Mandy Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket26-3232
JudgeAlice M. Batchelder; Helene N. White; Amul R. Thapar
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0454n.06
No. 26-3232
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Nov 16, 2026
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
MANDY NIELSEN,
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
) DISTRICT OF OHIO
SEVEN SEVENTEEN CREDIT UNION, INC.; )
ANGELO LOCASTRO, ) OPINION
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
Before: BATCHELDER, WHITE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Mandy Nielsen, a former employee of
Defendant Seven Seventeen Credit Union (the “Credit Union”), alleges that her supervisor,
Defendant Angelo LoCastro, sexually harassed her for multiple years and eventually caused the
Credit Union to terminate her employment. After Nielsen voluntarily dismissed some of her
claims, the district court entered summary judgment for the Credit Union and LoCastro on her
remaining claims.
On appeal, Nielsen challenges the entry of summary judgment on her claim for quid-pro-
quo sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1). Nielsen also asserts that LoCastro aided and abetted the Credit Union’s unlawful
No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al.
termination of Nielsen’s employment in violation of Ohio law. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 4112.02(J).1
Although we do not endorse all the district court’s reasoning, summary judgment for the
Credit Union was nonetheless proper, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by
disallowing the aiding-and-abetting claim against LoCastro after Nielsen had already dismissed
her claims against him and had failed to timely seek leave to amend her complaint.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
I. Facts
A. Nielsen’s Employment and Relationship with LoCastro
Mandy Nielsen began working for the Credit Union in March 2019. Angelo LoCastro,
who had previously worked with Nielsen at two other banks, actively recruited her for the position
and served as a professional reference for Nielsen’s application to the Credit Union. Before
working together at the Credit Union, Nielsen and LoCastro had engaged in flirtatious behavior,
and Nielsen had sent a sexually explicit photograph of herself to LoCastro on at least one occasion.
After Nielsen started working at the Credit Union, she and LoCastro began exchanging
sexually explicit photos. Nielsen testified that the flirtatious communications and exchanges of
explicit photos were not “ever really wanted” but that she went along with them because she “was
afraid of losing [her] job and [her] livelihood[.]” R. 71-1, PageID 959. She further testified that
she thought the communications with LoCastro “would eventually stop” and that she “didn’t say
no for a while because [she] was afraid.” Id. According to Nielsen, the photos she sent to LoCastro
1
Nielsen’s “Statement of the Issues for Appeal” includes her gender discrimination claim.
But she makes no substantive argument advancing this claim in her brief, and she has thus forfeited
it on appeal.
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No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al.
while employed at the Credit Union were “more graphic” than those she had sent him before.
R. 42-1, PageID 302.
In March 2020, Nielsen applied for and was promoted by the Credit Union to a position as
a Member Service Specialist in a department supervised by LoCastro. In her new role, Nielsen
began working in the same building as LoCastro, and their interactions involved physical touching,
including kissing and LoCastro’s “touching [Nielsen’s] body parts and putting his hands on [her].”
R. 71-1, PageID 958. Nielsen kissed and touched LoCastro, too.
After reconciling with her estranged fiancé in late 2020, Nielsen told LoCastro that she was
no longer okay with their flirtatious interactions and that “it would be better if [she and LoCastro]
had a working relationship.” R. 71-1, PageID 959–60. Despite Nielsen’s telling LoCastro “many
times” that the situation “was affecting [her] job” and that she did not “want to do this anymore,”
LoCastro continued to request sexually explicit photos from Nielsen and to send sexually explicit
photos of himself to Nielsen. R. 42-1, PageID 319. Nielsen felt “treated differently” by LoCastro
after these conversations and believed that he did not share “as much information about the
department or moving up” as he had before. Id. Nielsen further testified that she continued to
send sexually explicit photos of herself to LoCastro because she felt threatened by him. Nielsen
explained that although LoCastro did not explicitly threaten her, he told her to “[j]ust keep doing
what we’re doing, and everything will be okay with your job.” Id., PageID 302. Nielsen
interpreted this to mean that if she did not “do these things, [she was] going to lose [her] job.” Id.
