Doe v. The Maybourne Beverly Hills Operator, LLC
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketB341400
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/17/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
JANE DOE, B341400
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 24STCV05794)
v.
THE MAYBOURNE BEVERLY
HILLS OPERATOR, LLC,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Lynne M. Hobbs, Judge. Affirmed.
Fisher & Phillips, Todd B. Scherwin, Landon R. Schwob,
Serineh V. Terzyan, and Joshua M. Halen for Defendant and
Appellant.
Shegerian & Associates, Carney R. Shegerian, Mahru
Madjidi and Rosie Zilifyan for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
Maybourne Beverly Hills Operator, LLC (Maybourne)
appeals from an order denying its motion to compel arbitration.
Maybourne contends the trial court erroneously determined the
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual
Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402) precluded
the enforcement of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement
between The Maybourne Beverly Hills, a luxury hotel, and one of
its former employees, Jane Doe. The EFAA creates an exception
to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and provides that an
arbitration agreement is not enforceable (at the election of the
plaintiff) when the lawsuit relates to a “ ‘sexual harassment
dispute,’ ” defined as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged
to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal,
or State law.” (9 U.S.C. §§ 401(4), 402(a).) Maybourne chiefly
argues the EFAA does not apply to Doe’s allegations of gender and
pregnancy harassment under the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) and that the
exception is limited to harassment claims involving sexual
misconduct.
We conclude that the EFAA’s exception for sexual
harassment disputes is not limited to allegations of lewd or
lascivious behavior. Because Doe alleged a cause of action for
sexual harassment under FEHA, the EFAA requires that we look
to FEHA’s definition of sexual harassment, which encompasses
harassment on the basis of gender or pregnancy.
Doe adequately alleged she experienced harassment based
on her gender or pregnancy that created an objectively hostile
work environment. Thus, the trial court correctly determined the
EFAA applied to her case, and we affirm the order denying
Maybourne’s motion to compel arbitration.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Doe was employed by The Maybourne Beverly Hills from
May 2015 to January 2024 as a guest reception manager. In
June 2020 Doe signed an arbitration agreement. The first
paragraph stated Doe “will utilize binding arbitration as the sole
and exclusive means to resolve all disputes that may arise out of
or is related in any way to [her] employment with [Maybourne].”
The agreement provided Doe’s claim would be subject to
arbitration under the FAA.
In March 2024 Doe filed a complaint against Maybourne;
The Maybourne Beverly Hills; Beverly Hills Acquisitions, LLC;
and Maybourne Hotels Limited, alleging a cause of action for
“Harassment (Hostile Work Environment) on the Basis of
Sex/Gender/Pregnancy,” contending she was “subjected to
harassing conduct through a hostile work environment, in whole
or in part on the bases of [her] sex, gender, and pregnancy.” She
also alleged causes of action for sex discrimination and retaliation
in violation of FEHA, as well as a cause of action under California
common law for wrongful termination of employment in violation
of public policy.
The complaint alleged that all “key executive roles” at
Maybourne were held by men, and “[w]omen, including Doe, were
consistently treated as less than men and demoralized with
consistent misogynistic underpay and mistreatment.” After Doe
disclosed her first pregnancy in October 2020, she “noticed a
difference in how she was treated.” Between October 2020 and
February 2021 (when Doe began her first maternity leave),
“comments were made to her that she would have to discontinue
working after her pregnancy and that she would not be able to be
3
a career woman once she had children and related gender
responsibilities.”
In November 2021, several months after returning from
maternity leave, Doe applied for the position of director of front
office. She was never interviewed, despite following up twice with
the director of human resources. Over the next six months, Doe
spoke numerous times with the director of human resources, the
hotel manager, and the general manager, but she was “ ‘brushed
off’ with various excuses,” leading Doe to “realize that the reasons
she was passed up for this opportunity were her gender and her
recent pregnancy.” Doe complained to the general manager in
May 2022 that she should receive the same opportunity to
interview as other candidates, but Maybourne closed the position
without interviewing her and hired a man. Doe “felt discouraged
and believed that she was not being taken seriously in terms of
professional development, as she was given no opportunities for
growth.” This became more apparent as her second maternity
leave beginning November 2022 approached.
