Full Opinion

Filed 11/17/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN JANE DOE, B341400 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24STCV05794) v. THE MAYBOURNE BEVERLY HILLS OPERATOR, LLC, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Lynne M. Hobbs, Judge. Affirmed. Fisher & Phillips, Todd B. Scherwin, Landon R. Schwob, Serineh V. Terzyan, and Joshua M. Halen for Defendant and Appellant. Shegerian & Associates, Carney R. Shegerian, Mahru Madjidi and Rosie Zilifyan for Plaintiff and Respondent. ______________________ Maybourne Beverly Hills Operator, LLC (Maybourne) appeals from an order denying its motion to compel arbitration. Maybourne contends the trial court erroneously determined the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402) precluded the enforcement of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement between The Maybourne Beverly Hills, a luxury hotel, and one of its former employees, Jane Doe. The EFAA creates an exception to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and provides that an arbitration agreement is not enforceable (at the election of the plaintiff) when the lawsuit relates to a “ ‘sexual harassment dispute,’ ” defined as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” (9 U.S.C. §§ 401(4), 402(a).) Maybourne chiefly argues the EFAA does not apply to Doe’s allegations of gender and pregnancy harassment under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) and that the exception is limited to harassment claims involving sexual misconduct. We conclude that the EFAA’s exception for sexual harassment disputes is not limited to allegations of lewd or lascivious behavior. Because Doe alleged a cause of action for sexual harassment under FEHA, the EFAA requires that we look to FEHA’s definition of sexual harassment, which encompasses harassment on the basis of gender or pregnancy. Doe adequately alleged she experienced harassment based on her gender or pregnancy that created an objectively hostile work environment. Thus, the trial court correctly determined the EFAA applied to her case, and we affirm the order denying Maybourne’s motion to compel arbitration. 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Doe was employed by The Maybourne Beverly Hills from May 2015 to January 2024 as a guest reception manager. In June 2020 Doe signed an arbitration agreement. The first paragraph stated Doe “will utilize binding arbitration as the sole and exclusive means to resolve all disputes that may arise out of or is related in any way to [her] employment with [Maybourne].” The agreement provided Doe’s claim would be subject to arbitration under the FAA. In March 2024 Doe filed a complaint against Maybourne; The Maybourne Beverly Hills; Beverly Hills Acquisitions, LLC; and Maybourne Hotels Limited, alleging a cause of action for “Harassment (Hostile Work Environment) on the Basis of Sex/Gender/Pregnancy,” contending she was “subjected to harassing conduct through a hostile work environment, in whole or in part on the bases of [her] sex, gender, and pregnancy.” She also alleged causes of action for sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of FEHA, as well as a cause of action under California common law for wrongful termination of employment in violation of public policy. The complaint alleged that all “key executive roles” at Maybourne were held by men, and “[w]omen, including Doe, were consistently treated as less than men and demoralized with consistent misogynistic underpay and mistreatment.” After Doe disclosed her first pregnancy in October 2020, she “noticed a difference in how she was treated.” Between October 2020 and February 2021 (when Doe began her first maternity leave), “comments were made to her that she would have to discontinue working after her pregnancy and that she would not be able to be 3 a career woman once she had children and related gender responsibilities.” In November 2021, several months after returning from maternity leave, Doe applied for the position of director of front office. She was never interviewed, despite following up twice with the director of human resources. Over the next six months, Doe spoke numerous times with the director of human resources, the hotel manager, and the general manager, but she was “ ‘brushed off’ with various excuses,” leading Doe to “realize that the reasons she was passed up for this opportunity were her gender and her recent pregnancy.” Doe complained to the general manager in May 2022 that she should receive the same opportunity to interview as other candidates, but Maybourne closed the position without interviewing her and hired a man. Doe “felt discouraged and believed that she was not being taken seriously in terms of professional development, as she was given no opportunities for growth.” This became more apparent as her second maternity leave beginning November 2022 approached. When Doe returned from her second maternity leave in May 2023, she told the director of rooms that she “wanted to continue to grow in the company and to be considered for a promotion and more responsibility,” but he told her “there would be ‘no room for her to grow professionally’ ” at Maybourne. Later that year, after two employees left, Doe assumed additional responsibilities. But when she requested a raise and asked to be compensated for the extra work, her requests were ignored, and she was not considered for available positions. Doe was