As a salaried employee, Nielsen was expected to work 40 hours per week between Monday
and Friday from 8:00am to 5:00pm. Salaried employees usually worked for eight hours during
that nine-hour timespan and took an hour unpaid lunch. But LoCastro allowed Nielsen to “flex”
her schedule by coming in late, taking a long lunch, or leaving early for medical appointments or
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childcare obligations. LoCastro testified that he allowed this flexible schedule so long as Nielsen
worked 40 hours per week.
B. The Credit Union Terminates Nielsen’s Employment
On November 7, 2022, Ryan Hough, the Credit Union’s Senior Vice President of Human
Resources, terminated Nielsen’s employment for “time theft.” The previous month, an anonymous
whistleblower had reported to the Credit Union that Nielsen was routinely arriving to work late,
leaving work early, and taking long lunches. LoCastro was not the whistleblower. In response to
the report, the Credit Union conducted a “time audit” of Nielsen’s work hours during a two-week
period in September 2022. After reviewing security-camera footage of Nielsen’s arrivals and
departures from her workplace, the Credit Union determined that Nielsen had worked only 33.7
and 34.1 hours during each week, fewer than the required 40 hours per week.
LoCastro was not involved in the ongoing investigation and was not informed of the Credit
Union’s decision to terminate Nielsen’s employment until the morning of November 7. That
morning, Hough asked LoCastro whether LoCastro had authorized the variations to Nielsen’s
schedule during the two weeks in question, and LoCastro denied having done so.
Later that morning, Hough summoned Nielsen to a meeting with him and LoCastro, where
Hough terminated her employment. During the meeting, Nielsen did not inform Hough about
LoCastro’s unwanted advances but asked to speak with Hough privately. Hough refused but told
Nielsen that she could call him the next day. The parties dispute whether Nielsen tried to call
Hough, but it is undisputed that the private conversation never took place. The Credit Union did
not learn about Nielsen’s allegations against LoCastro until early 2023 when Hough reviewed a
letter Nielsen had sent to the state commission that was reviewing her claim for unemployment
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No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al.
benefits. Nielsen claims that LoCastro authorized all the variations to her schedule that led her to
work fewer than 40 hours during each of the two weeks the Credit Union investigated.
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo the district court’s entry of summary judgment for the Credit Union on
Nielsen’s quid-pro-quo sexual-harassment claim.2 Huang v. Ohio State Univ., 116 F.4th 541, 555
(6th Cir. 2024) (citing Milczak v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 102 F.4th 772, 782 (6th Cir. 2024)). To
establish a claim for quid-pro-quo sexual harassment, Nielsen needed to show that: (1) she was a
member of a protected class; (2) LoCastro subjected her to unwelcomed sexual advances; (3) these
unwelcomed advances were because of her sex; (4) submission to LoCastro’s unwelcomed
advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits, or that Nielsen’s refusal
to submit to LoCastro’s advances caused her to suffer a tangible job detriment; and (5) the Credit
Union is vicariously liable for LoCastro’s actions. Id. at 560. The Credit Union is entitled to
summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the Credit Union
thus “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). But the Credit Union is
not entitled to summary judgment if there is evidence in the record “on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). We
review the record in the light most favorable to Nielsen as the nonmoving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in her favor. Huang, 116 F.4th at 555.
2
The Credit Union did not seek dismissal on the pleadings. However, at summary
judgment the district court determined that Nielsen’s complaint did not adequately plead quid-pro-
quo sexual harassment. But because the district court went on to consider the claim on the merits
at summary judgment, we proceed to address that ruling.
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No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al.
III. Analysis
A.
1. Unwelcomed Sexual Advances
The parties do not dispute the first and third elements of Nielsen’s claim—that she is a
member of a protected class and that any unwelcomed advances were because of her sex. The
district court concluded that Nielsen failed to establish the second element of her claim: that
LoCastro subjected her to unwelcomed sexual advances. On appeal, the Credit Union urges us to
affirm on this ground. In its briefing, the Credit Union echoes the district court’s conclusion that
no record evidence shows that LoCastro’s sexual advances were unwelcomed. We disagree.
The district court concluded that Nielsen “has not shown by any evidence other than base
assertion that Defendant LoCastro’s conduct was unwanted or unwelcome.” R. 92, PageID 1841.
