Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-10038 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 1 of 12 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-10038 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ CECILE JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:23-cv-03881-MCR-HTC ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, KIDD, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Appellant Cecile Jackson, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the fed- USCA11 Case: 25-10038 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 2 of 12 2 Opinion of the Court 25-10038 eral defendant, the Secretary of the Air Force, her former em- ployer, on her claims of racial and gender discrimination and retal- iation. On appeal, she argues that the district court failed to con- sider the cumulative evidence of discrimination and reprisal in the record and otherwise applied an improper standard. Having re- viewed the record and read the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Secretary of the Air Force on Jackson’s claims. I. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752, 758 (11th Cir. 2025). We liberally construe pro se briefs. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). But “[w]hen an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal [a ground] on which the district court based its judgment, [s]he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). An appellant fails to properly “brief ” a claim when she does not “plainly and prominently” raise it in her initial brief or other- wise raises it in a “perfunctory manner” without supporting argu- ments and authority. Id. at 681 (quotation marks omitted). A court may grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ismael, 161 F.4th at 758 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). If a rational trier of fact cannot reach a decision for the nonmoving party, then no genuine USCA11 Case: 25-10038 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 3 of 12 25-10038 Opinion of the Court 3 issue of material fact exists. Id. When reviewing the record, we view all evidence and factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. We “will affirm the grant of summary judgment if the result is cor- rect, even if the [district] court relied upon an incorrect ground or gave a wrong reason.” Terrell v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 98 F.4th 1343, 1353 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted). II. Title VII provides that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting [fed- eral] employees . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Before suing their em- ployer, the federal employee “must seek relief from the agency where the alleged discrimination occurred.” Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 146 F.4th 972, 988 (11th Cir. 2025). As such, a federal em- ployee who believes she has been discriminated against must “ini- tiate contact” with an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct or within 45 days of the effective date of a personnel action. Id. at 989 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1)). The 45-day clock “begins run- ning for each discrimination claim when that claim accrues.” Id. Generally, if an employee misses the 45-day deadline, her claim is barred. Id. However, the 45-day deadline is not jurisdic- tional, and it may be waived or subject to estoppel and equitable tolling. Id. Thus, the 45-day deadline is extended “if the employee shows ‘that he or she did not know and reasonably should not have . . . known that the discriminatory matter . . . occurred.’” Id. USCA11 Case: 25-10038 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 4 of 12 4 Opinion of the Court 25-10038 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(2)) (alterations in original). More- over, an employee may amend her EEO charge to clarify her alle- gations or to add additional acts of alleged discrimination that grew out of the subject matter of the original charge. Id. Plaintiffs must also adhere to certain deadlines to ensure their complaint to the district court is timely filed. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.310, 1614.407. Depending on the type of EEO charge made, a plaintiff usually has 90 days from the receipt of the Final Agency Decision (“FAD”) on her individual charge to file her com- plaint before the district court. Id. § 1614.407(a). However, the deadline for filing a complaint is much shorter in mixed case com- plaints. Id. § 1614.310. “A mixed case complaint is a complaint of employment discrimination filed with a federal agency based on race; . . . [or] sex; . . . related to or stemming from an action that can be appealed to the” Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”). Id. § 1614.302(a)(1). Such an appeal must be made within 30 days of the plaintiff’s receipt of the FAD. Id. § 1614.302(d)(1)(ii). How- ever, the plaintiff may choose instead to forgo the MSPB appeal and directly file suit in federal court but must do so within 30 days of receipt of the FAD. Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 45, 133 S. Ct. 596, 601 (2012); See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). We have held that § 2000e-16(a) imposes different require- ments for discrimination claims by federal employees in contrast with private-sector Title VII cases, explaining that federal person- nel actions must not be tainted by differential treatment based on a protected characteristic. Babb v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs. (“Babb USCA11 Case: 25-10038 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 5 of 12 25-10038 Opinion of the Court 5 II”), 992 F.3d 1193, 1198–1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2021). If “‘discrimi- nation plays any part in the way a decision is made,’ then that deci- sion necessarily ‘is not made in a way that is untainted by such dis- crimination.’” Id. at 1199 (quoting Babb v. Wilkie (“Babb I”), 589 U.S. 399, 406, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1173-74 (2020)). Thus, Title VII’s federal- sector provision does not require a showing of but-for causation to make out a violation. Id., 140 S. Ct. at 1173-74. Rather, a federal-sector employee must show only that a pro- tected characteristic played any part in her employer’s process in reaching an adverse employment decision. Buckley v. Sec’y of Army, 97 F.4th 784, 794 (11th Cir. 2024). This necessarily means that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which imposes a heavier burden of proof, does not apply to federal-sector Title VII claims. Id. at 794–95. However, this does not mean that a federal employee cannot use the McDonnell Douglas framework to state her claim. Rosado v. Sec’y, Dep’t of the Navy, 127 F.4th 858, 866 (11th Cir. 2025). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she “experienced an adverse employment action,” (3) she “was qualified to perform the job,” and (4) her “em- ployer treated similarly situated employees outside h[er] class more favorably.” Jimenez, 146 F.4th at 996. If the prima facie case of McDonnell Douglas is unavailing, however, a plaintiff may present a “convincing mosaic of circum- stantial evidence” that establishes “an inference of intentional dis- USCA11 Case: 25-10038 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 6 of 12 6 Opinion of the Court 25-10038 crimination.” Id. at 997 (quotation marks omitted). The “convinc- ing mosaic” standard “refers to a variety of evidence” that strongly suggests that the employer’s decision was based on the employee’s protected characteristic. Id. (quotation marks omitted). In estab- lishing the convincing mosaic, a plaintiff can “point to suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees, or evidence that the employer’s justi- fication for its action is pretextual.” Id. This standard is essentially a “stand-in” for garden-variety Rule 56 summary judgment analyses in the employment discrimi- nation context. See Ismael, 161 F.4th at 760. Thus, it always exists as the normal option for a district court adjudicating a summary judgment motion, while McDonnell Douglas is a special evidentiary showing that can be satisfied on top of the convincing mosaic framework. Id. at 765. A failure of a plaintiff to satisfy McDonnell Douglas is thus non-dispositive in and of itself at summary judg- ment, and a district court must nevertheless conduct the broader convincing mosaic inquiry by considering all the evidence. Id. at 763–65. Regardless of the framework a plaintiff uses to establish her case, we ultimately analyze the evidence to simply determine “whether there is enough evidence to show that the reason for an adverse employment action was illegal discrimination.” Jimenez, 146 F.4th at 997 (quotation marks omitted). We are not meant to act as a “super-personnel department,” and it is not our role to sec- ond-guess an employer’s decisions, as an employer may act for a USCA11 Case: 25-10038 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 7 of 12 25-10038 Opinion of the Court 7 good reason or a bad reason, so long as that reason was not an un- lawful one. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Notably, the presence of an “adverse employment action” is not just an element of the prima facie discrimination case. Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1056 (11th Cir. 2012). The existence of an adverse employment action is part of the Title VII claim itself. Id. An adverse employment action is a change in an employee’s work- ing condition that harms “an identifiable term or condition of em- ployment.” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354–55, 144 S. Ct. 967, 974 (2024) (addressing adverse employment actions in a private-sector employee’s Title VII discrimination suit). Essentially, an adverse employment action encompasses any action where the plaintiff is “treat[ed] worse” due to her protected characteristic, or “suffer[s] some injury in employment terms or conditions.” Id. at 355–56. As we noted in Jimenez, § 2000e-16(a) refers to “personnel ac- tions,” which we construe more narrowly than an adverse employ- ment action. Jimenez, 146 F.4th at 995 n.7. Thus, a federal-sector employee must “describe conduct that rises to [the] level” of a “per- sonnel action” as defined under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2). Babb II, 992 F.3d at 1209 (discussing a federal-sector Title VII retaliatory hostile work environment claim). Under § 2302(a)(2), the following are considered personnel actions: a “disciplinary or corrective action,” a performance evaluation, “a decision concerning pay, benefits, or awards, or concerning education or training if the education or training may reasonably be expected to lead to an appointment, USCA11 Case: 25-10038 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 8 of 12 8 Opinion of the Court 25-10038 promotion, performance evaluation, or other action described in this subparagraph,” and “any other significant change in duties, re- sponsibilities, or working conditions.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii), (viii), (ix), & (xii). We generally do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 189 F.4th 1281, 1297 n. 9 (11th Cir. 2026). A plaintiff also cannot raise new claims at the summary judgment stage. Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004). To assert a new claim, the plaintiff must amend her complaint, which the plaintiff cannot do through arguments in her brief opposing the defendant’s sum- mary judgment motion. Id. at 1315. III. The record demonstrates that Jackson fails to show error in the district court’s order granting summary judgment as to her dis- crimination claims. As an initial matter, we find that none of Jack- son’s arguments involving the Family Medical Leave Act, Fifth Amendment, Privacy Act, defamation, or hostile work environ- ment are properly before us because she did not raise these claims in the district court. Additionally, her brief is entirely silent as to the district court’s finding of no adverse personnel action because of these alleged discriminatory acts. We could affirm on the aban- donment basis alone, but we also conclude that affirmance is proper on the merits. Assuming the district court erred in failing to conduct a for- mal “convincing mosaic” inquiry under Ismael, such error was USCA11 Case: 25-10038 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 9 of 12 25-10038 Opinion of the Court 9 harmless because the order otherwise indicates that the district court did not improperly exclude certain evidence. See Ismael, 161 F.4th at 763. We conclude that each piece of alleged discrimina- tion, even when all inferences are drawn in Jackson’s favor, does not raise a triable issue of genuine fact. Many of the alleged inci- dents fail because the facts in the record show no adverse personnel action or because they are otherwise time-barred by the 45-day reg- ulatory deadline. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order of summary judgment to the Secretary of the Army on Jackson’s discrimination claims. IV. Title VII also protects federal employees from retaliation. Babb II, 992 F.3d at 1203. To establish a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must establish “that she (1) en- gaged in protected EEO activity and (2) suffered an adverse em- ployment action, and (3) she must establish a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Terrell, 98 F.4th at 1355. The plaintiff “can establish a violation either by proving that her EEO activity was a but-for cause of [the adverse employment action] or by proving that retaliation tainted” the decision-making process. Id. Where an adverse employment action occurs before an employee engages in a protected activity, such adverse employ- ment action cannot serve as the basis for a retaliation claim. Id. Moreover, the plaintiff must show that the decisionmaker knew that she engaged in a protected activity at the time he or she made the adverse employment decision. Jiminez, 146 F.4th at 998. USCA11 Case: 25-10038 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 10 of 12 10 Opinion of the Court 25-10038 We have relied on standards that apply but-for causation in determining whether retaliation tainted a personnel action under the more lenient federal-sector causation standard. See Buckley v. Sec’y of the Army, 97 F.4th 784, 799-800 (11th Cir. 2024) (relying on prior caselaw in the context of a but-for inquiry regarding temporal proximity between protected activity and personnel actions in find- ing that a federal-sector retaliation claim failed). In the context of a but-for inquiry, “[t]he burden of causation can be met by showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action . . . [b]ut mere temporal prox- imity, without more, must be very close.” Thomas v. Cooper Light- ing, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). “Thus, in the absence of other evidence tending to show causation, if there is a substantial delay between the protected ex- pression and the adverse action, the complaint of retaliation fails as a matter of law.” Id. This necessarily entails showing that the de- cisionmaker was aware of the plaintiff’s protected activity. See Pat- terson v. Georgia Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1351 (11th Cir. 2022). We have held that, even when there is close temporal proximity be- tween protected conduct and materially adverse employment ac- tion, temporal proximity alone does not establish the necessary pretext to show retaliatory intent. Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1137 n.15 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). V. USCA11 Case: 25-10038 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 11 of 12 25-10038 Opinion of the Court 11 The record demonstrates that the district court did not err in dismissing Jackson’s retaliation claim. As an initial matter, be- cause Jackson did not raise any argument against the district court’s finding that no federal personnel actions sufficed to maintain her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), she has abandoned any chal- lenge to the order, and we can affirm based on this reason alone. Even on the merits, we conclude that her claim still fails because every allegedly adverse action taken by the defendant either pre- dated any protected activity—and thus cannot constitute a re- prisal—or fails to meet the “significant harm” standard for adverse employment actions in the retaliation context. Many of the alleged actions of reprisal—restructuring, in- creased workload, promotion comment, pay differential request, the Fall 2020 Employee Performance Report, and the leave ap- proval issue—all pre-dated Jackson’s first contact with her EEO counselor. The other alleged instances of unlawful conduct cannot form the basis of a retaliation claim because they do not imply suf- ficient adverse employment action. None of these alleged unlaw- ful actions caused Jackson significant harm. Although Jackson complains of various office slights and verbal harassment, she never suffered a serious disciplinary action that affected her pay or benefits. Thus, we affirm the district court’s order of summary judgment to the Secretary of the Army on Jackson’s retaliation claim. Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af- firm the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the USCA11 Case: 25-10038 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 12 of 12 12 Opinion of the Court 25-10038 Secretary of the Air Force on Jackson’s claims of unlawful discrim- ination and retaliation. AFFIRMED.