African People's Education and Defense Fund, Inc. v. Pinellas County

USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 1 of 39 FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-13547 ____________________ AFRICAN PEOPLE'S EDUCATION AND DEFENSE FUND, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, versus PINELLAS COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, by and through the Pinellas County Board, of County Commissioners, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:23-cv-02395-TPB-AAS ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 2 of 39 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13547 Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, Circuit Judges, and HUCK,∗ District Judge. NEWSOM, Circuit Judge: Florida nonprofit African People’s Education and Defense Fund twice applied for COVID-relief grants from monies made available to Pinellas County by the federal government. The Pi- nellas County Board of Commissioners initially approved APEDF’s first grant request but later revoked that approval; the Board de- nied the group’s second grant application outright. APEDF sued, contending that the Board had revoked the first grant and denied the second on the basis of race and because of the group’s associa- tion with the “Uhuru Movement”—which APEDF describes as a collection of “like-minded groups and individuals promoting Black community empowerment.” The district court dismissed APEDF’s First Amendment, equal-protection, and procedural-due- process claims at the pleadings stage. We affirm in part and reverse in part. In particular, we hold that the district court was correct to dismiss APEDF’s procedural-due-process claim but that it erred in dismissing the organization’s First Amendment and equal-protec- tion claims. ∗ Honorable Paul C. Huck, United States District Judge for the Southern Dis- trict of Florida, sitting by designation. USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 3 of 39 24-13547 Opinion of the Court 3 I A Because this case comes to us on appeal from the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, “for purposes of this appeal, we take the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” DeMarcus v. Univ. of S. Ala., 133 F.4th 1305, 1309 n.1 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modi- fied). The African People’s Education and Defense Fund is a § 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. For almost 30 years, APEDF has served the black community of south St. Petersburg, Florida. APEDF’s stated mission is “to defend the human and civil rights of the African community and end the disparities faced by African people in health, healthcare, education, and economic develop- ment.” Am. Compl. ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 35. To that end, APEDF provides a host of services: It operates a gym, a licensed kitchen, a commu- nity center, and a Saturday school, and it performs free HIV testing. APEDF also runs a radio station, “Black Power 96,” which broad- casts community health information, provides internships for local youth, and supports local musicians. APEDF’s community center is called the “Uhuru House.” In Swahili, the word “Uhuru” means “freedom.” APEDF asserts that it is associated with the “Uhuru Movement”—which, it says, “is not a distinct or formal entity, but a broad characterization of like- minded groups and individuals promoting Black community USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 4 of 39 4 Opinion of the Court 24-13547 empowerment, such as the ‘Black Power Movement’ or the ‘Civil Rights Movement.’” Id. ¶ 51(a). Like so many other organizations, APEDF was hit hard by COVID-19. Recognizing the pandemic’s widespread economic im- pact, Congress passed the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, which authorized relief funds. Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4 (2021) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 802–803). Pinellas County received ARPA money to provide COVID-relief grants to nonprofits. Thereafter, the County contracted with the Pinellas Community Foundation to review grant applications and make recommendations to the County’s Board of Commissioners. In September 2022, APEDF applied for an ARPA grant to purchase radio-station equipment so that Black Power 96 could “continue broadcasting timely information on local health and ed- ucational services and emergency alerts.” The Foundation ranked APEDF’s application fourth out of the 55 that it received. On the basis of the Foundation’s assessment, the Board approved funding for the 34 highest-ranked grant applications—including APEDF’s. Soon after, the Foundation sent APEDF an email confirming that it would be awarded $36,801. The Foundation followed up with a draft contract, which APEDF received, signed, and returned. A month later, though, newly seated Board member Chris Latvala raised questions about APEDF’s grant. Via text, he di- rected his aide, Tyler Bonneau, to “Google the African peoples one.” Am. Compl. Ex. F at 2, Dkt. No. 35–6. When Bonneau re- sponded, “That’s the Uhuru House in St. Pete” and said that USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 5 of 39 24-13547 Opinion of the Court 5 APEDF’s “website doesn’t look so good,” Latvala replied that he was “going