Lakey v. Bryant

Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 7, 2026 Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________ CYNTHIA LAKEY; DOUGLAS LAKEY, as co-Special Administrators for the Estate of Jared Lakey, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. No. 25-7068 CHRIS BRYANT, in his official and individual capacities as Sheriff of Carter County, Defendant - Appellee, and JOSHUA TAYLOR, in his individual capacity; BRANDON DINGMAN, in his individual capacity, Defendants. _________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 6:20-CV-00152-RAW) _________________________________ Steven J. Terrill, Bryan & Terrill, Edmond, Oklahoma (J. Spencer Bryan with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Rebecca A. Boyer, Collins Zorn & Wagner, PLLC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Wellon B. Poe, and Jamison C. Whitson, with her on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee. _________________________________ Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, McHUGH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 2 _________________________________ McHUGH, Circuit Judge. _________________________________ After Jared Lakey was seen screaming naked on a residential street in Wilson, Oklahoma, officers from the Wilson Police Department responded to the scene. The Wilson officers tased Mr. Lakey fifty-three times in a nine-minute period and an assisting deputy, David Duggan from the Carter County Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”), placed Mr. Lakey in a chokehold restraint. Deputy Duggan acted pursuant to a Mutual Aid Policy, which required CCSO officers to respond to calls for assistance from smaller law enforcement agencies like the Wilson Police Department. The multiple tasings and neck restraint ultimately led to Mr. Lakey’s death. Plaintiffs-Appellants Douglas and Cynthia Lakey, as administrators for Mr. Lakey’s estate (the “Estate”), filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various constitutional violations by individual officers and municipal entities. As relevant to this appeal, the Estate alleged that Defendant-Appellee Sheriff Chris Bryant of the CCSO was liable in his individual and official capacities for (1) maintaining an informal custom of permitting his officers to use excessive force; (2) maintaining the Mutual Aid Policy, which it argues increased the risk of excessive force being used against arrestees; and (3) failing to train officers how to respond to requests for assistance under the Mutual Aid Policy. After Sherrif Bryant received notice of the litigation, his cell phone containing certain texts from the night of the incident was destroyed. And Sheriff Bryant then threw the broken phone away, preventing retrieval of 2  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 3 the messages. The Estate filed a motion for spoliation sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), which the district court denied. The court concluded that the Estate had failed to show it was prejudiced by the lost texts and made a factual finding that Sheriff Bryant had not destroyed the evidence in bad faith. Sheriff Bryant then filed separate motions for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part. The court concluded that Sheriff Bryant in his individual capacity was entitled to qualified immunity for the Mutual Aid Policy, noting that the Estate had failed to show maintaining the policy violated clearly established law. But it allowed the Mutual Aid Policy claims to go to trial against Sheriff Bryant in his official capacity. As to the claim alleging a custom of allowing excessive force, the court granted summary judgment. The court determined there was no evidence of a pattern of excessive force violations sufficient to show an informal custom. At trial, the jury considered claims that the individual Wilson officers were liable for using excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and claims that Sheriff Bryant was liable in his official capacity for maintaining and for inadequate training under the Mutual Aid Policy. On the first day of testimony, the Estate sought to introduce evidence that, although the Wilson officers had been criminally charged for Mr. Lakey’s death, Deputy Duggan was not criminally charged for his part in the incident. But the court excluded the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, stating without explanation that the prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. The jury ultimately found the individual Wilson officers liable for excessive force but found that Sheriff Bryant was not liable for the Mutual Aid Policy. 3  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 4 On appeal, the Estate raises four arguments. First, it argues that the district court erred in holding Sheriff Bryant was entitled to qualified immunity for maintaining the Mutual Aid Policy. Second, the Estate argues the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Bryant on its claim alleging a custom of allowing excessive force. Third, the Estate contends that the district court erred in excluding evidence that Deputy Duggan was not criminally charged for his part in Mr. Lakey’s death. Finally, the Estate argues that the district court erred in denying its Rule 37(e) motion for spoliation sanctions because it erroneously placed the entire burden of proving prejudice on the Estate and improperly weighed the evidence to determine that Sheriff Bryant destroyed his text messages negligently as opposed to intentionally. For the reasons explained below, we see no basis for reversal. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background 1. The Mutual Aid Policy As sheriff of Carter County, Chris Bryant adopted and enforced a Mutual Aid Policy, requiring deputies in the CCSO to respond when smaller municipal agencies requested assistance. The Mutual Aid Policy provides that “[r]equests from other law enforcement agencies . . . for back-up personnel or other assistance will be honored by the Carter County Sheriff’s Office whenever the request is of an urgent nature and in non- emergency cases when available manpower exists.” App. Vol. II at 438. 4  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 5 Deputies from the CCSO began responding to calls for assistance following enactment of the Mutual Aid Policy. But CCSO deputies soon found that some local officers would not assist them when they responded to calls for mutual aid. CCSO Deputy Billy Mitchell testified that he felt he was “on [his] own” when responding to calls from certain Wilson Police Department officers under the Mutual Aid Policy. App. Vol. II at 403. Sheriff Bryant testified that he was aware some Wilson officers were not providing backup, and he was aware that this lack of backup increased the risk to his deputies and arrestees. However, because the Wilson officers were not his employees, Sheriff Bryant did not contact the Wilson chief of police to correct this problem. 2. The Incident On July 4, 2019, Jared Lakey was spending the weekend with his friend Kody Helms in Wilson, Oklahoma. After attending a Fourth of July celebration, Mr. Lakey left with other friends before returning to Mr. Helms’s home. When Mr. Helms returned home later that night, Mr. Lakey was half-dressed and appeared to be in an agitated state. In response to Mr. Helms’s direction that Mr. Lakey either calm down or leave, Mr. Lakey left the residence. Neighbors heard a commotion outside the residence and noticed Mr. Lakey, half- naked, screaming incoherently in the street. The neighbors called the Wilson Police Department. Wilson Police Officer Joshua Taylor arrived at the scene and encountered a fully naked man, except for socks, standing in the middle of the street, waving his arms, and acting in a manner Officer Taylor associated with possible drug use. Officer Taylor called for backup, to which Wilson Police Officer Brandon Dingman responded. When 5  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 6 Officer Dingman arrived, Mr. Lakey was lying face down on the ground with Officer Taylor pointing his taser at Mr. Lakey from a few feet away. According to Officers Dingman and Taylor, Officer Dingman approached Mr. Lakey to handcuff him. When Officer Dingman placed a foot on Mr. Lakey’s back to stabilize him, Mr. Lakey began to rise. Both Officers Taylor and Dingman activated their tasers. While this was ongoing, Officer Dingman radioed for additional backup. The call triggered the Mutual Aid Policy, and CCSO Deputy David Duggan responded. While waiting for Deputy Duggan to arrive, Officers Taylor and Dingman never attempted to handcuff Mr. Lakey, opting instead to keep him on the ground using their tasers. Over a roughly nine-minute period, Officers Taylor and Dingman tased Mr. Lakey fifty-three times. When Deputy Duggan arrived at the scene, Officers Dingman and Taylor were standing away from Mr. Lakey, and Mr. Lakey was sitting on the ground. Mr. Lakey was not resisting, fighting, or making any threatening gestures. Without issuing any commands, Deputy Duggan approached Mr. Lakey from behind and placed him in a Lateral Vascular Neck Restraint (“LVNR”). The LVNR is designed to put pressure on carotid arteries, thereby cutting off oxygen flow and causing the individual to pass out. Deputy Duggan applied the LVNR until Mr. Lakey passed out, at which point the officers placed Mr. Lakey in handcuffs. Deputy Duggan testified that he used the LVNR because he feared that Officers Taylor and Dingman “were not going to help when [he] went hands on, and due to the size of Mr. Lakey,” not because Mr. Lakey’s behavior required such a hold. App. Vol. II 6  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 7 at 393–94. Deputy Duggan learned the LVNR during his previous employment as an Oklahoma Highway Patrol Trooper. It is undisputed that the CCSO did not train its deputies to use any type of chokehold or neck restraint, including the LVNR. And before this incident, no deputy had used a neck restraint during Sheriff Bryant’s time in office, which began in 2016. Medical responders were called to the scene where Mr. Lakey was treated before being transferred to University of Oklahoma Medical Center in Oklahoma City. Mr. Lakey passed away at the hospital on July 6, 2019. A medical examiner’s autopsy listed Mr. Lakey’s cause of death as a heart attack, caused in part by the use of tasers and the neck restraint. 3. The Aftermath Sheriff Bryant was informed about the incident during the night or early morning of July 4/July 5, 2019, and he responded to the scene as part of the investigation. Sheriff Bryant ordered Deputy Duggan to go to a hospital to get a drug and alcohol screening, and Deputy Mitchell accompanied Deputy Duggan to the hospital. During this time, Sheriff Bryant’s phone records show that he and Deputy Mitchell exchanged several text messages. After the investigation revealed the extent of Deputy Duggan’s involvement, Sheriff Bryant turned the case over to the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation. That same day, Deputy Duggan was placed on administrative leave pending resolution of the investigation. 