivision (a)],
a defendant or petitioner may file a motion requesting disclosure to the
defense of all evidence relevant to a potential violation of subdivision (a) in
the possession or control of the state.” (§ 745, subd. (d).) The motion must
“describe the type of records or information the defendant seeks.” (Ibid.)
“Upon a showing of good cause, the court shall order the records to be
released.” (Ibid.)
During the pendency of this appeal, there was a split of authority as to
whether a habeas petitioner may bring a “freestanding” motion for discovery
under section 745, subdivision (d), without first obtaining an order to show
cause. (See People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 287–290 (Serrano),
review granted Jan. 15, 2025, S288202 [holding by analogy to case law
3 Alternatively, the defendant may “move to stay the appeal and request
remand to the superior court to file a motion pursuant to” section 745. (§ 745,
subd. (b).)
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interpreting section 1054.9 that RJA permits petitioners to bring standalone
discovery motion in preparation for filing habeas corpus petition]; In re
Montgomery (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1072 (Montgomery), review
granted Dec. 11, 2024, S287339 [because order summarily denying habeas
corpus petition was final when filed, trial court would have exceeded its
jurisdiction by ordering postconviction discovery in absence of any proceeding
pending before it].) The Supreme Court granted review in both cases, but
before there was occasion to rule, the Legislature amended section 1473 to
allow petitioners to file a motion for disclosures under section 745,
subdivision (d), “upon the prosecution of a petition under this subdivision or
in preparation to file a petition.” (AB 1071 (Reg. Sess. 2025–2026), ch. 721,
§ 3, adding § 1473, subd. (e)(2), italics added.) In light of AB 1071, the
Supreme Court dismissed review in Montgomery and Serrano “without
prejudice to any new motion under Penal Code, section 745, subdivision (d),
that the petitioner may file.” (People v. Serrano (2025) 340 Cal.Rptr.3d 28; In
re Montgomery (2025) 340 Cal.Rptr.3d 28.)
Another recent development concerns section 1473, subdivision (e)(5),
which provides that if a petitioner requests appointment of counsel, “the
court shall appoint counsel if the petitioner cannot afford counsel and . . . the
petition pleads a plausible allegation of a violation of” the RJA. During the
pendency of this appeal, the court in McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 33 (McIntosh) held that the test for appointment of counsel is a
“separate and distinct” inquiry from the assessment of the sufficiency of the
prima facie showing for purposes of issuing an order to show cause. (Id. at
p. 44.) To decide whether to appoint counsel, the court must simply assess
whether the factual allegations in the petition adequately allege a violation of
the RJA. (McIntosh, at p. 44.) But for an order to show cause, the court must
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determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of
“entitlement to relief,” which requires the petitioner to address potential
procedural bars and “extends beyond the four corners of the habeas petition”
to include consideration of exhibits, the superior court’s file, and the informal
response and reply. (Ibid.) As such, “the inquiry before issuance of an [order
to show cause] is manifestly broader than mere review of the adequacy of the
factual allegations that appear in the petition.” (Id. at pp. 44–45.)
B. Appealability
The right of appeal is statutory, and a judgment or order is not
appealable unless expressly made so by statute. (Serrano, supra, 106
Cal.App.5th at p. 292.) Criminal appeals are generally governed by section
1237, which provides that an appeal may be taken by a defendant from “a
final judgment of conviction” (§ 1237, subd. (a)) and “any order made after
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party” (id., subd. (b)). “[A]
reviewing court is ‘without jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a
nonappealable order, and has the duty to dismiss such an appeal upon its
own motion.’ ” (In re Mario C. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1307.)
The RJA does not expressly authorize a direct appeal from an order
denying a postjudgment motion for discovery under section 745, subdivision
(d). Thus, the order in question is appealable only if it affects the defendant’s
substantial rights. (Serrano, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 292; § 1237,
subd. (b).) Despite their other differences, Montgomery and Serrano were in
agreement that the denial of a standalone postjudgment motion for discovery
under the RJA is not directly appealable. (Serrano, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 282–283, 292–293; Montgomery, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1071–
1072.) “[R]eview of such orders lies in mandate.” (Serrano, at p. 293.) And
while Montgomery and Serrano relied on different rationales, both rejected
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the argument that such an order is a postjudgment order affecting the
substantial rights of a party for purposes of section 1237, subdivision (b).
(See Serrano, at p. 292 [holding by analogy to section 1054.9 and In re Steele
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 682 that denial of RJA discovery motion may only be
challenged by petition for writ of mandate]; Montgomery, at p. 1068 [because
trial court summarily denied habeas corpus petition, it had no jurisdiction to
grant RJA discovery motion, and an order denying relief that the court has no
jurisdiction to grant does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights].)
AB 1071 did not change this result, as nothing in the new legislation
indicates the Legislature’s intent to abrogate the nonappealability holdings of
Montgomery and Serrano. Indeed, the introduced version of AB 1071
proposed adding section 1473.2, subdivision (j), as follows: “The denial of
counsel, granting or denial of disclosures to prepare a petition and the
granting or denial of a petition brought under this section shall be appealable
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1237.” (AB 1071 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.)
as introduced Feb. 20, 2025.) This proposed language was removed from AB
1071 before the law was passed. (See Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1071
(2025-2026 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 29, 2025.)
