Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3812-24 M.R.K., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. S.R.R., Defendant-Respondent. ________________________ Submitted October 15, 2026 – Decided November 6, 2026 Before Judges Currier and Marczyk. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, Docket No. FV-18-0108-26. M.R.K., self-represented appellant. S.R.R., self-represented respondent. PER CURIAM Plaintiff M.R.K. 1 appeals from the Family Part's July 17, 2025 order denying her application for a final restraining order (FRO) and dismissing the temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant S.R.R. under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. We affirm. I. Plaintiff and defendant were married from 2015 to 2019 and have one child together. During the marriage, plaintiff alleged defendant physically, verbally, and psychologically abused her. For example, she claimed defendant hit her several times. According to plaintiff, defendant assaulted her on multiple occasions, including one incident that rendered her unconscious and another where she thought she might die. Plaintiff also alleged defendant stole her salary and jewelry and sent it to his parents abroad. Plaintiff reported defendant's abuse to the police in 2018 and obtained a TRO. However, she later voluntarily dismissed the TRO because she was afraid of the consequences to her marriage. She later filed for divorce. After the 1 We use initials for the parties' names pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d)(9) and (10). A-3812-24 2 parties divorced, plaintiff acknowledged the physical abuse stopped but claimed the verbal and emotional abuse continued. Plaintiff obtained another TRO in July 2025. In plaintiff's complaint, she alleged defendant harassed her. To support this accusation, she detailed two incidents. First, she maintained that on June 22, 2025, defendant parked outside her house, even though he was not supposed to go to her house according to their custody agreement. While defendant was parked on the public street outside her home, he sent her a message through the Our Family Wizard application (Family Wizard app) 2 asking about their child. Plaintiff did not respond to defendant's message. After waiting in his car for thirty minutes without any further communication, defendant left. The second incident alleged in the complaint occurred on July 2, 2025. Plaintiff asserted defendant contacted her through the Family Wizard app twice, forty-five minutes past the time allowed in the custody agreement. Plaintiff did not answer either message. Defendant testified he tried to contact plaintiff 2 Our Family Wizard is a co-parenting application that allows parents to share messages, calendars, and documents concerning their children. A-3812-24 3 several times before July 2, 2025 because he had not seen their child in three weeks. Plaintiff did not answer those messages either. Plaintiff recounted several incidents of prior domestic abuse in her complaint and at trial. In addition to the matters previously noted, plaintiff alleged several other episodes where she was allegedly physically assaulted by defendant between 2014 and 2024. The court tried the case over two days. Immediately after trial, it rendered an oral opinion. It first acknowledged the history of domestic violence in the parties' marriage. Pursuant to the "detailed history of a very tumultuous marriage," the court agreed many events during the marriage would have constituted domestic violence. However, the court emphasized it was tasked with evaluating the two predicate acts set forth in the complaint. Under the first prong of Silver,3 the court ruled neither of the alleged incidents constituted harassment because defendant did not possess the requisite subjective intent to harass plaintiff. As for the June incident, the court stressed defendant had a right to see their child, and even if he was in violation of the custody agreement by coming to plaintiff's house, there was sufficient evidence proving he intended to see their child—not to harass plaintiff. 3 Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006). A-3812-24 4 Similarly, regarding the July incident, the court found defendant intended to contact their child, not to harass plaintiff. The court added the late phone calls were a "de minimis sort of infraction[,] . . . to the extent it even violates . . . the existing [custody] orders at all." Further, the court concluded the calls were not "so alarming or annoying as to constitute harassment." Therefore, the court concluded plaintiff did not meet her burden to prove defendant harassed her on either date. Despite not finding the predicate act of harassment, the court continued to address the second prong of Silver. It noted plaintiff failed to "adduce any specific evidence addressing how her safety [was] compromised." Instead, the court noted plaintiff was seeking "guidelines . . . with respect to the parties' . . . communications and their co-parenting issues." On July 17, 2025, the court entered an order denying the FRO and dismissing the TRO. This appeal ensued. II. Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by failing to find the predicate act of harassment. She maintains she needs an FRO to protect herself from defendant. She further avers the trial court failed to adequately consider defendant's past A-3812-24 5 history of domestic violence. Plaintiff also asserts the court did not provide adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Our scope of review of Family Part orders is limited. C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's findings because of its special expertise in family matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). We must "accord substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the difference between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise between couples.'" C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 428 (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)). That deference is particularly strong when the evidence is largely testimonial and rests on a judge's credibility findings. See Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). We will not disturb a trial judge's factual findings unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). However, we do not accord deference to legal conclusions and review such conclusions de novo. Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). A-3812-24 6 The entry of an FRO under the PDVA requires the trial court to make certain findings pursuant to a two-step analysis. Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). First, the court "must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125. The court should make this determination "in light of the previous history of violence between the parties." Ibid. (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402). If the plaintiff is alleging harassment as the predicate act, they must prove the defendant "[made], or cause[d] to be made, one or more communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). "[A]nnoyance or alarm" is understood as conduct that is designed "to disturb, irritate, or bother." J.D., 207 N.J. at 477 (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 580 (1997)). A defendant may also harass another if the defendant "[e]ngages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). Harassment can only occur, however, if a defendant acts with a specific intent, that is, "with the purpose of harassing the victim." D.M.R. v. M.K.G., 467 N.J. Super. 308, 323 (App. Div. 2021). "'A finding of a purpose to A-3812-24 7 harass may be inferred from the evidence presented' and from common sense and experience." Ibid. (quoting H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 327 (2003)). But "that finding must be supported by some evidence that the actor's conscious object was to alarm or annoy; mere awareness that someone might be alarmed or annoyed is insufficient." J.D., 207 N.J. at 487 (citing State v. Fuchs, 230 N.J. Super. 420, 428 (App. Div. 1989)). Although a single communication may be sufficient to establish a defendant's liability under the harassment statute, a trial court must, nevertheless, consider "the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the harassment statute has been violated." H.E.S., 175 N.J. at 326 (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 404). Second, if a court finds a predicate act occurred that satisfies N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a), such as harassment, "the judge must determine whether a restraining order is necessary to protect the plaintiff from future danger or threats of violence." D.M.R., 467 N.J. Super. at 322. Even though this second determination—whether a domestic violence restraining order should be issued—is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse. A-3812-24 8 [Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127; see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 29(b) ("[T]he court shall grant any relief necessary to prevent further abuse.").] Thus, this is a fact intensive inquiry. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) instructs "[t]he court shall consider but not be limited to" seven factors: (1) The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse; (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property; (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant; (4) The best interests of the victim and any child; (5) In determining custody and parenting time the protection of the victim's safety; (6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection from another jurisdiction; and (7) Any pattern of coercive control against a person that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with, threatens, or exploits a person's liberty, freedom, bodily integrity, or human rights with the court specifically considering evidence of the need for protection from immediate danger or the prevention of further abuse. If the court finds that one or more factors of coercive control are more or less relevant than others, the court shall make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the reasons why the court reached that conclusion. Following our review of the record and the governing legal principles, we are unpersuaded by plaintiff's arguments. We affirm the trial court's order denying an FRO substantially for the reasons expressed in the court's A-3812-24 9 comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion. We add the following comments to amplify our decision. The trial court thoroughly explained its rationale for concluding plaintiff failed to demonstrate defendant acted with the purpose to harass for both the June 22 and July 2 incidents. As to the June 22 episode, while plaintiff and defendant usually exchanged their child at a local police department, the court found defendant showing up at plaintiff's house, and remaining in the car, combined with his testimony he had not seen his daughter in weeks, proved his subjective intent was to see his daughter, not to harass plaintiff. Likewise, regarding the July 2 incident, the court noted defendant had the purpose to speak with his daughter, not to harass plaintiff, and the two phone calls placed after 7:00 p.m. were a "de minimis" departure from the custody agreement and, in any event, did not rise to the level of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. These findings were amply supported by the record and the court's credibility findings. Although the court proceeded to address the second prong of Silver, it was unnecessary given its findings plaintiff did not prove defendant committed a predicate act. The two-prong test under the Silver framework is expressly sequential: a court must first find a predicate act of domestic violence occurred under prong one before it is required to reach prong two. G.G.S. v. A.C.B., 484 A-3812-24 10 N.J. Super. 546, 569 (App. Div. 2026). Stated differently, if no predicate act is established, the inquiry ends and the court need not address prong two at all. Because we conclude the court did not err in its findings under prong one of Silver, we need not address plaintiff's arguments as to prong two. We briefly address plaintiff's argument the court failed to adequately consider the prior history of domestic violence. In Cesare, the Supreme Court noted, while courts are "not obligated to find a past history of abuse before determining that an act of domestic violence has been committed in a particular situation, [courts] must at least consider [the prior history] in the course of its analysis." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402. As such, "a finding of violence in the parties' past" may lead the court to conclude that "an ambiguous incident qualifies as prohibited conduct [under the statute]." Ibid. Here, the trial court directly addressed the alleged history of domestic abuse. In fact, it stated, "if there was a full trial on those earlier acts [during the marriage], . . . [it would constitute] domestic violence." However, even with such history, the court determined an FRO was not warranted because it was satisfied plaintiff failed to prove defendant committed a predicate act under the PDVA. A demonstrated history of domestic violence between the parties, A-3812-24 11 standing alone, is insufficient to entitle plaintiff to an FRO. We discern no basis to disturb the court's findings. To the extent we have not specifically addressed any remaining arguments raised by plaintiff, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-3812-24 12