7  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 8 On June 29, 2020, Deputy Duggan met with the district attorney, who requested Deputy Duggan’s resignation in lieu of the district attorney’s office filing criminal charges against him. Text messages between Deputy Duggan and someone named “Gary” in the days after the meeting show Deputy Duggan recounting to Gary that Sheriff Bryant disagreed with his being pressured to resign, that Sheriff Bryant was “behind” him, and that Sheriff Bryant was “pissed.” App. Vol. II at 364–65. Deputy Duggan resigned from the CCSO effective July 2, 2020. The district attorney brought criminal charges against Officers Taylor and Dingman for murder in the second degree. Both were found guilty by a jury and convicted in November 2021. However, Sheriff Bryant did not discipline Deputy Duggan, and he was not criminally charged. Deputy Duggan claimed no one told him that the LVNR violated the CCSO’s use of force policy and that he believed the LVNR was an approved use of force technique. Sheriff Bryant did not make any changes to CCSO’s written policies as the result of the incident with Mr. Lakey. During litigation, Sheriff Bryant reported that his cell phone had been destroyed in January 2020 when it fell onto the road and was run over by another vehicle. Despite having received a preservation letter and a notice of a tort claim, Sheriff Bryant threw away the phone and his SIM card without preserving its contents. Sheriff Bryant had an older model iPhone, which did not automatically backup cloud storage or otherwise save a backup. As a result, the text messages between Sheriff Bryant and Deputy Mitchell immediately after the incident were lost. 8  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 9 B. Procedural Background On May 26, 2020, the Estate filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. As relevant to this appeal, the Third Amended Complaint brought claims against Sheriff Bryant in his official and individual capacities. The Estate alleged that Sherriff Bryant was liable for maintaining policies approving the use of excessive force. Throughout the litigation, the Estate developed claims that Sheriff Bryant was liable for maintaining the Mutual Aid Policy and failing to train deputies how to respond under the Mutual Aid Policy. 1 On February 7, 2023, the Estate filed a motion for spoliation sanctions against Sheriff Bryant based on his missing cell phone and his failure to maintain text messages from the night of the incident. The Estate brought its motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), which allows the court to impose sanctions on a party who fails to preserve electronically stored information in anticipation of litigation if the failure prejudices another party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e). Specifically, the Estate requested default judgment. Rule 37(e)(2) provides that default judgment is an appropriate remedy 1 Allegations regarding the Mutual Aid Policy do not appear in the operative complaint. Nonetheless, Sheriff Bryant does not argue this as a basis to affirm the dismissal of related claims on summary judgment. And official capacity claims based on the Mutual Aid Policy were included in the pretrial order. “When an issue is set forth in the pretrial order, it is not necessary to amend previously filed pleadings because the pretrial order is the controlling document for trial.” Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he inclusion of a claim in the pretrial order is deemed to amend any previous pleadings which did not include that claim.” Id. We therefore consider the Mutual Aid Policy claims as properly raised. 9  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 10 only “upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation.” The district court denied the motion. The court first determined that while Sheriff Bryant had a duty to preserve his cell phone data, the Estate had not shown that the spoliation was prejudicial and that the lost messages would have been favorable to its case. In making this determination, the district court assumed that the party requesting spoliation sanctions under Rule 37(e) has the burden to show prejudice. In addition to its conclusion on prejudice, the court made a factual finding that Sheriff Bryant was merely negligent in destroying his phone and text messages and that he did not intentionally deprive the Estate of evidence. Sheriff Bryant filed separate motions for summary judgment for the claims against him in his official and individual capacities. The district court entered an order addressing both motions for summary judgment, granting them in part and denying them in part. The court granted summary judgment for the official capacity claim alleging a policy of allowing excessive force. It determined there was no evidence showing a pattern of excessive force, as required for a jury to find Sheriff Bryant liable for maintaining an informal policy. As to the individual capacity claim, alleging supervisory liability for the Mutual Aid Policy, the court likewise granted the motion for summary judgment, concluding that Sheriff Bryant was entitled to qualified immunity. Specifically, the district court concluded the Estate had failed to present any case law showing the Mutual Aid Policy violated established law and, instead, had presented only cases addressing Deputy Duggan’s underlying use of force. However, because qualified 10  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 11 immunity does not apply to official capacity claims, the court denied summary judgment for the official capacity claims alleging liability for maintaining and for failure to train under the Mutual Aid Policy. Twelve days before trial, the parties and the district court held a pretrial conference. At the conference, the court determined it would allow the Estate to present evidence that the district attorney declined to criminally charge Deputy Duggan. Sheriff Bryant filed a motion to reconsider that decision, which the district court denied. The case was tried before a jury from July 22 through July 28, 2025. The remaining claims heard by the jury were claims against Officers Taylor and Dingman for excessive force, a claim against Sheriff Bryant in his official capacity for deliberate indifference to the risk of excessive force under the Mutual Aid Policy, and a claim against Sheriff Bryant in his official capacity