Full Opinion

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-1412 YOUSEF A. ISMAIL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID STEINER, Postmaster General, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:23-cv-00851 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED NOVEMBER 5, 2025 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2026 ____________________ Before RIPPLE, KIRSCH, and LEE, Circuit Judges. LEE, Circuit Judge. Yousef Ismail, a Middle Eastern male, has worked for the United States Postal Service for over twenty years and, at the time of this suit, served as a mail car- rier in the Carpentersville, Illinois post office. In February 2022, police officers escorted Ismail from the workroom floor after a disagreement about overtime with his supervisor that escalated into yelling and profanity. The Postal Service then placed him on emergency leave without pay for two days. 2 No. 25-1412 Ismail claims that this incident evidenced a pattern of race and national origin discrimination and retaliation as well as a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The district court granted summary judgment for the Postal Service on all claims. Finding no error, we affirm. I. Background When reviewing summary judgment, we take the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Hayes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 176 F.4th 994, 1002 (7th Cir. 2026). But here, Ismail did not oppose the Postal Service’s Local Rule 65.1 Statement of Facts as he was required to do. 1 As a result, the district court deemed the facts offered by the Postal Ser- vice as true. Because the district court did not abuse its discre- tion in doing so (as we will explain later), we too will proceed along these lines. Ismail was born in Palestine and identifies as Middle East- ern. Mail carriers in his position begin their days casing and sorting their assigned mail on the workroom floor and then make deliveries on their route. Ismail worked between eight and twelve hours a day and requested overtime on a near- daily basis using Postal Service Form 3996. On February 11, 2022, while Ismail was casing his mail on the workroom floor, his supervisor Salvatore Calabrese told 1 See N.D. Ill. LR 56.1(e)(3) (“To dispute an asserted fact, a party must cite specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact and must con- cisely explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact. As- serted facts may be deemed admitted if not controverted with specific ci- tations to evidentiary material.”). No. 25-1412 3 him to return from his route by 5:30 p.m. They debated about how long the route should take given the day’s mail volume. As they conversed, Calabrese was standing close to Ismail and was not wearing a mask, which Ismail felt violated COVID protocols. The interaction escalated into yelling, and Cala- brese and union steward Benjamin Oswald both asked Ismail to move the discussion to Calabrese’s office. Ismail, however, refused and kept yelling on the workroom floor, exclaiming at one point, “I don’t give a shit!” In response, Calabrese left the floor and called the post- master and police; Ismail stayed on the floor. The police even- tually arrived and escorted Ismail out of the facility. As a re- sult of his actions, the Postal Service placed Ismail on emer- gency off-duty status, which led to his immediate removal from work and docking of two days’ pay. Ismail returned to work as usual on Monday, February 14. He later filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement challenging the emergency placement. The parties eventually resolved the grievance by settlement, and the Postal Service agreed to rescind the placement and compen- sate Ismail for the two days of missing pay. Ismail raises several other incidents that, he claims, reveal discriminatory treatment. On March 2, 2022, for example, Is- mail signed a form indicating that he would work through lunch that day. When Calabrese mistakenly excluded the time from Ismail’s records, Ismail complained, and Calabrese cor- rected the error. On April 30, 2022, Ismail was mistakenly charged for fail- ing to work while sick with COVID. He informed Calabrese, who corrected this error as well. 4 No. 25-1412 On May 26, 2022, Calabrese conducted Ismail’s annual route observation to determine the length of the route and the approximate time necessary to complete it. On that day, they were joined by Joseph Hoffarth, a new supervisor from an- other post office, who was there to be trained. According to Ismail, he found Hoffarth’s presence intimidating. Ismail also asserts that, on June 2, 2022, Calabrese stood close to him while he was talking to the union steward. Ismail viewed this as an indication that Calabrese wanted him to stop talking with the steward and instead return to work. Ismail filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint about the events of February 11 with the Postal Ser- vice on June 10, 2022. After investigating the incident, the Ser- vice’s EEO Office issued its final decision finding no discrim- ination or retaliation on November 8, 2022. As of July 2023, Ismail had filed eight other EEO complaints between 2003 and 2018 and thirty-one union grievances between 2006 and Janu- ary 2022. After receiving the final agency decision, Ismail filed this lawsuit against the Postal Service. After discovery, the Postal Service filed a motion for summary judgment, which the dis- trict court granted. Ismail appeals. II. Discussion We review a district court’s summary judgment de novo. Abayomi v. Collins, 182 F.4th 587, 593 (7th Cir. 2026). A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the mo- vant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the No. 25-1412 5 nonmoving party.” Runkel v. City of Springfield, 51 F.4th 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). A. Local Rule 56.1 The district court deemed admitted the statements in the Postal Service’s statement of facts, citing Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1. We review a district court’s enforce- ment of local rules for an abuse of discretion. Rongere v. City of Rockford, 99 F.4th 1095, 1101 (7th Cir. 2024). Our circuit has long recognized that district courts “may require strict com- pliance with their local rules[.]” Id. (quoting Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2020)). Ismail does not dispute the fact that he failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1. Instead, he contends that the district court violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(3), which provides that a court “may consider other materials in the rec- ord” that are not cited by the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). To oppose summary judgment, Ismail had attached the deposition transcript of the union steward to