Full Opinion

25-1907-cv Prophete v. Acevedo-Smith United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit August Term 2026 Submitted: November 2, 2026 Decided: November 16, 2026 No. 25-1907-cv G ERALD C. P ROPHETE , Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DHS SERGEANT HAYDEE ACEVEDO-SMITH, SHIELD #866, DHS OFFICER A. WATKINS, BADGE #161-6186, DHS SPECIAL OFFICER ALEX ANDUJAR, SHIELD #895, Defendants-Appellees, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HOMELESS SERVICES, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, No. 19-cv-3466, Kiyo A. Matsumoto, Judge. Before: W ALKER , J ACOBS , and B IANCO , Circuit Judges. Plaintiff-Appellant Gerald C. Prophete appeals from the district court’s judgment, entered after a jury verdict in favor of the defendants on his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. On appeal, Prophete argues that the district court erred in precluding him, under Federal Rules of Evidence 608(b) and 403, from cross- examining Defendant-Appellee Haydee Acevedo-Smith concerning disciplinary reports that ostensibly discredited her accounts of two unrelated use-of-force incidents, and that such error was not harmless. We hold that, even assuming arguendo that the district court’s analysis under Rule 608(b) was erroneous, it did not abuse its discretion in precluding that questioning under Rule 403. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Matthew W. Christiana (Andrew J. Kopke, on the brief), Kopke Christiana & Rastetter LLP, Brooklyn, New York, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Jonathan Schoepp-Wong (Richard Dearing, Devin Slack, Steven Banks, on the brief), New York City Law Department, New York, New York, for Defendants-Appellees. J OSEPH F. B IANCO , Circuit Judge: Plaintiff-Appellant Gerald C. Prophete alleges that he was assaulted by homeless shelter staff. He appeals from a judgment entered after a jury verdict in favor of the defendants on his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, false arrest, and 2 malicious prosecution. Prophete argues that the district court erred in precluding him, under Federal Rules of Evidence 608(b) and 403, from cross-examining Defendant-Appellee Haydee Acevedo-Smith concerning disciplinary reports that ostensibly discredited her accounts of two unrelated use-of-force incidents, and that such error was not harmless. We hold that, even assuming arguendo that the district court’s analysis under Rule 608(b) was erroneous, it did not abuse its discretion in precluding that questioning under Rule 403. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. BACKGROUND On October 2, 2018, Prophete was residing at Samaritan Village Shelter, a shelter for homeless people staffed by Department of Homeless Services (“DHS”) officers and non-DHS staff. Acevedo-Smith was the commanding DHS officer at the shelter and supervised Defendants-Appellees Abraham Watkins and Alex Andujar. That morning, Prophete attempted to exit the shelter without swiping his identification card as required. At trial, each party recounted the ensuing events differently. Prophete testified as follows: He had not swiped his identification card because the swipe machine was broken. A non-DHS shelter employee and Acevedo-Smith nonetheless directed Prophete to swipe his card. Prophete and Acevedo- Smith argued, and Prophete ultimately swiped his card and began to walk out of the shelter. Acevedo-Smith “started walking right alongside” him, telling him to “move faster.” Joint App’x at 166. After exiting the building, Prophete continued to argue with Acevedo-Smith from approximately “7 to 10” feet away. Id. at 170–71. Without warning, Acevedo-Smith sprayed Prophete in the face with pepper spray. Acevedo-Smith called for back-up, 3 two officers arrived, and Watkins handcuffed Prophete from behind. 1 Acevedo-Smith testified as follows: That morning, Prophete and the shelter employee had been arguing about the card scanner when Prophete spit on the employee. Acevedo-Smith, Watkins, and Andujar escorted Prophete out of the shelter, telling him to “take a walk to calm down.” Id. at 411. Outside the shelter, Prophete continued “waving [his hands] and screaming,” and then “lunged at” Acevedo-Smith with “two closed fists,” but did not touch her. Id. at 457–60. When Prophete was approximately five feet away from Acevedo-Smith, she sprayed him with pepper spray. Watkins and Andujar also gave testimony. Watkins testified that Prophete had been yelling and cursing and had spit on the shelter employee. He also testified that because Prophete “wasn’t trying to listen to nobody,” Acevedo-Smith pepper sprayed him outside the shelter. Id. at 271–73. Andujar testified as follows: Acevedo-Smith had repeatedly asked Prophete to leave the vicinity of the shelter. As Prophete exited the shelter, he intentionally “bumped into” and spit on the shelter employee. Id. at 337–39. Acevedo-Smith directed Andujar and Watkins to “detain” Prophete. Id. at 345. However, Prophete “continued to exit the facility,” which Andujar viewed as “a form of resisting.” Id. Outside the shelter, Acevedo-Smith pepper sprayed Prophete, and Prophete was handcuffed. Prior to the trial, Prophete moved in limine, pursuant to Rule 608(b), to impeach Acevedo-Smith by cross-examining her on credibility findings from disciplinary reports concerning her 1Prophete was issued summonses for disorderly conduct and harassment, which were later dismissed. 