aware that other women employed by Maybourne were likewise not properly compensated for the extra work they did. 4 In December 2023, after Doe again inquired about advancement opportunities, the regional director told her “that she was a mother and that her first priority would always be her children.” This director “further suggested that Doe not ask anyone for a promotion or a raise and that she look for other places to work, implying that, because of her gender and gender- plus responsibilities, she would have no opportunities to be promoted.” When Doe responded that she wanted at a minimum to be fairly compensated for the work she was performing, she was told there was “no point in asking” for a raise. Dissatisfied with that response, Doe scheduled a meeting with the director of human resources. Shortly after, that director called her into a meeting and said Doe had been seen going into hotel rooms with another employee. The director insinuated Doe and the employee were engaging in a sexual relationship, a charge that was false. Even after Doe provided the innocent explanation for coworkers accompanying her into hotel rooms, Maybourne placed her on unpaid suspension and terminated her employment five days later. Doe alleged she was terminated—based on the false pretext that she had engaged in inappropriate sexual activity at work—in retaliation for “ask[ing] for a raise to provide her gender pay equity.” Maybourne filed a motion to compel arbitration. 1 In opposition, Doe argued her claims were not arbitrable because 1 The other defendants did not join the motion to compel, and they are not parties on appeal. Maybourne contended in its motion that both defendants Beverly Hills Acquisition, LLC and Maybourne Hotels Limited did not employ Doe but “are entitled to enforce the Arbitration Agreement.” Maybourne further contended the third named defendant, The Maybourne Beverly 5 they arose from a sexual harassment dispute and thus triggered the EFAA exception to mandatory arbitration under 9 U.S.C. sections 401 and 402. The trial court denied the motion to compel. The court found Doe’s claims “sounding in discrimination and harassment based on sex, fit the definition of sexual harassment under California state law, and thus under the EFAA.” It further stated, “Although Defendants argue that the EFAA was targeted to prevent the forced arbitration of cases involving harassment founded upon lewd or lascivious motives [citation], it is ‘applicable ... State law’ which determines the definition of sexual harassment dispute here, and the applicable California law not only includes harassment based on pregnancy within its definition, but clarifies that ‘[s]exually harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire.’ ” The court ruled that Doe had stated a viable sexual harassment claim: “Plaintiff alleges that after informing her employer of her pregnancy, she was subject to comments suggesting that she could not be a ‘career woman’ once she had children, was told by a company director that as a mother her priorities would always be outside of work, and when she complained of this behavior, [was] met with false accusations of a sexual relationship with a coworker.” Maybourne timely appealed from the order denying the motion to compel arbitration. Hills, is the name under which Maybourne does business in California. The trial court’s order denied the motion as to Maybourne only. 6 DISCUSSION A. Applicable Federal Law and Standard of Review The parties’ arbitration agreement provides that any dispute “that may arise out of or is related in any way to [Doe’s] employment with [Maybourne]” would be submitted to binding arbitration under the FAA. The parties agree the FAA governs, and we apply the FAA to their dispute. (See Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 791, 801 (Liu).) The FAA provides that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract or as otherwise provided in chapter 4.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) The EFAA (Pub. L. No. 117-90 (Mar. 3, 2022) 136 Stat. 26, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402) is the “chapter 4” referenced in section 2 of the FAA. Enacted by Congress in 2022, the EFAA is “the first major amendment in the history of the FAA.” (Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc. (2d Cir. 2024) 112 F.4th 74, 84.) It amended the FAA to render predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable (at the election of the plaintiff) in cases relating to sexual assault or sexual harassment disputes. (See 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402; Liu, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 801.) Specifically, the statute provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, ... no predispute arbitration agreement ... shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C. § 402(a).) The EFAA defines a “ ‘sexual harassment dispute’ ” as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment 7 under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” (9 U.S.C. § 401(4).) It provides that “[a]n issue as to whether this chapter applies with respect to a dispute shall be determined under Federal law.” (9 U.S.C. § 402(b).) Congress enacted the EFAA in response to concerns that mandatory arbitration clauses had become “ ‘virtually ubiquitous,’ ” depriving employees of access to the courts and allowing workplace harassment claims to remain confidential. (Quilala v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 75, 83 (Quilala); see H.R. Rep. No. 117-234, 2d Sess., p. 4 (2022).) The House Judiciary Committee “expressed concern that forced arbitration in such cases ‘protect[s] the company by keeping the records of an arbitration secret,’ which then enables employers to ‘retaliate against a victim—rather than confront the harasser or the attacker—without fear of their actions becoming public through the courts’; ‘allows for the growth of office cultures that ignore harassment’; and ‘create[s] incentives for the corporate protection of rapists and other serial harassers.’ [Citation.] Through the EFAA, Congress sought to correct this imbalance by ensuring that survivors of sexual harassment and assault can pursue their claims in court rather than in a system that ‘often favors the company over the individual.’ ” (Quilala, at p. 83.) While the FAA reflects “a strong federal policy favoring arbitration, the EFAA creates a targeted exception to that policy where allegations of sexual harassment or sexual assault are at issue,” based on “Congress’s determination that such claims warrant resolution through the public court system rather than through private arbitration.” (Quilala, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 83; see Casey v. Superior Court (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 575, 585 8 (Casey) [in cases relating to a sexual harassment dispute, “the EFAA rejects the policy of favoring enforceability of arbitration agreements, and replaces it with a rule of unenforceability of arbitration agreements”]; accord, Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law, P.C. (2d Cir. 2026) 193 F.4th 219, 230-231 [the EFAA “mark[s] a deliberate departure from the FAA’s general policy favoring arbitration”].) “[W]hen, as here, the ruling presents a pure question of law (whether the EFAA applies and preempts [defendants’] motion to compel), we review the trial court’s order de novo.” (Casey, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 583; see Kader v. Southern California Medical Center, Inc. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 214, 221 [de novo review where trial court’s denial of motion to compel arbitration rests on pure questions of law, including questions of statutory interpretation].) B. The EFAA Does Not Limit “Sexual Harassment Disputes” to Allegations of Sexual Misconduct Maybourne argues the phrase “ ‘sexual harassment dispute,’ ” as used in the EFAA (9 U.S.C. §§ 401(4), 402(a)), should be construed narrowly to mean allegations of sexual misconduct, i.e., a “tort ‘sexual’ in nature,” as opposed to harassing conduct motivated by the victim’s gender or pregnancy. It asserts that “the #MeToo movement giving rise to the EFAA stemmed from horrific instances of suppressed misconduct of a sexual nature,” and Congress did not intend the EFAA’s arbitration exclusions to extend any more broadly. The EFAA is not susceptible to the interpretation urged by Maybourne. Statutory interpretation of Congressional legislation “begins with the text.” (Ross v. Blake (2016) 578 U.S. 632, 638.) “[A] court’s proper starting point lies in a careful examination of the 9 ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself. [Citation.] Where … that examination yields a clear answer, judges must stop.” (Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media (2019) 588 U.S. 427, 436; see Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia (2020) 590 U.S. 644, 674 [“when the meaning of the statute’s terms is plain, our job is at an end”]; accord, Liu, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 802 [where the language of the statute is clear, we have no choice but to “ ‘enforce it according to its terms’ ”].) “[W]hen deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words ‘in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’ [Citation.] Our duty, after all, is ‘to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.’ ” (King v. Burwell (2015) 576 U.S. 473, 486.) Examining the legislative purpose and history is appropriate only when statutory language remains ambiguous after consideration of the text and its context. (See Bostock, at p. 674 [“[l]egislative history … is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it”].) The United States Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence reinforces that, if the plain text of the EFAA is clear, it is irrelevant whether the Congressional legislators had in mind a particular type of “#MeToo” allegation when they passed it. Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, supra, 590 U.S 644 is instructive. The Supreme Court held that firing someone for being gay or transgender violated Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed discrimination in the workplace on the basis of sex. (Bostock, at p. 650.) The court observed: “Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have anticipated their work would lead to this particular result. Likely, they weren’t thinking about many of the Act’s consequences that have become apparent over the years, including 10 its prohibition against discrimination on the basis of motherhood or its ban on the sexual harassment of male employees. But the limits of the drafters’ imagination supply no reason to ignore the law’s demands. When the express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.” (Id. at p. 653.) One cannot reasonably