Holy Trinity Ukrainian Catholic Church v. Township of Collier
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket26-2072
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 26-2072
_______________
HOLY TRINITY UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH,
Appellant
v.
TOWNSHIP OF COLLIER; GABE BENVENUTI; WAYNE CHIURAZZI; TIM
DOWNEY, JR.; JULIE MURPHY; KARI SUTER; DAWNLEE VAUGHN; MARY
ANN CUPPLES-WISNIOWSKI
_______________
(W.D. Pa. No. 2:26-cv-00024)
_______________
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
_______________
Present: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, and HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE,
RESTREPO, BIBAS, PORTER, MATEY, PHIPPS, FREEMAN,
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, CHUNG, BOVE, and MASCOTT, Circuit
Judges
The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant in the above-captioned case having been
submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court and to all the other
available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who concurred
in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the judges of the circuit in
regular service not having voted for rehearing, the petition for rehearing by the panel and
the Court en banc is DENIED*.
*
Judges Matey, Phipps, Bove and Mascott would grant the petition for rehearing by the
en banc court. Judge Phipps, joined by Judges Matey, Bove, and Mascott, files the at-
tached dissent sur denial of rehearing.
By the Court,
s/Stephanos Bibas
Circuit Judge
Dated: November 16, 2026
JK/cc: All Counsel of Record
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge, joined by MATEY, BOVE, and MASCOTT, Circuit Judges, dissenting
sur denial of rehearing en banc.
The Opinion in this case could give the misimpression that our Nation was founded
on a commitment to municipal governance instead of a dedication to religious freedom.
The errors behind that falsehood jeopardize the protection of many federal rights – not just
those ensured by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Yet with
respect to RLUIPA, a government’s substantial burden of the exercise of religion,
regardless of the regulatory status quo, constitutes irreparable harm, and a preliminary
injunction should have been entered in this case to allow the church to move forward with
its shrine project. For those reasons, elaborated below, in addition to the points made by
Judge Matey in his Dissenting Opinion, I vote to grant the petition for en banc
reconsideration.
A. The Opinion’s Irreparable-Harm Analysis Contravenes Circuit Precedent
and Threatens Rights.
The land use provisions in RLUIPA protect two fundamental rights: those
associated with religious exercise and those related to interests in real property. See Anash,
Inc. v. Borough of Kingston, 184 F.4th 214, 238 (3d Cir. 2026) (“RLUIPA shields more
than just religious beliefs; it protects ‘religious exercise,’ defined as ‘any exercise of
religion’ including the use of real property for religious exercise.” (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A)–(B))). Precedent makes clear that a substantial burden of either is
irreparable harm. See id. at 246–47. And when a government interferes with both of those
interests by restricting land use in a manner that substantially burdens religious exercise,
that is a double blow – irreparable harm twice over. Thus, from the Opinion’s
determination that Collier Township “very likely” substantially burdened Holy Trinity
Ukrainian Catholic Church’s exercise of religion by denying the church’s rezoning
application for a shrine to St. Mary on its property, it follows that the township very likely
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irreparably harmed the church. Holy Trinity Ukrainian Cath. Church v. Township of
Collier, 2026 WL 3119159, at *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 19, 2026). That is the binding law of this
Court. See Anash, 184 F.4th at 246–47. By deviating from Circuit precedent, the Opinion
has no precedential effect in this respect. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1 (2018). But the magnitude
of its error still merits immediate correction.
As an attempted workaround, the Opinion invents a new legal concept – the “time-
sensitive, spiritual harm” standard. Holy Trinity Ukrainian Cath. Church, 2026 WL
3119159, at *5. As an early tell of that standard’s infirmity, the Opinion announces the
standard without citation to a single authority, just its say-so. And because the standard
analyzes only the church’s religious rights and not those associated with its interests in real
property, it neglects that RLUIPA’s land use provisions protect both religious exercise and
property interests.