4 prior use of force in unrelated incidents. In those incidents, she pepper-sprayed other shelter residents on January 1 and 8, 2019— approximately three months after the Prophete incident. On January 11, 2019, Lieutenant Michael A. Brill, on behalf of the Investigation Unit of the New York City Police Department’s Management Team, issued a memorandum setting forth “investigative findings” as to the January 8 incident (the “Brill memorandum”). Sealed App’x at 55 (capitalization omitted). On May 2, 2019, administrative charges for both the January 1 and 8 incidents were served on Acevedo-Smith. On May 30, 2019, hearing officer Petal Harlow convened an “informal conference,” attended by Acevedo-Smith and her union representative. Id. at 13 (capitalization omitted). On June 12, 2019, Harlow issued a “summary” of that conference (the “Harlow summary”) and recommended a 45-day suspension. Id. (capitalization omitted). With respect to the January 1 incident, according to the Harlow summary, Harlow found that the shelter’s CCTV footage “refuted” Acevedo-Smith’s account of the resident’s conduct prior to the use of force. Id. at 16. That footage, Harlow stated, “established that the [resident] had not moved from his position and did not adopt a fighting stance as alleged by [Acevedo- Smith].” Id. She further noted that “[t]he evidence confirmed” that Acevedo-Smith had used excessive force during this incident. Id. As to the January 8 incident, the Harlow summary states that Harlow found Acevedo-Smith’s statements regarding the resident “kicking” other officers to be “refuted by the CCTV footage.” Id. at 17. 2 The Brill memorandum also addressed this 2 The Harlow summary appears to contain a typo, stating that “the client’s [i.e., resident’s] testimony was refuted by the CCTV footage,” Sealed App’x at 17, but the context of the report makes clear that the subject of that sentence 5 incident, describing similar statements by Acevedo-Smith and assessing their accuracy based on CCTV footage. The memorandum states that, although the resident “appear[ed] to be visibly upset and may very well [have been] making threats towards staff and DHS officers,” Acevedo-Smith deployed pepper spray when the resident’s hands were in his pockets, not “grabb[ing] a chair in a threatening manner.” Id. at 55. It states that “other [unspecified] documents generated in connection with the arrest also appear to contain detai[l]s which embellish the actions of the [resident].” Id. The district court denied Prophete’s motion to cross-examine Acevedo-Smith regarding the Harlow summary and Brill memorandum in order to impeach her credibility under Rule 608(b). See Prophete v. Acevedo-Smith, 788 F. Supp. 3d 345, 353–59 (E.D.N.Y. 2025). Applying the non-exhaustive factors listed in United States v. Cedeño, 644 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011), the district court found that those reports did “not contain any clear adverse credibility findings.” Prophete, 778 F. Supp. 3d at 359. The district court explained that neither report indicated that Acevedo- Smith’s statements had been dishonest, as opposed to inaccurate for other possible reasons (such as inadvertence). For example, the district court concluded that “[t]he disciplinary findings for the January 8, 2019 incident involve, at worst, apparent embellishments—the details of which are unspecified,” and “this vague and conclusory disciplinary finding fails to identify which documents included any embellished details, what details were embellished, and whether any of the embellishments were material.” Id. (emphases in original). In short, the district court determined that the reports’ findings did not constitute adverse was intended to be Acevedo-Smith’s testimony. 6 credibility findings on which Rule 608(b) authorized cross- examination. In the alternative, the district court concluded that cross-examination concerning the reports was barred by Rule 403, citing the risks of unfair prejudice and jury confusion. