Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0454n.06 No. 26-3232 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 16, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) MANDY NIELSEN, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE NORTHERN ) DISTRICT OF OHIO SEVEN SEVENTEEN CREDIT UNION, INC.; ) ANGELO LOCASTRO, ) OPINION Defendants-Appellees. ) ) Before: BATCHELDER, WHITE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges. HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Mandy Nielsen, a former employee of Defendant Seven Seventeen Credit Union (the “Credit Union”), alleges that her supervisor, Defendant Angelo LoCastro, sexually harassed her for multiple years and eventually caused the Credit Union to terminate her employment. After Nielsen voluntarily dismissed some of her claims, the district court entered summary judgment for the Credit Union and LoCastro on her remaining claims. On appeal, Nielsen challenges the entry of summary judgment on her claim for quid-pro- quo sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a)(1). Nielsen also asserts that LoCastro aided and abetted the Credit Union’s unlawful No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al. termination of Nielsen’s employment in violation of Ohio law. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(J).1 Although we do not endorse all the district court’s reasoning, summary judgment for the Credit Union was nonetheless proper, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing the aiding-and-abetting claim against LoCastro after Nielsen had already dismissed her claims against him and had failed to timely seek leave to amend her complaint. Accordingly, we AFFIRM. I. Facts A. Nielsen’s Employment and Relationship with LoCastro Mandy Nielsen began working for the Credit Union in March 2019. Angelo LoCastro, who had previously worked with Nielsen at two other banks, actively recruited her for the position and served as a professional reference for Nielsen’s application to the Credit Union. Before working together at the Credit Union, Nielsen and LoCastro had engaged in flirtatious behavior, and Nielsen had sent a sexually explicit photograph of herself to LoCastro on at least one occasion. After Nielsen started working at the Credit Union, she and LoCastro began exchanging sexually explicit photos. Nielsen testified that the flirtatious communications and exchanges of explicit photos were not “ever really wanted” but that she went along with them because she “was afraid of losing [her] job and [her] livelihood[.]” R. 71-1, PageID 959. She further testified that she thought the communications with LoCastro “would eventually stop” and that she “didn’t say no for a while because [she] was afraid.” Id. According to Nielsen, the photos she sent to LoCastro 1 Nielsen’s “Statement of the Issues for Appeal” includes her gender discrimination claim. But she makes no substantive argument advancing this claim in her brief, and she has thus forfeited it on appeal. -2- No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al. while employed at the Credit Union were “more graphic” than those she had sent him before. R. 42-1, PageID 302. In March 2020, Nielsen applied for and was promoted by the Credit Union to a position as a Member Service Specialist in a department supervised by LoCastro. In her new role, Nielsen began working in the same building as LoCastro, and their interactions involved physical touching, including kissing and LoCastro’s “touching [Nielsen’s] body parts and putting his hands on [her].” R. 71-1, PageID 958. Nielsen kissed and touched LoCastro, too. After reconciling with her estranged fiancé in late 2020, Nielsen told LoCastro that she was no longer okay with their flirtatious interactions and that “it would be better if [she and LoCastro] had a working relationship.” R. 71-1, PageID 959–60. Despite Nielsen’s telling LoCastro “many times” that the situation “was affecting [her] job” and that she did not “want to do this anymore,” LoCastro continued to request sexually explicit photos from Nielsen and to send sexually explicit photos of himself to Nielsen. R. 42-1, PageID 319. Nielsen felt “treated differently” by LoCastro after these conversations and believed that he did not share “as much information about the department or moving up” as he had before. Id. Nielsen further testified that she continued to send sexually explicit photos of herself to LoCastro because she felt threatened by him. Nielsen explained that although LoCastro did not explicitly threaten her, he told her to “[j]ust keep doing what we’re doing, and everything will be okay with your job.” Id., PageID 302. Nielsen interpreted this to mean that if she did not “do these things, [she was] going to lose [her] job.” Id. As a salaried employee, Nielsen was expected to work 40 hours per week between Monday and Friday from 8:00am to 5:00pm. Salaried employees usually worked for eight hours during that nine-hour timespan and