When Doe returned from her second maternity leave in
May 2023, she told the director of rooms that she “wanted to
continue to grow in the company and to be considered for a
promotion and more responsibility,” but he told her “there would
be ‘no room for her to grow professionally’ ” at Maybourne. Later
that year, after two employees left, Doe assumed additional
responsibilities. But when she requested a raise and asked to be
compensated for the extra work, her requests were ignored, and
she was not considered for available positions. Doe was aware
that other women employed by Maybourne were likewise not
properly compensated for the extra work they did.
4
In December 2023, after Doe again inquired about
advancement opportunities, the regional director told her “that
she was a mother and that her first priority would always be her
children.” This director “further suggested that Doe not ask
anyone for a promotion or a raise and that she look for other
places to work, implying that, because of her gender and gender-
plus responsibilities, she would have no opportunities to be
promoted.” When Doe responded that she wanted at a minimum
to be fairly compensated for the work she was performing, she was
told there was “no point in asking” for a raise. Dissatisfied with
that response, Doe scheduled a meeting with the director of
human resources. Shortly after, that director called her into a
meeting and said Doe had been seen going into hotel rooms with
another employee. The director insinuated Doe and the employee
were engaging in a sexual relationship, a charge that was false.
Even after Doe provided the innocent explanation for
coworkers accompanying her into hotel rooms, Maybourne placed
her on unpaid suspension and terminated her employment five
days later. Doe alleged she was terminated—based on the false
pretext that she had engaged in inappropriate sexual activity at
work—in retaliation for “ask[ing] for a raise to provide her gender
pay equity.”
Maybourne filed a motion to compel arbitration. 1 In
opposition, Doe argued her claims were not arbitrable because
1 The other defendants did not join the motion to compel, and
they are not parties on appeal. Maybourne contended in its
motion that both defendants Beverly Hills Acquisition, LLC and
Maybourne Hotels Limited did not employ Doe but “are entitled to
enforce the Arbitration Agreement.” Maybourne further
contended the third named defendant, The Maybourne Beverly
5
they arose from a sexual harassment dispute and thus triggered
the EFAA exception to mandatory arbitration under 9 U.S.C.
sections 401 and 402.
The trial court denied the motion to compel. The court
found Doe’s claims “sounding in discrimination and harassment
based on sex, fit the definition of sexual harassment under
California state law, and thus under the EFAA.” It further stated,
“Although Defendants argue that the EFAA was targeted to
prevent the forced arbitration of cases involving harassment
founded upon lewd or lascivious motives [citation], it is
‘applicable ... State law’ which determines the definition of sexual
harassment dispute here, and the applicable California law not
only includes harassment based on pregnancy within its
definition, but clarifies that ‘[s]exually harassing conduct need not
be motivated by sexual desire.’ ” The court ruled that Doe had
stated a viable sexual harassment claim: “Plaintiff alleges that
after informing her employer of her pregnancy, she was subject to
comments suggesting that she could not be a ‘career woman’ once
she had children, was told by a company director that as a mother
her priorities would always be outside of work, and when she
complained of this behavior, [was] met with false accusations of a
sexual relationship with a coworker.”
Maybourne timely appealed from the order denying the
motion to compel arbitration.
Hills, is the name under which Maybourne does business in
California. The trial court’s order denied the motion as to
Maybourne only.
6
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Federal Law and Standard of Review
The parties’ arbitration agreement provides that any
dispute “that may arise out of or is related in any way to [Doe’s]
employment with [Maybourne]” would be submitted to binding
arbitration under the FAA. The parties agree the FAA governs,
and we apply the FAA to their dispute. (See Liu v. Miniso Depot
CA, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 791, 801 (Liu).)
The FAA provides that arbitration agreements “shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract or as
otherwise provided in chapter 4.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) The EFAA
(Pub. L. No. 117-90 (Mar. 3, 2022) 136 Stat. 26, codified at
9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402) is the “chapter 4” referenced in section 2 of
the FAA. Enacted by Congress in 2022, the EFAA is “the first
major amendment in the history of the FAA.” (Olivieri v. Stifel,
Nicolaus & Co., Inc. (2d Cir. 2024) 112 F.4th 74, 84.) It amended
the FAA to render predispute arbitration agreements
unenforceable (at the election of the plaintiff) in cases relating to
sexual assault or sexual harassment disputes. (See 9 U.S.C.
