Full Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________ No. 26-2072 _______________ HOLY TRINITY UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, Appellant v. TOWNSHIP OF COLLIER; GABE BENVENUTI; WAYNE CHIURAZZI; TIM DOWNEY, JR.; JULIE MURPHY; KARI SUTER; DAWNLEE VAUGHN; MARY ANN CUPPLES-WISNIOWSKI _______________ (W.D. Pa. No. 2:26-cv-00024) _______________ SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING _______________ Present: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, and HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, RESTREPO, BIBAS, PORTER, MATEY, PHIPPS, FREEMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, CHUNG, BOVE, and MASCOTT, Circuit Judges The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant in the above-captioned case having been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court and to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the judges of the circuit in regular service not having voted for rehearing, the petition for rehearing by the panel and the Court en banc is DENIED*. * Judges Matey, Phipps, Bove and Mascott would grant the petition for rehearing by the en banc court. Judge Phipps, joined by Judges Matey, Bove, and Mascott, files the at- tached dissent sur denial of rehearing. By the Court, s/Stephanos Bibas Circuit Judge Dated: November 16, 2026 JK/cc: All Counsel of Record PHIPPS, Circuit Judge, joined by MATEY, BOVE, and MASCOTT, Circuit Judges, dissenting sur denial of rehearing en banc. The Opinion in this case could give the misimpression that our Nation was founded on a commitment to municipal governance instead of a dedication to religious freedom. The errors behind that falsehood jeopardize the protection of many federal rights – not just those ensured by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Yet with respect to RLUIPA, a government’s substantial burden of the exercise of religion, regardless of the regulatory status quo, constitutes irreparable harm, and a preliminary injunction should have been entered in this case to allow the church to move forward with its shrine project. For those reasons, elaborated below, in addition to the points made by Judge Matey in his Dissenting Opinion, I vote to grant the petition for en banc reconsideration. A. The Opinion’s Irreparable-Harm Analysis Contravenes Circuit Precedent and Threatens Rights. The land use provisions in RLUIPA protect two fundamental rights: those associated with religious exercise and those related to interests in real property. See Anash, Inc. v. Borough of Kingston, 184 F.4th 214, 238 (3d Cir. 2026) (“RLUIPA shields more than just religious beliefs; it protects ‘religious exercise,’ defined as ‘any exercise of religion’ including the use of real property for religious exercise.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)–(B))). Precedent makes clear that a substantial burden of either is irreparable harm. See id. at 246–47. And when a government interferes with both of those interests by restricting land use in a manner that substantially burdens religious exercise, that is a double blow – irreparable harm twice over. Thus, from the Opinion’s determination that Collier Township “very likely” substantially burdened Holy Trinity Ukrainian Catholic Church’s exercise of religion by denying the church’s rezoning application for a shrine to St. Mary on its property, it follows that the township very likely 1 irreparably harmed the church. Holy Trinity Ukrainian Cath. Church v. Township of Collier, 2026 WL 3119159, at *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 19, 2026). That is the binding law of this Court. See Anash, 184 F.4th at 246–47. By deviating from Circuit precedent, the Opinion has no precedential effect in this respect. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1 (2018). But the magnitude of its error still merits immediate correction. As an attempted workaround, the Opinion invents a new legal concept – the “time- sensitive, spiritual harm” standard. Holy Trinity Ukrainian Cath. Church, 2026 WL 3119159, at *5. As an early tell of that standard’s infirmity, the Opinion announces the standard without citation to a single authority, just its say-so. And because the standard analyzes only the church’s religious rights and not those associated with its interests in real property, it neglects that RLUIPA’s land use provisions protect both religious exercise and property interests. The fabricated time-sensitive-spiritual-harm standard also rests on the assumption that some spiritual harms are not time-sensitive. But that is a judicial value judgment – and a novel one at that. Cf. Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522, 569 (2025) (reiterating that an unconstitutional burden on religious exercise “for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury” (quoting Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 19 (2020) (per curiam))). In addition, the standard takes courts down a perilous path of adjudicating the worth of spiritual matters as well as their time- sensitivity. Cf. Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (“Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”). Indeed, without qualm or hesitation, the Opinion compares Rosh Hashanah, a Jewish High Holy Day, to the Ukrainian Catholic memorial services that the church intends to perform at the shrine. See Holy Trinity Ukrainian Cath. Church, 2026 WL 3119159, at *2, *6. In other cases, the standard would 2 have even more expansive application. If a local ordinance prevented weekday worship services during the morning rush hour, a court would have to examine the spiritual harm associated with that restriction as well as the time-sensitivity of that harm. That opens the door to mischief by taking civil courts far afield from their proper adjudicatory role and by allowing the possibility that governments could dictate hours of worship. Fortunately, the time-sensitive-spiritual-harm standard is not the law since prior precedent makes clear that a substantial burden on religious exercise constitutes irreparable harm. See Anash, 184 F.4th at 246–47. Even though the time-sensitive-spiritual-harm standard has no binding effect, en banc review is appropriate to pellucidly reject this significant error. The Opinion’s conclusion that the township’s interference with the church’s fundraising for the shrine dedicated to St. Mary was not an irreparable harm also presents a compelling case for en banc review. The Opinion reasons that the harm to fundraising is not irreparable because it “can be compensated with money damages.” Holy Trinity Ukrainian Cath. Church, 2026 WL 3119159, at *5. What a dangerous principle. Under that rationale, the loss of life would not be irreparable because it is compensable through wrongful-death suits. Similarly, destruction or waste of real property would not be irreparable because a court could later order compensation through money damages. This approach leaves the here-and-now value of many rights – including constitutional rights – incapable of protection through preliminary injunctive relief. For instance, in times of peace, the quartering of troops in a person’s home would not be an irreparable harm as long as the owner could later recover money for the rent. But see U.S. Const. amend. III (“No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the Consent of the Owner . . . .”). The same would be true for involuntary servitude – it would not be an irreparable harm since the servant could later be compensated with money. But see id. amend. XIII, 3 § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). The scary part is that unlike the Opinion’s analysis of the irreparable harm associated with religious and property rights, which has no binding effect going forward given its contravention of precedent, the fundraising holding does have precedential value. Beyond that error in principle, which jeopardizes the judicial protection of many rights, the Opinion’s fundraising analysis is wrong on its own terms. The damage to a religious community from the inability to fundraise for religious purposes is much more than pocketbook injury. No amount of judicial relief can restore the loss of faith that often accompanies the inability to pursue religious uses of real property. See Holy Trinity Ukrainian Cath. Church, 2026 WL 3119159, at *9 (Matey, J., dissenting) (“Absent relief now, Holy Trinity faces more years of litigation followed by more years of approvals, fundraising, and construction before it can realize the religious values of the Shrine Project.”); see also Emma Green, The Quiet Religious-Freedom Fight That is Remaking America, The Atlantic, Nov. 5, 2017 (“By the time they take on a zoning challenge, many religious groups are already struggling to find and retain members, and to get by on shoestring budgets.”). Thus, the loss of fundraising opportunities is not solely a compensable monetary injury; it is an irreparable harm. B. The Opinion Mistakenly Elevates the Status Quo of Municipal Interests Above Federally Protected Rights. In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), the Supreme Court articulated a four-part test for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 20 (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that 4 the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”). That test, which “reflect[s] a practice with a background of several hundred years of history,” Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024) (quotation omitted), is apparently not good enough. Instead of following it, the Opinion creates a new sub-factor centered around the status quo: movants bear an “especially heavy” burden when they “seek[] to disrupt the status quo.” Holy Trinity Ukrainian Cath. Church, 2026 WL 3119159, at *2. That innovation is not permissible under Winter. That decision articulated the governing standard for preliminary injunctions without mention of any especially heavy burden associated with the disruption of the status quo. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; cf. also id. at 43 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasizing that denying the injunction would “maintain what has become the status quo”); id. at 53 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the defendant’s proposed action was not a continuation of the status quo). As further confirmation that this new especially-heavy-burden gloss is off-limits, last year, the Supreme Court instructed a district court to enter a preliminary injunction ordering a school board to change its policies that burdened parents’ religious exercise. Mahmoud, 606 U.S. at 569. In disrupting the status quo, the Supreme Court did not impose a heightened burden on the parent plaintiffs, nor did it so much as mention the status quo. By imposing an especially-heavy-burden criterion that is not part of the Supreme Court’s well-established test, the Opinion continues its pattern disregard of binding precedent.1 1 The Opinion’s prioritization of the status quo also reflects a comparative hostility to the exercise of religion at least in light of the Supreme Court’s willingness to disrupt the regulatory status quo to allow topless dancing and the receipt of funding by non- governmental organizations that do not oppose prostitution and sex trafficking. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 924, 934 (1975) (upsetting the status quo by affirming a preliminary injunction against municipal ordinance prohibiting topless dancing); Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 210–11, 221 (2013) 5 The Opinion’s prominent reliance on the status quo is likewise unjustified. In balancing the equities, the Opinion does not identify a single hardship that the township would experience because of the requested preliminary relief. Rather, the Opinion treats the status quo of municipal regulation as a value independently worthy of equitable protection. That is incorrect. Even if the land use regulations and their implementation are viewed as the status quo (instead of RLUIPA’s baseline guarantee of rights), those municipal regulations do not carry the same weight as federal interests and rights. See Anash, 184 F.4th at 247 (explaining that “interests protected by federal legislation take precedence over conflicting interests preserved in state or municipal law”). And when the balance is between the vindication of federal rights and preserving a status quo created by municipal law, the status quo does not triumph. See Holy Trinity Ukrainian Cath. Church, 2026 WL 3119159, at *9 (Matey, J., dissenting) (explaining that disrupting the status quo in this case “should trouble no one” because “the Township never held power to discriminate against homes of religious worship in the first place”). This is not the first time that a federal court has made the mistake of prioritizing the status quo of local interests over federal rights. Plaintiffs challenging local laws or practices imposing racial segregation were sometimes subordinated to the status quo of those laws or practices. E.g., Singleton v. Anson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 387 F.2d 349, 350 (4th Cir. 1967) (denying preliminary relief to Black students seeking school transfers because the school year was already underway, and “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction ordinarily is to preserve the status quo until the rights can be fully determined by trial”). But the decisions enforcing the status quo of segregation were often overturned. (disturbing the status quo by affirming a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a federal statute that required that funding be withheld from non-governmental organizations that were combatting HIV/AIDS but that did not explicitly oppose prostitution and sex trafficking). 6 E.g., Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm’n, 284 F.2d 631, 632–33 (4th Cir. 1960) (per curiam) (overturning a denial of a preliminary injunction to a Black man segregated out of a waiting room at an airport in a case in which the district court had refused to enter an injunction because the man would not “suffer irreparable damage” and “the injunction would not maintain the status quo but change it”); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 396 U.S. 1215, 1216–17 (1969) (Brennan, J., in chambers) (overturning a stay of a preliminary injunction in a case in which the appellate court had concluded that the stay was in service of “the maintenance of the status quo”); Clemons v. Bd. of Educ. of Hillsboro, 228 F.2d 853, 856 (6th Cir. 1956) (overturning the denial of an injunction to prohibit discriminatory school- zoning rules in a case in which the district court refused to enter an injunction because it would “seriously disrupt the orderly procedure and administration” of the all-White schools). By favoring local regulation over the protection of federal rights, the Opinion keeps unfortunate company, and by leaving that error uncorrected, this Court does too. 7