for failure to train under the Mutual Aid Policy. On the first day of testimony, Sheriff Bryant made an oral motion to reconsider the ruling allowing evidence that Deputy Duggan was not criminally charged. The court again denied the motion. However, after the midmorning break, the court reconsidered its prior ruling and ordered the parties to refrain from eliciting evidence that Deputy Duggan was not criminally charged. As the testimony had progressed, the court stated it had concluded that “the prejudice of that [evidence] substantially outweighs its probative value.” On July 28, 2025, the jury returned a verdict finding Officers Taylor and Dingman liable for excessive force. But the jury found that Sheriff Bryant was not liable for either 11  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 12 of the official capacity claims against him. The court entered judgment the next day, and the Estate timely appealed. II. DISCUSSION The Estate challenges the district court’s summary judgment decision, evidentiary decisions at trial, and the denial of its Rule 37(e) motion for spoliation sanctions. We address each of these arguments, ultimately concluding that the district court did not reversibly err. Our discussion of these issues proceeds in three parts. In Part A, we review the district court’s summary judgment decision, first considering whether the district court correctly dismissed the Estate’s individual capacity claim against Sheriff Bryant and then addressing the correctness of its decision dismissing the claim for a policy of excessive force against Sheriff Bryant in his official capacity. For the reasons explained below, we affirm both aspects of the summary judgment ruling. In Part B, we consider whether any evidentiary errors entitle the Estate to a new trial. Specifically, we address the Estate’s claim that the district court improperly excluded evidence that Deputy Duggan was not criminally charged for his actions during the incident with Mr. Lakey. Because we conclude that any error was harmless, we reject this argument. Finally, in Part C, we consider the Estate’s claim that the district court reversibly erred in denying sanctions for spoliation of Sheriff Bryant’s cell phone evidence. Again, we detect no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm. 12  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 13 A. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment to Sheriff Bryant “We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo, applying the same standards as the district court.” Snyder v. Beam Techs., Inc., 147 F.4th 1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 2025) (quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The movant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie demonstration of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003). “Such a movant may make its prima facie demonstration simply by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.” Id. The nonmovant must then bring forth “specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). “We view the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Flores v. Henderson, 101 F.4th 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Estate brought claims against Sheriff Bryant in his individual capacity, as well as claims based on his official capacity. Because the legal requirements to prevail on each of these claims are distinct, we analyze them separately. 13  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 14 1. The district court correctly held Sheriff Bryant is entitled to qualified immunity on the Estate’s individual capacity claims. The district court granted summary judgment to Sheriff Bryant in his individual capacity, concluding that he was entitled to qualified immunity. Specifically, the court determined that the Estate failed to cite a controlling Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case showing that it was clearly established Sheriff Bryant could face supervisory liability for implementing the Mutual Aid Policy. The Estate argues that maintaining the Mutual Aid Policy was such an obvious constitutional violation that no case law is required to meet the clearly established requirement. To provide context for our rejection of the Estate’s argument, we begin with an overview of the relevant legal background. a. Supervisory Liability and Qualified Immunity Section 1983 permits imposing liability on a “defendant-supervisor who creates, promulgates, implements, or in some other way possesses responsibility for the continued operation of a policy the enforcement . . . of which” causes a plaintiff to be deprived of constitutional rights. Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010). Section 1983, however, “does not authorize liability under a theory of respondeat superior.” Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 767 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). To impose supervisory liability, a plaintiff “must show an affirmative link between the supervisor and the constitutional violation.” Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1248 (10th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Establishing this affirmative link requires showing three prongs: “(1) personal involvement, (2) sufficient causal connection, and 14  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 15 (3) culpable state of mind.” Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1195. The state of mind required depends on the constitutional right at issue, Schneider, 717 F.3d at 769, but it “can be no less than the mens rea required . . . to commit the underlying constitutional violation,” Cox, 800 F.3d at 1249 (quotation marks omitted). Neither party challenges the district court’s conclusion that the applicable mens rea to supervisory liability for Fourth Amendment excessive force is deliberate indifference. 