Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 454 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CV-26-252 BRITTANY SCHULTZ Opinion Delivered September 30, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT V. SMITH DISTRICT [NO. 66FJV-23-558] ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR HONORABLE DIANNA HEWITT CHILDREN LADD, JUDGE APPELLEES AFFIRMED WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge Appellant Brittany Schultz appeals from the Sebastian County Circuit Court’s order terminating her parental rights to her three children, Minor Child 1 (MC1) (DOB 05-15- 14), Minor Child 2 (MC2) (DOB 07-21-21), and Minor Child 3 (MC3) (DOB 10-12-23).1 On appeal, Schultz argues that the circuit court (1) lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the termination order; (2) clearly erred in finding that statutory grounds existed to support the termination; and (3) clearly erred in finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. We affirm. 1 The parental rights of MC1’s legal father, Christopher Hutton, were not terminated. The legal father of MC2, Jason Hollan, never appeared in the case and was found to have abandoned MC2. Hollan’s parental rights were terminated in the same order as Schultz’s, and he did not appeal. The once-putative father of MC3, Micah Collum, failed to establish paternity and was dismissed from the case. I. Relevant Facts On December 18, 2023, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for dependency-neglect and emergency custody of MC1, MC2, and MC3. 2 In the affidavit attached to the petition, a family-service worker (FSW) stated that DHS had received a report concerning Schultz’s mental stability while in the hospital with MC3 on December 14, 2023. Schultz had been arguing with Micah Collum, was screaming and yelling, and appeared to be very anxious. Schultz reportedly made comments that she wanted to die and that she had ideas in her head to drive her car into a tree. Schultz refused a recommended assessment at the hospital, and hospital staff contacted law enforcement due to Schultz’s erratic behavior. The next day, December 15, the FSW conducted a home visit; Schultz submitted to a drug screen and tested positive for cocaine and THC. Schultz told the FSW that she was not seeing her therapist, that she was not on her medication, and that Collum had stolen her medication. Schultz reported that Collum was using drugs when MC3 was born and had been staying with her and caring for MC3 while she was working and that Collum had relapsed. DHS exercised a seventy-two-hour hold based on concerns that both substance abuse and mental instability, developmental status, or cognitive deficiency seriously impaired the caregiver’s ability to supervise, protect, or care for the children. 2 The record reflects that when the petition was filed, there was a pending protective- services case that had been opened by DHS in November 2023 on the basis of Garrett’s Law after Schultz and MC3 tested positive for THC at MC3’s birth in October 2023, and a cord- blood-test result later came back positive for cocaine and THC. 2 The circuit court granted the petition for emergency custody on December 19, finding that there was probable cause to believe the children were dependent-neglected and that it was contrary to their welfare to remain in Schultz’s custody. A probable-cause hearing was held on December 20, and an order was filed on December 29. The court found that probable cause existed and continued to exist requiring that the children remain in DHS custody. The court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the children and granted DHS discretion to begin a trial home placement if Schultz could provide documentation that her medications had been filled and a negative drug screen. An adjudication hearing was held on January 23, 2024, and an order was filed January 30. The circuit court found that the allegations in the petition and accompanying affidavit were substantiated by the proof and that the children were dependent-neglected based on Garrett’s Law. The court further found that, at the time of the hearing, Schultz had appropriate housing and a stable job and, since the removal, had resumed taking her medication and was seeing a therapist regularly. According to the written order, “[p]ermanent custody” of the children was returned to Schultz, but because of concerns about Schultz’s drug use, the court was “keeping this case open, in a court-involved [protective-services] case.” The court ordered Schultz to cooperate with DHS. On April 2, the circuit court held a review hearing. The court was concerned with Schultz’s lack of cooperation and noted that two FSWs had testified that Schultz was difficult to work with and that Schultz “appeared to be smiling during serious testimony and she interrupted testimony and was defensive at times.” The court allowed the children to remain 3 with Schultz and ordered Schultz to comply with an updated case plan. The court ordered Schultz to submit to a psychological evaluation, hair-follicle testing, and random drug screens; continue with counseling; complete parenting classes; provide DHS with MC1’s homeschool curriculum; and permit DHS to see the children