took an hour unpaid lunch. But LoCastro allowed Nielsen to “flex” her schedule by coming in late, taking a long lunch, or leaving early for medical appointments or -3- No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al. childcare obligations. LoCastro testified that he allowed this flexible schedule so long as Nielsen worked 40 hours per week. B. The Credit Union Terminates Nielsen’s Employment On November 7, 2022, Ryan Hough, the Credit Union’s Senior Vice President of Human Resources, terminated Nielsen’s employment for “time theft.” The previous month, an anonymous whistleblower had reported to the Credit Union that Nielsen was routinely arriving to work late, leaving work early, and taking long lunches. LoCastro was not the whistleblower. In response to the report, the Credit Union conducted a “time audit” of Nielsen’s work hours during a two-week period in September 2022. After reviewing security-camera footage of Nielsen’s arrivals and departures from her workplace, the Credit Union determined that Nielsen had worked only 33.7 and 34.1 hours during each week, fewer than the required 40 hours per week. LoCastro was not involved in the ongoing investigation and was not informed of the Credit Union’s decision to terminate Nielsen’s employment until the morning of November 7. That morning, Hough asked LoCastro whether LoCastro had authorized the variations to Nielsen’s schedule during the two weeks in question, and LoCastro denied having done so. Later that morning, Hough summoned Nielsen to a meeting with him and LoCastro, where Hough terminated her employment. During the meeting, Nielsen did not inform Hough about LoCastro’s unwanted advances but asked to speak with Hough privately. Hough refused but told Nielsen that she could call him the next day. The parties dispute whether Nielsen tried to call Hough, but it is undisputed that the private conversation never took place. The Credit Union did not learn about Nielsen’s allegations against LoCastro until early 2023 when Hough reviewed a letter Nielsen had sent to the state commission that was reviewing her claim for unemployment -4- No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al. benefits. Nielsen claims that LoCastro authorized all the variations to her schedule that led her to work fewer than 40 hours during each of the two weeks the Credit Union investigated. II. Standard of Review We review de novo the district court’s entry of summary judgment for the Credit Union on Nielsen’s quid-pro-quo sexual-harassment claim.2 Huang v. Ohio State Univ., 116 F.4th 541, 555 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Milczak v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 102 F.4th 772, 782 (6th Cir. 2024)). To establish a claim for quid-pro-quo sexual harassment, Nielsen needed to show that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) LoCastro subjected her to unwelcomed sexual advances; (3) these unwelcomed advances were because of her sex; (4) submission to LoCastro’s unwelcomed advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits, or that Nielsen’s refusal to submit to LoCastro’s advances caused her to suffer a tangible job detriment; and (5) the Credit Union is vicariously liable for LoCastro’s actions. Id. at 560. The Credit Union is entitled to summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the Credit Union thus “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). But the Credit Union is not entitled to summary judgment if there is evidence in the record “on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). We review the record in the light most favorable to Nielsen as the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Huang, 116 F.4th at 555. 2 The Credit Union did not seek dismissal on the pleadings. However, at summary judgment the district court determined that Nielsen’s complaint did not adequately plead quid-pro- quo sexual harassment. But because the district court went on to consider the claim on the merits at summary judgment, we proceed to address that ruling. -5- No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al. III. Analysis A. 1. Unwelcomed Sexual Advances The parties do not dispute the first and third elements of Nielsen’s claim—that she is a member of a protected class and that any unwelcomed advances were because of her sex. The district court concluded that Nielsen failed to establish the second element of her claim: that LoCastro subjected her to unwelcomed sexual advances. On appeal, the Credit Union urges us to affirm on this ground. In its briefing, the Credit Union echoes the district court’s conclusion that no record evidence shows that LoCastro’s sexual advances were unwelcomed. We disagree. The district court concluded that Nielsen “has not shown by any evidence other than base assertion that Defendant LoCastro’s conduct was unwanted or unwelcome.” R. 92, PageID 1841. In making that determination, the district court relied on Nielsen’s acknowledgment that she