interpret the express terms of the EFAA to exclude allegations of gender- or pregnancy-based harassment, and to instead cover only allegations of sexual misconduct or conduct of a lascivious nature. The EFAA provides that a plaintiff can avoid application of a predispute arbitration agreement in a “case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law” and “relates to ... [a] sexual harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C. § 402(a).) “ ‘[S]exual harassment dispute’ ” is defined as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” (9 U.S.C. § 401(4).) The EFAA thus plainly directs courts to apply the definition of “sexual harassment” applicable under the particular law invoked by the plaintiff. (See Singh v. Meetup LLC (S.D.N.Y. 2024) 750 F.Supp.3d 250, 254 (Singh) [“Because the EFAA looks to ‘Federal, Tribal, or State law,’ the Court must also consider the liability standards of … the state and local statutes on which [plaintiff] relies for her sexual harassment claims.”].) “[T]he EFAA does not require courts to impose a distinction between sexual harassment that is lewd, romantic, or sexual and that which is not when the state law itself does not do so.” (Ding v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2025) 765 F.Supp.3d 897, 903, affd. Ding v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc. (9th Cir. 2026) 187 F.4th 1231 (Ding).) Because the text of the EFAA is 11 unambiguous on this point, there is no need to look to extratextual considerations. (See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105, 119 [concluding there was no need to examine legislative history of FAA exclusion provision where the statutory text was clear].) C. Sexual Harassment Under FEHA Encompasses Harassment Based on Gender or Pregnancy, Not Merely Conduct Motivated by Sexual Desire Because Doe’s complaint alleged causes of action under FEHA and California common law, the EFAA requires that we examine whether she has alleged conduct that, if proven, would constitute sexual harassment under California law. Maybourne contends that Doe’s allegations of harassment based on her gender and pregnancy, as opposed to harassment motivated by sexual desire, do not constitute “sexual harassment” under FEHA. Maybourne’s interpretation of FEHA is incorrect. FEHA provides “[i]t is an unlawful employment practice” to “harass an employee” “because of ... sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, [or] reproductive health decisionmaking,” among other categories. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1).) It states that “ ‘harassment’ because of sex includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” (Id., subd. (j)(4)(C).) It specifically provides that “[s]exually harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire.” (Ibid.) For purposes of “unlawful practices” under FEHA (including harassment), “sex” includes, but is not limited to, a person’s gender or pregnancy. (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (r)(1), (2).) Conversely, “gender” means “sex.” (Id., subd. (r)(2).) 12 California Civil Rights Department regulations provide further guidance. They provide: “Sexual harassment is unlawful as defined in section 11019(b) [of the regulations], and includes verbal, physical, and visual harassment, as well as unwanted sexual advances. An employer may be liable for sexual harassment even when the harassing conduct was not motivated by sexual desire. A person alleging sexual harassment is not required to sustain a loss of tangible job benefits in order to establish harassment. Sexually harassing conduct may be either ‘quid pro quo’ or ‘hostile work environment’ sexual harassment: [¶] (1) ‘Quid pro quo’ (Latin for ‘this for that’) sexual harassment is characterized by explicit or implicit conditioning of a job or promotion on an applicant or employee’s submission to sexual advances or other conduct based on sex. [¶] (2) Hostile work environment sexual harassment occurs when unwelcome comments or conduct based on sex unreasonably interfere with an employee’s work performance or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11034, subd. (f).) “ ‘Sex’ has the same definition as provided in Government Code section 12926, which includes, but is not limited to, pregnancy; childbirth; … [and] gender.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11030, subd. (c).) Nothing in the FEHA statute or the regulations specifies that, to constitute “sexual harassment,” the challenged conduct must involve lewd or lascivious conduct. Rather, as discussed, FEHA provides that “[s]exually harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C); see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11034, subd. (f).) “[S]exual harassment may be symptomatic of gender-based hostility, the employer or supervisor using sexual harassment primarily to 13 subordinate women, to remind them of their lower status in the workplace, and to demean them. In this latter circumstance, the ‘sexual’ element of the harassment is only secondary.” (E.E.O.C. v. Farmer Bros. Co. (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 891, 897-898 [addressing claims brought under FEHA and Title VII]; see Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2010) 47 Cal.4th 686, 707 (Roby) [harassment may be “ ‘ “engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives” ’ ”]; Thomas v. Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 609 (Thomas) [sexual harassment may be motivated by “ ‘defendant’s bias against women,’ ” as opposed to sexual desire]; Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 348, overruled on other grounds by Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798.) Maybourne argues that in providing that “ ‘harassment’ because of sex includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C), italics added), the Legislature distinguished sexual harassment from gender harassment and harassment based on pregnancy. It contends “sexual harassment” is a narrower category of conduct that does not include gender or pregnancy-based harassment. Without articulating it, Maybourne is invoking “the well-settled maxim of statutory interpretation that different words or phrases in a statute must have different meanings.” (Orange County Water Dist. v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 252, 347; accord Roy v. Superior Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1352 [“ ‘[w]hen the Legislature uses different words as part of the same statutory scheme, those words are presumed to have different meanings’ ”].) However, “words or phrases can have different meanings without being mutually exclusive…. 14 [D]ifferent words and phrases may have overlapping, but not coextensive, meanings.” (Orange County Water Dist., at p. 347.) As discussed, FEHA provides that the terms “sex” and “gender” have the same meaning, and are interchangeable, in the context of claims for harassment under FEHA. (See Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (r)(1), (2).) Further, the regulations provide “[h]ostile work environment sexual harassment occurs when unwelcome comments or conduct based on sex unreasonably interfere with an employee’s work performance or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11034, subd. (f)(2), italics added.) Because “sex” is equivalent to gender and pregnancy under FEHA, unwelcome comments or conduct based on sex or gender or pregnancy give rise to a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim if the conduct unreasonably interfered with an employee’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. (See Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (r)(1); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, §§ 11030, 11034, subd. (f)(2).) Examining the FEHA statutory and regulatory scheme as a whole, we conclude the Legislature did not intend to draw any meaningful distinction between conduct that constitutes “sexual harassment” and conduct that constitutes gender- or pregnancy- based harassment. Rather, in providing that “ ‘harassment’ because of sex includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C), italics added), the Legislature intended to emphasize the breadth of FEHA’s prohibition of workplace harassment. (See Decloedt v. Radnet Management, Inc. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 732, 743 (Decloedt) [“we read [Gov. Code] section 12940, subdivision (j)(4)(C) as a provision 15 by which the Legislature removed any doubt that harassment based on gender, pregnancy, childbirth, and medical conditions relating to pregnancy and childbirth constitute harassment because of sex, even though that form of harassment may not be motivated by sexual desire”].) California courts have consistently interpreted the term “sexual harassment” under FEHA to include harassment based on gender, not just harassment that is lascivious in nature. In Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, the California Supreme Court explained that FEHA’s “prohibition against sexual harassment includes protection from a broad range of conduct, ranging from expressly or impliedly conditioning employment benefits on submission to or tolerance of unwelcome sexual advances, to the creation of a work environment that is hostile or abusive on the basis of sex.” (Miller, at p. 461.) “[A] plaintiff may establish a hostile work environment without demonstrating the existence of coercive sexual conduct directed at the plaintiff or even conduct of a sexual nature.” (Id. at p. 469.) For instance, a plaintiff may state a cause of action based upon a hostile work environment when the plaintiff alleged she was the object of ridicule, insults, threats, and more exacting work requirements than male coworkers who resented a female employee’s entry into their workforce. (Id. at p. 462.) The next year, in the seminal case Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264 (Lyle), the Supreme Court reiterated, “ ‘To plead a cause of action for [hostile work environment] sexual harassment, it is “only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor in the discrimination, and that if the plaintiff ‘had been a man she would not have been treated in the same manner.