Pollard nevertheless maintains the trial court’s order is appealable
because he challenges not only the discovery ruling but the denial of his
request for appointment of counsel. We fail to see how this demonstrates
appealability. The request for appointment of counsel came in the prayer for
relief of Pollard’s habeas corpus petition. Pollard acknowledges that the
denial of that petition is not directly appealable. (See Robinson v. Lewis
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 895 [no statutory right to appeal denial of habeas
petition in noncapital cases].) Furthermore, employing Serrano’s reasoning,
a habeas corpus proceeding is “ ‘ “a separate matter from the criminal case
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itself,” ’ ” and an appeal from the denial of a request for appointment of
counsel in a habeas corpus petition is not from “an order ‘after judgment
(§ 1237, subd. (b)) in the criminal action, but . . . an interlocutory order in a
current or future habeas proceeding.” (Serrano, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at
p. 292.) As such, section 1237, subdivision (b), does not provide authority for
a direct appeal from an order denying a request for counsel made in
connection with a habeas corpus petition. Again, “review of such orders lies
in mandate.” (Serrano, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 293.)
McIntosh does not assist Pollard on the issue of appealability, and it
instead reinforces the propriety of seeking review through a petition for writ
of mandate. Although McIntosh held that the trial court erred by conflating
the plausible-allegation test for appointment of counsel with the entitlement-
to-relief standard for issuance of orders to show cause (McIntosh, supra, 110
Cal.App.5th at p. 44), it did not address appealability. The claim of error
came before the McIntosh court in a petition for habeas corpus, which the
court construed as a petition for writ of mandate. (Id. at p. 46.) Nothing in
McIntosh suggests that a direct appeal lies from the trial court’s erroneous
denial of a request for counsel in connection with a habeas corpus petition.
Pollard nevertheless insists the trial court’s denial of discovery and
appointed counsel is an appealable postjudgment order affecting his
substantial rights because it is undisputed4 that the record presents at least
one plausible claim of an RJA violation (the resentencing court’s “shucking
and jiving” remark), and the habeas corpus petition’s “concurrent filing and
4 The People “concede[] the court’s ‘shucking and jiving’ comment meets
the minimal standard for stating a plausible RJA violation.” But at the same
time, the People contend Pollard forfeited any RJA claim based on this
remark by failing to raise it below in either his habeas corpus petition or his
RJA motion. We express no opinion on this forfeiture issue.
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incorporation into Pollard’s RJA motion papers made a case-specific showing
of racial animus under section 745, subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2), sufficient to
trigger his right to a hearing and to counsel under subdivision (c).” We again
cannot agree. Setting aside any potential issue of forfeiture, Pollard provides
no explanation or authority addressing how the plausibility of his RJA claim
resolves the procedural question of appealability.
That Pollard concurrently filed an RJA motion incorporating the
allegations of his habeas corpus petition does not assist him in demonstrating
appealability. Notably, Pollard does not contend the denial of his RJA motion
is directly appealable. As discussed, an RJA motion is available to a
defendant in ongoing criminal proceedings before the judgment is final (as
distinguished from the available postjudgment procedural vehicles of a
habeas corpus petition or motion to vacate a conviction under section 1473.7).
(See § 745, subd. (b); Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 999–1000.) Here,
as in Hodge, the trial court “did not have jurisdiction to consider” the RJA
motion “because incarcerated defendants whose convictions are final may
only raise claims under that act in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”
(Hodge, at p. 991.) Pollard identifies no substantial right that is affected by
the denial of a motion for relief the court had no jurisdiction to grant. (See
Montgomery, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 1068 [“ ‘A trial court denying relief
that the court has no jurisdiction to grant does not affect a defendant’s
substantial rights and is therefore not appealable under section 1237,
subdivision (b).’ ”].)
Finally, Pollard asks that we exercise our discretion to treat the appeal
as a petition for writ of mandate. We decline to do so.
“ ‘An appellate court has discretion to treat a purported appeal from a
nonappealable order as a petition for writ of mandate, but that power should
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be exercised only in unusual circumstances.’ [Citation.] Our state Supreme
Court has found circumstances appropriate to justify this course ‘where
[1] requiring the parties to wait for a final judgment might lead to
unnecessary trial proceedings, [2] the briefs and record included in substance
the necessary elements for a proceeding for a writ of mandate, [3] there was
no indication the trial court would appear as a party in a writ proceeding,
[4] the appealability of the order was not clear, and [5] all the parties urged
the court to decide the issue rather than dismiss the appeal.’ ” (Williams v.
Impax Laboratories, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1071–1072, citing Olson
v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390 (Olson).)
Pollard does not provide any meaningful analysis of the Olson factors.
Instead, he maintains there are “unusual circumstances” justifying writ
treatment because “the law is new and unsettled as to the proper procedural
vehicle for seeking a complex range of relief requested under the [RJA].”
While it is apparent that the law pertaining to the RJA is developing, the
appealability question presented here is not in doubt. (See Serrano, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 282–283, 292–293; Montgomery, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1071–1072; McIntosh, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 46–47
[mandate lies to correct erroneous denial of counsel in habeas corpus
proceedings].) “ ‘Routine granting of requests to treat improper appeals as
writs where there are no exigent reasons for doing so would only encourage
parties to burden appellate courts with reviews of immediate orders.’ ”
(Ballard v. Taylor (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1736, 1740.)
Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as
a petition for writ of mandate.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed without prejudice to any new and appropriate
motion under sections 745, subdivision (d), and 1473, subdivision (e)(2), that
Pollard may file in light of recent legislation.
_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Petrou, J.
_________________________
Rodríguez, J.
People v. Pollard (A171385)
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