§§ 401-402; Liu, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 801.)
Specifically, the statute provides: “Notwithstanding any
other provision of this title, at the election of the person alleging
conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual
assault dispute, ... no predispute arbitration agreement ... shall be
valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under
Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault
dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C. § 402(a).)
The EFAA defines a “ ‘sexual harassment dispute’ ” as “a dispute
relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment
7
under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” (9 U.S.C.
§ 401(4).) It provides that “[a]n issue as to whether this chapter
applies with respect to a dispute shall be determined under
Federal law.” (9 U.S.C. § 402(b).)
Congress enacted the EFAA in response to concerns that
mandatory arbitration clauses had become “ ‘virtually
ubiquitous,’ ” depriving employees of access to the courts and
allowing workplace harassment claims to remain confidential.
(Quilala v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2025)
117 Cal.App.5th 75, 83 (Quilala); see H.R. Rep. No. 117-234,
2d Sess., p. 4 (2022).) The House Judiciary Committee “expressed
concern that forced arbitration in such cases ‘protect[s] the
company by keeping the records of an arbitration secret,’ which
then enables employers to ‘retaliate against a victim—rather than
confront the harasser or the attacker—without fear of their
actions becoming public through the courts’; ‘allows for the growth
of office cultures that ignore harassment’; and ‘create[s] incentives
for the corporate protection of rapists and other serial harassers.’
[Citation.] Through the EFAA, Congress sought to correct this
imbalance by ensuring that survivors of sexual harassment and
assault can pursue their claims in court rather than in a system
that ‘often favors the company over the individual.’ ” (Quilala, at
p. 83.)
While the FAA reflects “a strong federal policy favoring
arbitration, the EFAA creates a targeted exception to that policy
where allegations of sexual harassment or sexual assault are at
issue,” based on “Congress’s determination that such claims
warrant resolution through the public court system rather than
through private arbitration.” (Quilala, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at
p. 83; see Casey v. Superior Court (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 575, 585
8
(Casey) [in cases relating to a sexual harassment dispute, “the
EFAA rejects the policy of favoring enforceability of arbitration
agreements, and replaces it with a rule of unenforceability of
arbitration agreements”]; accord, Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law, P.C.
(2d Cir. 2026) 193 F.4th 219, 230-231 [the EFAA “mark[s] a
deliberate departure from the FAA’s general policy favoring
arbitration”].)
“[W]hen, as here, the ruling presents a pure question of law
(whether the EFAA applies and preempts [defendants’] motion to
compel), we review the trial court’s order de novo.” (Casey, supra,
108 Cal.App.5th at p. 583; see Kader v. Southern California
Medical Center, Inc. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 214, 221 [de novo
review where trial court’s denial of motion to compel arbitration
rests on pure questions of law, including questions of statutory
interpretation].)
B. The EFAA Does Not Limit “Sexual Harassment Disputes” to
Allegations of Sexual Misconduct
Maybourne argues the phrase “ ‘sexual harassment
dispute,’ ” as used in the EFAA (9 U.S.C. §§ 401(4), 402(a)), should
be construed narrowly to mean allegations of sexual misconduct,
i.e., a “tort ‘sexual’ in nature,” as opposed to harassing conduct
motivated by the victim’s gender or pregnancy. It asserts that
“the #MeToo movement giving rise to the EFAA stemmed from
horrific instances of suppressed misconduct of a sexual nature,”
and Congress did not intend the EFAA’s arbitration exclusions to
extend any more broadly. The EFAA is not susceptible to the
interpretation urged by Maybourne.
Statutory interpretation of Congressional legislation “begins
with the text.” (Ross v. Blake (2016) 578 U.S. 632, 638.) “[A]
court’s proper starting point lies in a careful examination of the
9
ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself. [Citation.]