The fabricated time-sensitive-spiritual-harm standard also rests on the assumption
that some spiritual harms are not time-sensitive. But that is a judicial value judgment –
and a novel one at that. Cf. Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522, 569 (2025) (reiterating that
an unconstitutional burden on religious exercise “for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury” (quoting Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn
v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 19 (2020) (per curiam))). In addition, the standard takes courts
down a perilous path of adjudicating the worth of spiritual matters as well as their time-
sensitivity. Cf. Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)
(“Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”). Indeed, without qualm or hesitation,
the Opinion compares Rosh Hashanah, a Jewish High Holy Day, to the Ukrainian Catholic
memorial services that the church intends to perform at the shrine. See Holy Trinity
Ukrainian Cath. Church, 2026 WL 3119159, at *2, *6. In other cases, the standard would
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have even more expansive application. If a local ordinance prevented weekday worship
services during the morning rush hour, a court would have to examine the spiritual harm
associated with that restriction as well as the time-sensitivity of that harm. That opens the
door to mischief by taking civil courts far afield from their proper adjudicatory role and by
allowing the possibility that governments could dictate hours of worship. Fortunately, the
time-sensitive-spiritual-harm standard is not the law since prior precedent makes clear that
a substantial burden on religious exercise constitutes irreparable harm. See Anash,
184 F.4th at 246–47. Even though the time-sensitive-spiritual-harm standard has no
binding effect, en banc review is appropriate to pellucidly reject this significant error.
The Opinion’s conclusion that the township’s interference with the church’s
fundraising for the shrine dedicated to St. Mary was not an irreparable harm also presents
a compelling case for en banc review. The Opinion reasons that the harm to fundraising is
not irreparable because it “can be compensated with money damages.” Holy Trinity
Ukrainian Cath. Church, 2026 WL 3119159, at *5. What a dangerous principle. Under
that rationale, the loss of life would not be irreparable because it is compensable through
wrongful-death suits. Similarly, destruction or waste of real property would not be
irreparable because a court could later order compensation through money damages. This
approach leaves the here-and-now value of many rights – including constitutional rights –
incapable of protection through preliminary injunctive relief. For instance, in times of
peace, the quartering of troops in a person’s home would not be an irreparable harm as long
as the owner could later recover money for the rent. But see U.S. Const. amend. III (“No
soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the Consent of the Owner
. . . .”). The same would be true for involuntary servitude – it would not be an irreparable
harm since the servant could later be compensated with money. But see id. amend. XIII,
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§ 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.”). The scary part is that unlike the Opinion’s analysis of the
irreparable harm associated with religious and property rights, which has no binding effect
going forward given its contravention of precedent, the fundraising holding does have
precedential value.
Beyond that error in principle, which jeopardizes the judicial protection of many
rights, the Opinion’s fundraising analysis is wrong on its own terms. The damage to a
religious community from the inability to fundraise for religious purposes is much more
than pocketbook injury. No amount of judicial relief can restore the loss of faith that often
accompanies the inability to pursue religious uses of real property. See Holy Trinity
Ukrainian Cath. Church, 2026 WL 3119159, at *9 (Matey, J., dissenting) (“Absent relief
now, Holy Trinity faces more years of litigation followed by more years of approvals,
fundraising, and construction before it can realize the religious values of the Shrine
Project.”); see also Emma Green, The Quiet Religious-Freedom Fight That is Remaking
America, The Atlantic, Nov. 5, 2017 (“By the time they take on a zoning challenge, many
religious groups are already struggling to find and retain members, and to get by on
shoestring budgets.”). Thus, the loss of fundraising opportunities is not solely a
compensable monetary injury; it is an irreparable harm.
B. The Opinion Mistakenly Elevates the Status Quo of Municipal Interests
Above Federally Protected Rights.
In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), the
Supreme Court articulated a four-part test for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 20 (“A
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
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the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”).
That test, which “reflect[s] a practice with a background of several hundred years of
history,” Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024) (quotation omitted), is
apparently not good enough. Instead of following it, the Opinion creates a new sub-factor
centered around the status quo: movants bear an “especially heavy” burden when they
“seek[] to disrupt the status quo.” Holy Trinity Ukrainian Cath. Church, 2026 WL
3119159, at *2.
