Prophete v. Acevedo-Smith
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-1907-cv
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
25-1907-cv
Prophete v. Acevedo-Smith
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
August Term 2026
Submitted: November 2, 2026
Decided: November 16, 2026
No. 25-1907-cv
G ERALD C. P ROPHETE ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DHS SERGEANT HAYDEE ACEVEDO-SMITH, SHIELD #866, DHS
OFFICER A. WATKINS, BADGE #161-6186, DHS SPECIAL OFFICER
ALEX ANDUJAR, SHIELD #895,
Defendants-Appellees,
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HOMELESS SERVICES,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York,
No. 19-cv-3466, Kiyo A. Matsumoto, Judge.
Before: W ALKER , J ACOBS , and B IANCO , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Gerald C. Prophete appeals from the
district court’s judgment, entered after a jury verdict in favor of
the defendants on his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive
force, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. On appeal,
Prophete argues that the district court erred in precluding him,
under Federal Rules of Evidence 608(b) and 403, from cross-
examining Defendant-Appellee Haydee Acevedo-Smith
concerning disciplinary reports that ostensibly discredited her
accounts of two unrelated use-of-force incidents, and that such
error was not harmless. We hold that, even assuming arguendo
that the district court’s analysis under Rule 608(b) was erroneous,
it did not abuse its discretion in precluding that questioning
under Rule 403. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
Matthew W. Christiana (Andrew J. Kopke, on
the brief), Kopke Christiana & Rastetter LLP,
Brooklyn, New York, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Jonathan Schoepp-Wong (Richard Dearing,
Devin Slack, Steven Banks, on the brief), New
York City Law Department, New York, New
York, for Defendants-Appellees.
J OSEPH F. B IANCO , Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Gerald C. Prophete alleges that he was
assaulted by homeless shelter staff. He appeals from a judgment
entered after a jury verdict in favor of the defendants on his
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, false arrest, and
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malicious prosecution. Prophete argues that the district court
erred in precluding him, under Federal Rules of Evidence 608(b)
and 403, from cross-examining Defendant-Appellee Haydee
Acevedo-Smith concerning disciplinary reports that ostensibly
discredited her accounts of two unrelated use-of-force incidents,
and that such error was not harmless. We hold that, even
assuming arguendo that the district court’s analysis under Rule
608(b) was erroneous, it did not abuse its discretion in precluding
that questioning under Rule 403. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
BACKGROUND
On October 2, 2018, Prophete was residing at Samaritan
Village Shelter, a shelter for homeless people staffed by
Department of Homeless Services (“DHS”) officers and non-DHS
staff. Acevedo-Smith was the commanding DHS officer at the
shelter and supervised Defendants-Appellees Abraham Watkins
and Alex Andujar. That morning, Prophete attempted to exit the
shelter without swiping his identification card as required. At
trial, each party recounted the ensuing events differently.
Prophete testified as follows: He had not swiped his
identification card because the swipe machine was broken. A
non-DHS shelter employee and Acevedo-Smith nonetheless
directed Prophete to swipe his card. Prophete and Acevedo-
Smith argued, and Prophete ultimately swiped his card and
began to walk out of the shelter. Acevedo-Smith “started walking
right alongside” him, telling him to “move faster.” Joint App’x at
166. After exiting the building, Prophete continued to argue with
Acevedo-Smith from approximately “7 to 10” feet away. Id. at
170–71. Without warning, Acevedo-Smith sprayed Prophete in
the face with pepper spray. Acevedo-Smith called for back-up,
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two officers arrived, and Watkins handcuffed Prophete from
behind. 1
Acevedo-Smith testified as follows: That morning, Prophete
and the shelter employee had been arguing about the card
scanner when Prophete spit on the employee. Acevedo-Smith,
Watkins, and Andujar escorted Prophete out of the shelter, telling
him to “take a walk to calm down.” Id. at 411. Outside the shelter,
Prophete continued “waving [his hands] and screaming,” and
then “lunged at” Acevedo-Smith with “two closed fists,” but did
not touch her. Id. at 457–60. When Prophete was approximately
five feet away from Acevedo-Smith, she sprayed him with pepper
spray.