Where … that examination yields a clear answer, judges must
stop.” (Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media (2019)
588 U.S. 427, 436; see Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia (2020)
590 U.S. 644, 674 [“when the meaning of the statute’s terms is
plain, our job is at an end”]; accord, Liu, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 802 [where the language of the statute is clear, we have no
choice but to “ ‘enforce it according to its terms’ ”].) “[W]hen
deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words
‘in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.’ [Citation.] Our duty, after all, is ‘to construe
statutes, not isolated provisions.’ ” (King v. Burwell (2015)
576 U.S. 473, 486.) Examining the legislative purpose and history
is appropriate only when statutory language remains ambiguous
after consideration of the text and its context. (See Bostock, at
p. 674 [“[l]egislative history … is meant to clear up ambiguity, not
create it”].)
The United States Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence
reinforces that, if the plain text of the EFAA is clear, it is
irrelevant whether the Congressional legislators had in mind a
particular type of “#MeToo” allegation when they passed it.
Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, supra, 590 U.S 644 is
instructive. The Supreme Court held that firing someone for
being gay or transgender violated Title VII of the federal Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed discrimination in the
workplace on the basis of sex. (Bostock, at p. 650.) The court
observed: “Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have
anticipated their work would lead to this particular result.
Likely, they weren’t thinking about many of the Act’s
consequences that have become apparent over the years, including
10
its prohibition against discrimination on the basis of motherhood
or its ban on the sexual harassment of male employees. But the
limits of the drafters’ imagination supply no reason to ignore the
law’s demands. When the express terms of a statute give us one
answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no
contest. Only the written word is the law, and all persons are
entitled to its benefit.” (Id. at p. 653.)
One cannot reasonably interpret the express terms of the
EFAA to exclude allegations of gender- or pregnancy-based
harassment, and to instead cover only allegations of sexual
misconduct or conduct of a lascivious nature. The EFAA provides
that a plaintiff can avoid application of a predispute arbitration
agreement in a “case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State
law” and “relates to ... [a] sexual harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C.
§ 402(a).) “ ‘[S]exual harassment dispute’ ” is defined as “a
dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual
harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.”
(9 U.S.C. § 401(4).) The EFAA thus plainly directs courts to apply
the definition of “sexual harassment” applicable under the
particular law invoked by the plaintiff. (See Singh v. Meetup LLC
(S.D.N.Y. 2024) 750 F.Supp.3d 250, 254 (Singh) [“Because the
EFAA looks to ‘Federal, Tribal, or State law,’ the Court must also
consider the liability standards of … the state and local statutes
on which [plaintiff] relies for her sexual harassment claims.”].)
“[T]he EFAA does not require courts to impose a distinction
between sexual harassment that is lewd, romantic, or sexual and
that which is not when the state law itself does not do so.” (Ding
v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2025) 765 F.Supp.3d 897,
903, affd. Ding v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc. (9th Cir. 2026)
187 F.4th 1231 (Ding).) Because the text of the EFAA is
11
unambiguous on this point, there is no need to look to extratextual
considerations. (See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001)
532 U.S. 105, 119 [concluding there was no need to examine
legislative history of FAA exclusion provision where the statutory
text was clear].)
C. Sexual Harassment Under FEHA Encompasses Harassment
Based on Gender or Pregnancy, Not Merely Conduct
Motivated by Sexual Desire
Because Doe’s complaint alleged causes of action under
FEHA and California common law, the EFAA requires that we
examine whether she has alleged conduct that, if proven, would
constitute sexual harassment under California law. Maybourne
contends that Doe’s allegations of harassment based on her
gender and pregnancy, as opposed to harassment motivated by
sexual desire, do not constitute “sexual harassment” under FEHA.
Maybourne’s interpretation of FEHA is incorrect.
FEHA provides “[i]t is an unlawful employment practice” to
“harass an employee” “because of ... sex, gender, gender identity,
gender expression, age, sexual orientation, [or] reproductive
health decisionmaking,” among other categories. (Gov. Code,
§ 12940, subd. (j)(1).) It states that “ ‘harassment’ because of sex
includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment
based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”
(Id., subd. (j)(4)(C).) It specifically provides that “[s]exually
harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire.” (Ibid.)
For purposes of “unlawful practices” under FEHA (including
harassment), “sex” includes, but is not limited to, a person’s
gender or pregnancy. (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (r)(1), (2).)
Conversely, “gender” means “sex.” (Id., subd. (r)(2).)
