Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 1 of 48 FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12787 ____________________ KEITH EDWARDS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jerry Blasingame, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus OFFICER J. GRUBBS, #6416, Defendant-Appellant, CITY OF ATLANTA, ATLANTA POLICE DEPT., Defendants. ____________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-02047-SCJ ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 2 of 48 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12787 ____________________ No. 24-12925 ____________________ KEITH EDWARDS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jerry Blasingame, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus OFFICER J. GRUBBS, #6416, THE CITY OF ATLANTA, Defendants-Appellees, ATLANTA POLICE DEPT., Defendant. ____________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-02047-SCJ ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 3 of 48 24-12787 Opinion of the Court 3 Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and HONEYWELL, Dis- trict Judge. * JORDAN, Circuit Judge: We substitute the opinion which follows in place of our prior opinion, reported as Edwards v. Grubbs, 169 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2026). These consolidated appeals involve a single use-of-force in- cident in Atlanta, Georgia, on July 10, 2018. On that fateful day, City of Atlanta Police Officer Jon Grubbs pulled his taser’s trigger, hit Jerry Blasingame in the back, and sent him barreling down a steep embankment that led to a metal utility box on a concrete plat- form at the bottom. Mr. Blasingame suffered severe injuries when he hit the box and platform, and his guardian sued Officer Grubbs and the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force. The jury found against Officer Grubbs and the City and awarded signif- icant compensatory and punitive damages. The district court granted the City’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and re- duced the award of punitive damages against Officer Grubbs. We confront a number of issues on appeal, including quali- fied immunity, municipal liability, and the constitutional limits on punitive damage awards. Based on our review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm in all respects. * Honorable Charlene Edwards Honeywell, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation. USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 4 of 48 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12787 I A Around 2:30 p.m. on July 10, 2018, Officer Grubbs and his partner patrolled the streets of Atlanta, Georgia, near an on-ramp to Interstate 20. Traffic was heavy, as it so often is, and the two officers observed Mr. Blasingame—a 65-year-old homeless man— on the side of the roadway reaching into a vehicle and receiving money from the driver. Officer Grubbs’ partner parked the police cruiser in the nearby gore. Officer Grubbs then exited the cruiser to confront Mr. Blasingame. When Mr. Blasingame saw Officer Grubbs, he ran. Officer Grubbs crossed two lanes of traffic and chased Mr. Blasingame on the shoulder of the road. Officer Grubbs ordered Mr. Blasingame to stop, but he continued to flee. As Officer Grubbs drew closer, Mr. Blasingame crossed over a roadside guardrail. Mr. Blasingame, who was unarmed, did not cause Officer Grubbs to be in imminent fear, and did not say any- thing to Officer Grubbs during this chase. Beyond the guardrail, Mr. Blasingame made his way to- wards an opening in the brush with a steep decline and the highway below. Without verbal warning, Officer Grubbs drew and de- ployed his taser in dart mode, hitting Mr. Blasingame in the back. USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 5 of 48 24-12787 Opinion of the Court 5 This caused Mr. Blasingame to fall down the steep embankment where he hit his head on the concrete platform of a utility box.1 Emergency medical services estimated the embankment to be 30 feet long. The distance between the point of impact on the utility box and the guardrail was approximately 23 feet and 9 inches. The angle of the decline was approximately 30 to 40 de- grees, as displayed in these photographs and diagrams of the scene: D.E. 211-31 at 4. 1 The entire chase had taken approximately 45 seconds. USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 6 of 48 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12787 D.E. 211-31 at 9. 2 2 This diagram was created with generative artificial intelligence. USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 7 of 48 24-12787 Opinion of the Court 7 EMS transported Mr. Blasingame to Grady Hospital in criti- cal condition. He suffered, among other injuries, traumatic brain damage, and became quadriplegic due to a spinal injury. Nearly a month later, on August 9, 2018, Officer Grubbs vis- ited Mr. Blasingame—who was still at Grady Hospital—to give him a citation for two misdemeanor offenses: (1) pedestrian solici- tation on a roadway in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-97; and (2) ob- struction of a law enforcement officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17- 4-6. The chase and tasing of Mr. Blasingame was not recorded because Officer Grubbs’ body-worn camera was in “buffering mode” from 1:48 p.m. to 2:36 p.m. Buffering mode records for up to two minutes at a time and then erases the footage. At 2:36 p.m., Officer Grubbs’ body-worn camera was turned off. 3 The City of Atlanta performed an audit on the use of body- worn cameras by its police officers from November of 2017 through May of 2018. The audit found that officers assigned body- worn cameras captured footage for only 33% of dispatch calls de- spite a policy that officers shall record when arriving at the scene of a call. 3 Mr. Edwards’ experts opined that Officer Grubbs turned off his body-worn camera intentionally. Officer Grubbs reactivated his body-worn camera once he was at the bottom of the embankment, with Mr. Blasingame unconscious, but by then the footage had been