Full Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-7088 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 9, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court CHRISTY BAILEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jeffrey Peterson, deceased, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 25-7088 (D.C. No. 6:20-CV-00327-JAR) CITY OF ADA, (E.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellee, and OFFICER MARCUS BEALE; OFFICER JUSSELY CANADA; OFFICER MICHAEL MEEKS; OFFICER PHILLIP VOGT, Defendants. _________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________ Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, McHUGH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. ** _________________________________ * This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined ** unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. Appellate Case: 25-7088 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 2 To survive summary judgment on a failure-to-train municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must present evidence showing that the municipality’s training is inadequate. A municipal defendant does not bear the burden of proving that it does, in fact, provide adequate training. In this case, an officer shot a man after entering his private residence without a warrant. The district court granted summary judgment for the municipality on Plaintiff’s failure-to-train municipal liability claim. We conclude Plaintiff did not meet her burden to show the City of Ada’s training is inadequate because her evidence is at best neutral and at worst (at least for her case) tends to affirmatively show that officers are trained on warrantless entry in private residences. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. I. Defendant Marcus Beale (“Beale”), a police officer, responded to Megan Timmons’ call that Jeffrey Peterson had taken her property and kicked her out of his apartment. Beale and Timmons approached Defendant’s apartment door to retrieve Timmons’ belongings. Timmons testified that she pushed the front door open slightly. Peterson, who was on the other side of the door, then shut the door from the inside. Beale had a slightly different version. He testified that after the door opened, he rested his arm against the top of the doorway and Peterson slammed the door, trapping Beale’s arm. Peterson then warned Beale that he would treat him as an intruder. Beale drew his weapon and called for backup. When backup arrived, the officers breached Peterson’s door. Once inside, Beale shot and killed Peterson. 2 Appellate Case: 25-7088 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 3 Plaintiff Christy Bailey, representing Peterson’s estate, sued Beale and the backup officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting claims of unlawful entry and excessive force. Plaintiff also sued Defendant City of Ada (“the City”) under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for claims including, as relevant here, failure to train. Plaintiff also made numerous claims under state law. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the backup officers’ motion on all claims and the City’s motion as to the failure-to-train claim. The district court denied Beale’s motion for summary judgment on the unlawful entry claim but granted the motion as to the excessive force claim. The district court denied the City’s motion as to the state law claims because their viability depended upon the surviving claim against Beale. Beale filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that the district court erred in denying qualified immunity. Bailey v. Beale, 2025 WL 1662004, at *1 (10th Cir. 2025). We agreed and concluded that Plaintiff had not shown that Beale’s unlawful entry violated clearly established law. Id. at *5. We reversed and remanded with instructions to grant qualified immunity to Beale. Id. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Beale and the City on all federal claims. It then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on Plaintiff’s state law claims. Plaintiff now appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to her failure-to-train claim against the City and as to its refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims. 3 Appellate Case: 25-7088 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 4 II. A. Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in its factual assessment of the City of Ada’s failure to train the officers on warrantless entry into private residences. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Hiett, 22 F.4th 1190, 1193 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing US Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1324 (10th Cir. 2010)). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. (citing Tesone v. Empire Mktg. Strategies, 942 F.3d 979, 994 (10th Cir. 2019)). If no genuine issue of material fact exists, the law entitles a party to summary judgment. Id. (citing In re MDL 2700 Genetech Herceptin (Trastuzumab) Mktg. & Sales Prac. Litig., 960 F.3d 1210, 1224 (10th Cir. 2020)). When Congress enacted § 1983, it did not intend to subject municipalities to liability unless an official policy caused a constitutional tort. George ex rel. Bradshaw v. Beaver Cnty. ex rel. Beaver Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 32 F.4th 1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2013)). We thus hold municipalities responsible for only their own acts and not for the independent acts of their employees. Id. (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)). To hold a municipality liable, “a plaintiff must prove that (1) an official policy or custom (2) caused the plaintiff’s constitutional injury and (3) that the municipality enacted or maintained that policy with deliberate indifference to the risk of that injury occurring.” Id. (citing Schneider, 717 F.3d at 769–71). Municipal liability is “most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to 4 Appellate Case: 25-7088 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 5 train.” Id. (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)). A municipality’s decision not to train its officers rises to the level of an official government policy under § 1983 only when the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to persons’ rights with whom the untrained employees come into contact. Id. The deliberate indifference standard is a rigorous one, which requires “proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Id. In the context of municipal liability, we ordinarily require a plaintiff to prove a pattern of constitutional violations by untrained employees to show deliberate indifference. Id. “Evidence of a pre-existing pattern of violations is only unnecessary in a narrow range of circumstances . . . in which the unconstitutional consequences of a failure to train are highly predictable and patently obvious.” Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 63–64). This is the so called “single-incident failure-to-train municipal liability.” We begin with the question of whether the city provided an adequate training program. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). The district court granted summary judgment after finding no dispute of material fact existed that training was adequate. Plaintiff disputes this finding. Oklahoma law requires law enforcement officers to receive certification through the “Council on Law Enforcement Education and Training” (“CLEET”) program. See Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3d 1215, 1218 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006). Oklahoma also has a “functional[ly] equivalent” process under the “Collegiate 5 Appellate Case: 25-7088 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 6 Officer Program” (“COPs”). Under COPs, college students concentrating in criminal justice can choose to take the COPs Program as the equivalency of an internship. COPs has “the same coursework” and the “same amount of hours as the [CLEET] basic [program].” The City relies on COPs training as “good training” for new officers because it is recognized by CLEET. Beale received his CLEET certification through COPs. The City also required Beale to go through field training with a field training officer. When asked whether this training covers entry into private residences, Chief of Police Carl Allen testified that he was “sure” that this would be “one of the blocks that would be covered” during this field training. He later clarified that he was unsure “[w]hether or not that would be a specific block” listed in the Field Training outline but that he “assum[ed]” that this would be covered in general terms as “some of the circumstances that they will possibly find themselves in.” Finally, Officers must complete a minimum of twenty-four hours of continuing CLEET education each year. Beale completed more than twenty-four hours of CLEET training each year, although his CLEET transcript does not indicate that any of these trainings related to warrantless entry into private residences. The district court found that COPs and CLEET offered training on entering private dwellings to officers. The district court determined that it would be “impossible” to conclude that the “the City made a deliberate choice to not train its officers” under these circumstances. First, it relied on an Eastern District of Oklahoma decision that CLEET-certification itself is sufficient to support a finding 6 Appellate Case: 25-7088 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 7 of adequate training. Id. (citing Jones v. Hacker, 2015 WL 1279363, at *8 n.7 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 20, 2015)). The district court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that Chief Allen was unable “to specifically identify the curriculum of CLEET and COPS training programs.” Id. at 1421. The district court concluded that “[r]eliance upon these programs to provide training to the officer does not represent an abandonment of the City’s obligation to train—rather, it indicates an effort to use these established training programs to meet its needs in insuring uniform training for its officers.” Id. Plaintiff challenges the district court’s factual analysis. Plaintiff points to Beale’s COPs transcript, his CLEET transcript, the Field Training form and manual, and the City of Ada’s Policy and Procedure Manual and argues that none of these resources “mention the legal standards, policies, and procedures for the warrantless entry into a private residence.” Plaintiff also argues that mere reliance on CLEET certification does not show that Oklahoma adequately trained Beale as a legal matter. Plaintiff has the burden to prove the City provided inadequate training—but she fails to meet it. Carr v. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff asks us to infer that no training on warrantless entry into private residences occurred because none of the sources cataloguing the training that Beale underwent specifically mentions “standards, policies, and procedures for the warrantless entry into a private residence.” But a lack of specificity in these listings is not sufficient for such an inference, particularly where deponents have testified that the training covers these areas and no evidence exists suggesting that the City did not provide this training. 7 Appellate Case: 25-7088 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 8 Beginning with Beale’s COPs transcript, Beale received a degree in Criminal Justice (Law Enforcement) before the City hired him. His transcript has a checkmark next to classes, including “Criminal Investigation I,” “Intro to Law Enforcement,” “Criminal Investigation II,” “Police Administration,” and “First Aid.” Beale also took classes including “Criminal Justice Issues,” “Legal ASP Crim Just Proc,” “Interrogation Techniques,” “The Police Function,” and “Intro to Criminal Justice.” He also completed a COPs internship. The record also contains an attached sheet listing various classes that appear to be relevant for COPs from Oklahoma universities. Under the East Central University record, red checkmarks are next to each class listed and dates appear next to two courses that match the dates that Beale took those classes, including what it describes as an “Intro – Legal” class (and is the “Intro to Law Enforcement” class on Beale’s transcript). The transcript itself doesn’t clearly indicate that Beale learned about warrantless entries into private residences. But it’s certainly not proof of the opposite. The record also contains some testimony on the issue of whether Beale’s COPs instruction included training on entering private residences. One could view this evidence as inconclusive, or alternatively as supporting that he did receive at least some instruction in this area. During his deposition, an attorney asked Beale whether he took any classes at ECU “that would train you on entering into a private residence.” He testified that “[w]e went over case law in a lot of different classes. I couldn’t pick out a certain class.” The attorney then followed up “[d]id the training or did the class include the legal standard for entering into a private residence?” and 8 Appellate Case: 25-7088 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 9 “[d]id the training or the coursework include the procedures for entering into a private residence?” Beale responded that he did not recall for either question. Plaintiff argues on appeal that this is evidence of the absence of this training. We disagree. First, Beale indicated he did go over case law regarding entering private residences, just that he could not remember which ones. He did not recall the attorney’s more specific questions about whether the coursework included legal standards or procedures. Even if the sum total of Beale’s testimony is that he does not recall either way whether he received this training before he graduated in 2015, sitting in a deposition in 2022, this is not evidence sufficient to meet Plaintiff’s burden of creating a dispute of material fact as to the adequacy of Beale’s training. At most, it would allow a jury to speculate that he did not receive this training because he could not remember either way. Testimony from Chief Allen further suggests that the COPs program likely covers the warrantless entry