12
California Civil Rights Department regulations provide
further guidance. They provide: “Sexual harassment is unlawful
as defined in section 11019(b) [of the regulations], and includes
verbal, physical, and visual harassment, as well as unwanted
sexual advances. An employer may be liable for sexual
harassment even when the harassing conduct was not motivated
by sexual desire. A person alleging sexual harassment is not
required to sustain a loss of tangible job benefits in order to
establish harassment. Sexually harassing conduct may be either
‘quid pro quo’ or ‘hostile work environment’ sexual harassment:
[¶] (1) ‘Quid pro quo’ (Latin for ‘this for that’) sexual harassment
is characterized by explicit or implicit conditioning of a job or
promotion on an applicant or employee’s submission to sexual
advances or other conduct based on sex. [¶] (2) Hostile work
environment sexual harassment occurs when unwelcome
comments or conduct based on sex unreasonably interfere with an
employee’s work performance or create an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11034,
subd. (f).) “ ‘Sex’ has the same definition as provided in
Government Code section 12926, which includes, but is not
limited to, pregnancy; childbirth; … [and] gender.” (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 2, § 11030, subd. (c).)
Nothing in the FEHA statute or the regulations specifies
that, to constitute “sexual harassment,” the challenged conduct
must involve lewd or lascivious conduct. Rather, as discussed,
FEHA provides that “[s]exually harassing conduct need not be
motivated by sexual desire.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C);
see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11034, subd. (f).) “[S]exual
harassment may be symptomatic of gender-based hostility, the
employer or supervisor using sexual harassment primarily to
13
subordinate women, to remind them of their lower status in the
workplace, and to demean them. In this latter circumstance, the
‘sexual’ element of the harassment is only secondary.” (E.E.O.C.
v. Farmer Bros. Co. (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 891, 897-898
[addressing claims brought under FEHA and Title VII]; see Roby
v. McKesson Corp. (2010) 47 Cal.4th 686, 707 (Roby) [harassment
may be “ ‘ “engaged in for personal gratification, because of
meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives” ’ ”]; Thomas v.
Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 609
(Thomas) [sexual harassment may be motivated by “ ‘defendant’s
bias against women,’ ” as opposed to sexual desire]; Accardi v.
Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 348, overruled on other
grounds by Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798.)
Maybourne argues that in providing that “ ‘harassment’
because of sex includes sexual harassment, gender harassment,
and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C), italics added), the
Legislature distinguished sexual harassment from gender
harassment and harassment based on pregnancy. It contends
“sexual harassment” is a narrower category of conduct that does
not include gender or pregnancy-based harassment. Without
articulating it, Maybourne is invoking “the well-settled maxim of
statutory interpretation that different words or phrases in a
statute must have different meanings.” (Orange County Water
Dist. v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 252,
347; accord Roy v. Superior Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1337,
1352 [“ ‘[w]hen the Legislature uses different words as part of the
same statutory scheme, those words are presumed to have
different meanings’ ”].) However, “words or phrases can have
different meanings without being mutually exclusive….
14
[D]ifferent words and phrases may have overlapping, but not
coextensive, meanings.” (Orange County Water Dist., at p. 347.)
As discussed, FEHA provides that the terms “sex” and
“gender” have the same meaning, and are interchangeable, in the
context of claims for harassment under FEHA. (See Gov. Code,
§ 12926, subd. (r)(1), (2).) Further, the regulations provide
“[h]ostile work environment sexual harassment occurs when
unwelcome comments or conduct based on sex unreasonably
interfere with an employee’s work performance or create an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.” (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 2, § 11034, subd. (f)(2), italics added.) Because “sex” is
equivalent to gender and pregnancy under FEHA, unwelcome
comments or conduct based on sex or gender or pregnancy give
rise to a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim if the
conduct unreasonably interfered with an employee’s work
performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment. (See Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (r)(1); Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 2, §§ 11030, 11034, subd. (f)(2).)
