Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Pollard CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A171385 v. JERRY POLLARD, (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HC816031) Defendant and Appellant. Jerry Pollard appeals from an order of the trial court denying (1) a motion for relief under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA) (Pen. Code,1 § 745); (2) a motion for postjudgment discovery under section 1054.9; and (3) a request for appointment of counsel contained in the prayer for relief of Pollard’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. We conclude the order is nonappealable and dismiss the appeal.2 The dismissal is without prejudice to any new and appropriate motion under sections 745, subdivision (d), and 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Although Pollard requested oral argument in response to the court clerk’s standard oral argument waiver notice, the right to oral argument extends only to an appeal that is “ ‘considered on the merits and decided by a written opinion.’ ” (Moles v. Regents of University of California (1982) 32 Cal.3d 867, 871.) Because we dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits, there is no right to oral argument, nor is it necessary to our dismissal of the appeal. 1 1473, subdivision (e)(2), that Pollard may file in the trial court in light of recent legislation. (Assembly Bill No. 1071 (AB 1071) (Reg. Sess. 2025–2026); Stats. 2025, ch. 721, § 3, eff. January 1, 2026.) FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Conviction and Prior Appeals For convenience, we note the underlying facts of Pollard’s conviction are set forth in detail in Pollard v. White (9th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 1430, 1431– 1432. For our purposes, it suffices to say that in 1986, a jury convicted Pollard of first-degree murder with an enhancement for personal use of a firearm, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 32 years to life in state prison. On appeal, the judgment was reversed due to instructional error on the element of premeditation. (People v. Pollard (Sept. 6, 1988, A035094) [nonpub. opn.].) However, rehearing was granted, and a new opinion was issued reducing the conviction to second degree murder. (People v. Pollard (Dec. 29, 1988, A035094) [nonpub. opn.].) At the resentencing hearing in June 1989, Pollard submitted a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court summarily denied, explaining that it had no discretion to do anything on remand other than modify Pollard’s sentence to reflect the applicable term for second degree murder. When the court asked if there was any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed, Pollard protested, and the court stated to defense counsel, “If there is any motion to be made, . . . I am sure you can make it in proper form, writing to advise the Court as to what’s going on. It does seem this is taking on somewhat of a circus atmosphere now, and it seems to me we are shucking and jiving, but I could be wrong.” The court resentenced Pollard to an aggregate term of 22 years to life in prison. Pollard again appealed, and the 2 judgment was affirmed. (People v. Pollard (Jun. 29, 1989, A046686) [nonpub. opn.].) B. RJA Filings Effective January 1, 2021, the Legislature enacted the RJA. (Stats. 2020, ch. 317; see Assembly Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.).) In April 2024, Pollard, acting in pro per, filed the following documents in the trial court: (1) a “Motion for Relief Due to Discrimination” under the RJA; (2) a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging violations of the RJA; (3) a motion for discovery under section 1054.9; and (4) a notice of lodging of exhibits. In his habeas corpus petition, Pollard alleged that the traffic stop leading to his arrest in March 1985 was racially motivated; that his trial counsel exhibited racial animus by refusing Pollard’s request to move to suppress evidence; that the trial judge and defense counsel were motivated by racial bias when they refused to allow Pollard to testify at trial; that Pollard was charged with a more serious crime and received a harsher sentence than similarly-situated non-Black defendants; that the erroneous jury instructions given at Pollard’s original trial were the result of racial bias by the prosecutor and judge; and that the Court of Appeal’s decision to reduce Pollard’s conviction to second degree murder rather than remand for retrial reflected racial bias. In the prayer for relief, Pollard requested that the court appoint counsel to represent him. The RJA motion incorporated the allegations of the habeas corpus petition In his discovery motion, Pollard requested all material evidence in defense counsel’s trial file; all material to which Pollard would have been 3 entitled at the time of trial under section 1054.9; and any physical evidence to which he would have been entitled under section 1054.9. C. Trial Court’s Decision In June 2024, the trial court issued a written order denying Pollard’s habeas petition for failure to state a prima facie case for relief, finding Pollard made only conclusory allegations and “present[ed] no evidence that any of the alleged conduct was motivated by [Pollard’s] race, ethnicity, or national origin.” After denying the habeas petition, the trial court turned to the RJA motion and concluded such a motion is “available only when there are pending criminal proceedings before the court. [Citation.] The motion is not an independent remedy; it is ancillary to an on-going proceeding. [Citation.] Because the judgment became final in 1989 [citation] and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus has been denied here, there is nothing pending to which the motion