erased. USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 8 of 48 8 Opinion of the Court 24-12787 B Keith Edwards, Mr. Blasingame’s guardian and conservator, brought this suit against Officer Grubbs and the City of Atlanta, asserting three claims: (1) a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force against Officer Grubbs and the City; (2) a state-law assault and battery claim against Officer Grubbs; and (3) a state-law respondeat superior claim against the City. The district court granted an unopposed partial summary judgment motion on the respondeat superior claim. The court then entered a “stipulated order for voluntarily dismissal” of the assault and battery claim. Before trial on the § 1983 claims, Officer Grubbs did not move to dismiss or seek summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. In August of 2022, the parties proceeded to an eight-day trial on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. At the close of the defendants’ case, the district court denied Officer Grubbs’ Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immun- ity grounds. The jury returned a verdict totaling $100 million in favor of Mr. Edwards: $60 million against the City and $40 million against Officer Grubbs. The $40 million award against Officer Grubbs consisted of $20 million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages. Post-trial, the district court denied Officer Grubbs’ renewed Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified im- munity grounds and a subsequent motion for reconsideration. The USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 9 of 48 24-12787 Opinion of the Court 9 court, however, granted Officer Grubbs’ motion for remittitur and reduced the punitive damages award against him to $1 million. The district court granted the City’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and overturned the jury’s verdict against the City. The court ruled that Mr. Edwards did not prove that the City’s policies, customs, or practices were the moving force behind Officer Grubbs’ unconstitutional conduct. The court denied Mr. Edwards’ Rule 60(b) motion for medical expenses and denied, without prejudice, his motion for attorney’s fees. On Sep- tember 7, 2023, Mr. Blasingame passed away. II Officer Grubbs appeals the district court’s denial of qualified immunity in his Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and his motion for reconsideration. Mr. Edwards appeals the dis- trict court’s grant of the City’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding municipal liability, the reduction of the punitive damages award against Officer Grubbs, the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, and the denial of his motion for attorney’s fees. We first consider the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law to Officer Grubbs based on qualified immunity. Of- ficer Grubbs contends that the court improperly denied him the protections of qualified immunity because, in his view, he did not violate Mr. Blasingame’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 10 of 48 10 Opinion of the Court 24-12787 A “The denial of qualified immunity is a question of law we review de novo.” Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1246 n.1 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “We also review de novo a dis- trict court’s denial of a Rule 50(b) motion.” Luxottica Grp., S.p.A. v. Airport Mini Mall, Ltd. Liab. Co., 932 F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We consider all the evidence, and the infer- ences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmov- ing party.” Id. (quotation omitted). See also Bailey v. Swindell, 89 F.4th 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2024) (“In determining whether a gov- ernment official is entitled to qualified immunity following a jury verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party [who] prevailed at trial.”) (internal quotation marks and cita- tion omitted). B Mr. Edwards asserts that Officer Grubbs did not mention qualified immunity until the middle of trial and thus has “waived” its protections. See Br. for Appellee at 30. “Although jurists often use the words interchangeably, forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right; waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 11 of 48 24-12787 Opinion of the Court 11 adopted) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). So the question is whether Officer Grubbs forfeited the qualified immunity defense by not raising it before trial. Although “qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of a litigation[,]” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (emphasis added), it is not a jurisdic- tional defense that must be raised sua sponte. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 373 (2001). “Qualified immunity,” in other words, “is an affirmative defense that may be waived.” Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1355 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). For example, it “must be pled, and if it is not, it is deemed waived.” Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Moore v. Mor- gan, 922 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.1991)). Here, Officer Grubbs pled qual- ified immunity as a defense in his answer but did not move to dis- miss or for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Ordinarily, “[a] defendant can forfeit an affirmative defense by failing to raise it, and ‘an affirmative defense, once forfeited, is excluded from the case.’” Patel v. Hamilton Med. Ctr., Inc., 967 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 470 (2012)) (alterations adopted). For qualified immunity, “a de- fendant is entitled to have any evidentiary disputes upon which the qualified immunity defense turns decided by the jury so that the court can apply the jury’s factual determinations to the law and en- ter a post-trial decision on the defense.” Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015). “When the case goes to trial, the USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 12 of 48 12 Opinion of the Court 24-12787 jury itself decides the issues of historical fact that are determinative of the qualified immunity defense, but the jury does not apply the law relating to qualified immunity to those historical facts it finds; that is the court’s duty.” Id. (citations omitted). Special interrogatories can be used when there are issues of fact that may affect a qualified immunity defense. See Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1164 (11th Cir. 2018). In this case, Officer Grubbs did not request any special interrogatories, and the verdict form asked the jury only one threshold question: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence [ ] [t]hat Jerry Blasingame was subjected to excessive or unreasonable force by Defendant Of- ficer Jon Grubbs?” D.E. 163 at 1. After Mr. Edwards rested his case, Officer Grubbs moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a), arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court declined to grant Officer Grubbs qualified immunity at that time; the court then de- nied the motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the defendants’ case. Officer Grubbs later renewed his motion pursu- ant to Rule 50(b). The court again rejected Officer Grubbs’ quali- fied immunity defense and denied the motion. We reject Mr. Edwards’ contention that Officer Grubbs for- feited his qualified immunity defense. We do so because qualified immunity—which is both an immunity from suit and a defense to liability—can be raised for the first time at trial (assuming, of course, that it has been properly pled). See, e.g., Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 842 n.16 (7th Cir. 1989); Spann v. Rainey, 987 USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 13 of 48 24-12787 Opinion of the Court 13 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1993); White v. Bibb Cnty., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1382 (M.D. Ga. 1998). Cf. Johnson, 280 F.3d at 1317 (“Defend- ants who are not successful with their qualified immunity defense before trial can re-assert it at the end of the plaintiff’s case in a Rule 50(a) motion.”) (citations omitted). C The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government of- ficials who perform discretionary functions from civil liability when their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To be eligible for qualified immunity, a government official must first establish that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the al- leged wrongful act occurred.” Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 480 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)). Mr. Edwards does not dispute that Officer Grubbs was act- ing within the scope of his discretionary authority when he dis- charged his taser. See Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1116 (11th Cir. 2019) (police officers act within their discretionary authority when they are “on duty . . . conducting arrest and investigative func- tions”). The burden therefore shifts to Mr. Edwards to establish that qualified immunity does not apply. See Bailey, 843 F.3d at 480. He can do this by proving (1) a violation of a constitutional right (2) that “was clearly established at the time of [Officer Grubbs’] USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 14 of 48 14 Opinion of the Court 24-12787 alleged misconduct.” Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Ed- wards “must satisfy both prongs of the analysis to overcome a de- fense of qualified immunity.” Bailey, 843 F.3d at 480. 1 The Fourth Amendment forbids the use of excessive force to apprehend a suspect. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Charles v. John- son, 18 F.4th 686, 699 (11th Cir. 2021). The Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard governs whether a law enforce- ment officer’s use of force during an arrest or a seizure was exces- sive. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hind- sight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20– 22 (1968)). Because this inquiry is an objective one, “the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (citations omit- ted). We have distilled the evaluation of an officer’s use of force into six factors: (1) the severity of the suspect’s crime, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat of harm to others, (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or trying to flee, (4) the need for the use of force, (5) the USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 15 of 48 24-12787 Opinion of the Court 15 relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used, and (6) how much injury was inflicted. Wade v. Daniels, 36 F.4th 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Mobley v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)). If the force was lethal, “that is, force that an officer knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm[,] . . . we must also consider whether the officer” had “‘prob- able cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious phys- ical harm, either to the officer or to others or that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm” and whether the officer gave “some warning about the possible use of deadly force, if feasible.” Bradley v. Benton, 10 F.4th 1232, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12 (“[I]f the sus- pect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.”). The use of a taser is not per se deadly force. We have said, however, that “tasing a person who is at an elevated height may come with a substantial risk of serious bodily harm or death.” Brad- ley, 10 F.4th at 1241 (“join[ing] many other courts” to consider the issue). When a suspect is in a vulnerable and dangerous elevated position, the use of a taser in dart mode becomes equivalent to USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 16 of 48 16 Opinion of the Court 24-12787 deadly force because it “has the capacity to completely incapacitate [the] individual.” Jones v. Treubig, 963 F.3d 214, 229 (2d Cir. 2020). That is because a taser’s “electrical impulse instantly overrides the victim’s central nervous system, paralyzing the muscles through- out the body, rendering the target limp and helpless.” Bryan v. McPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 824 (9th Cir. 2010). Accord Draper v. Reyn- olds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1273 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a taser “uses propelled wire to conduct energy to a remote target, thereby controlling and overriding the body’s central nervous system”). Here Mr. Blasingame was at the top of a 30-foot decline with a slope of 30 to 40 degrees and with dangers—a highway and a con- crete structure—below. And he was running down a steep em- bankment when Officer Grubbs tased him in the back. Although Officer Grubbs argues that a reasonable officer could not see the steep embankment and danger from his perspective, this assertion is contrary to other evidence adduced at trial. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Ed- wards, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a Fourth Amendment violation. See Chaney v. City of Orlando, 483 F.3d 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2007). Officer Grubbs did not have “probable cause to believe that [Mr. Blasingame] committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. The evidence at trial at most established that Mr. Blasingame committed the misdemeanor offense of panhandling. See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-97(b). USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 17 of 48 24-12787 Opinion of the Court 17 Second, Mr. Blasingame was not an immediate threat to Of- ficer Grubbs or his partner. Mr. Blasingame may have posed a threat to the drivers on the highway, and might have put himself in danger had he run onto the highway, but he did not do so. See Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005) (con- sidering the extent to which the suspect poses a threat to himself or herself under the second factor). The evidence at trial demon- strated that Mr. Blasingame remained on the side of the road before and during the interaction with the officers. He did not act errati- cally or run into the road at any point. Importantly, Officer Grubbs testified that he never saw a weapon on Mr. Blasingame. And he acknowledged that Mr. Blasingame never threatened him nor put him in “imminent fear” of his life. See D.E. 197 at 56, 62. Officer Grubbs does not and cannot argue that he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Blasingame posed “a threat of serious physical harm” to him or his partner. See Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1240. Officer Grubbs did testify that Mr. Blasingame made a “swinging-type motion” towards him, without making contact. See D.E. 197 at 59:1–61:8. But the jury was not required to believe Of- ficer Grubbs on this point, even if his testimony was uncontro- verted. See, e.g., Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 279 (1945); Tyler v. Beto, 391 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1968). In reviewing the denial of judg- ment as a matter of law, we assume that the jury resolved all con- flicts and credibility determinations, and drew all inferences, in Mr. Edwards’ favor. See Bailey, 89 F.4th at 1329. And a “factfinder can USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 18 of 48 18 Opinion of the Court 24-12787 use a witness’[ ] noncredible testimony as corroborating substan- tive evidence against the witness’[ ] interests, regardless of whether the case arises in the civil or criminal context.” Silva v. Dos Santos, 68 F.4th 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2023). Third, the evidence at trial showed that Mr. Blasingame ran away from the officers. Although Mr. Blasingame fled, he was never given a chance to finally comply before force was used. Of- ficer Grubbs admitted that he never provided any verbal warning before deploying his taser. Fourth, we acknowledge that some use of force was neces- sary, as Mr. Blasingame showed no signs of ending the chase. See D.E. 197 at 77 (Officer Grubbs testified that he “deployed the Taser to terminate the pursuit [and] to prevent [Mr. Blasingame] from entering the highway”). But this factor does not weigh heavily in Officer Grubbs’ favor because the force was more than minimal. Fifth, the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used tilts significantly in Mr. Edwards’ favor. The amount of force used by an officer “must be reasonably propor- tionate to the need for that force.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198. When a non-dangerous and unarmed suspect takes flight, deadly force is disproportionate. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. Various of our cases reflect this principle. See Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1243 (using “this level of force to stop an unarmed man who was not suspected of com- mitting a violent crime from fleeing on foot . . . is excessive”); Sal- vato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1294 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Using deadly force, without warning, on an unarmed, retreating suspect is USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 19 of 48 24-12787 Opinion of the Court 19 excessive.”); Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2003) (deadly force may not be used when the only “danger presented by [the suspects’] continued flight was the risk of an accident during the pursuit”). Sixth, and finally, the injuries inflicted were severe. Mr. Blasingame’s skull was crushed, and he was rendered quadriplegic. Due to his spinal cord injury, Mr. Blasingame could not move an- ything below his neck. Considering and weighing these factors, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Officer Grubbs violated Mr. Blasingame’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Therefore, the first qualified immunity prong is satisfied. 