That innovation is not permissible under Winter. That decision articulated the
governing standard for preliminary injunctions without mention of any especially heavy
burden associated with the disruption of the status quo. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; cf. also
id. at 43 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasizing that denying the injunction would “maintain
what has become the status quo”); id. at 53 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
defendant’s proposed action was not a continuation of the status quo). As further
confirmation that this new especially-heavy-burden gloss is off-limits, last year, the
Supreme Court instructed a district court to enter a preliminary injunction ordering a school
board to change its policies that burdened parents’ religious exercise. Mahmoud, 606 U.S.
at 569. In disrupting the status quo, the Supreme Court did not impose a heightened burden
on the parent plaintiffs, nor did it so much as mention the status quo. By imposing an
especially-heavy-burden criterion that is not part of the Supreme Court’s well-established
test, the Opinion continues its pattern disregard of binding precedent.1
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The Opinion’s prioritization of the status quo also reflects a comparative hostility to the
exercise of religion at least in light of the Supreme Court’s willingness to disrupt the
regulatory status quo to allow topless dancing and the receipt of funding by non-
governmental organizations that do not oppose prostitution and sex trafficking. See Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 924, 934 (1975) (upsetting the status quo by affirming a
preliminary injunction against municipal ordinance prohibiting topless dancing); Agency
for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 210–11, 221 (2013)
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The Opinion’s prominent reliance on the status quo is likewise unjustified. In
balancing the equities, the Opinion does not identify a single hardship that the township
would experience because of the requested preliminary relief. Rather, the Opinion treats
the status quo of municipal regulation as a value independently worthy of equitable
protection. That is incorrect. Even if the land use regulations and their implementation
are viewed as the status quo (instead of RLUIPA’s baseline guarantee of rights), those
municipal regulations do not carry the same weight as federal interests and rights. See
Anash, 184 F.4th at 247 (explaining that “interests protected by federal legislation take
precedence over conflicting interests preserved in state or municipal law”). And when the
balance is between the vindication of federal rights and preserving a status quo created by
municipal law, the status quo does not triumph. See Holy Trinity Ukrainian Cath. Church,
2026 WL 3119159, at *9 (Matey, J., dissenting) (explaining that disrupting the status quo
in this case “should trouble no one” because “the Township never held power to
discriminate against homes of religious worship in the first place”).
This is not the first time that a federal court has made the mistake of prioritizing
the status quo of local interests over federal rights. Plaintiffs challenging local laws or
practices imposing racial segregation were sometimes subordinated to the status quo of
those laws or practices. E.g., Singleton v. Anson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 387 F.2d 349, 350
(4th Cir. 1967) (denying preliminary relief to Black students seeking school transfers
because the school year was already underway, and “[t]he purpose of a preliminary
injunction ordinarily is to preserve the status quo until the rights can be fully determined
by trial”). But the decisions enforcing the status quo of segregation were often overturned.
(disturbing the status quo by affirming a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a
federal statute that required that funding be withheld from non-governmental organizations
that were combatting HIV/AIDS but that did not explicitly oppose prostitution and sex
trafficking).
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E.g., Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm’n, 284 F.2d 631, 632–33 (4th Cir. 1960) (per
curiam) (overturning a denial of a preliminary injunction to a Black man segregated out of
a waiting room at an airport in a case in which the district court had refused to enter an
injunction because the man would not “suffer irreparable damage” and “the injunction
would not maintain the status quo but change it”); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 396 U.S. 1215,
1216–17 (1969) (Brennan, J., in chambers) (overturning a stay of a preliminary injunction
in a case in which the appellate court had concluded that the stay was in service of “the
maintenance of the status quo”); Clemons v. Bd. of Educ. of Hillsboro, 228 F.2d 853, 856
(6th Cir. 1956) (overturning the denial of an injunction to prohibit discriminatory school-
zoning rules in a case in which the district court refused to enter an injunction because it
would “seriously disrupt the orderly procedure and administration” of the all-White
schools). By favoring local regulation over the protection of federal rights, the Opinion
keeps unfortunate company, and by leaving that error uncorrected, this Court does too.
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