in the home. A second review hearing was held on June 4. The court found that Schultz was “doing much better this review.” Schultz had stable housing and transportation, was managing her mental health, had completed the psychological evaluation, and her hair-follicle test came back negative. The court found that Schultz was not currently working and that she still needed to finish parenting classes. Additionally, the court was concerned that Schultz had not provided an accredited curriculum regarding MC1’s education. The court allowed custody of the children to remain with Schultz and ordered that the case be left “open at this time to address the concern regarding [MC1’s] education and for [Schultz] to finish parenting.” A third review hearing was held on August 6. Schultz tested positive for THC at the hearing. The circuit court ordered DHS to hold a staffing to discuss the results of Schultz’s psychological evaluation and the recommendations made therein. The court found that Schultz had not complied with the court’s previous orders to provide the curriculum for MC1 and to finish parenting classes and ordered her to do so. The court also noted that Schultz had testified she was moving out of state but would not say where she was moving. The court was concerned with Schultz’s lack of compliance and positive drug test. The court 4 found that Schultz was “making the case difficult” and “failing to cooperate” and that progress was “backsliding.” The court found that MC1’s father, Christopher Hutton, had complied with the case plan and orders of the court, and the court was impressed with Hutton’s progress. Hutton had been residing in Kansas and, nevertheless, had been present at every hearing. The court found that it was in MC1’s best interest to be placed in Hutton’s temporary custody, and it so ordered. As to MC2 and MC3, who were currently with MC1 on an extended visit with Hutton, the court ordered that custody be placed with DHS because “the parents are unfit for custody or placement” but that MC2 and MC3 could remain in Hutton’s care on an extended visit. The court ordered supervised visitation between the children and Schultz. Schultz was ordered to maintain contact with DHS, including providing her current address. The court noted that the testimony and evidence indicated Schultz still had a home, transportation, and employment in Fort Smith and ordered that “[s]ervices shall continue to be offered in Fort Smith, AR, and [Schultz] shall comply with services.” A fourth review hearing was held on October 15. The court found that Hutton’s testimony was credible and that Schultz’s testimony was not credible. The court remained concerned about Schultz’s lack of cooperation and hostility during the case. The court found that Schultz had not yet benefited from the services in the case. Schultz was ordered to obtain and maintain appropriate housing, transportation, and income; provide proof of vehicle insurance; resolve her criminal issues; continue with therapy; complete anger-management 5 classes; and maintain regular visitation/family time. DHS was ordered to look at Schultz’s psychological evaluation “closely and confirm the history she gave is accurate and in full disclosure” so that all diagnoses and recommendations are accurate. The court ordered that MC1 “is hereby placed in the full permanent custody of the parent, Christopher Hutton.” Hutton and MC1 were “dismissed from the case, as permanency has been achieved for [MC1] with custody of him being placed with [his father].” As to MC2 and MC3, the court set the case goal as reunification with a concurrent goal of guardianship. The court ordered that MC2 and MC3 shall remain on extended visit with Hutton and noted that there was currently an “ongoing ICPC [3] [home study] request in Kansas.” The court ordered supervised visitation between the children and Schultz to occur at an appropriate facility in Kansas. A permanency-planning hearing was scheduled for January 7, 2025. On November 15, 2024, DHS filed a motion for emergency change of custody of MC1. DHS had learned that less than two weeks after the circuit court issued its order awarding “full permanent custody” of MC1 to Hutton, Schultz petitioned a Kansas court for an order of protection from stalking, sexual assault, or human trafficking against Hutton. The Kansas court had entered a temporary order of protection listing as protected persons Schultz and all three children. DHS was concerned that the Kansas court would potentially enter a permanent order of protection and give Schultz custody of MC1, when the court in 3 Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. 