Watkins and Andujar also gave testimony. Watkins testified
that Prophete had been yelling and cursing and had spit on the
shelter employee. He also testified that because Prophete “wasn’t
trying to listen to nobody,” Acevedo-Smith pepper sprayed him
outside the shelter. Id. at 271–73. Andujar testified as follows:
Acevedo-Smith had repeatedly asked Prophete to leave the
vicinity of the shelter. As Prophete exited the shelter, he
intentionally “bumped into” and spit on the shelter employee. Id.
at 337–39. Acevedo-Smith directed Andujar and Watkins to
“detain” Prophete. Id. at 345. However, Prophete “continued to
exit the facility,” which Andujar viewed as “a form of resisting.”
Id. Outside the shelter, Acevedo-Smith pepper sprayed Prophete,
and Prophete was handcuffed.
Prior to the trial, Prophete moved in limine, pursuant to Rule
608(b), to impeach Acevedo-Smith by cross-examining her on
credibility findings from disciplinary reports concerning her
1Prophete was issued summonses for disorderly conduct and harassment,
which were later dismissed.
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prior use of force in unrelated incidents. In those incidents, she
pepper-sprayed other shelter residents on January 1 and 8, 2019—
approximately three months after the Prophete incident. On
January 11, 2019, Lieutenant Michael A. Brill, on behalf of the
Investigation Unit of the New York City Police Department’s
Management Team, issued a memorandum setting forth
“investigative findings” as to the January 8 incident (the “Brill
memorandum”). Sealed App’x at 55 (capitalization omitted). On
May 2, 2019, administrative charges for both the January 1 and 8
incidents were served on Acevedo-Smith. On May 30, 2019,
hearing officer Petal Harlow convened an “informal conference,”
attended by Acevedo-Smith and her union representative. Id. at
13 (capitalization omitted). On June 12, 2019, Harlow issued a
“summary” of that conference (the “Harlow summary”) and
recommended a 45-day suspension. Id. (capitalization omitted).
With respect to the January 1 incident, according to the Harlow
summary, Harlow found that the shelter’s CCTV footage
“refuted” Acevedo-Smith’s account of the resident’s conduct
prior to the use of force. Id. at 16. That footage, Harlow stated,
“established that the [resident] had not moved from his position
and did not adopt a fighting stance as alleged by [Acevedo-
Smith].” Id. She further noted that “[t]he evidence confirmed”
that Acevedo-Smith had used excessive force during this
incident. Id.
As to the January 8 incident, the Harlow summary states that
Harlow found Acevedo-Smith’s statements regarding the
resident “kicking” other officers to be “refuted by the CCTV
footage.” Id. at 17. 2 The Brill memorandum also addressed this
2 The Harlow summary appears to contain a typo, stating that “the client’s
[i.e., resident’s] testimony was refuted by the CCTV footage,” Sealed App’x
at 17, but the context of the report makes clear that the subject of that sentence
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incident, describing similar statements by Acevedo-Smith and
assessing their accuracy based on CCTV footage. The
memorandum states that, although the resident “appear[ed] to be
visibly upset and may very well [have been] making threats
towards staff and DHS officers,” Acevedo-Smith deployed
pepper spray when the resident’s hands were in his pockets, not
“grabb[ing] a chair in a threatening manner.” Id. at 55. It states
that “other [unspecified] documents generated in connection
with the arrest also appear to contain detai[l]s which embellish
the actions of the [resident].” Id.
The district court denied Prophete’s motion to cross-examine
Acevedo-Smith regarding the Harlow summary and Brill
memorandum in order to impeach her credibility under Rule
608(b). See Prophete v. Acevedo-Smith, 788 F. Supp. 3d 345, 353–59
(E.D.N.Y. 2025). Applying the non-exhaustive factors listed in
United States v. Cedeño, 644 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011), the district court
found that those reports did “not contain any clear adverse
credibility findings.” Prophete, 778 F. Supp. 3d at 359. The district
court explained that neither report indicated that Acevedo-
Smith’s statements had been dishonest, as opposed to inaccurate
for other possible reasons (such as inadvertence). For example,
the district court concluded that “[t]he disciplinary findings for
the January 8, 2019 incident involve, at worst, apparent
embellishments—the details of which are unspecified,” and “this
vague and conclusory disciplinary finding fails to identify which
documents included any embellished details, what details were
embellished, and whether any of the embellishments were
material.” Id. (emphases in original). In short, the district court
determined that the reports’ findings did not constitute adverse
was intended to be Acevedo-Smith’s testimony.