may attach.” As to the discovery motion, which the court construed as falling under the RJA, the court similarly concluded that “[b]ecause there are no on-going criminal proceedings before this Court, a motion pursuant to Penal Code 745(d) is not the proper procedural method by which to obtain the documents or the information sought. [¶] The Motion is therefore DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.” On July 28, 2024, Pollard filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s denial of the “Motion for Relief Due to Discrimination and Motion Pursuant to 1054.9 for Writ of Habeas Corpus Discovery.” DISCUSSION Pollard, who is now represented by appellate counsel, contends the trial court erroneously concluded it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the discovery motion after denying the concurrently-filed habeas corpus petition, and that 4 good cause was shown for the requested discovery. Pollard further contends the court had a mandatory duty to consider his request for appointed counsel based on a review of the factual allegations of the habeas corpus petition before conducting a prima facie review of Pollard’s entitlement to habeas relief. The People contend the appeal must be dismissed because it is taken from a nonappealable order. We agree. A. Relevant RJA Provisions and Recent Legal Developments “[T]he RJA added section 745 to the Penal Code (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.5) and amended sections 1473 and 1473.7 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, §§ 4, 5) to allow defendants whose judgments are final or who are no longer in custody, respectively, to seek relief for RJA violations.” (In re Pride (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 997, 1008.) The RJA precludes the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction or sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin, and “provides remedies upon proof of a violation for defendants in ongoing criminal prosecutions, and also for convicted defendants whose convictions are already final if they are eligible to seek relief under the application provision of the statute.” (People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 999 (Hodge).) Section 745(a) sets forth four categories of conduct that violate the RJA, which we briefly summarize as follows: (1) bias or animus against defendants based on their race, ethnicity, or national origin exhibited by the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer in the case, an expert witness, or a juror (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)); (2) use of “racially discriminatory language” by the above individuals during the trial, in court, and during the proceedings (§ 745, subd. (a)(2)); (3) disparities in the severity of charges and convictions based on the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or 5 national origin (§ 745, subd. (a)(3)); and (4) sentencing disparities based on the race, ethnicity, or national origin of the defendant or victim (§ 745, subds. (a)(4)(A), (B).) The RJA “informs defendants how to seek relief during various stages of a criminal proceeding.” (People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 810.) The available procedural avenues set forth in the statute are as follows: by “motion” in the trial court “in ongoing criminal prosecutions” (§ 745, subds. (b), (c)); Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 999); on direct appeal from a conviction or sentence (§ 745, subd. (b))3; by postjudgment petition for writ of habeas corpus (§ 1473, subd. (e)); and by motion to vacate the conviction or sentence (§ 1473.7) if the movant is no longer imprisoned or restrained. “In any proceeding alleging a violation of [section 745, subdivision (a)], a defendant or petitioner may file a motion requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential violation of subdivision (a) in the possession or control of the state.” (§ 745, subd. (d).) The motion must “describe the type of records or information the defendant seeks.” (Ibid.) “Upon a showing of good cause, the court shall order the records to be released.” (Ibid.) During the pendency of this appeal, there was a split of authority as to whether a habeas petitioner may bring a “freestanding” motion for discovery under section 745, subdivision (d), without first obtaining an order to show cause. (See People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 287–290 (Serrano), review granted Jan. 15, 2025, S288202 [holding by analogy to case law 3 Alternatively, the defendant may “move to stay the appeal and request remand to the superior court to file a motion pursuant to” section 745. (§ 745, subd. (b).) 6 interpreting section 1054.9 that RJA permits petitioners to bring standalone discovery motion in preparation for filing habeas corpus petition]; In re Montgomery (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1072 (Montgomery), review granted Dec. 11, 2024, S287339 [because order summarily denying habeas corpus petition was final when filed, trial court would have exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering postconviction discovery in absence of any proceeding pending before it].) The Supreme Court granted review in both cases, but before there was occasion to rule, the Legislature amended section 1473 to allow petitioners to file a motion for disclosures under section 745, subdivision (d), “upon the prosecution of a petition under this subdivision or in preparation to file a petition.” (AB 1071 (Reg. Sess. 2025–2026), ch. 721, § 3, adding § 1473, subd. (e)(2), italics added.) In light of AB 1071, the Supreme Court dismissed review in Montgomery and Serrano “without prejudice to any new motion under Penal Code, section 745, subdivision (d), that the petitioner may file.” (People v. Serrano (2025) 340 Cal.Rptr.3d 28; In re Montgomery (2025) 340 Cal.Rptr.3d 28.) Another recent development concerns section 1473, subdivision (e)(5), which provides that if a petitioner requests appointment of counsel, “the court shall appoint counsel if the petitioner cannot afford counsel and . . . the petition pleads a plausible allegation of a violation of” the RJA. During the pendency of this appeal, the court in McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33 (McIntosh) held that the test for appointment of counsel is a “separate and distinct” inquiry from the assessment of the sufficiency of the prima facie showing for purposes of issuing an order to show cause. (Id. at p. 44.) To decide whether to appoint counsel, the court must simply assess whether the factual allegations in the petition adequately allege a violation of the RJA. (McIntosh, at p. 44.) But for an order to show cause, the court must 7 determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of “entitlement to relief,” which requires the petitioner to address potential procedural bars and “extends beyond the four corners of the habeas petition” to include consideration of exhibits, the superior court’s file, and the informal response and reply. (Ibid.) As such, “the inquiry before issuance of an [order to show cause] is manifestly broader than mere review of the adequacy of the factual allegations that appear in the petition.” (Id. at pp. 44–45.) B. Appealability The right of appeal is statutory, and a judgment or order is not appealable unless expressly made so by statute. (Serrano, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 292.) Criminal appeals are generally governed by section 1237, which provides that an appeal may be taken by a defendant from “a final judgment of conviction” (§ 1237, subd. (a)) and “any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party” (id., subd. (b)). “[A] reviewing court is ‘without jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a nonappealable order, and has the duty to dismiss such an appeal upon its own motion.’ ” (In re Mario C. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1307.) The RJA does not expressly authorize a direct appeal from an order denying a postjudgment motion for discovery under section 745, subdivision (d). Thus, the order in question is appealable only if it affects the defendant’s substantial rights. (Serrano, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 292; § 1237, subd. (b).) Despite their other differences, Montgomery and Serrano were in agreement that the denial of a standalone postjudgment motion for discovery under the RJA is not directly appealable. (Serrano, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 282–283, 292–293; Montgomery, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1071– 1072.) “[R]eview of such orders lies in mandate.” (Serrano, at p. 293.) And while Montgomery and Serrano relied on different rationales, both rejected 8 the argument that such an order is a postjudgment order affecting the substantial rights of a party for purposes of section 1237, subdivision (b). (See Serrano, at p. 292 [holding by analogy to section 1054.9 and In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682 that denial of RJA discovery motion may only be challenged by petition for writ of mandate]; Montgomery, at p. 1068 [because trial court summarily denied habeas corpus petition, it had no jurisdiction to grant RJA discovery motion, and an order denying relief that the court has no jurisdiction to grant does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights].) AB 1071 did not change this result, as nothing in the new legislation indicates the Legislature’s intent to abrogate the nonappealability holdings of Montgomery and Serrano. Indeed, the introduced version of AB 1071 proposed adding section 1473.2, subdivision (j), as follows: “The denial of counsel, granting or denial of disclosures to prepare a petition and the granting or denial of a petition brought under this section shall be appealable pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1237.” (AB 1071 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 20, 2025.) This proposed language was removed from AB 1071 before the law was passed. (See Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1071 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 29, 2025.) Pollard nevertheless maintains the trial court’s order is appealable because he challenges not only the discovery ruling but the denial of his request for appointment of counsel. We fail to see how this demonstrates appealability. The request for appointment of counsel came in the prayer for relief of Pollard’s habeas corpus petition. Pollard acknowledges that the denial of that petition is not directly appealable. (See Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 895 [no statutory right to appeal denial of habeas petition in noncapital cases].) Furthermore, employing Serrano’s reasoning, a habeas corpus proceeding is “ ‘ “a separate matter from the criminal case 9 itself,” ’ ” and an appeal from the denial of a request for appointment of counsel in a habeas corpus petition is not from “an order ‘after judgment (§ 1237, subd. (b)) in the criminal action, but . . . an interlocutory order in a current or future habeas proceeding.” (Serrano, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 292.) As such, section 1237, subdivision (b), does not provide authority for a direct appeal from an order denying a request for counsel made in connection with a habeas corpus petition. Again, “review of such orders lies in mandate.” (Serrano, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 293.) McIntosh does not assist Pollard on the