6 this case had found Schultz unfit for custody or placement and ordered her restricted to supervised visitation with the children. The circuit court granted an emergency change of custody, placed custody of MC1 with DHS, and added Hutton and MC1 as parties to the case again. All three children were removed from Hutton and placed in foster care in Arkansas. On November 26, the circuit court held a probable-cause hearing on the emergency change of custody as to MC1, and an order was filed on December 4. The court found that Schultz’s testimony at the hearing was not credible. The court had concerns about Schultz’s instability, her actions in Kansas, and the serious and negative impact of her actions on the children. The court found that Schultz “was attempting to usurp the Court’s authority with her pleadings filed in Kansas.” The court ordered that there shall be no visitation between the children and Schultz without further order of the court. The court further found that it had “exclusive jurisdiction regarding custody and placement of the juveniles.” The court ordered that if any other court, including an out-of-state court, awarded Schultz custody of the children, “Schultz shall not exercise any custody towards [the children] and shall immediately return [the children] to [DHS].” A permanency-planning hearing was held on January 7, 2025, and an order was filed on January 17. The court remained very concerned about returning custody of the children to Schultz. The court found that Schultz had not been honest in her testimony and was “not credible at all.” The court found that Schultz was pursuing a Kansas case “while coming into this court and essentially denying that stance.” Schultz had been inconsistent with counseling 7 and had not completed Triple P parenting classes. The court found that visitation had not been beneficial to the children, “and especially with respect to [MC1], who has been severely affected by the last visit.” The court did not believe that continued services offered to Schultz would result in a successful reunification. The court had “grave concerns” about contact between the children and Schultz and ordered that it was not in the best interest of the children to have any form of visitation with Schultz. The court further found that DHS had complied with the case plan and orders of the court and had made reasonable efforts to provide family services and finalize a permanency plan for the children. The court found that DHS had offered numerous services, including parenting classes, hair-follicle testing, random drug tests, home visits, case-manager services, and facilitating the pending ICPC home study in Kansas. The court found that Schultz, nevertheless, had not made significant, measurable progress. The goal of the case was changed to adoption following termination of parental rights with respect to Schultz. The court noted that it had consistently found that Hutton had followed the case plan and “continues to find that there is nothing left other than clean up the mess caused by this mother in Kansas.” The court ordered that the children remain in DHS custody because Schultz was unfit, and custody could not be placed with Hutton until the legal matter in Kansas was resolved. On January 23, 2025, DHS filed a petition for termination of Schultz’s parental rights alleging subsequent factors and aggravated circumstances as grounds for termination. A termination hearing was held on March 4, June 10, and September 16. Schultz admitted that 8 the case had been going on for over a year and that, as of March 4, when the termination hearing began, she still had not completed anger-management or Triple P parenting classes and needed to find stable housing. By the time of the final hearing date on September 16, she testified that she had housing, transportation, and employment and that she had completed the following services: two hair-follicle tests, two psychological evaluations, three different parenting classes, anger-management classes, and a drug-and-alcohol assessment. She testified that she had recently moved but was unable to provide an address for her new home and was “not exactly sure” how many bedrooms there were. She also testified that she currently had two jobs but admitted that she had not provided any proof of employment to DHS. She testified that she was not aware of the recommendations made in her second psychological evaluation, which was completed in February 2025, until a week or two before the September 16 hearing date. She testified that while she did not reach out to her FSW about those referrals, she would be willing to complete the recommended services if the court would allow her more time to work on her case plan. DHS caseworker Elyse Turner testified that, throughout the case, Schultz was “always combative” and difficult to work with. Turner said that Schultz never provided an accredited homeschool curriculum for MC1. She said that Schultz did not complete the Triple P parenting classes because she did not want anyone in the home. She testified that after the children were placed with Schultz at the adjudication hearing, Schultz left and moved to Kansas and did not finish her case plan, causing the children to be placed in DHS custody 9 once again. According to Turner, Schultz refused to provide DHS an address in Kansas and would not allow DHS access to records concerning her progress. Turner testified that DHS had not been able to verify Schultz’s housing or employment. She said that, by the time of the termination hearing, DHS still had the same concerns regarding Schultz; nothing had changed. As to Schultz’s compliance with the case plan and orders of the court, Turner said: “She doesn’t like to do them and very rarely does she, unless . . . her back is to the wall, will she do them.” She