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 280, italics added.) The court 16 explained that “[i]t is the disparate treatment of an employee on the basis of sex—not the mere discussion of sex or use of vulgar language—that is the essence of a sexual harassment claim.” (Ibid.) Since then, California courts have routinely held that the crux of a sexual harassment claim is that the harassment was “ ‘because of sex,’ ” not whether there was any sexual desire, interest, or misconduct. (See Thomas, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 609; Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 586; Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239-1240; Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 114, 132; Singleton v. United States Gypsum Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1564.) The Ninth Circuit and a number of federal district courts addressing the applicability of the EFAA to harassment claims under FEHA have similarly construed “sexual harassment” under FEHA to include gender- or pregnancy-based harassment that did not involve lascivious conduct or statements. (See, e.g., Ding, supra, 187 F.4th at pp. 1239-1240; Woodruff-Drouault v. Securitas Security Services USA Inc. (C.D.Cal. Dec. 3, 2025, No. EDCV 25-529 JGB (SPX)) 2025 WL 4683972, *3; Gill v. US Data Management, LLC (C.D.Cal. Dec. 2, 2024, No. 2:24-CV- 05255-MCS-MAR) 2024 WL 5402494, *2 [“Defendant contends that a claim for gender harassment under [FEHA] does not qualify as a sexual harassment dispute…. Not so.”].) We conclude that a “sexual harassment dispute” under the EFAA can include a FEHA hostile workplace claim based on harassment due to gender or pregnancy, without any lascivious acts, advances, or comments. 17 D. Doe Adequately Pleaded a “Sexual Harassment Dispute” Under FEHA Maybourne argues Doe has not alleged a viable sexual harassment claim under FEHA and thus she cannot invoke the EFAA to avoid arbitration. According to Maybourne, Doe will “not be able to show that the alleged conduct was severe or pervasive” because “[a]t most, she has alleged two comments regarding her being a mother and focusing on her children.” Doe sufficiently alleged a FEHA sexual harassment dispute and thus triggered the EFAA. 1. The unsettled standard for evaluating whether the allegations of a complaint trigger the EFAA Congress did not specify the standard for determining whether a plaintiff has “alleged” a “sexual harassment dispute” such that it falls within the EFAA exception to arbitrability. (9 U.S.C. § 402(a); see Bruce v. Adams & Reese, LLP (6th Cir. 2026) 168 F.4th 367, 375 (Bruce) [“The EFAA … does not itself define what it means for a plaintiff to ‘allege’ [a sexual harassment] dispute” to trigger EFAA’s safe harbor].) No California court has yet decided the question. (See Decloedt, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 744 [“[a]ssuming arguendo” that the most exacting standard applied]; Liu, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 799, fn. 2 [declining to reach “what threshold, if any, a plaintiff’s sexual harassment related claims must meet before the EFAA becomes applicable”].) The federal district courts have split on the appropriate standard. Many have held the EFAA applies only where the plaintiff’s allegations relating to a sexual harassment dispute could survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 12(b)(6)). (See, e.g., Smith 18 v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2025, No. 24 CIV. 4633 (JPC)) 2025 WL 2782484, *8-11; Smith v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., LLC (D.Conn. Aug. 19, 2025, No. 3:24-CV-01266 (KAD)) 2025 WL 2403042, *5; Kelly v. Rosenberg & Estis, P.C. (S.D.N.Y. 2025) 804 F.Supp.3d 461, 465; Mitura v. Finco Services, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2024) 712 F.Supp.3d 442, 451; Singh, supra, 750 F.Supp.3d at p. 253; Delo v. Paul Taylor Dance Foundation, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 685 F.Supp.3d 173, 180-182; Yost v. Everyrealm, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 657 F.Supp.3d 563, 577, 586 (Yost).) “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” (Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) 556 U.S. 662, 678 (Iqbal), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544, 570 (Twombly); see Decloedt, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 745.) “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (Ashcroft, at p. 678.) Some district courts have applied a more lenient standard, requiring only “nonfrivolous” allegations of sexual harassment, “with the sufficiency of those claims to be reserved for proper merits adjudication.” (Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law, P.C. (S.D.N.Y. 2024) 757 F.Supp.3d 498, 533 (Diaz-Roa), affd. Diaz-Roa v. Hermes, P.C., supra, 193 F.4th 219; accord, O’Donnell v. Magazzino Italian Art Found. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026, No. 25-CV- 2918 (JGLC)) 2026 WL 880646, *8.) This standard, borrowed from the one set forth in Bell v. Hood (1946) 327 U.S. 678 for analyzing the sufficiency of allegations for federal question jurisdiction, requires “that the conduct must be actually alleged 19 and with sufficient specificity that the court is able to determine the law that is applicable and that there is a real and nonfrivolous reason to believe that the conduct violates that law against sexual harassment.” (Diaz-Roa, at p. 542.) In Yost, the district court explained it rejected the less stringent “frivolousness” standard in favor of the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard because to read the EFAA to void arbitration agreements when plaintiffs are unable to plead claims of sexual harassment to meet a plausibility standard could “destabilize the FAA’s statutory scheme” that favors arbitration. (Yost, 657 F.Supp.3d at p. 586.) “It would enable a plaintiff to evade a binding arbitration agreement—as to wholly distinct claims, and for the life of a litigation—by the expedient of adding facially unsustainable and quickly dismissed claims of sexual harassment.” (Ibid.) The