issue of appealability, and it instead reinforces the propriety of seeking review through a petition for writ of mandate. Although McIntosh held that the trial court erred by conflating the plausible-allegation test for appointment of counsel with the entitlement- to-relief standard for issuance of orders to show cause (McIntosh, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 44), it did not address appealability. The claim of error came before the McIntosh court in a petition for habeas corpus, which the court construed as a petition for writ of mandate. (Id. at p. 46.) Nothing in McIntosh suggests that a direct appeal lies from the trial court’s erroneous denial of a request for counsel in connection with a habeas corpus petition. Pollard nevertheless insists the trial court’s denial of discovery and appointed counsel is an appealable postjudgment order affecting his substantial rights because it is undisputed4 that the record presents at least one plausible claim of an RJA violation (the resentencing court’s “shucking and jiving” remark), and the habeas corpus petition’s “concurrent filing and 4 The People “concede[] the court’s ‘shucking and jiving’ comment meets the minimal standard for stating a plausible RJA violation.” But at the same time, the People contend Pollard forfeited any RJA claim based on this remark by failing to raise it below in either his habeas corpus petition or his RJA motion. We express no opinion on this forfeiture issue. 10 incorporation into Pollard’s RJA motion papers made a case-specific showing of racial animus under section 745, subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2), sufficient to trigger his right to a hearing and to counsel under subdivision (c).” We again cannot agree. Setting aside any potential issue of forfeiture, Pollard provides no explanation or authority addressing how the plausibility of his RJA claim resolves the procedural question of appealability. That Pollard concurrently filed an RJA motion incorporating the allegations of his habeas corpus petition does not assist him in demonstrating appealability. Notably, Pollard does not contend the denial of his RJA motion is directly appealable. As discussed, an RJA motion is available to a defendant in ongoing criminal proceedings before the judgment is final (as distinguished from the available postjudgment procedural vehicles of a habeas corpus petition or motion to vacate a conviction under section 1473.7). (See § 745, subd. (b); Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 999–1000.) Here, as in Hodge, the trial court “did not have jurisdiction to consider” the RJA motion “because incarcerated defendants whose convictions are final may only raise claims under that act in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” (Hodge, at p. 991.) Pollard identifies no substantial right that is affected by the denial of a motion for relief the court had no jurisdiction to grant. (See Montgomery, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 1068 [“ ‘A trial court denying relief that the court has no jurisdiction to grant does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights and is therefore not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).’ ”].) Finally, Pollard asks that we exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. We decline to do so. “ ‘An appellate court has discretion to treat a purported appeal from a nonappealable order as a petition for writ of mandate, but that power should 11 be exercised only in unusual circumstances.’ [Citation.] Our state Supreme Court has found circumstances appropriate to justify this course ‘where [1] requiring the parties to wait for a final judgment might lead to unnecessary trial proceedings, [2] the briefs and record included in substance the necessary elements for a proceeding for a writ of mandate, [3] there was no indication the trial court would appear as a party in a writ proceeding, [4] the appealability of the order was not clear, and [5] all the parties urged the court to decide the issue rather than dismiss the appeal.’ ” (Williams v. Impax Laboratories, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1071–1072, citing Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390 (Olson).) Pollard does not provide any meaningful analysis of the Olson factors. Instead, he maintains there are “unusual circumstances” justifying writ treatment because “the law is new and unsettled as to the proper procedural vehicle for seeking a complex range of relief requested under the [RJA].” While it is apparent that the law pertaining to the RJA is developing, the appealability question presented here is not in doubt. (See Serrano, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 282–283, 292–293; Montgomery, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1071–1072; McIntosh, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 46–47 [mandate lies to correct erroneous denial of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings].) “ ‘Routine granting of requests to treat improper appeals as writs where there are no exigent reasons for doing so would only encourage parties to burden appellate courts with reviews of immediate orders.’ ” (Ballard v. Taylor (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1736, 1740.) Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. 12 DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed without prejudice to any new and appropriate motion under sections 745, subdivision (d), and 1473, subdivision (e)(2), that Pollard may file in light of recent legislation. _________________________ Fujisaki, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: _________________________ Petrou, J. _________________________ Rodríguez, J. People v. Pollard (A171385) 13