said that Schultz picks and chooses what it is she wants to do or not do. According to Turner, it was not until the termination petition was filed that Schultz finally decided to start some of the services. Turner testified that the last visitation between the children and Schultz occurred nearly a year prior. Turner did not believe that any visitation would be appropriate; it would be too traumatic for the children. She noted the suffering inflicted on the children in connection with Schultz’s court filings in Kansas. Turner testified that Schultz had not benefited from any of the services that she had completed. She further testified that there were no services DHS could offer to help achieve successful reunification. Turner did not believe that continuing services would result in a successful reunification because of Schultz’s “history of trying to do services,” her resistance, and her lack of communication. Additionally, Turner testified to the children’s adoptability. She said that Hutton was interested in adopting MC2 and MC3 so that all three children could be together and continue their tight bond. She said that it was necessary to terminate Schultz’s rights as to 10 MC1 for MC1 to achieve permanency, especially because of Schultz’s mental instability and refusal to take responsibility for her actions. DHS caseworker supervisor Kristen Hill testified that the referral for Triple P parenting class was made before Schultz moved to Kansas. Hill said that Schultz knew that Triple P wanted to be in her home and attempted to get services started, but Schultz chose to go to Kansas. Hill testified that there are not any services DHS could continue to offer for successful reunification in light of Schultz’s lack of compliance throughout the entire case. She said that Schultz did not want to comply with anything the court ordered or that DHS had ordered. She testified that even in the beginning, when it was a protective-services case and the children were in her home, Schultz still did not want to comply with DHS. She said that Schultz was “very defiant and argumentative.” Hill did not believe that Schultz would benefit from any services for which DHS had not made referrals because, based on Schultz’s history, she would not comply. Hill testified that when Schultz found out the circuit court had awarded Hutton full permanent custody of MC1 in October 2024, she immediately went to a court in Kansas and filed an order of protection against Hutton. Hill said that because of the order of protection in Kansas, DHS had to remove the children from Hutton. The children were brought back to Arkansas and placed in foster care. According to Hill, Hutton had done nothing wrong, and the order of protection was based on the lies that Schultz was perpetuating on the Kansas court. Nevertheless, until the order of protection in Kansas was resolved, the children could not go back to Hutton. 11 Hill had been present at the hearings before the circuit court and had attended four of the hearings before the court in Kansas. Hill recalled the circuit court ordering Schultz, and Schultz agreeing, to do everything possible to get the children removed from the Kansas order of protection. Hill testified that Schultz did not comply with the court’s order. Instead, Schultz went to the court in Kansas and argued vigorously that the Kansas court had jurisdiction over the issue of the children’s custody. Schultz told the Kansas court that she was doing everything she was supposed to do and never mentioned any of the Arkansas court’s orders or asked to have the children removed from the order of protection. According to Hill, Schultz’s lack of cooperation with DHS paled in comparison to Schultz’s contemptuous behavior relating to the Kansas order of protection. Hill had never seen this blatant disregard of a court order by a parent. Hill testified that because of Schultz’s actions, MC1 was not with his father from October 2024 to March 2025. And Schultz’s failure to follow the circuit court’s order to get the children removed from the order of protection tacked on an additional three months. Hill said that if Schultz had complied with the court’s order, the children could have gone back to Hutton and, especially MC1, would not have endured months of foster-care placement with a “stranger” instead of being with his father. She testified that ultimately Hutton had to hire an attorney in Kansas to resolve the order of protection so that MC1 could come home. Hill stated that nothing changed after the order of protection was resolved and the children went back to Kansas with Hutton; Schultz had “stayed away” from the children since October 2024. Hill testified that the case had been open for nearly two years, and it 12 would not be safe for the children to return to Schultz. She testified that the children are adoptable and that there were no barriers to Hutton’s adopting MC2 and MC3 as a single parent so that the three children could stay together. She said that even if Hutton did not adopt, the children would benefit from having an emotionally stable parent and not Schultz. The circuit court entered an order terminating Schultz’s parental rights on January 16, 2026. The court found that DHS had