to raise hell.” Id. Two days later, Latvala texted Bonneau again: “[L]ook to see if this African group is a hate group or the uhurhus [sic] by ADL [i.e., Anti-Defamation League] or sovern [sic] poverty law center.” Am. Compl. Ex. G at 1, Dkt. No. 35–7. Bonneau responded with a screenshot of an ADL webpage that included the following descrip- tion: “The Uhuru Movement, also known as the International Peo- ple’s Democratic Uhuru Movement (InPDUM), is a Florida-based international socialist Black separationist organization.” Id. Quot- ing the ADL site, Bonneau texted that “[t]he Uhuru Movement has ties to antisemitic Black Nationalist organizations.” Id. Latvala then asked: “[I]s the radio equip for [B]lack [P]ower 96”? Id. at 2. Bonneau replied that the grant list didn’t detail how the funding would be used. Id. Latvala ended the conversation by compliment- ing Bonneau’s “great work.” Id. Later the same day, Latvala voiced his concerns at a Board work-session meeting, asserting that “[a]ccording to [APEDF’s] website . . . they’re associated with the [Uhurus] in St. Petersburg.” Am. Compl. Ex. H at 1, Dkt. No. 35–8. Latvala asked Foundation CEO Duggan Cooley: “[H]ow would a group that has ties to anti- semitic nationalist groups get approved for funding?” Id. Cooley responded that APEDF “went through the funding process like other organizations.” Id. He acknowledged that the Foundation was “concerned about some of the issues that ha[d] arisen because of [an] FBI investigation” of the Uhuru headquarters, but said that USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 6 of 39 6 Opinion of the Court 24-13547 after flagging these issues for the County he was advised that APEDF’s application should “be scored in this process like every other organization.” Id. During the same meeting, Latvala charged that the Uhurus “once held a mock trial in which they sentenced the mayor and chief of police in St. Petersburg to death[.]” Id. Cooley said that while he was “not familiar” with that episode, he was “familiar with some of the other challenges” associated with the Uhurus. Id. Lat- vala also claimed that the Uhurus “support the release of all black prisoners.” Id. Cooley responded that he didn’t know about that, either. The following day, Latvala texted Bonneau again: “[T]he [U]hurus are claiming we are discriminating if we defund them.” Am. Compl. Ex. G at 3. But, he said, “One of my questions yester- day was about political parties being eligible so we are going to use that.” Id. He signed off by saying, “[T]his ain’t my first rodeo.” Id. A few days later, Latvala directed Bonneau to “write down that African group on a sheet a [sic] paper for the meeting.” Am. Compl. Ex. I at 1, Dkt. No. 35–9. At a Board meeting the following day, Latvala formally moved to revoke APEDF’s funding. During the meeting, Latvala explained that he “d[id] not think that we should be funding radio stations with the amount of needs that there are in our community,” and that, instead, the Board should “prioritize[e] people over products and things.” Am. Compl. ¶ 82. The Board ultimately revoked APEDF’s radio-equipment grant. APEDF wasn’t notified that its grant would be discussed at the USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 7 of 39 24-13547 Opinion of the Court 7 Board meeting, and the Board’s agenda didn’t list the grant as an agenda item. In its complaint, APEDF alleges that at least four non- profits that serve predominantly white communities—and aren’t black-led—received grants for “products and things” despite Lat- vala’s stated opposition to that type of funding. Id. ¶ 85. A month before the revocation of its radio-station grant, APEDF had applied for a second award in the amount of $67,327 to fund the purchase and installation of an “urgently needed” back- up power generator for its building. Id. ¶¶ 42, 88. APEDF had ex- perienced frequent outages due to storms and an aging power grid, and it contended that a back-up generator would ensure its ability to keep the radio on air, the kitchen open, and the food in its com- mercial refrigerators and freezers cold. After the revocation of the radio-station grant, though, the Foundation raised concerns about APEDF’s second application. In an email, Cooley stated that “[t]he ARPA Nonprofit Capital Project Fund eligibility requires that the funding benefit 501(c)(3) direct service nonprofits.” Id. ¶ 45. That was a problem, he said, because it was “impossible to isolate the benefit of generators to solely ben- efit the African People’s Education and Defense Fund”—the gener- ator that APEDF sought, he believed, would be installed in a build- ing that it shared with the African People’s Socialist Party. Id. APEDF denies that it shares a location with the African People’s Socialist Party. It further denies that location-sharing restrictions appear in the eligibility criteria posted on the Foundation’s ARPA Nonprofit Capital Project Fund’s website and insists that numerous USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 8 of 39 8 Opinion of the Court 24-13547 ARPA grant recipients (including the YMCA) share their spaces with other groups. Eventually, Cooley distributed a memo with the Founda- tion’s funding recommendations. It endorsed approval of 19 of the 78 applications, including APEDF’s. Indeed, the