2 “We therefore assume without deciding that deliberate indifference is the applicable state of mind.” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 769. A “policymaker is deliberately indifferent when he deliberately or consciously fails to act when presented with an obvious risk of constitutional harm which will almost inevitably result in constitutional injury of the type experienced by the plaintiff.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). To sustain a claim requires “proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 997 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). “In most instances,” a “pattern of tortious conduct” is required to establish notice. Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 2 We apply deliberate indifference to supervisory liability for “Fourteenth Amendment claim[s] involving injuries to an inmate,” such as excessive force to pretrial detainees. See Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 997 (10th Cir. 2019). And at least one of our sister circuits, the Fifth, has held that deliberate indifference applies to supervisory liability for Fourth Amendment excessive force. See Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 616, 620 (5th Cir. 2018) (applying the deliberate indifference standard to a claim of supervisory liability under the Fourth Amendment where the supervisor ordered his subordinate to tase a fleeing suspect). However, neither the parties nor the district court cited a controlling Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court case holding that deliberate indifference is the requisite mens rea for claims of supervisory liability for Fourth Amendment excessive force. 15  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 16 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998). However, “[i]n a narrow range of circumstances . . . deliberate indifference may be found absent a pattern of unconstitutional behavior if a violation of federal rights is a ‘highly predictable’ or ‘plainly obvious’ consequence of a municipality’s action or inaction.” Id. at 1307–08 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409; then quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989)). “Persons sued under § 1983 in their individual capacity may invoke the defense of qualified immunity.” Duda v. Elder, 7 F.4th 899, 909 (10th Cir. 2021). “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). When properly raised, “this affirmative defense creates a presumption that the defendant is immune from suit.” Sanchez v. Guzman, 105 F.4th 1285, 1292 (10th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). Overcoming this presumption requires a plaintiff to show that “(1) the officers’ alleged conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the violation, such that every reasonable official would have understood, that such conduct constituted a violation of that right.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de novo.” Id. The parties’ arguments here concern only the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. To meet the second prong and show that the law was clearly established, the plaintiff can cite to “either a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision, or 16  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 17 the weight of authority from other courts, existing at the time of the alleged violation.” T.D. v. Patton, 868 F.3d 1209, 1220 (10th Cir. 2017). Clearly establishing a right does not “require a case directly on point,” but the precedent “must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). In some cases, a “general constitutional rule” may be sufficient when it applies “with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)). Of course, “some things are so obviously unlawful that they don’t require detailed explanation and sometimes the most obviously unlawful things happen so rarely that a case on point is itself an unusual thing.” Browder v. City of Albuquerque, 787 F.3d 1076, 1082 (10th Cir. 2015). In applying qualified immunity to claims of supervisory liability, it is not enough to demonstrate that the subordinate’s actions violated clearly established law. See Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2018). Instead, clearly established law must have put the supervisor on notice that his supervisory conduct itself violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. “In other words, [the Estate] must identify a case where an official acting under similar circumstances as [Sheriff Bryant] was held to have violated the Constitution.” See id. (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)). b. Analysis The Estate concedes that it did not provide “either a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision, or the weight of authority from other courts, existing at the time of the alleged violation,” T.D., 868 F.3d at 1220, establishing that the Mutual Aid Policy 17  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 18 violates clearly established rights. Instead, it relies on the proposition that general statements of law may be sufficient to make the law clearly established in some circumstances. However, such “[o]bvious cases are rare and inarguable.” Crane v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 15 F.4th 1296, 1310 (10th Cir. 2021). For example, the Supreme Court in Hope v. Pelzer held that handcuffing a shirtless inmate to a hitching post in the sun for seven hours, without bathroom breaks, and with minimal water, was an “obvious” Eighth Amendment violation. 