provided family services to Schultz since November 2023. At the time of the termination hearing, which began on March 4, 2025, Schultz had only recently paid for anger-management classes that she was ordered to complete on October 15, 2024. Additionally, Schultz was “evasive in revealing where she was living,” and “it was evident to the Court that she did not have stable housing.” She provided incomplete information as to her employment. She never provided the homeschool curriculum to DHS despite her testimony that she did so in May 2024. The court found that Schultz’s testimony throughout the pendency of the case showed her lack of truthfulness, lack of cooperation, and continuous attempts to manipulate and disregard the case plan and orders of the court. The court noted that Schultz reported in her psychological evaluation that this case began after she was falsely accused of substance abuse. The court further noted that while Schultz originally tested positive for cocaine, she was ultimately able to produce a drug test negative for cocaine, but she continued to test positive for THC, and the children were adjudicated dependent-neglected pursuant to Garrett’s Law. The court found that Schultz’s testimony regarding cocaine usage “has been inconsistent and has been all over the place[,]” but “[t]he evidence is absolute that she has consistently used marijuana before, during, and 13 after this case opened[.]” By the beginning of the termination hearing, Schultz had still not completed anger-management classes; she never provided the homeschool curriculum; she did not have appropriate housing; and she had not completed Triple P parenting classes. Among other things, the court found Schultz’s filing a protective-family-services case against Hutton in Kansas “incredible” in light of the fact that before the children were placed with Hutton on an extended visit, Schultz had characterized Hutton as her best friend. As a result of Schultz’s actions, which caused a Kansas court to enter an ordering prohibiting Hutton from having contact with MC1, the circuit court had no choice but to remove MC1 from the custody of Hutton and place MC1 back in the custody of DHS, disrupting MC1’s previously achieved permanency. The court found that Schultz’s actions causing all three children to be separated from Hutton were “extremely harmful” to the children and caused them “significant trauma.” The court found that, by the time of the termination hearing, Schultz “continued to fail to cooperate and her credibility continued to be lacking” and that the record shows that Schultz “has continuing instability, repeated positive drug screens, has failed to provide proof of compliance with services, has moved across state lines without notice, and has interfered with Court-ordered placements.” The court found that, despite nearly fifteen months of intensive services, Schultz “has not achieved or maintained the stability necessary to safely parent her children, and the juveniles would be at risk of harm if returned to [her].” After considering the evidence, the circuit court found by clear and convincing evidence that both grounds alleged in the petition supported termination and that it was in 14 the children’s best interest to terminate Schultz’s parental rights. First, the court found that Schultz had subjected the children to aggravated circumstances: specifically, that “a determination has been or is made by a judge that there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful reunification[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35- 325(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A)–(B)(i) (Supp. 2025). The court stated the following with respect to the aggravated-circumstances ground: The Court found at the hearing on January 7, 2025, that continuing to work services is not likely to result in a successful reunification. [Schultz’s] actions in this case have been detrimental to the health, safety, and welfare of the juveniles, and she has failed to work or benefit from any services, despite the intense services offered by [DHS]. The Court has found for her to have contact with the juveniles to be harmful and against the juveniles’ best interest. She has taken action to circumvent the Court’s orders and then lied to the Court about doing so. The Court does find there is little likelihood services to the family which would result in a successful reunification. Next, the court found that “other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of [the children] in the custody of [Schultz] is contrary to [the children’s] health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, [Schultz] has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate [her] circumstances that prevent the placement of [the children] in [her] custody[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a). The court found the following with respect to the other- subsequent-factors ground: Schultz has failed to comply with the orders of the Court, or work services towards reunification. [She] has taken actions that have been harmful and traumatizing to the juvenile[s’] health, safety, and welfare. She has failed to 15 obtain or maintain stability in housing, income, or transportation. She