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credibility findings on which Rule 608(b) authorized cross-
examination. In the alternative, the district court concluded that
cross-examination concerning the reports was barred by Rule 403,
citing the risks of unfair prejudice and jury confusion.
At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants
on all claims, and the district court entered judgment accordingly.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Prophete argues on appeal that the district court improperly
precluded his counsel from cross-examining Acevedo-Smith
concerning “false statements and adverse credibility findings
made in administrative disciplinary proceedings,” under Rules
608(b) and 403, and that the error was not harmless. Appellant’s
Br. at 16, 25–28 (capitalization omitted). We need not address the
district court’s ruling that the proposed cross-examination was
barred by Rule 608(b) because, even assuming arguendo that the
determination was erroneous, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in precluding that questioning under Rule 403.
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion, United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235, 244 (2d Cir. 2012),
disturbing such rulings “only where the decision to admit or
exclude evidence was manifestly erroneous,” United States v.
Litvak, 889 F.3d 56, 67 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Under Rule 403, a district court may exclude
otherwise admissible evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of,” inter alia, “unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury.” Fed. R.
Evid. 403. The rule applies to evidence offered for impeachment,
including cross-examination pursuant to Rule 608(b). See Hynes
v. Coughlin, 79 F.3d 285, 294 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The trial judge has
discretion under Rules 608(b) and 403 to determine whether [the
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questioning related to a witness’s character for truthfulness],
though relevant, should be excluded.”); United States v. Crowley,
318 F.3d 401, 417–18 (2d Cir. 2003). “Under Rule 403, so long as the
district court has conscientiously balanced the proffered
evidence’s probative value with the risk for prejudice, its
conclusion will be disturbed only if it is arbitrary or irrational.”
United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2006).
“Because the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the
evidence and its effect on the jury, his Rule 403 rulings are entitled
to considerable deference and will not be overturned absent a
clear abuse of discretion.” Costantino v. Herzog, 203 F.3d 164, 173
(2d Cir. 2000).
Here, it was neither arbitrary nor irrational for the district
court to preclude cross-examination on the disciplinary reports
regarding the two January 2019 incidents under Rule 403. To
have probative value, any testimony concerning the reports
would have required at least some explanation of the January
2019 incidents—neither of which involved Prophete. Thus, the
proposed cross-examination and any resulting redirect
examination (during which Acevedo-Smith might offer
additional details) would have “produced confusing and
distracting sideshows regarding the facts of controversies
completely unrelated” to Prophete’s allegations. Crowley, 318
F.3d at 418; see also Ricketts v. City of Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1414 (2d
Cir. 1996) (“[T]he district court did not abuse its broad discretion
in determining that a trial within a trial . . . would have been more
confusing than helpfully probative . . . .”), as amended on reh’g in
part (Feb. 14, 1996).
Moreover, such cross-examination presented substantial risks
of unfair prejudice based on improper propensity inferences.
Both January 2019 incidents involved the use of pepper spray by
Acevedo-Smith against shelter residents, and the consequent
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disciplinary proceedings focused on whether the threat posed by
each resident justified the force Acevedo-Smith used. Testimony
concerning the January 2019 incidents would have risked
misleading the jury into reasoning that (1) based on those
incidents, Acevedo-Smith had a propensity to use excessive force
against shelter residents, and (2) she therefore likely also did so
against Prophete. 3 See Berkovich v. Hicks, 922 F.2d 1018, 1022–23
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in precluding reference to prior complaints against the
defendant under Rule 403, due in part to the risk of unfair
prejudice from forbidden propensity inferences); Fed. R. Evid.
404(b)(1) (“Evidence of any other . . . act is not admissible to prove
a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion
the person acted in accordance with the character.”).