Examining the FEHA statutory and regulatory scheme as a
whole, we conclude the Legislature did not intend to draw any
meaningful distinction between conduct that constitutes “sexual
harassment” and conduct that constitutes gender- or pregnancy-
based harassment. Rather, in providing that “ ‘harassment’
because of sex includes sexual harassment, gender harassment,
and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C), italics added), the
Legislature intended to emphasize the breadth of FEHA’s
prohibition of workplace harassment. (See Decloedt v. Radnet
Management, Inc. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 732, 743 (Decloedt) [“we
read [Gov. Code] section 12940, subdivision (j)(4)(C) as a provision
15
by which the Legislature removed any doubt that harassment
based on gender, pregnancy, childbirth, and medical conditions
relating to pregnancy and childbirth constitute harassment
because of sex, even though that form of harassment may not be
motivated by sexual desire”].)
California courts have consistently interpreted the term
“sexual harassment” under FEHA to include harassment based on
gender, not just harassment that is lascivious in nature. In Miller
v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, the California
Supreme Court explained that FEHA’s “prohibition against sexual
harassment includes protection from a broad range of conduct,
ranging from expressly or impliedly conditioning employment
benefits on submission to or tolerance of unwelcome sexual
advances, to the creation of a work environment that is hostile or
abusive on the basis of sex.” (Miller, at p. 461.) “[A] plaintiff may
establish a hostile work environment without demonstrating the
existence of coercive sexual conduct directed at the plaintiff or
even conduct of a sexual nature.” (Id. at p. 469.) For instance, a
plaintiff may state a cause of action based upon a hostile work
environment when the plaintiff alleged she was the object of
ridicule, insults, threats, and more exacting work requirements
than male coworkers who resented a female employee’s entry into
their workforce. (Id. at p. 462.)
The next year, in the seminal case Lyle v. Warner Brothers
Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264 (Lyle), the Supreme
Court reiterated, “ ‘To plead a cause of action for [hostile work
environment] sexual harassment, it is “only necessary to show
that gender is a substantial factor in the discrimination, and that
if the plaintiff ‘had been a man she would not have been treated in
the same manner.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 280, italics added.) The court
16
explained that “[i]t is the disparate treatment of an employee on
the basis of sex—not the mere discussion of sex or use of vulgar
language—that is the essence of a sexual harassment claim.”
(Ibid.) Since then, California courts have routinely held that the
crux of a sexual harassment claim is that the harassment was
“ ‘because of sex,’ ” not whether there was any sexual desire,
interest, or misconduct. (See Thomas, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 609; Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 586;
Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228,
1239-1240; Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 114, 132;
Singleton v. United States Gypsum Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th
1547, 1564.) The Ninth Circuit and a number of federal district
courts addressing the applicability of the EFAA to harassment
claims under FEHA have similarly construed “sexual harassment”
under FEHA to include gender- or pregnancy-based harassment
that did not involve lascivious conduct or statements. (See, e.g.,
Ding, supra, 187 F.4th at pp. 1239-1240; Woodruff-Drouault v.
Securitas Security Services USA Inc. (C.D.Cal. Dec. 3, 2025,
No. EDCV 25-529 JGB (SPX)) 2025 WL 4683972, *3; Gill v.
US Data Management, LLC (C.D.Cal. Dec. 2, 2024, No. 2:24-CV-
05255-MCS-MAR) 2024 WL 5402494, *2 [“Defendant contends
that a claim for gender harassment under [FEHA] does not
qualify as a sexual harassment dispute…. Not so.”].)
We conclude that a “sexual harassment dispute” under the
EFAA can include a FEHA hostile workplace claim based on
harassment due to gender or pregnancy, without any lascivious
acts, advances, or comments.
17
D. Doe Adequately Pleaded a “Sexual Harassment Dispute”
Under FEHA
Maybourne argues Doe has not alleged a viable sexual
harassment claim under FEHA and thus she cannot invoke the
EFAA to avoid arbitration. According to Maybourne, Doe will “not
be able to show that the alleged conduct was severe or pervasive”
because “[a]t most, she has alleged two comments regarding her
being a mother and focusing on her children.” Doe sufficiently
alleged a FEHA sexual harassment dispute and thus triggered the
EFAA.
1. The unsettled standard for evaluating whether the
allegations of a complaint trigger the EFAA
Congress did not specify the standard for determining
whether a plaintiff has “alleged” a “sexual harassment dispute”
such that it falls within the EFAA exception to arbitrability.
(9 U.S.C. § 402(a); see Bruce v. Adams & Reese, LLP (6th Cir.