has continually been untruthful to the Court. The Court has found for her to have contact with the juveniles to be harmful and against the juveniles’ best interest. She has taken action to circumvent the Court’s orders and then lied to the Court about doing so. [She] has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the circumstances that prevent placement of the juvenile[s] in [her] custody. Finally, the circuit court found that termination of Schultz’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The court noted that DHS had identified potential adoptive placements for the children and that Schultz “continues to have instability, repeated positive drug screens, failed to comply with services, and despite the length of time this case has been open, she has not achieved or maintained the stability necessary to safely parent the children.” Specifically, the court made the following findings: As to [MC2’s and MC3’s] adoptability, the Court finds that the juveniles are adoptable. As to the adoptability of [MC1], the Court finds that adoptability as to him is legally irrelevant as Christopher Hutton’s parental rights are not being terminated and as such [MC1] could not be free for adoption after the termination. However, the Court does find that it is in [MC1’s] best interest that Brittany Schultz’s parental rights be terminated as to [MC1] as well, despite the parental rights of Christopher Hutton not being terminated as well. As to potential harm, the Court finds that the juveniles would be subjected to potential harm if parental rights are not terminated, specifically, potential psychological and physical harm to the juvenile[s]. As stated above, and in paragraph 9 of this order, the facts show Brittany Schultz has subjected the juveniles to trauma from her actions and the juveniles would be subjected to potential harm if the rights were not terminated. Schultz obtained an order of indigency for appeal and filed a timely notice of appeal on February 3, 2026. II. Standard of Review 16 A circuit court’s order terminating parental rights must be based upon findings proved by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3). A circuit court must find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child, taking into consideration (1) the likelihood that the child will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and (2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(A). The order terminating parental rights must also be based on a showing of clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds for termination listed in section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B). Jurls v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 443, at 10, 676 S.W.3d 316, 324. Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural rights of parents, but parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child. Perry v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 193, at 7, 625 S.W.3d 374, 379. In deciding whether to terminate the parental rights of a parent, the circuit court has a duty to look at the entire picture of how that parent has discharged his or her duties as a parent. Id., 625 S.W.3d at 379. The intent behind the termination-of- parental-rights statute is to provide permanency in a child’s life when it is not possible to return the child to the family home because it is contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and a return to the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(a)(3). Even full 17 compliance with the case plan is not determinative; the issue is whether the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her child. Jurls, 2023 Ark. App. 443, at 10, 676 S.W.3d at 324. This court’s review of termination proceedings is de novo, and we will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 324. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 324. In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, we give due deference to the opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 324. III. Discussion A. Jurisdiction In her first point on appeal, Schultz purports to raise an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. Relying on Young v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2012 Ark. 334, Schultz argues that the circuit court lost jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights when the court adjudicated the children dependent-neglected and then simultaneously ordered the children placed back in her “permanent” custody. Schultz contends that this effectively terminated the dependent-neglected status of the children and closed the dependency- neglect proceeding. In a similar vein, Schultz also contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to “reopen” the case as to MC1 and order an emergency change of custody when the court had previously awarded full permanent custody to Hutton and dismissed MC1 and 18 Hutton from the case. Schultz further argues that the commission of statutory and procedural errors throughout the case divested the circuit court of jurisdiction to enter the termination order. We disagree. Schultz’s reliance on Young is misplaced, and her argument does not implicate the circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. In Young, an earlier dependency-neglect action had been closed in 2009 when the juvenile court placed the child in the permanent custody of the Sextons with visitation to the mother. 