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on all claims, and the district court entered judgment accordingly. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION Prophete argues on appeal that the district court improperly precluded his counsel from cross-examining Acevedo-Smith concerning “false statements and adverse credibility findings made in administrative disciplinary proceedings,” under Rules 608(b) and 403, and that the error was not harmless. Appellant’s Br. at 16, 25–28 (capitalization omitted). We need not address the district court’s ruling that the proposed cross-examination was barred by Rule 608(b) because, even assuming arguendo that the determination was erroneous, the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding that questioning under Rule 403. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235, 244 (2d Cir. 2012), disturbing such rulings “only where the decision to admit or exclude evidence was manifestly erroneous,” United States v. Litvak, 889 F.3d 56, 67 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Under Rule 403, a district court may exclude otherwise admissible evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of,” inter alia, “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. The rule applies to evidence offered for impeachment, including cross-examination pursuant to Rule 608(b). See Hynes v. Coughlin, 79 F.3d 285, 294 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The trial judge has discretion under Rules 608(b) and 403 to determine whether [the 7 questioning related to a witness’s character for truthfulness], though relevant, should be excluded.”); United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417–18 (2d Cir. 2003). “Under Rule 403, so long as the district court has conscientiously balanced the proffered evidence’s probative value with the risk for prejudice, its conclusion will be disturbed only if it is arbitrary or irrational.” United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2006). “Because the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and its effect on the jury, his Rule 403 rulings are entitled to considerable deference and will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Costantino v. Herzog, 203 F.3d 164, 173 (2d Cir. 2000). Here, it was neither arbitrary nor irrational for the district court to preclude cross-examination on the disciplinary reports regarding the two January 2019 incidents under Rule 403. To have probative value, any testimony concerning the reports would have required at least some explanation of the January 2019 incidents—neither of which involved Prophete. Thus, the proposed cross-examination and any resulting redirect examination (during which Acevedo-Smith might offer additional details) would have “produced confusing and distracting sideshows regarding the facts of controversies completely unrelated” to Prophete’s allegations. Crowley, 318 F.3d at 418; see also Ricketts v. City of Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1414 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he district court did not abuse its broad discretion in determining that a trial within a trial . . . would have been more confusing than helpfully probative . . . .”), as amended on reh’g in part (Feb. 14, 1996). Moreover, such cross-examination presented substantial risks of unfair prejudice based on improper propensity inferences. Both January 2019 incidents involved the use of pepper spray by Acevedo-Smith against shelter residents, and the consequent 8 disciplinary proceedings focused on whether the threat posed by each resident justified the force Acevedo-Smith used. Testimony concerning the January 2019 incidents would have risked misleading the jury into reasoning that (1) based on those incidents, Acevedo-Smith had a propensity to use excessive force against shelter residents, and (2) she therefore likely also did so against Prophete. 3 See Berkovich v. Hicks, 922 F.2d 1018, 1022–23 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding reference to prior complaints against the defendant under Rule 403, due in part to the risk of unfair prejudice from forbidden propensity inferences); Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1) (“Evidence of any other . . . act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”). To be sure, as Prophete notes, we held in United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (Sept. 28, 2012), that, by finding evidence offered under Rule 608(b) “insufficiently probative of the witness’s credibility to be admitted,” the district court in that case “effectively made a true Rule 403 balancing impossible.” Id. at 251. However, it does not follow that a Rule 403 ruling is always invalid absent a complete and correct Cedeño analysis. Whether or not