536 U.S. at 733–35, 738. We have also found obvious constitutional violations, for example, where a prosecutor fabricated evidence, Truman v. Orem City, 1 F.4th 1227, 1240 (10th Cir. 2021), and where an off-duty officer followed an individual home and pointed his firearm at the individual for no law enforcement purpose, Rosales v. Bradshaw, 72 F.4th 1145, 1157 (10th Cir. 2023). The implementation of a Mutual Aid Policy, requiring deputies to assist smaller law enforcement agencies, is not one of these rare and inarguable cases for which mere general statements of law are sufficient to make the law clearly established. Sheriff Bryant testified that he knew some Wilson officers were not providing backup when his deputies responded to requests for mutual aid. He likewise testified that he was aware providing aid with a lack of backup “increased the risk to deputies and citizens.” App. Vol. IV at 630. But it is not clear this increased risk was constitutionally impermissible. The Estate points to the established right to be free from excessive force. To hold Sheriff Bryant liable for maintaining the Mutual Aid Policy, however, it must have been clearly established that the risk posed by the Mutual Aid Policy went beyond constitutionally 18  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 19 permissible bounds. Although Sheriff Bryant was aware of increased risks from a lack of backup, no evidence indicates that it was “known or obvious” that his deputies would use excessive force when responding to calls for mutual aid. See Burke, 935 F.3d at 997 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 410). Indeed, the Estate has failed to point to a case holding that a policy resulting in a similar risk to arrestees violated constitutional rights. And, in the absence of such case law, it is far from obvious that the risks posed by the Mutual Aid Policy (involving one alleged incident of excessive force) presented an “obvious risk of constitutional harm.” See id. at 997–98 (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Estate has failed to overcome the presumption that Sheriff Bryant is entitled to qualified immunity for maintaining the Mutual Aid Policy. 2. The district court correctly held Sheriff Bryant is entitled to summary judgment on the Estate’s municipal liability claim. The district court also granted summary judgment and dismissed the claims against Sheriff Bryant in his official capacity based on allegations of an informal policy of excessive force. The court determined that the Estate had failed to show a pattern of violations sufficient to create a triable issue. The Estate argues that the district court erred because its claim does not depend on a pattern of violations. Instead, it maintains that its claim turns on whether Sheriff Bryant ratified Deputy Duggan’s conduct. From evidence of post-incident conduct, such as a lack of discipline imposed on Deputy Duggan, the absence of any changed policy, and the failure to provide additional training after the incident, the Estate contends that a reasonable jury could conclude Sheriff Bryant 19  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 20 approved of Deputy Duggan’s actions. In its reply, the Estate also argues that post- incident ratification can show that conduct was “consistent with existing policy or practice.” Reply at 7 (quotation marks omitted). In making this argument, the Estate mixes two theories of municipal liability: ratification and informal custom. As we explain in detail below, neither theory provides a basis for reversal. The Estate explicitly waived a ratification theory before the district court. And while ratification may be relevant to proving an informal custom, this separate theory nonetheless requires evidence of a widespread pattern of constitutional violations. The Estate has provided no such evidence. Thus, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Sheriff Bryant on the Estate’s claim alleging an informal custom of excessive force. a. Municipal Liability under § 1983 Lawsuits against government employees in their official capacity “represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). Municipalities and their government units are “included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Id. at 690. Accordingly, we treat the claims against Sheriff Bryant in his official capacity as asserting claims against the CCSO. “‘Under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for their own illegal acts,’ meaning ‘they are not vicariously liable for their employees’ actions.’” Manning v. City of Tulsa, 170 F.4th 1287, 1299 (10th Cir. 2026) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)).“To establish a claim for damages under § 1983 against municipal entities or 20  Appellate Case: 25-7068 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2026 Page: 21 local government bodies, the plaintiff must prove (1) the entity executed a policy or custom (2) that caused the plaintiff to suffer deprivation of constitutional or other federal rights.” Thao v. Grady Cnty. Crim. Just. Auth., 159 F.4th 1214, 1227 (10th Cir. 2025) (quotation marks omitted). A municipal policy or custom may take the form of (1) “a formal regulation or policy statement”; (2) an informal custom; (3) “decisions of municipal employees with final policymaking authority”; (4) “ratification by final policymakers of the decisions of subordinates to whom authority was delegated”; or (5) the “deliberately indifferent failure to adequately train or supervise employees.” Pyle v. Woods, 874 F.3d 1257, 1266 (10th Cir. 2017). The theories of proving a policy or custom that are relevant to this appeal are ratification and informal custom. “[A] municipality will not be found liable under a ratification theory unless a final decisionmaker ratifies an employee’s specific unconstitutional actions, as well as the basis for these actions.” Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 790 (10th Cir. 2010). And for a municipality to be held liable for an informal custom, it must “amoun[t] to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Id. at 788. (quotation marks omitted). b. Analysis Because the Estate’s arguments