Full Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 26-1486 JOSEPH GREGORY v. PHM TERRANCE DAWDY; OFFICER LUCAS S. DEHART; DUSTIN M. LANDFRIED; and OFFICER ARTHUR E. RHOADES, JR., Appellants _____________________________ On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, W.D. Pa. Judge Susan Paradise Baxter, No. 1:24-cv-00012 Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, AND AMBRO, Circuit Judges Submitted: Sept. 22, 2026; Filed: Nov. 20, 2026 _____________________________ NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION * KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. This interlocutory appeal stems from Appellee Joseph Gregory’s pro se claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by Appellant Police Officers’ use of excessive force during his arrest. 1 Appellants sought unsuccessfully to have the District Court dismiss the claim or, in the alternative, grant them summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. They now appeal, but for the following reasons, we will affirm. * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. 1 Gregory also raised a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on deliberate inference to his serious medical needs and a Pennsylvania law negligence claim for failing to provide timely medical treatment. They are not before us on appeal. I. DISCUSSION 2 Appellants do not dispute that they are not entitled to qualified immunity on the face of Gregory’s Complaint. Instead, they argue that the District Court should have considered the body-cam video evidence they submitted in connection with their motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds because it was “integral to or explicitly relied upon” in Gregory’s Complaint. Opening Br. 20 (quoting In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 n.7 (3d Cir. 2016)). Alternatively, they assert that the District Court erred by declining to convert that motion into a motion for summary judgment. We address each argument in turn. A. The District Court Properly Declined to Consider Appellants’ Video Evidence at the Motion-to-Dismiss Stage. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, “courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). We have recognized an exception for “a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint” where a plaintiff attaches a document to his 2 The District Court had jurisdiction over Gregory’s § 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds de novo. Stringer v. County of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 84 (3d Cir. 2025). When reviewing a denial of qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage, “we must accept [the] plaintiff’s allegations as true and draw all inferences in his or her favor.” George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 571 (3d Cir. 2013). Moreover, “we will not dismiss a complaint ‘merely because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff[] can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits.’” Stringer, 141 F.4th at 84 (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). 2 complaint, heavily relies on it throughout his complaint, or makes allegations he could have known only by referring to the document. Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)). The rationale for this exception is simple: “[T]he primary problem raised by looking to documents outside the complaint—lack of notice to the plaintiff—is dissipated where the plaintiff has actual notice and has relied upon these documents in framing the complaint.” Id. at 249 (citation modified) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1426). Here, notwithstanding Appellants’ arguments to the contrary, the video evidence they submitted with their motion to dismiss does not fit within this exception. Independent of any reference to the video footage, Gregory’s Complaint alleges facts that not even Appellants dispute are sufficient to state a claim for excessive force. It alleges, for example, that in the course of arresting him, Appellant Rhoades “struck the plaintiff in the face with a closed fist which resulted in physical damage to the plaintiff’s mouth knocking his teeth out,” and that the remaining Appellants “pick[ed] the plaintiff up off of his feet and body slam[med] the plaintiff to the ground after the plaintiff was already pinned against a parked car.” App. 140-41. Its references to the video evidence are, on the other hand, few and fleeting. The Complaint states only that “defendant officer Arthur E. Rhoads [sic] is herd [sic] on body cam footage stating to the plaintiff . . . ‘You are right I knocked your tooth out[,’]” and that after his arrest, a John Doe Officer (who is not a party to the suit) can be “herd [sic] on body cam footage” stating that the officers were “going to take him to the station and charge him” instead of taking him to the hospital. App. 141. No other 3 allegation in this five-page Complaint refers to or appears to rely on the video footage, and the second of the two references relates more directly to Gregory’s deliberate indifference claim than to his excessive force claim. Nonetheless, Appellants contend these two references are sufficient to make the video “integral to or explicitly relied upon” in the Complaint. Opening Br. 20 (citation omitted). They point to In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), where “the District Court . . . relied on evidence extrinsic to [the] pleadings,” 822 F.3d at 133, but that case ultimately cuts the other way: We proceeded to hold that such reliance was erroneous under Rule 12(b)(6) and vacated the district court’s order. See id. at 133 & n.7, 136. Appellants also attempt to distinguish Gregory’s Complaint from the cases on which the District Court relied, but they are on all fours. The complaints in those cases, too, made at most only passing reference to the contents of extrinsic video footage, so the district courts likewise refused to consider the footage in deciding motions to dismiss. 3 3 See Heller v. Hammerle, No. 2:20-cv-01656, 2021 WL 3426807, at *5 (W.D. Pa. June 30, 2021) (“The Court emphasizes, however, that its consideration of Defendants’ unauthenticated video at this juncture would be a discretionary exception to the general rule and that it does not appear from the Complaint that all of Plaintiffs’ claims are entirely dependent on its content, or that the video alone would entirely resolve any question of either misrepresentation in the Affidavit or the existence of probable cause.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-cv-01656, 2021 WL 3419678 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2021); Slippi-Mensah v. Mills, No. 1:15-cv-07750, 2016 WL 4820617, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016) (declining to consider video evidence because it “only encompasses one part of the events that are the basis for plaintiff’s claims” and the “complaint does not cite to, refer to, or attach the video footage”); Velez v. Fuentes, No. 15-6939, 2016 WL 4107689, at *1 n.2 (D.N.J. July 29, 2016) (explaining that although “the video from the camera in the police vehicle . . . may be considered with respect to the motion for summary judgment,” the court would “not, however, consider this evidence in deciding the motion to dismiss”). 