Full Opinion

25-2528-cv Moy v. Napoli Shkolnik UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 17th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: Steven J. Menashi, Sarah A. L. Merriam, Matthew A. Schwartz, Circuit Judges. ____________________________________________ Selma Moy, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 25-2528 Napoli Shkolnik, PLLC, Paul Napoli, Marie Napoli, Defendants-Appellees, Gloria Werle, Salvatore C. Badala, Defendants. ____________________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellant: STEPHEN BERGSTEIN, Bergstein & Ullrich, New Paltz, New York. For Defendants-Appellees: HOLLY G. ROGERS, Melick & Porter, LLP, Southbury, Connecticut. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Ho, J.). Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff-Appellant Selma Moy appeals from a judgment granting summary judgment to the defendants on her discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal. I Selma Moy sued her former employer, Napoli Shkolnik, PLLC, and several individual defendants at the firm, alleging discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of federal law, New York state law, and New York City law. The district court dismissed some of Moy’s claims and allowed the rest to proceed to discovery under a Civil Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order, setting the various discovery deadlines. The Order specified that requests to modify or extend the schedule must be made “no fewer than two business days prior to the expiration of the date sought to be extended.” J. App’x 49 (emphasis omitted). Aside from an unsuccessful settlement conference in November 2024, Moy took no steps to advance her case until January 31, 2025, the last day of fact discovery. She did not provide her initial disclosures, serve written discovery requests, respond or object to the defendants’ discovery requests, or provide any other information during the fact discovery period. On January 31, Moy’s counsel 2 filed a letter requesting a sixty-day extension of the fact discovery deadline. The district court denied the request because “(1) Plaintiff had not shown diligence in the taking of discovery, and (2) the request was untimely filed without any explanation.” Moy v. Napoli Shkolnik, PLLC, No. 23-CV-3788, 2025 WL 2780865, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2025). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The defendants argued that because Moy provided no information during fact discovery, she was “left with literally no admissible evidence to support her claims.” J. App’x 76 (¶ 8). Moy filed an opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In that opposition, she offered a counterstatement of the facts and presented declarations from witnesses, emails, and various other documents. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment for two reasons. First, the district court concluded that summary judgment was warranted because Moy had no admissible evidence to support her claims. See Moy, 2025 WL 2780865, at *2 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). The district court declined to consider the evidence Moy had proffered in her opposition because “none of these materials were disclosed during the fact discovery period.” Id. at *3. Second, the district court relied on Rule 41(b) in granting summary judgment because, in its view, Moy had failed to prosecute her case. See id. The district court reasoned that “a summary judgment motion may be granted by default if the facts justify a dismissal for failure to prosecute.” Id. (quoting Lediju v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 173 F.R.D. 105, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). The district court applied our court’s five-factor test under Rule 41(b) and concluded that “the balance of factors weighs in favor of dismissal for failure to prosecute.” Id. This appeal followed. II Moy argues that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing her case for failure to prosecute. The defendants contend that the discussion of the 3 Rule 41(b) factors was dicta. In the defendants’ view, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment because Moy’s failure to participate in discovery left her without admissible evidence to support her claims. We agree with Moy that her failure to prosecute did not justify the grant of summary judgment. While a failure to prosecute may warrant dismissal under Rule 41(b), it is not a valid basis for granting summary judgment under Rule 56. But the district court did not grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment solely on the basis of a failure to prosecute. The district court additionally determined that summary judgment was appropriate because “there is no timely- disclosed record evidence to support [Moy’s] claims.” Id. at *4. We conclude that Moy forfeited any challenge to the exclusion of her untimely evidence. Without any admissible evidence to support her claims, the district court properly granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. A “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2023). “Summary judgment is proper when ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” McKinney v. City of Middletown, 49 F.4th 730, 737 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, “the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. “If the moving party carries its burden, the nonmoving party must ‘come forward with evidence that would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in its favor.’” McKinney, 49 F.4th at 738 (quoting Burt Rigid Box, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 302 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2002)). If the nonmoving party fails to meet this burden, then “there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential 4 element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. B Moy bore the burden of proving the essential elements of her claims at trial. The defendants carried their initial burden by “pointing out to the district court” that “there is an absence of evidence to support” Moy’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see J. App’x 75 (¶ 6) (“Plaintiff never provide[d] any information as to what she would testify to if called to testify at trial; did not identify any witnesses in support of her claims; did not identify any documents in support of her claims; and did not specify any damages that she claimed to have incurred.”). The burden shifted to Moy to “come forward with evidence that would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in [her] favor.” McKinney, 49 F.4th at 738 (quoting Burt Rigid Box, 302 F.3d at 91). Moy argues that she “submitted evidence demonstrating her case is meritorious.” Appellant’s Br. 25. But the district court declined to consider that evidence because it was not disclosed in fact discovery, where it could be contested by the defendants. Nowhere in her opening appellate brief does Moy challenge the decision of the district court to exclude her untimely evidence. “When a party fails adequately to present arguments in an appellant’s brief, we consider those arguments abandoned.” Hayden v. Koons, 183 F.4th 136, 148 (2d Cir. 2026) (quoting State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158, 172 (2d Cir. 2004)). Because Moy does not challenge the exclusion of her evidence, we conclude that she has forfeited the argument. Without any evidence properly before the district court to support her claims, Moy cannot carry her burden. Moy argues that “the district court did not grant summary judgment on the substance of the case” and therefore she “had no basis to challenge that ruling beyond arguing that dismissal was improper under Rule 41(b).” Reply Br. 19. We are not persuaded. The discussion of the Rule 41(b) factors by the district court might have been confusing because the motion before it was one for summary 5 judgment rather than a motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b). And we agree with Moy that her purported failure to prosecute her case, standing alone, would not be a sufficient basis for a grant of summary judgment. Rule 41(b) authorizes a “dismissal” rather than summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). But the district court did not rely solely on Rule 41(b). The district court was clear that it granted the motion for summary judgment “because there is no timely-disclosed record evidence to support her claims.” Moy, 2025 WL 2780865, at *4. Moy has not adequately presented an argument on appeal that the district court erroneously excluded her untimely evidence. Without any admissible evidence to support her claims, summary judgment in favor of the defendants was proper. Moy also forfeited any challenge to the denial of her request to extend the deadline to complete discovery. Moy argues in her reply brief that the order denying her extension request was incorporated in her notice of appeal because “a notice of appeal from a final judgment brings up for review all reviewable rulings which produced the judgment.” Reply Br. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting SongByrd, Inc. v. Est. of Grossman, 206 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2000)). Even if her notice of appeal encompassed the order denying her request, Moy was still required to develop an argument challenging that decision in her opening brief. See Hayden, 183 F.4th at 148; see also McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A]rguments not raised in an appellant’s opening brief, but only in his reply brief, are not properly before an appellate court.”). But Moy offers no justification for her failure to timely request an extension as required under the district judge’s individual rules and Scheduling Order. Nor does she address the good-cause standard under Rule 16(b)(4), which governs modification of a scheduling order. “[I]t is not our obligation to ferret out a party’s arguments. That, after all, is the purpose of briefing.” McCarthy, 406 F.3d at 186. Accordingly, we conclude that Moy has also forfeited any challenge to that ruling. We affirm the judgment of the district court because it did not err in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. Because that decision justifies the judgment, we need not separately consider whether the 6 district court abused its discretion insofar as it also relied on Rule 41(b) to justify the dismissal of Moy’s case. * * * We have considered Moy’s remaining arguments, which we conclude are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 7