Foundation ranked APEDF’s application fourth overall, though it footnoted a concern about recipients sharing a benefit with non-applicants. Two months later, the Pinellas County Commission’s staff recom- mended changes to the Foundation’s list, including a directive to “unassign” the funding for three applicants—including APEDF. Id. ¶ 49. The stated reason for “unassign[ing]” APEDF’s funding was that the project wouldn’t directly counteract COVID’s effects. At a later meeting, the Board voted to fund all applicants on the Foun- dation’s original list except APEDF. In its complaint, APEDF al- leges that at least three nonprofits that serve predominantly white communities—and are not black-led—received grant funding even though their projects wouldn’t directly counteract COVID’s ef- fects. B Following the denial of its second grant application, APEDF sued Pinellas County, by and through its Board of Commissioners, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In particular, APEDF alleged (1) retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, (2) racial discrimination in vi- olation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend- ment, and (3) procedural unfairness in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 9 of 39 24-13547 Opinion of the Court 9 dismissed all three claims with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This is APEDF’s appeal. 1 II The standard applicable under Rule 12(b)(6) is familiar. Dis- missal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if, but only if, the plaintiff fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the facts alleged “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although we needn’t accept “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements,” we must “accept as true” all factual allegations in the complaint. Id. at 663, 678. We will consider the propriety of the dismissal of APEDF’s claims in turn, beginning with its contention that the County retal- iated against it in violation of the First Amendment. A “[A]s a general matter the First Amendment prohibits gov- ernment officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory 1 We “review[] de novo a district court’s order of dismissal, accepting the alle- gations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favora- ble to the plaintiff.” Mesa Valderrama v. United States, 417 F.3d 1189, 1194 (11th Cir. 2005). USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 10 of 39 10 Opinion of the Court 24-13547 actions” for engaging in protected speech or association. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006). To state a valid First Amendment retaliation claim, APEDF must show (1) that it engaged in “consti- tutionally protected” activity, (2) that it “suffered adverse conduct that would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engag- ing in such” activity, and (3) that “there was a causal relationship between the adverse conduct and the protected [activity].” Brannon v. Finkelstein, 754 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2014). APEDF contends that the County violated its First Amend- ment rights by revoking one grant award and denying the applica- tion for another in retaliation for its expressive association with a disfavored group—the Uhuru Movement. The district court re- jected that claim, seemingly on two grounds. As an initial matter, the court suggested that, as a new applicant for a government grant, APEDF might be barred from asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim under Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996). In that case, the Supreme Court held that an inde- pendent contractor with a preexisting commercial relationship with the government could bring such a claim but declined to de- cide whether new applicants for government contracts enjoy simi- lar First Amendment protection. Id. at 685. Moreover, and in any event, the district court held that even if APEDF could assert a re- taliation claim, it hadn’t adequately alleged one. For reasons we will explain, we hold (1) that Umbehr doesn’t bar APEDF’s claim and (2) that APEDF has alleged enough to sur- vive a motion to dismiss. USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 11 of 39 24-13547 Opinion of the Court 11 1 First, Umbehr. There, the Supreme Court considered whether and to what extent independent government contractors have First Amendment rights. 518 U.S. at 673–74. A contractor who had an existing trash-hauling contract with a municipal gov- ernment brought a First Amendment retaliation claim alleging that the county commission had terminated his at-will contract in retal- iation for his public criticism. Id. at 671–72. The parties took dia- metrically opposite positions: The plaintiff argued that because he was an independent contractor rather than an employee, the gov- ernment lacked any interest that could diminish his speech rights and that he was therefore entitled to the full First Amendment pro- tection enjoyed by ordinary citizens. Id. at 677. The County, by contrast, asserted that the contractor wasn’t entitled to any First Amendment protection—not even the limited protection typically given to government employees. See id. at 676. The Supreme Court rejected both extremes in favor of a middle ground. The Court noted