2026) 168 F.4th 367, 375 (Bruce) [“The EFAA … does not itself
define what it means for a plaintiff to ‘allege’ [a sexual
harassment] dispute” to trigger EFAA’s safe harbor].) No
California court has yet decided the question. (See Decloedt,
supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 744 [“[a]ssuming arguendo” that the
most exacting standard applied]; Liu, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 799, fn. 2 [declining to reach “what threshold, if any, a
plaintiff’s sexual harassment related claims must meet before the
EFAA becomes applicable”].)
The federal district courts have split on the appropriate
standard. Many have held the EFAA applies only where the
plaintiff’s allegations relating to a sexual harassment dispute
could survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 12(b)(6)). (See, e.g., Smith
18
v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2025, No. 24 CIV. 4633
(JPC)) 2025 WL 2782484, *8-11; Smith v. Boehringer Ingelheim
Pharms., LLC (D.Conn. Aug. 19, 2025, No. 3:24-CV-01266 (KAD))
2025 WL 2403042, *5; Kelly v. Rosenberg & Estis, P.C. (S.D.N.Y.
2025) 804 F.Supp.3d 461, 465; Mitura v. Finco Services, Inc.
(S.D.N.Y. 2024) 712 F.Supp.3d 442, 451; Singh, supra,
750 F.Supp.3d at p. 253; Delo v. Paul Taylor Dance Foundation,
Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 685 F.Supp.3d 173, 180-182; Yost v.
Everyrealm, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 657 F.Supp.3d 563, 577, 586
(Yost).)
“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” (Ashcroft
v. Iqbal (2009) 556 U.S. 662, 678 (Iqbal), quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544, 570 (Twombly); see
Decloedt, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 745.) “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” (Ashcroft, at p. 678.)
Some district courts have applied a more lenient standard,
requiring only “nonfrivolous” allegations of sexual harassment,
“with the sufficiency of those claims to be reserved for proper
merits adjudication.” (Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law, P.C.
(S.D.N.Y. 2024) 757 F.Supp.3d 498, 533 (Diaz-Roa), affd. Diaz-Roa
v. Hermes, P.C., supra, 193 F.4th 219; accord, O’Donnell v.
Magazzino Italian Art Found. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026, No. 25-CV-
2918 (JGLC)) 2026 WL 880646, *8.) This standard, borrowed
from the one set forth in Bell v. Hood (1946) 327 U.S. 678 for
analyzing the sufficiency of allegations for federal question
jurisdiction, requires “that the conduct must be actually alleged
19
and with sufficient specificity that the court is able to determine
the law that is applicable and that there is a real and nonfrivolous
reason to believe that the conduct violates that law against sexual
harassment.” (Diaz-Roa, at p. 542.)
In Yost, the district court explained it rejected the less
stringent “frivolousness” standard in favor of the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard because to read the EFAA to void arbitration
agreements when plaintiffs are unable to plead claims of sexual
harassment to meet a plausibility standard could “destabilize the
FAA’s statutory scheme” that favors arbitration. (Yost,
657 F.Supp.3d at p. 586.) “It would enable a plaintiff to evade a
binding arbitration agreement—as to wholly distinct claims, and
for the life of a litigation—by the expedient of adding facially
unsustainable and quickly dismissed claims of sexual
harassment.” (Ibid.) The court further concluded the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard was “well-known to
Congress,” allowing a reasonable inference that in passing the
EFAA, Congress “was aware that only [plausible] allegations of
sexual harassment law had the capacity to proceed past the
pleading stage in federal court.” (Yost, at p. 585.)
The courts adopting the less stringent “frivolousness”
standard reason that “plaintiffs commonly fail to state a claim in
their initial complaint, only for the claim to survive after direction
from the Court and an opportunity to amend. [Citation.] This
iterative process between courts and litigants is baked into the
procedural rules governing federal practice. [Citations.] To read
the EFAA as requiring plausibility in order to survive a motion to
compel would deny plaintiffs whose first pleadings were
technically flawed the opportunity to amend, sending claims to
arbitration that would have been clearly within the EFAA’s scope
20
if the plaintiff had submitted a better initial complaint. [¶]
Sending improperly pled but potentially viable claims to
arbitration would be inconsistent with Congressional intent.”