In making that determination, the district court relied on Nielsen’s acknowledgment that she had
not produced any documents to support her testimony that she had told LoCastro that his sexual
advances were unwelcomed. But Nielsen testified that, although she did not initially tell LoCastro
that his sexual advances were unwelcomed, she eventually “told him many times” that “I don’t
want to do this anymore.” R. 42-1, PageID 319. She further testified that she began telling
LoCastro that his sexual advances were unwelcomed after she reconciled with her fiancé in
late 2020. Nielsen’s testimony alone, even if self-serving, is sufficient to create a genuine dispute
of material fact regarding whether LoCastro’s sexual advances were unwelcomed. See Davis v.
Gallagher, 951 F.3d 743, 750 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Although perhaps not as strong as some other
evidence might be, self-serving statements can create a genuine dispute of material fact to be
resolved at trial.”). Because Nielsen testified that she repeatedly told LoCastro that she did not
want to continue sending or receiving sexually explicit photos, the district court erred in rejecting
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No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al.
Nielsen’s testimonial evidence as a “base assertion.” See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
The district court also concluded that evidence of two incidents where Nielsen tried to kiss
LoCastro “cut[s] against the elemental sufficiency needed for her claim to survive summary
judgment.” R. 92, PageID 1842. The first asserted incident was at a Credit Union Christmas party,
where, according to LoCastro, he pushed Nielsen away when she tried to kiss him.3 But Nielsen
testified that this never happened, and at summary judgment we must view this evidence in the
light most favorable to Nielsen and refrain from making credibility determinations based on
conflicting testimony. See Huang, 116 F.4th at 555 (explaining that courts do not make credibility
determinations at summary judgment).
The second incident took place in LoCastro’s office, where Nielsen tried to kiss him while
he was on a Zoom call. Nielsen acknowledged that this incident occurred but explained that she
tried to kiss LoCastro because “[h]e was upset with me about something, so I was trying to . . .
make things okay.” R. 42-1, PageID 323. The record is unclear whether this incident happened
before or after Nielsen first told LoCastro in late 2020 that she did not “want to do this anymore.”4
However, even if the incident occurred sometime later, the district court incorrectly determined
that this incident defeated Nielsen’s claim by weighing evidence that LoCastro’s advances were
welcomed against evidence that they were not. That is not the court’s role at summary judgment.
See Huang, 116 F.4th at 555 (explaining that courts do not weigh evidence at summary judgment).
A reasonable jury could weigh the evidence differently and find that LoCastro’s sexual advances
3
The record is unclear whether the party was in 2019 (before Nielsen claims she told
LoCastro to stop) or in 2021 (after). There was no party in 2020 due to COVID-19.
4
Nielsen testified that she did not remember when the incident occurred.
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No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al.
were unwelcomed—even if the attempted kisses occurred—because Nielsen repeatedly told
LoCastro that she wanted his sexual advances to stop. Cf. Souther v. Posen Const., Inc.,
523 F. App’x 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2013) (concluding plaintiff failed to establish supervisor’s sexual
advances were unwelcomed where she never complained to that supervisor or to anyone else about
advances).
The district court thus erred in finding that LoCastro’s sexual advances were not
unwelcomed in light of a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Nielsen repeatedly told
LoCastro that she wanted the advances to stop.
2. Causation
The Credit Union also argues that we should affirm the summary judgment in its favor
because “[t]here is no evidence [Nielsen] received a job benefit or suffered a tangible job detriment
because of the alleged sexual harassment.” Credit Union’s Br. at 21. Nielsen counters that she
suffered a tangible job detriment—termination of her employment—because of LoCastro’s quid-
pro-quo sexual harassment. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (identifying
termination of employment as tangible job detriment). Although raised by the Credit Union, the
district court did not consider the causation argument at summary judgment. However, “when a
district court grants summary judgment, we can affirm on any ground supported by the record and
raised below.” Patterson v. Kent State Univ., 155 F.4th 635, 644 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing M.J. ex
rel. S.J. v. Akron City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 1 F.4th 436, 451 (6th Cir. 2021)).