that the relevant precedents ex- isted on a “spectrum”: Our unconstitutional conditions precedents span a spectrum from government employees, whose close relationship with the government requires a balanc- ing of important free speech and government inter- ests, to claimants for tax exemptions, users of public facilities, and recipients of small government subsi- dies who are much less dependent on the government but more like ordinary citizens whose viewpoints on USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 12 of 39 12 Opinion of the Court 24-13547 matters of public concern the government has no le- gitimate interest in repressing. Id. at 680 (internal citations omitted). The Court held that an inde- pendent contractor who (like the plaintiff before it) has a preexist- ing commercial relationship with the government is akin to a gov- ernment employee and therefore entitled to comparable constitu- tional protection. Id. at 678. Accordingly, a First Amendment re- taliation claim brought by such a contractor triggers so-called Pick- ering-balancing—“a fact-sensitive and deferential weighing of the government employer’s legitimate interests against its employees’ First Amendment rights.” Id. at 668 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). Even as it “recognize[d]” that independent contractors who have preexisting relationships with the government have a (quali- fied) right “not to be terminated for exercising their First Amend- ment rights,” id. at 686, the Supreme Court reserved the question whether “bidders or applicants for new government contracts” are entitled to First Amendment protection, id. (emphasis added). Re- lying heavily on that limiting language, the County argues here that because APEDF is only an aspiring contractor, not an established one, it has no First Amendment rights. See Br. of Appellee at 12– 13. APEDF rejoins that it is less like an aspiring government con- tractor than an ordinary citizen applying for a limited government benefit. See Br. of Appellant at 23 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). We think that APEDF has the better of the argument. USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 13 of 39 24-13547 Opinion of the Court 13 Where, as here, the government is doling out public fund- ing, it operates as a sovereign rather than as an employer. Pinellas County wasn’t seeking an ongoing relationship with APEDF, nor was it offering to pay APEDF to perform a service or to act as an agent. Rather, it was simply determining whether APEDF’s contri- butions to the public justified an award of grant money. In that respect, APEDF is less like an employee or a traditional govern- ment contractor and “more like [an] ordinary citizen[] whose view- points on matters of public concern the government has no legiti- mate interest in repressing.” Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 680; cf. Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 38 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that food vendors denied a license to sell in a public forum weren’t prospec- tive government contractors). To be sure, APEDF wasn’t (and isn’t) legally entitled to a COVID-relief grant. And as the County emphasizes, the govern- ment doesn’t engage in viewpoint discrimination simply because it “selectively fund[s] a program to encourage certain activities it be- lieves to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.” Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)). That being said, “even in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not ‘ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’” Id. at 587 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[E]ven though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 14 of 39 14 Opinion of the Court 24-13547 for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely.”). The Supreme Court’s decision in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley illustrates the First Amendment’s application to those seeking government grants and subsidies. There, the Court re- jected a facial challenge to a funding provision in a statute govern- ing an arts-related grant program. 524 U.S. at 572–73. The clause at issue required government officials to ensure that “artistic excel- lence and artistic merit are the criteria by which [grant] applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American pub- lic.” Id. at 572 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)). Unsuccessful grant applicants argued that the provision was “a paradigmatic example of viewpoint discrimination because it reject[ed] any artistic speech that either fail[ed] to respect mainstream values or offend[ed] standards of decency.” Id. at 580. The Court disagreed, concluding that it did “not introduce considerations that, in practice, would effectively preclude or punish the expression of particular views.” Id. at 583. Notably, though, in so doing, the Court described the sorts of circumstances that might give rise to a meritorious as-ap- plied challenge: If the [government] were to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a different case. We have stated that, even in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not “ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas,” USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 