court further concluded the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard was “well-known to Congress,” allowing a reasonable inference that in passing the EFAA, Congress “was aware that only [plausible] allegations of sexual harassment law had the capacity to proceed past the pleading stage in federal court.” (Yost, at p. 585.) The courts adopting the less stringent “frivolousness” standard reason that “plaintiffs commonly fail to state a claim in their initial complaint, only for the claim to survive after direction from the Court and an opportunity to amend. [Citation.] This iterative process between courts and litigants is baked into the procedural rules governing federal practice. [Citations.] To read the EFAA as requiring plausibility in order to survive a motion to compel would deny plaintiffs whose first pleadings were technically flawed the opportunity to amend, sending claims to arbitration that would have been clearly within the EFAA’s scope 20 if the plaintiff had submitted a better initial complaint. [¶] Sending improperly pled but potentially viable claims to arbitration would be inconsistent with Congressional intent.” (Thomas v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc. (N.D.Ill. July 24, 2025, No. 25-CV-77) 2025 WL 2084159, *4; see Diaz-Roa, supra, 757 F.Supp.3d at p. 539 [“While in the ordinary course, a successful Rule 12(b)(6) motion gives rise to an opportunity to replead, no such practice exists when a motion to compel [arbitration] is granted because the complaint fails to meet the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.”].) 2 2 To counteract the concern that applying a Rule 12(b)(6) standard would be unfair to plaintiffs who would be denied an opportunity to replead their complaints before their cases were sent to arbitration, some courts have suggested that courts that apply this more exacting standard could still afford plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaints. (See Collin v. HID Global Corp. (N.D.Cal. Oct. 27, 2026, No. 26-CV-08982-WHO) 2026 WL 3219948, *3 [denying motion to compel arbitration without prejudice where complaint did not plausibly allege sexual harassment, and granting plaintiff leave to amend complaint “to state the numerous instances … described in her declaration that, combined with the other allegations in the complaint, may … trigger the EFAA”]; Madison v. Niagara Bottling, LLC (S.D.Tex. Apr. 17, 2026, Civ. A. No. CV H-25-5701) 2026 WL 1042477, *3, *6 [denying motion to compel arbitration without prejudice and allowing plaintiff leave to amend complaint to plausibly allege a sexual harassment claim such that EFAA would apply]; Smith v. Meta Platforms, Inc., supra, 2025 WL 2782484, at *10, fn. 16 [“there is no reason a court could not allow a plaintiff to file an amended complaint while a motion to compel is pending”]; see also Van De Hey v. EPAM Systems Inc. (N.D.Cal. Feb. 28, 2025, No. 24-CV-08800-RFL) 2025 WL 829604, *3 [“in the event that a 21 Until recently no federal circuit court had addressed the issue. (See Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law, P.C., supra, 193 F.4th at p. 223, fn. 3 [concluding it was unnecessary in that appeal to resolve the question of the proper standard]; Ding, supra, 187 F.4th at p. 1239 [assuming without deciding that most stringent standard applied]; Bruce, supra, 168 F.4th at p. 376 [“leav[ing] for another day the question” of which standard applies].) However, in a split decision, a panel of the Ninth Circuit has now addressed the question in Holland-Thielen v. SpaceX (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2026, No. 25-4811) __ F.4th __ [2026 WL 3403297] (SpaceX). The majority in SpaceX declined to adopt either the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard or the “frivolousness” standard. The court held: “[T]he EFAA’s definition of ‘sexual harassment dispute’ does not say that a plaintiff must ‘adequately allege’ sexual harassment [or] ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” (SpaceX, supra, __ F.4th at p. __ [2026 WL 3403297, at *5].) Rather, “the phrase ‘conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment’ [in § 401(4)] means ‘conduct that is asserted to amount to sexual harassment.’ Because the word ‘allege’ requires only an assertion, which may or may not eventually be proven meritorious, § 401(4)’s plain terms are not limited to conduct that certainly amounts to sexual harassment. Rather, to decide if § 401(4)’s definition is satisfied, courts must determine whether the plaintiff’s complaint describes conduct asserted to be a basis for a sexual harassment claim.” (Ibid., fn. plaintiff is compelled into arbitration and later uncovers additional information that bolsters the plausibility of the sexual harassment claim … plaintiff may move to lift the stay in federal court in order to re-litigate the motion to compel arbitration”].) 22 omitted.) The court reasoned that “[section] 401(4)’s ‘under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law’ clause simply makes clear that a plaintiff must contend that there was a legal violation under an applicable part of one of those bodies of law (as opposed to, for example, under foreign law or a law unrelated to sexual harassment).” (Id. at *7.) The majority determined that the plaintiff employees’ complaint against SpaceX met this standard: it included at least one claim premised on alleged retaliation by SpaceX for the em