2012 Ark. 334, at 2. Two years later, the Sextons filed, in the same case name and number from the closed dependency-neglect action, an emergency petition to modify the mother’s visitation. Id. at 2–3 n.1. The mother counterclaimed, seeking custody of the child. The juvenile court reopened the case and decided the custody issue in a “permanency-planning” format, although it was not a dependency-neglect matter. Our supreme court held in the Young appeal that the circuit court erred in applying the Juvenile Code because the dependency-neglect case had been resolved, the action had been terminated, and the case could not be reopened. Id. at 3. However, because the juvenile division is a circuit court—and therefore a court of general jurisdiction—with authority to hear a general child-custody case, the supreme court nevertheless decided the merits of the appeal. Id. at 3–4. We discussed the Young holding in Abram v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2016 Ark. App. 437, 502 S.W.3d 563. In Abram, a dependency-neglect case was opened and subsequently closed after the children successfully achieved reunification with their mother. Less than a month after the case had been closed, the mother was arrested on drug-related 19 charges, and DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect under the same docket number of the case that the court had closed the month before. Eventually, a termination hearing was held, and at the close of the hearing, the mother orally moved to dismiss the termination proceeding on the basis that DHS had erroneously filed the case under the same docket number as the closed dependency-neglect action. The circuit court denied the motion and terminated the mother’s parental rights. We rejected the mother’s argument in the Abram appeal as follows: Appellant’s reliance on Young is misplaced. The facts in this case are very different from the facts before the court in Young. Here, the dependency- neglect action had been closed for less than a month when the new petition for emergency custody and dependency neglect was filed, not two years later as in Young. Second, the new petition in this case was not a general-custody matter but a dependency-neglect petition, exactly the type of case heard in juvenile court. Appellant admits that the circuit court in this case had jurisdiction over the matter. Appellant argues, relying on Young, that the court improperly exercised its jurisdiction and thus that the [circuit] court erred in not dismissing the case. We recognize that the supreme court held in Young that the circuit court erred in reopening the two-year-closed dependency-neglect case to entertain a petition for modification of visitation. We do not interpret the court’s opinion, however, as forbidding the reopening of a closed dependency- neglect case in all circumstances, nor do we discern that the court offered a remedy for any alleged error in doing so. Indeed, in Young, where the court specifically held that the circuit court erred in reopening the case, the court then decided the merits of the appeal. Accordingly, in this dependency-neglect case—decided on its own merits, occurring less than a month after the initial dependency-neglect case had been closed, and over which the juvenile court clearly had subject-matter jurisdiction—we hold that the court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 4–5, 502 S.W.3d at 566–67 (footnote omitted). 20 Notably, in the present case, the circuit court did not close the initial dependency- neglect case. Rather, while the adjudication order states that the children were placed back in the “permanent” custody of Schultz, the court expressly ordered that the case be left open and that DHS continue to offer services due to concerns about Schultz’s drug usage. We note that the course of action taken by the circuit court here does not come within the meaning of “permanent custody” as contemplated in the Juvenile Code. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-102(44) (Supp. 2025) (“Permanent custody” means “custody that is transferred to a person as a permanency disposition in a juvenile case and the case is closed.”); cf. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-102(59) (“Temporary custody” means “custody that is transferred to a person during the pendency of the juvenile division of circuit court case when services are being provided to achieve the goal of the case plan.”); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-102(60) (“Trial placement” means that custody of the juvenile remains with DHS, but the juvenile is returned to the home of a parent or the person from whom custody was removed for a period not to exceed sixty days.); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-102(48) (“Protection plan” means a written plan developed by DHS in conjunction with the family and support network to protect the juvenile from harm and that allows the juvenile to remain safely in the home.). We also note that, from our review of the