To be sure, as Prophete notes, we held in United States v. White,
692 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (Sept. 28, 2012), that, by
finding evidence offered under Rule 608(b) “insufficiently
probative of the witness’s credibility to be admitted,” the district
court in that case “effectively made a true Rule 403 balancing
impossible.” Id. at 251. However, it does not follow that a Rule
403 ruling is always invalid absent a complete and correct Cedeño
analysis. Whether or not the district court erroneously applied
the Cedeño factors to exclude evidence under Rule 608(b), its
alternative Rule 403 analysis is subject to case-specific review.
That is confirmed by practice. See, e.g., United States v. Potapova,
800 F. App’x 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2020) (“We need not address the
district court’s determination that the extrinsic evidence here was
3 The district court noted that, prior to the January 2019 incidents, Acevedo
Smith “had no prior disciplinary history in her last 16 years with [DHS].”
Prophete, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 358 n.7 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
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barred by Rules 608(b) and 401 because, even assuming those
determinations were erroneous, the district court acted within its
discretion in excluding the evidence under Rule 403.”); Morris v.
Long, 592 F. App’x 579, 580 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The district court
acted within its discretion when it excluded evidence of Long’s
alleged dishonest conduct because, assuming the evidence fell
within the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), the district
court could properly conclude under Federal Rule of Evidence
403 that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative and
risked confusing the issues and misleading the jury.”); see also
Kelly v. Boeing Petroleum Servs., Inc., 61 F.3d 350, 360 (5th Cir. 1995)
(“Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the district court erred
on its relevance call and did so to the point of abuse of discretion,
we would still sustain the evidentiary rulings of the district court
under its application of [Rule] 403.”).
In White, we found “dispositive[]” that “the defense simply
sought to inquire whether [the witness] previously gave
testimony . . . under oath, in another federal gun possession case,
and whether the judge in that case refused to credit six different
aspects of [that] testimony.” 692 F.3d at 251. That line of inquiry
did not risk unfair prejudice or jury confusion because it “did not
seek to delve into the facts of [the other case] or . . . the specific
instances when [the witness’s] testimony was discredited.” Id.
The Rule 403 balancing discussed in White therefore relied not
only on an erroneous assessment that the proffered evidence
lacked any probative value, but also on the absence of prejudice
or confusion counterweights.
Here, in contrast to White, even if the district court erred in
assessing the admissibility under the Cedeño factors, that ruling
did not “effectively ma[k]e a true Rule 403 balancing impossible,”
692 F.3d at 251, because its reasons for independently excluding
that evidence, due to the risk of unfair prejudice and jury
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confusion under Rule 403, were not undermined by that ruling.
Whereas we noted the proposed cross-examination in White was
narrow, Prophete sought to cross-examine Acevedo-Smith,
without limitation, regarding both fact-intensive reports and all
ostensible “false statements” she had made in connection with
the January 2019 incidents. Appellant’s Br. at 3. Even assuming
arguendo that the cross-examination had substantial probative
value concerning character for truthfulness, the district court
reasonably determined that it presented substantial risk of juror
confusion by inviting jurors to consider vague characterizations
about testimony bearing upon closely analogous events. Perhaps
even more importantly, there was a clear danger of unfair
prejudice from the jury using that impeachment evidence to draw
impermissible propensity inferences, given the facial similarities
between the underlying January 2019 incidents and the alleged
interaction between Acevedo-Smith and Prophete—a
consideration that, as noted above, was absent in White. 4
In sum, even assuming arguendo that cross-examination
regarding the disciplinary reports against Acevedo-Smith was
permissible under Rule 608(b) because it had probative value, the
record is sufficient to conclude that the district court’s alternative
holding under Rule 403 was not “arbitrary or irrational,” and thus
4 We recognize that Rules 608(b) and 403 exist in some tension. The more
similar the subject matter of a prior credibility finding is to the instant case,
the more probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness that prior
finding is under Rule 608(b). Cedeño, 644 F.3d at 82; White, 692 F.3d at 249.
Yet the same similarity may risk propensity inferences that counsel against
admission per Rule 403. This is all the more reason for deference to the
district court judge, who is in the best position to weigh these competing
concerns.
11
did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Awadallah, 436 F.3d at
131.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
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