4 In short, the District Court did not err in concluding that the video footage was not sufficiently integral to or explicitly relied upon in Gregory’s Complaint to be considered on a motion to dismiss. B. We Lack Jurisdiction Over the District Court’s Decision Not to Convert Appellants’ Motion to Dismiss Into a Motion for Summary Judgment. Although Appellants dispute the District Court’s decision not to convert their motion under Rule 12(b)(6) to a motion under Rule 56, this argument is not properly before us. Our jurisdiction is limited to review of final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and “collateral orders,” which “finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310 (1995) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). We may also review orders in which the disposition is “fundamental to the further conduct of the case.” Gillette v. Prosper, 858 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154 (1964)). At issue here is the Magistrate Judge’s order declining to convert Appellants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, which predated the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity and, standing alone, is neither a final nor an appealable collateral order in this case. 4 See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Hershey Creamery Corp., 945 4 The parties consented to the Magistrate Judge’s jurisdiction to hear and determine pretrial matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Magistrate Judge entered the order on May 5, 2025, and allowed the parties to submit additional filings with respect to Appellants’ motion to dismiss. Gregory filed a response to Appellants’ motion, but Appellants did not file a reply. On November 4, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation to deny Appellants immunity, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), as to 5 F.2d 1272, 1279 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding “a garden variety pretrial order” is not immediately appealable). To be sure, the District Court should have considered the Magistrate Judge’s order alongside its report and recommendation because both determinations affected the qualified immunity analysis. 5 But Appellants did not appeal the Magistrate Judge’s order to the District Court or to this Court. 6 Indeed, despite the relevance Appellants ascribe to the Magistrate Judge’s failure to convert the motion in their merits briefing before this Court, it is wholly absent from their Notice of Appeal. As a result, that order is not properly before us. In sum, we see no reason to disturb the District Court’s conclusion that “a determination of whether the force used was reasonable requires a more developed factual Gregory’s excessive force and deliberate indifference claims. The District Court adopted that recommendation. 5 Had the District Court considered the Magistrate Judge’s order, it should not have overturned the order unless Gregory was given “an adequate opportunity for discovery or to submit rebuttal evidence.” Beverly Enters., Inc. v. Trump, 182 F.3d 183, 190 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999); accord Garlanger v. Verbeke, 223 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605 n.4 (D.N.J. 2002); Ramirez v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 425, 430-31 (D.N.J. 1998). 6 Although we have not yet addressed this issue in a precedential opinion, it is at least arguable that the denial of Appellants’ alternative request to convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment “operate[s] as a denial” of qualified immunity, Stringer, 141 F.4th at 84, because “the practical effect of the order was to require [Appellants] to proceed to discovery on this claim,” Weimer v. County of Fayette, 972 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2020). See, e.g., Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[Q]ualified immunity may be implicitly denied when a government official otherwise entitled to immunity is nonetheless subjected to ‘the burdens of such pretrial matters as discovery.’” (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996))); George, 738 F.3d at 571 (concluding that the district court’s order fell within the collateral order doctrine because the “practical effect of the district court’s order was a denial of the defense of qualified immunity”); see also In re Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367, 374 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that “we have interlocutory jurisdiction to review an implied denial” of qualified immunity). 6 record.” Gregory v. Dawdy, No. 1:24-cv-00012, 2025 WL 4635306, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:24-cv-00012, 2026 WL 305090 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2026). Indeed, as we recently observed in Stringer v. County of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76 (3d Cir. 2025), “Rule 12(b)(6) is often ‘a mismatch for [qualified] immunity and almost always a bad ground for dismissal,’” id. at 85 (quoting Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 162 n.14 (3d Cir. 2020)), because “the fact-bound nature of the clearly established inquiry combined with the dearth of facts at the pleading stage” may preclude a district court from discerning “the precise contours of the official’s conduct and the context in which it occurred.” Id. at 86. In such instances, the court “must deny the motion to dismiss and seek to resolve qualified immunity at summary judgment.” Id. That is the case here, so we will remand for discovery to proceed. But we do so with a caution. Here, the District Court expressed its intent to provide Gregory with “a full opportunity to conduct discovery to support his viable claims.” App. 201 (emphasis added). But the purpose of qualified immunity is to shield government officials from “broad-ranging discovery,” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982), and “the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of resolving qualified immunity ‘at the earliest possible stage in litigation,’” Stringer, 141 F.4th at 85 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Thus, we affirm the District Court’s order denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds without prejudice to allow Appellants to re-raise qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment at the earliest opportunity, and discovery in the first instance should be narrowly tailored to that defense. Id. at 90; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 7 II. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the District Court’s order denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds without prejudice, and will remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 8