had not produced any documents to support her testimony that she had told LoCastro that his sexual advances were unwelcomed. But Nielsen testified that, although she did not initially tell LoCastro that his sexual advances were unwelcomed, she eventually “told him many times” that “I don’t want to do this anymore.” R. 42-1, PageID 319. She further testified that she began telling LoCastro that his sexual advances were unwelcomed after she reconciled with her fiancé in late 2020. Nielsen’s testimony alone, even if self-serving, is sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether LoCastro’s sexual advances were unwelcomed. See Davis v. Gallagher, 951 F.3d 743, 750 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Although perhaps not as strong as some other evidence might be, self-serving statements can create a genuine dispute of material fact to be resolved at trial.”). Because Nielsen testified that she repeatedly told LoCastro that she did not want to continue sending or receiving sexually explicit photos, the district court erred in rejecting -6- No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al. Nielsen’s testimonial evidence as a “base assertion.” See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). The district court also concluded that evidence of two incidents where Nielsen tried to kiss LoCastro “cut[s] against the elemental sufficiency needed for her claim to survive summary judgment.” R. 92, PageID 1842. The first asserted incident was at a Credit Union Christmas party, where, according to LoCastro, he pushed Nielsen away when she tried to kiss him.3 But Nielsen testified that this never happened, and at summary judgment we must view this evidence in the light most favorable to Nielsen and refrain from making credibility determinations based on conflicting testimony. See Huang, 116 F.4th at 555 (explaining that courts do not make credibility determinations at summary judgment). The second incident took place in LoCastro’s office, where Nielsen tried to kiss him while he was on a Zoom call. Nielsen acknowledged that this incident occurred but explained that she tried to kiss LoCastro because “[h]e was upset with me about something, so I was trying to . . . make things okay.” R. 42-1, PageID 323. The record is unclear whether this incident happened before or after Nielsen first told LoCastro in late 2020 that she did not “want to do this anymore.”4 However, even if the incident occurred sometime later, the district court incorrectly determined that this incident defeated Nielsen’s claim by weighing evidence that LoCastro’s advances were welcomed against evidence that they were not. That is not the court’s role at summary judgment. See Huang, 116 F.4th at 555 (explaining that courts do not weigh evidence at summary judgment). A reasonable jury could weigh the evidence differently and find that LoCastro’s sexual advances 3 The record is unclear whether the party was in 2019 (before Nielsen claims she told LoCastro to stop) or in 2021 (after). There was no party in 2020 due to COVID-19. 4 Nielsen testified that she did not remember when the incident occurred. -7- No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al. were unwelcomed—even if the attempted kisses occurred—because Nielsen repeatedly told LoCastro that she wanted his sexual advances to stop. Cf. Souther v. Posen Const., Inc., 523 F. App’x 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2013) (concluding plaintiff failed to establish supervisor’s sexual advances were unwelcomed where she never complained to that supervisor or to anyone else about advances). The district court thus erred in finding that LoCastro’s sexual advances were not unwelcomed in light of a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Nielsen repeatedly told LoCastro that she wanted the advances to stop. 2. Causation The Credit Union also argues that we should affirm the summary judgment in its favor because “[t]here is no evidence [Nielsen] received a job benefit or suffered a tangible job detriment because of the alleged sexual harassment.” Credit Union’s Br. at 21. Nielsen counters that she suffered a tangible job detriment—termination of her employment—because of LoCastro’s quid- pro-quo sexual harassment. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (identifying termination of employment as tangible job detriment). Although raised by the Credit Union, the district court did not consider the causation argument at summary judgment. However, “when a district court grants summary judgment, we can affirm on any ground supported by the record and raised below.” Patterson v. Kent State Univ., 155 F.4th 635, 644 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing M.J. ex rel. S.J. v. Akron City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 1 F.4th 436, 451 (6th Cir. 2021)). The Credit Union argues that there is no genuine dispute that Nielsen’s employment was terminated for time theft (i.e., working fewer than 40 hours per week). According to the Credit Union, its termination decision was unrelated to LoCastro’s unwelcomed sexual advances. The Credit Union contends that Hough—who was unaware of Nielsen’s allegations of sexual -8- No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al. harassment—made the final decision to terminate Nielsen’s employment. The Credit Union further asserts that LoCastro “was not involved in the decision” and “became aware of Hough’s termination decision just before the meeting” in which Nielsen’s employment was terminated. Credit Union’s Br. at 23. Based on this evidence, the Credit Union insists that Nielsen “was not terminated based on the alleged sexual harassment” but “for failure to work her required hours[.]” Id. Nielsen counters that record evidence shows that LoCastro influenced Hough’s decision to terminate her employment. On the morning the Credit Union terminated Nielsen’s employment, Hough asked LoCastro whether “[Nielsen’s] late arrivals, long lunches, [and] early dismissals” were “authorized by him,” and LoCastro “said no.” R. 73-2, PageID 1232; R. 73-3, PageID 1342. Hough further acknowledged that LoCastro, as Nielsen’s supervisor, had “some authority to deviate from [her] expected schedule . . . within reason.” R. 73-2, PageID 1170. And Mark Munno (the Credit Union’s Senior Vice President of Delivery Channels who was involved in the termination decision) testified that if LoCastro permitted Nielsen to work fewer than 40 hours per week, then LoCastro, not Nielsen, would be at fault. As Nielsen contends, this testimony suggests that if LoCastro had authorized Nielsen’s schedule during the two weeks at issue, “the problem would have been with LoCastro and not Nielsen, [so] Nielsen would not have been discharged.” Nielsen’s Br. at 13. And Nielsen testified that LoCastro had approved her hours during the two audited weeks but lied to Hough when asked. We agree with Nielsen that a reasonable jury could find that LoCastro influenced Hough’s decision to terminate Nielsen’s employment. Nielsen’s argument is similar to a “cat’s paw” theory of liability, which “focus[es] on whether another individual and not the actual decision maker ‘is the driving force behind the employment action.’” EEOC v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, -9- No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al. 1069 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Principi, 283 F. App’x. 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2008)). The record shows that Hough asked LoCastro whether he had authorized Nielsen’s schedule before Hough terminated Nielsen’s employment. Although Hough also testified that LoCastro was not involved in the decision, a reasonable jury could find nonetheless that LoCastro caused the Credit Union to terminate Nielsen’s employment when he lied to Hough about not authorizing Nielsen’s schedule. In other words, Hough was the final decisionmaker, but LoCastro still may have had a decisive influence on Hough’s decision. That is enough to create a genuine dispute of material fact about whether LoCastro’s answer was a causal factor in Hough’s decision to terminate Nielsen’s employment. See Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 352 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining in discrimination context that supervisor’s biased report to decisionmaker “may be a causal factor in the adverse action” if decisionmaker relies on it); cf. Sanford v. Main St. Baptist Church Manor, Inc., 327 F. App’x 587, 598 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment on quid-pro-quo sexual-harassment claim where no evidence showed that supervisor’s influence may have been decisive on termination decision). Still, Nielsen must establish either that submission to LoCastro’s unwelcome advances was a condition for receiving job benefits, or that Nielsen’s refusal to submit to those advances caused the termination of her employment. See Huang, 116 F.4th at 560 (describing causation element of quid-pro-quo sexual-harassment claim). Nielsen argues that LoCastro conditioned her “flexible schedule” on her submission to his requests for sexually explicit photos from her. According to Nielsen, this scheduling arrangement resulted in a tangible job detriment when LoCastro lied to Hough about Nielsen’s schedule, causing the Credit Union to terminate her employment. Nielsen speculates that LoCastro lied “so that he could avoid scrutiny falling on him for the whole situation -10- No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al. regarding the [scheduling] benefit” and his unwelcomed sexual advances toward Nielsen. Nielsen’s Br. at 13–14. But there are several problems with this argument. First, while flexible scheduling was a benefit of her salaried position, working fewer than the required hours was not. So even if a jury concluded that she would not have been permitted to work her reduced hours if she had not engaged in the sexual activity with LoCastro, this