2 “Clearly established means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” District of Co- lumbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). A right may be clearly established for qualified im- munity purposes in one of three ways: (1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) con- duct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law. USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 20 of 48 20 Opinion of the Court 24-12787 Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 144 F.4th 1246, 1258 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Under the third method, a general constitutional rule may apply with ob- vious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the very action in question has not previously been held unlawful.” Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted). Understanding that we cannot operate at a high level of gen- erality, see Mullinex v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015), the question here is whether it was clearly established in July of 2018 that an officer could not fire a taser at an unarmed panhandling suspect feeling on foot who had not threatened anyone, was not a danger, and was in a vulnerable position—i.e., running down a steep embankment leading to a highway—that created a danger of death or serious bodily harm. We answer that question affirmatively. In Bradley, we denied qualified immunity to an officer who in 2015 tased a non-dangerous and unarmed fleeing suspect on an elevated surface, under similar circumstances—the suspect was atop an eight-foot wall when shot. See Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1243–44. We held that the law was clearly established in two ways. First, the Supreme Court’s decision in Garner provided the officer with no- tice because it was a “materially similar precedent.” Id. at 1243. Sec- ond, even “absent a case directly on point,” the use of force “was obviously unconstitutional.” Id. at 1244. Here we conclude, as we did in Bradley, that Garner provided notice to Officer Grubbs that his tasing of Mr. Blasingame under the circumstances constituted USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 21 of 48 24-12787 Opinion of the Court 21 excessive force. We therefore do not address the “obvious clarity” method. Our discussion in Bradley about Garner providing notice ap- plies here, so we quote that discussion in full: [In Garner,] the Supreme Court held that a police of- ficer used excessive force when he shot an unarmed burglary suspect to stop him from fleeing on foot. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 21. The . . . Court has cautioned us against relying on the holding of Garner to the extent that holding is “cast at a high level of generality.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004). But we are concerned with Garner’s analogous facts, not Gar- ner’s high-level holding. Garner clearly established that an officer cannot use deadly force to stop an un- armed man who is not suspected of committing a vi- olent crime from fleeing on foot. That is precisely what happened in Garner and that is precisely what happened in this case. Accordingly, Garner put Officer [Grubbs] on notice that he could not use deadly force to stop [Mr. Blasingame] from running away on foot. To be sure, there is one factual distinction between this case and Garner. In Garner, the officer shot the sus- pect with a gun. Here, Officer [Grubbs] shot [Mr. Blasingame] with a taser. But that is a distinction without a difference. As explained above, taking the facts in the light most favorable to [Mr. Edwards], [Officer Grubbs] used deadly force when he shot [Mr. Blasingame on a steep embankment] with a taser. That is, he used force that he knew would “create a USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 22 of 48 22 Opinion of the Court 24-12787 substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.” He used this level of force to stop an unarmed man who was not suspected of committing a violent crime from fleeing on foot. Garner establishes that this level of force is excessive in that circumstance. Id. at 1243 (citations omitted). Officer Grubbs asserts that the wall in Bradley is so different in kind from the embankment here that Bradley cannot apply. We disagree. First, Officer Grubbs’ characterization of the terrain as a “grassy hill,” Br. for Appellant at 30, is not determinative. What matters is that the embankment had a slope of 30 to 40 degrees and a drop of about 24 feet from the point of impact. Second, the char- acterization ignores that Mr. Blasingame was running with his back to Officer Grubbs when he was hit, and had no opportunity to pre- pare himself for a fall.4 We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Grubbs and uphold the liability verdict against him. 5 4 We acknowledge that in Stewart v. Garcia, 139 F.4th 698, 707 (8th Cir. 2025), the Eighth Circuit held that a suspect’s right to be free from the use of deadly force (a taser) while on an eight-or-nine-foot fence was not clearly established in April of 2018. Stewart, however, is inconsistent with our decision in Bradley, 139 F.4th at 707–08. 5 Officer Grubbs also appeals the order denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 50(b) motion asserting qualified immunity. Because the denial of qualified immunity to Officer Grubbs was correct, the district court did not err in denying his motion for reconsideration. USCA11 Case: 24-12787 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2026 Page: 23 of 48 24-12787 Opinion of the Court 23 III Now to the City of Atlanta. Mr. Edwards challenges the dis- trict court’s entry of judgment as a matter of law to the City on his municipal liability claim under § 1983. We review a district court’s entry of judgment as a matter of law de novo. See Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 38 F.4th 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2022). We apply the same standards as the district court, meaning “we consider all the evidence, and the infer- ences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmov- ing party.” Advanced Bodycare Sols., LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 615 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d