The Credit Union argues that there is no genuine dispute that Nielsen’s employment was
terminated for time theft (i.e., working fewer than 40 hours per week). According to the Credit
Union, its termination decision was unrelated to LoCastro’s unwelcomed sexual advances. The
Credit Union contends that Hough—who was unaware of Nielsen’s allegations of sexual
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No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al.
harassment—made the final decision to terminate Nielsen’s employment. The Credit Union
further asserts that LoCastro “was not involved in the decision” and “became aware of Hough’s
termination decision just before the meeting” in which Nielsen’s employment was terminated.
Credit Union’s Br. at 23. Based on this evidence, the Credit Union insists that Nielsen “was not
terminated based on the alleged sexual harassment” but “for failure to work her required hours[.]”
Id.
Nielsen counters that record evidence shows that LoCastro influenced Hough’s decision to
terminate her employment. On the morning the Credit Union terminated Nielsen’s employment,
Hough asked LoCastro whether “[Nielsen’s] late arrivals, long lunches, [and] early dismissals”
were “authorized by him,” and LoCastro “said no.” R. 73-2, PageID 1232; R. 73-3, PageID 1342.
Hough further acknowledged that LoCastro, as Nielsen’s supervisor, had “some authority to
deviate from [her] expected schedule . . . within reason.” R. 73-2, PageID 1170. And Mark Munno
(the Credit Union’s Senior Vice President of Delivery Channels who was involved in the
termination decision) testified that if LoCastro permitted Nielsen to work fewer than 40 hours per
week, then LoCastro, not Nielsen, would be at fault.
As Nielsen contends, this testimony suggests that if LoCastro had authorized Nielsen’s
schedule during the two weeks at issue, “the problem would have been with LoCastro and not
Nielsen, [so] Nielsen would not have been discharged.” Nielsen’s Br. at 13. And Nielsen testified
that LoCastro had approved her hours during the two audited weeks but lied to Hough when asked.
We agree with Nielsen that a reasonable jury could find that LoCastro influenced Hough’s
decision to terminate Nielsen’s employment. Nielsen’s argument is similar to a “cat’s paw” theory
of liability, which “focus[es] on whether another individual and not the actual decision maker ‘is
the driving force behind the employment action.’” EEOC v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057,
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No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al.
1069 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Principi, 283 F. App’x. 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2008)). The
record shows that Hough asked LoCastro whether he had authorized Nielsen’s schedule before
Hough terminated Nielsen’s employment. Although Hough also testified that LoCastro was not
involved in the decision, a reasonable jury could find nonetheless that LoCastro caused the Credit
Union to terminate Nielsen’s employment when he lied to Hough about not authorizing Nielsen’s
schedule. In other words, Hough was the final decisionmaker, but LoCastro still may have had a
decisive influence on Hough’s decision. That is enough to create a genuine dispute of material
fact about whether LoCastro’s answer was a causal factor in Hough’s decision to terminate
Nielsen’s employment. See Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 352 (6th Cir. 2012)
(explaining in discrimination context that supervisor’s biased report to decisionmaker “may be a
causal factor in the adverse action” if decisionmaker relies on it); cf. Sanford v. Main St. Baptist
Church Manor, Inc., 327 F. App’x 587, 598 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment on
quid-pro-quo sexual-harassment claim where no evidence showed that supervisor’s influence may
have been decisive on termination decision).
Still, Nielsen must establish either that submission to LoCastro’s unwelcome advances was
a condition for receiving job benefits, or that Nielsen’s refusal to submit to those advances caused
the termination of her employment. See Huang, 116 F.4th at 560 (describing causation element of
quid-pro-quo sexual-harassment claim). Nielsen argues that LoCastro conditioned her “flexible
schedule” on her submission to his requests for sexually explicit photos from her. According to
Nielsen, this scheduling arrangement resulted in a tangible job detriment when LoCastro lied to
Hough about Nielsen’s schedule, causing the Credit Union to terminate her employment. Nielsen
speculates that LoCastro lied “so that he could avoid scrutiny falling on him for the whole situation
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No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al.
regarding the [scheduling] benefit” and his unwelcomed sexual advances toward Nielsen.
Nielsen’s Br. at 13–14.
But there are several problems with this argument. First, while flexible scheduling was a
benefit of her salaried position, working fewer than the required hours was not. So even if a jury
concluded that she would not have been permitted to work her reduced hours if she had not
engaged in the sexual activity with LoCastro, this was not a job benefit to which she was otherwise
entitled.