the district court erroneously applied the Cedeño factors to exclude evidence under Rule 608(b), its alternative Rule 403 analysis is subject to case-specific review. That is confirmed by practice. See, e.g., United States v. Potapova, 800 F. App’x 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2020) (“We need not address the district court’s determination that the extrinsic evidence here was 3 The district court noted that, prior to the January 2019 incidents, Acevedo Smith “had no prior disciplinary history in her last 16 years with [DHS].” Prophete, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 358 n.7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 9 barred by Rules 608(b) and 401 because, even assuming those determinations were erroneous, the district court acted within its discretion in excluding the evidence under Rule 403.”); Morris v. Long, 592 F. App’x 579, 580 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The district court acted within its discretion when it excluded evidence of Long’s alleged dishonest conduct because, assuming the evidence fell within the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), the district court could properly conclude under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative and risked confusing the issues and misleading the jury.”); see also Kelly v. Boeing Petroleum Servs., Inc., 61 F.3d 350, 360 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the district court erred on its relevance call and did so to the point of abuse of discretion, we would still sustain the evidentiary rulings of the district court under its application of [Rule] 403.”). In White, we found “dispositive[]” that “the defense simply sought to inquire whether [the witness] previously gave testimony . . . under oath, in another federal gun possession case, and whether the judge in that case refused to credit six different aspects of [that] testimony.” 692 F.3d at 251. That line of inquiry did not risk unfair prejudice or jury confusion because it “did not seek to delve into the facts of [the other case] or . . . the specific instances when [the witness’s] testimony was discredited.” Id. The Rule 403 balancing discussed in White therefore relied not only on an erroneous assessment that the proffered evidence lacked any probative value, but also on the absence of prejudice or confusion counterweights. Here, in contrast to White, even if the district court erred in assessing the admissibility under the Cedeño factors, that ruling did not “effectively ma[k]e a true Rule 403 balancing impossible,” 692 F.3d at 251, because its reasons for independently excluding that evidence, due to the risk of unfair prejudice and jury 10 confusion under Rule 403, were not undermined by that ruling. Whereas we noted the proposed cross-examination in White was narrow, Prophete sought to cross-examine Acevedo-Smith, without limitation, regarding both fact-intensive reports and all ostensible “false statements” she had made in connection with the January 2019 incidents. Appellant’s Br. at 3. Even assuming arguendo that the cross-examination had substantial probative value concerning character for truthfulness, the district court reasonably determined that it presented substantial risk of juror confusion by inviting jurors to consider vague characterizations about testimony bearing upon closely analogous events. Perhaps even more importantly, there was a clear danger of unfair prejudice from the jury using that impeachment evidence to draw impermissible propensity inferences, given the facial similarities between the underlying January 2019 incidents and the alleged interaction between Acevedo-Smith and Prophete—a consideration that, as noted above, was absent in White. 4 In sum, even assuming arguendo that cross-examination regarding the disciplinary reports against Acevedo-Smith was permissible under Rule 608(b) because it had probative value, the record is sufficient to conclude that the district court’s alternative holding under Rule 403 was not “arbitrary or irrational,” and thus 4 We recognize that Rules 608(b) and 403 exist in some tension. The more similar the subject matter of a prior credibility finding is to the instant case, the more probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness that prior finding is under Rule 608(b). Cedeño, 644 F.3d at 82; White, 692 F.3d at 249. Yet the same similarity may risk propensity inferences that counsel against admission per Rule 403. This is all the more reason for deference to the district court judge, who is in the best position to weigh these competing concerns. 11 did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Awadallah, 436 F.3d at 131. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 12