15 of 39 24-13547 Opinion of the Court 15 Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) (internal quotation marks omit- ted), and if a subsidy were “manipulated” to have a “coercive effect,” then relief could be appropriate. See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (“[D]ifferential tax- ation of First Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints”). Id. at 587. The essence of APEDF’s First Amendment claim here is that the County manipulated the ARPA grant program to suppress ideas that it viewed as dangerous—namely, those associated with the Uhuru Movement. That, it seems to us, is the very kind of claim that the Finley Court suggested might have merit. Though the government can deny funding to applicants for many reasons, it “may not deny” even a discretionary “benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—espe- cially, his interest in freedom of speech.” Perry, 408 U.S. at 597; see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (“The appellees are plainly mistaken in their argument that, because a tax exemption is a ‘privilege’ or ‘bounty,’ its denial may not infringe speech.”). Accordingly, we reject the County’s argument that Umbehr forecloses APEDF’s First Amendment claim. We hold, to the con- trary, that APEDF is entitled to the same First Amendment protec- tion enjoyed by other grant applicants, with respect to which the USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 16 of 39 16 Opinion of the Court 24-13547 County acts more as sovereign than traditional (or quasi) employer. See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 678 (“Umbehr is correct that if the Board had exercised sovereign power against him as a citizen in response to his political speech, it would be required to demonstrate that its action was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”). Next, we consider whether APEDF has adequately stated a First Amendment retaliation claim. 2 Having concluded that APEDF is entitled to full (rather than diminished) First Amendment protection, we restate the governing test: To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, APEDF must allege (1) that it engaged in “constitutionally protected” speech or associational activity, (2) that it “suffered adverse conduct that would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging” in that activity, and (3) that “there was a causal relationship between the adverse conduct” and the activity. Brannon, 754 F.3d at 1274. i We think it clear that APEDF engaged in “constitutionally protected” activity. The right to association “has been character- ized as a right ‘implicit’ in the First Amendment.” O’Laughlin v. Palm Beach County, 30 F.4th 1045, 1053 (11th Cir. 2022). In particu- lar, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects both intimate and expressive association, the latter of which is at issue here. The Court has variously described expressive associa- tion as the “freedom to engage in association for the advancement USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 17 of 39 24-13547 Opinion of the Court 17 of beliefs and ideas,” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), and “the exercise of one’s right to choose one’s as- sociates,” Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987). APEDF has plausibly alleged that it engaged in constitution- ally protected expressive association. The complaint states that APEDF associates with those in the Uhuru Movement—which it calls “a broad pro-Black tendency” of “like-minded groups and in- dividuals promoting Black community empowerment”—and that the County was made aware of its association as a result of the “apparent content of [its] website” and the name of its community center—the “Uhuru House.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51(a), 54. The com- plaint further alleges that APEDF has served the black community of south St. Petersburg for 28 years by offering a variety of services, including the “Uhuru House” and a radio station called “Black Power 96.” Id. ¶¶ 10, 51(a), 78. And APEDF’s stated mission—“de- fend[ing] the human and civil rights of the African community”— unquestionably aligns with the Uhuru Movement’s goal of black empowerment. Id. ¶ 1. Taken together, the complaint’s allegations about engaging in expressive association satisfy Rule 12(b)(6)’s plausibility threshold. ii On, then, to whether APEDF adequately alleged that it suf- fered adverse conduct of the sort that “would ‘chill a person of or- dinary firmness’ in the plaintiff’s position from engaging in ‘future First Amendment activity.’” Hous. Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 18 of 39 18 Opinion of the Court 24-13547 468, 477 (2022) (quoting Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 397 (2019)); see Brannon, 754 F.3d at 1274. Taking the facts as pleaded, we ask whether a grant applicant “of ordinary firmness” would be de- terred from associating with a disfavored group by the revocation of one sizeable monetary grant and the denial of another. We’ve said that one function of the objective ordinary-firm- ness test is to “weed[] out” suits in which “the injuries complained of are trivial or amount to no more than de minimis inconvenience in the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005). “Some adverse actions may be easy to identify—an arrest, a prosecution, or a dismissal from govern- mental employment.” Hous. Cmty. Coll. Sys., 595 U.S. at 477. But of course, “no one would think that a mere frown from a supervi- sor constitutes a sufficiently adverse action to give rise to an action- able First Amendment claim.” Id. Along that spectrum—from criminal punishment to side-eye—the revocation and denial of gov- ernment grants fall somewhere in the middle. Pointing to the significance of the grants to its operations, APEDF claims that the County’s actions would likely deter a non- profit of ordinary firmness from engaging in expressive associa- tion. The County denies the existence of any chill because, it says, APEDF (1) “is free to engage in protected expressive association (including with the Uhuru Movement) without the benefit of grant funding” and (2) “in fact it does so.” Br. of Appellee at 19 (quoting Dist. Ct. Ord., Sept. 30, 2024, at 7–8). Again, we think APEDF has the better of the argument. USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 19 of 39 24-13547 Opinion of the Court 19 To take the County’s second rejoinder first, it mistakes what is an objective test for a subjective one. Our precedent doesn’t re- quire a First Amendment plaintiff to allege that the government’s retaliatory action in fact deterred it from engaging in protected ac- tivity. Rather, the question is whether the allegedly “adverse con- duct . . . would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engag- ing” in such activity. Brannon, 754 F.3d at 1274 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the mere fact (even if true) that APEDF has continued to associate with the Uhuru Movement, even after the revocation and denial of its grants, is not dispositive. The question isn’t what APEDF has done, but rather what a nonprofit of ordinary firmness in its circumstances would do. So, what of the County’s principal contention—that, as a matter of law, the denial of “the benefit of grant funding” can’t cause the requisite objective chill? Br. of Appellee at 18. The short answer is that Supreme Court precedent is to the contrary. In par- ticular, the Court’s unconstitutional-conditions decisions—to which we’ve already alluded, see supra at 13–15—make clear that the denial of a government benefit for speech-discriminatory rea- sons can have a chilling effect because that type of denial can oper- ate to penalize a speaker’s viewpoint. In Speiser v. Randall, the Supreme Court considered the con- stitutionality of a state statute that required applicants for a tax ex- emption to attest that they hadn’t advocated the overthrow of the government. 357 U.S. at 515–17. There, as here, the government asserted that because the tax exemption was a mere “privilege” or USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 20 of 39 20 Opinion of the Court 24-13547 “bounty,” its denial didn’t infringe would-be recipients’ speech. Id. at 518. The Court disagreed: To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech. . . . [T]he denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech. Id. The Supreme Court reiterated the same point in Finley. As already discussed, the Court explained there that while the govern- ment may “selectively fund a program to encourage certain activi- ties it believes to be in the public interest,” 524 U.S. at 588 (citation modified), it may not “leverage its power to award subsi- dies . . . into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints,” id. at 587. The Court further emphasized that “relief could be appropriate” where “a subsidy [is] ‘manipulated’ to have a ‘coercive effect.’” Id. (quot- ing Ragland, 481 U.S. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). APEDF has adequately alleged that it was put in a suffi- ciently “coercive” position here. The County offered nonprofits an opportunity to apply for grants to mitigate and remediate the fi- nancial harm caused by the global COVID pandemic. APEDF pre- pared and submitted two competitive grant applications explaining the economic harm it had suffered as a result of COVID and its need for the grants. It scored high on objective markers, and it in- itially won a $36,801 grant for radio equipment to permit Black USCA11 Case: 24-13547 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 07/29/2026 Page: 21 of 39 24-13547 Opinion of the Court 21 Power 96 to “continue broadcasting timely information on local health and educational services and emergency alerts.” Am. Compl. ¶ 25. Then, though, APEDF claims that on account of its association with the Uhuru Movement, its first grant was revoked and its second application—for a $67,327 grant to purchase an “ur- gently needed” back-up power generator—was denied. Id. ¶ 88; see id. ¶¶ 53–56. Giving it the benefit of reasonable inferences, APEDF has plausibly alleged that the County effectively punished it for as- sociating with the Uhuru movement—forcing it to choose between that association and an important infusion of cash that, by objec- tive markers, it seemed to have warranted. iii Last up, whether APEDF adequately alleged that “there was a causal relationship between the adverse conduct” and its pro- tected activity. Brannon, 754 F.3d at 1274 (citation modified). The Su