was not a job benefit to which she was otherwise entitled. Further, Nielsen testified that she initially submitted to LoCastro’s requests because she was afraid of losing her job and thought that LoCastro’s advances eventually would stop. But when asked to describe how she felt “treated differently” by him after she told him that she wanted to stop exchanging photos, Nielsen explained that she was not “privy to as much information about the department or moving up” as before. R. 42-1, PageID 319. Nielsen offers no evidence that LoCastro threatened—either explicitly or implicitly—to withhold any scheduling benefit or to alter her work schedule based on her reaction to his advances. Nielsen also testified that she continued to send sexually explicit photos to LoCastro because she felt threatened by him. But, again, when asked about how LoCastro threatened her, Nielsen’s testimony does not mention her schedule. Relatedly, Nielsen failed to establish that her refusal to submit to LoCastro’s advances caused him to lie to Hough about approving her schedule. Nielsen testified that she “knew something was coming” when the Credit Union terminated her employment because LoCastro had learned about an incident where Nielsen “had shown a coworker a photo that he had sent me that was inappropriate.” R. 42-1, PageID 283. But Nielsen does not argue that this incident constituted a refusal of LoCastro’s advances. Indeed, although Nielsen testified that she began telling LoCastro that his advances were unwelcomed in late 2020, she does not point to any evidence that -11- No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al. she stopped submitting to LoCastro’s unwelcomed advances before her employment was terminated. Further, Nielsen had been telling LoCastro that she did not want to exchange photos for two years by the time she was fired, which undermines the asserted causal link between her objections and LoCastro’s lie. So she cannot establish that LoCastro lied to Hough based on her refusal to submit to LoCastro’s advances, either. Additionally, Nielsen’s claim that that LoCastro lied “so that he could avoid scrutiny falling on him for the whole situation regarding the [scheduling] benefit” and his unwelcomed sexual advances toward Nielsen is not a claim that LoCastro lied because she refused his advances. Because Nielsen failed to establish a causal connection between her efforts to thwart LoCastro’s unwelcomed sexual advances and the termination of her employment, summary judgment for the Credit Union on her quid-pro-quo sexual-harassment claim was proper. B. Nielsen next argues that LoCastro aided and abetted the Credit Union’s unlawful termination of her employment in violation of Ohio law. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(J). Nielsen’s argument has two glaring problems. First, she did not bring the aiding-and-abetting claim she now seeks to assert against LoCastro. Nielsen alleged that the Credit Union discriminated against her based on sex in violation of § 4112, but stated in her complaint that her claim was “against the Defendant Credit Union only,” not LoCastro. R. 1, PageID 6–7. Second, although Nielsen later moved for leave to amend her complaint to add an aiding-and-abetting claim against LoCastro, her opening brief fails to mention—let alone challenge—the district court’s denial of that motion. By failing to argue on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for leave to amend her complaint to add an aiding-and-abetting claim, Nielsen has forfeited -12- No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al. that argument. See Scott v. First S. Nat’l Bank, 936 F.3d 509, 522 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[A]n appellant forfeits an argument that [s]he fails to raise in [her] opening brief.”) (collecting cases). The district court’s case-management order (entered on June 19, 2024) allowed the parties until July 31, 2024, to amend their pleadings; until January 31, 2025, to complete discovery; and until March 7, 2025, to file dispositive motions. Nielsen did not request leave to file her amended complaint until February 11, 2025—more than six months after the district court’s deadline to amend, after the close of discovery, and shortly before the deadline for dispositive motions. The district court ruled that Nielsen had failed to establish good cause for her request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b). See Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 909 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Once the scheduling order’s deadline passes, a plaintiff first must show good cause under Rule 16(b) for failure earlier to seek leave to amend before a court will consider whether amendment is proper[.]”). Because Nielsen fails to challenge (or even mention) the district court’s ruling or good-cause analysis, she has forfeited her argument on appeal. IV. Conclusion For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. -13-