(Thomas v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc. (N.D.Ill. July 24, 2025,
No. 25-CV-77) 2025 WL 2084159, *4; see Diaz-Roa, supra,
757 F.Supp.3d at p. 539 [“While in the ordinary course, a
successful Rule 12(b)(6) motion gives rise to an opportunity to
replead, no such practice exists when a motion to compel
[arbitration] is granted because the complaint fails to meet the
Rule 12(b)(6) standard.”].) 2
2 To counteract the concern that applying a Rule 12(b)(6)
standard would be unfair to plaintiffs who would be denied an
opportunity to replead their complaints before their cases were
sent to arbitration, some courts have suggested that courts that
apply this more exacting standard could still afford plaintiffs an
opportunity to amend their complaints. (See Collin v. HID Global
Corp. (N.D.Cal. Oct. 27, 2026, No. 26-CV-08982-WHO) 2026 WL
3219948, *3 [denying motion to compel arbitration without
prejudice where complaint did not plausibly allege sexual
harassment, and granting plaintiff leave to amend complaint “to
state the numerous instances … described in her declaration that,
combined with the other allegations in the complaint, may …
trigger the EFAA”]; Madison v. Niagara Bottling, LLC (S.D.Tex.
Apr. 17, 2026, Civ. A. No. CV H-25-5701) 2026 WL 1042477, *3, *6
[denying motion to compel arbitration without prejudice and
allowing plaintiff leave to amend complaint to plausibly allege a
sexual harassment claim such that EFAA would apply]; Smith v.
Meta Platforms, Inc., supra, 2025 WL 2782484, at *10, fn. 16
[“there is no reason a court could not allow a plaintiff to file an
amended complaint while a motion to compel is pending”]; see also
Van De Hey v. EPAM Systems Inc. (N.D.Cal. Feb. 28, 2025,
No. 24-CV-08800-RFL) 2025 WL 829604, *3 [“in the event that a
21
Until recently no federal circuit court had addressed the
issue. (See Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law, P.C., supra, 193 F.4th at
p. 223, fn. 3 [concluding it was unnecessary in that appeal to
resolve the question of the proper standard]; Ding, supra,
187 F.4th at p. 1239 [assuming without deciding that most
stringent standard applied]; Bruce, supra, 168 F.4th at p. 376
[“leav[ing] for another day the question” of which standard
applies].) However, in a split decision, a panel of the Ninth
Circuit has now addressed the question in Holland-Thielen v.
SpaceX (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2026, No. 25-4811) __ F.4th __ [2026 WL
3403297] (SpaceX).
The majority in SpaceX declined to adopt either the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard or the “frivolousness”
standard. The court held: “[T]he EFAA’s definition of ‘sexual
harassment dispute’ does not say that a plaintiff must ‘adequately
allege’ sexual harassment [or] ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’ ” (SpaceX, supra, __ F.4th at p. __ [2026 WL
3403297, at *5].) Rather, “the phrase ‘conduct that is alleged to
constitute sexual harassment’ [in § 401(4)] means ‘conduct that is
asserted to amount to sexual harassment.’ Because the word
‘allege’ requires only an assertion, which may or may not
eventually be proven meritorious, § 401(4)’s plain terms are not
limited to conduct that certainly amounts to sexual harassment.
Rather, to decide if § 401(4)’s definition is satisfied, courts must
determine whether the plaintiff’s complaint describes conduct
asserted to be a basis for a sexual harassment claim.” (Ibid., fn.
plaintiff is compelled into arbitration and later uncovers
additional information that bolsters the plausibility of the sexual
harassment claim … plaintiff may move to lift the stay in federal
court in order to re-litigate the motion to compel arbitration”].)
22
omitted.) The court reasoned that “[section] 401(4)’s ‘under
applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law’ clause simply makes clear
that a plaintiff must contend that there was a legal violation
under an applicable part of one of those bodies of law (as opposed
to, for example, under foreign law or a law unrelated to sexual
harassment).” (Id. at *7.) The majority determined that the
plaintiff employees’ complaint against SpaceX met this standard:
it included at least one claim premised on alleged retaliation by
SpaceX for the em