Further, Nielsen testified that she initially submitted to LoCastro’s requests because she
was afraid of losing her job and thought that LoCastro’s advances eventually would stop. But
when asked to describe how she felt “treated differently” by him after she told him that she wanted
to stop exchanging photos, Nielsen explained that she was not “privy to as much information about
the department or moving up” as before. R. 42-1, PageID 319. Nielsen offers no evidence that
LoCastro threatened—either explicitly or implicitly—to withhold any scheduling benefit or to alter
her work schedule based on her reaction to his advances. Nielsen also testified that she continued
to send sexually explicit photos to LoCastro because she felt threatened by him. But, again, when
asked about how LoCastro threatened her, Nielsen’s testimony does not mention her schedule.
Relatedly, Nielsen failed to establish that her refusal to submit to LoCastro’s advances
caused him to lie to Hough about approving her schedule. Nielsen testified that she “knew
something was coming” when the Credit Union terminated her employment because LoCastro had
learned about an incident where Nielsen “had shown a coworker a photo that he had sent me that
was inappropriate.” R. 42-1, PageID 283. But Nielsen does not argue that this incident constituted
a refusal of LoCastro’s advances. Indeed, although Nielsen testified that she began telling
LoCastro that his advances were unwelcomed in late 2020, she does not point to any evidence that
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No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al.
she stopped submitting to LoCastro’s unwelcomed advances before her employment was
terminated. Further, Nielsen had been telling LoCastro that she did not want to exchange photos
for two years by the time she was fired, which undermines the asserted causal link between her
objections and LoCastro’s lie. So she cannot establish that LoCastro lied to Hough based on her
refusal to submit to LoCastro’s advances, either.
Additionally, Nielsen’s claim that that LoCastro lied “so that he could avoid scrutiny
falling on him for the whole situation regarding the [scheduling] benefit” and his unwelcomed
sexual advances toward Nielsen is not a claim that LoCastro lied because she refused his advances.
Because Nielsen failed to establish a causal connection between her efforts to thwart
LoCastro’s unwelcomed sexual advances and the termination of her employment, summary
judgment for the Credit Union on her quid-pro-quo sexual-harassment claim was proper.
B.
Nielsen next argues that LoCastro aided and abetted the Credit Union’s unlawful
termination of her employment in violation of Ohio law. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(J).
Nielsen’s argument has two glaring problems. First, she did not bring the aiding-and-abetting
claim she now seeks to assert against LoCastro. Nielsen alleged that the Credit Union
discriminated against her based on sex in violation of § 4112, but stated in her complaint that her
claim was “against the Defendant Credit Union only,” not LoCastro. R. 1, PageID 6–7. Second,
although Nielsen later moved for leave to amend her complaint to add an aiding-and-abetting claim
against LoCastro, her opening brief fails to mention—let alone challenge—the district court’s
denial of that motion.
By failing to argue on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in denying her
motion for leave to amend her complaint to add an aiding-and-abetting claim, Nielsen has forfeited
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No. 26-3232, Nielsen v. Seven Seventeen Credit Union, et al.
that argument. See Scott v. First S. Nat’l Bank, 936 F.3d 509, 522 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[A]n appellant
forfeits an argument that [s]he fails to raise in [her] opening brief.”) (collecting cases). The district
court’s case-management order (entered on June 19, 2024) allowed the parties until July 31, 2024,
to amend their pleadings; until January 31, 2025, to complete discovery; and until March 7, 2025,
to file dispositive motions. Nielsen did not request leave to file her amended complaint until
February 11, 2025—more than six months after the district court’s deadline to amend, after the
close of discovery, and shortly before the deadline for dispositive motions. The district court ruled
that Nielsen had failed to establish good cause for her request under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(b). See Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 909 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Once the
scheduling order’s deadline passes, a plaintiff first must show good cause under Rule 16(b) for
failure earlier to seek leave to amend before a court will consider whether amendment is
proper[.]”). Because Nielsen fails to challenge (or even mention) the district court’s ruling or
good-cause analysis, she has forfeited her argument on appeal.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
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