into private dwellings. For instance, Chief Allen testified that COPs is “the same amount of hours as” CLEET and that it’s “the same coursework” as CLEET basic. Chief Allen’s testimony asserts that the COPs approved programs would teach the same sorts of things for the same amount of time because CLEET approves them. When reviewing the red checkmarks on Beale’s transcript, Chief Allen testified that it “looks to be categorizing probably the coursework of COPs, because it’s intro legal, which is a CLEET block.” He further noted that the “blocks that are checked off are law enforcement related, so I would assume there would be some coursework that would cover [training regarding 9 Appellate Case: 25-7088 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 10 entering a private dwelling.]” When asked why he would assume that the COPs certification “properly covered” warrantless entry into private dwellings, Chief Allen testified that CLEET “recognizes that it’s the equivalent to their basic training, and the basic training has legal blocks that cover those items,” although he admitted to having no personal knowledge about the COPs training curriculum. Although Chief Allen’s assumptions about COPs course requirements based on CLEET approval of those programs is not definitive proof that the City adequately trains its law enforcement officers, it suggests that the City does. In any case, none of this evidence shows that training is inadequate—which is what Plaintiff must show to create a material dispute to survive summary judgment. Beyond the COPs training, City of Ada officers also receive field training before they start work. As to whether this field training includes training on entering private residences, Chief Allen testified that he’s “sure that’s one of the blocks that would be covered” and that the Field Training Policy Manual sets forth the required field training. When asked whether he was “confident” that the field training includes entering private residences, Chief Allen responded that he could not say “[w]hether or not that would be a specific block,” but that “in general terms, that’s part of . . . the circumstances that they will possibly find themselves in, so I’m assuming, without having that document in front of me and going through it specifically, that that would be part of it, at least in a general term.” Beale, meanwhile, initially testified that he did not recall whether he received any field training on entering a private residence. But then when asked whether he “receive[d] 10 Appellate Case: 25-7088 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 11 any field training on the procedures for how to enter into a private residence” he testified that he “went over entering dwellings and stuff” with his field training officer, but that he could not remember the exact amount of time. Plaintiff argues that because Chief Allen and Beale could not identify “any specific City field training on the warrantless entry into a private residence” during deposition, this shows “there is no such training.” Plaintiff also points to the Field Training Guide and argues that nothing exists “pertaining to the warrantless entry into a private residence.” Again, Chief Allen and Beale’s testimony is equivocal, and the Field Training materials do not clearly indicate that Beale learned about warrantless entries into private residences during field training. But nothing Plaintiff relies on is preclusive of adequate training or shows that Beale did not receive such training. Both Allen and Beale indicated that they believed that field training covered this topic, at least in “general terms” as Chief Allen put it. The Field Training materials also include topics that could certainly cover entry into private residences. For instance, the OIT Training Guide for the Field Training Officer Program lists categories that were “explained to [Beale]” or that he performed or was tested on. One category includes “Arrest and Booking Procedures” including a subtopic on “How to Arrest” with a further subtopic of “[r]emoving occupants from residences.” The Field Training Manual provides additional detail, instructing Field Training Officers to explain “[r]emoving occupants from residences and other buildings” to trainees. “Some areas of instruction in this area would involve . . . 11 Appellate Case: 25-7088 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 12 [i]nstruct[ing] the [new recruit] what it means to be legally present and how it would affect your ability to arrest in certain situations.” To be clear, Defendant does not bear the burden of proving that it does, in fact, provide this training. The evidence Plaintiff relies on to argue that training is inadequate is at best either neutral or uninformative as to whether this training exists. Generally, however, it tends to affirmatively show that officers are trained on warrantless entry in private residences. 1 Thus, Plaintiff has not shown a genuine dispute of material fact, and we affirm the district court. 2 B. Finally, Plaintiff contends the district court erred by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. “We review the district court’s decision declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion.” 1 Plaintiff posits the district court failed to apply the relevant Tenth Circuit precedent governing single-incident Monell failure-to-train claims. Plaintiff contends the district court should have addressed (1) whether the warrantless entry into a private residence was a recurring situation and (2) whether the unlawful entry into Peterson’s residence and violation of his Fourth Amendment rights would be an obvious or highly predictable consequence of the failure to train police officers on the specific topic of the warrantless entry into private residences. But as we discussed, the evidence in the record does not show that the City failed to train police officers on that topic. So the district court had no need to address these specific issues relevant to the deliberate indifference standard of a failure-to-train claim. The district court did not err. Rather, it articulated the municipal liability elements, described the deliberate indifference standard, and concluded that the officers did receive training in the relevant areas. 2 Because Plaintiff has not shown a material fact dispute as to adequacy of training on warrantless entry into private residences, we need not address whether inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent city policy. 12 Appellate Case: 25-7088 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 13 Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 989 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda, L.L.C., 434 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 2006)). Supplemental jurisdiction is “a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.” Id. at 997 (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Indeed, a district court “usually should” decline jurisdiction over remaining state law claims once federal claims have been dismissed. Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998)). That’s the case here. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge 13