his response brief, which he believes the court ignored. But the district court in fact reviewed the transcript and cited it in its decision. See Ismail v. DeJoy, No. 23-851, 2025 WL 371781, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2025). What is more, the district court asked the Postal Service to provide the full transcript of Calabrese’s deposition (rather than just selected pages) so it could better assess the issues Ismail raised. The district court’s action were well within its discretion. B. Discriminatory Treatment Turning to the merits, Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual on account of race or na- tional origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). To survive summary 6 No. 25-1412 judgment, a Title VII plaintiff must point to evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a reasonable jury could find that such discrimination occurred. And, to do so, the plaintiff can utilize one of two well-trodden paths. First, he can involve the burden-shifting framework estab- lished in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this approach, he first must present evidence that “(1) [he] is a member of the protected class; (2) [he] met [his] em- ployer’s legitimate job expectations; (3) [he] suffered an ad- verse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employ- ees outside of the protected class were treated more favora- bly.” Naficy v. Ill. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 697 F.3d 504, 511 (7th Cir. 2012). If the plaintiff overcomes this hurdle, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, non-discrimi- natory reason for the action. Id. If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to present evidence that the offered reason was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 512. Second, a Title VII plaintiff can also employ a more holistic approach to the evidence to establish an inference of prohib- ited discrimination. See Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). Here, Ismail employs the McDonnell Douglas framework, and the Postal Service concedes the first three factors: Ismail is a member of a protected class; he performed his job well enough; and emergency placement and forced removal from the workroom floor was a “‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or condition” that qualifies as an adverse employment action. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354 (2024) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)). No. 25-1412 7 The dispute here centers around the last factor—Ismail’s contention that a colleague, Deborah Eckler, was a similarly situated employee who received more favorable treatment. When considering whether two individuals are similarly sit- uated, we take a “flexible, common-sense” approach—“the proposed comparator must be similar enough to permit a rea- sonable juror to infer, in light of all the circumstances, that an impermissible animus motivated the employer’s decision.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2012). Relevant factors include whether the individuals had the same super- visor; whether their respective positions were subject to the same standards; and whether the individuals engaged in sim- ilar conduct in similar circumstances. Id. at 847. “Whether a comparator is similarly situated is typically a question for the fact finder, unless, of course, the plaintiff has no evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the plaintiff met his burden on this issue.” McDaniel v. Progress Rail Locomotive, Inc., 940 F.3d 360, 369 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). According to Ismail, Eckler was a white female carrier who was also supervised by Calabrese. He claims that Eckler had confronted and yelled at Calabrese on the workroom floor but was not escorted out by the police. But Ismail did not observe the incident firsthand and has no personal knowledge of this incident. Nor does Ismail know whether Eckler faced discipline for the incident. And Calabrese him- self did not recall any serious confrontations with any em- ployees other than Ismail. Ismail also points to Oswald, who testified that arguments between mail carriers and members of management occasion- ally took place on the workroom floor. But Oswald did not 8 No. 25-1412 identify the names or racial and ethnic identities of the mail carriers involved in these altercations. And he acknowledged that such encounters were usually deescalated by the individ- uals involved. Simply put, Ismail has failed to create a genuine issue of fact that Eckler had engaged in substantially comparable con- duct and later received more favorable treatment. As a result, he has not met his burden to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Furthermore, even when taking the record as a whole, we agree with the district court that no reasonable jury could con- clude that the Postal Service’s emergency placement of Ismail on February 11 was attributable to his race or national origin, rather than his heated altercation with Calabrese on the work- room floor. See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. Accordingly, the district court properly entered judgment in favor of the Postal Service on this claim. C. Title VII Retaliation Title VII also proscribes retaliation against employees who complain of discrimination. To establish a retaliation claim, Ismail must show that: “(1) he engaged in a statutorily pro- tected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse employ- ment action; and (3) there was a but-for causal connection be- tween the two.” Abayomi, 182 F.4th at 596. Here, the Postal Service agrees that Ismail engaged in pro- tected activity by filing the numerous EEO complaints and does not dispute that he suffered an adverse action that would dissuade an employee from filing future complaints. The con- test is about causation. No. 25-1412 9 When a plaintiff brings a Title VII retaliation claim, he can show causation by presenting direct evidence “that [his] com- plaints and EEO filings were a substantial or motivating fac- tor” in his employer’s decisions to take the adverse action against him. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860 (citation modified). Ad- ditionally, he can offer circumstantial evidence that could lead to an inference of but-for causation, including: (1) “sus- picious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, … and other bits and pieces from which an inference of retaliatory intent might be drawn”; (2) evidence “that similarly situated employees were treated differently”; and (3) facts indicating “that the employer offered a pretextual reason for an adverse employment action.” Id. (citation modified). Here, Ismail relies primarily on what he believes to be sus- picious timing to draw the causal link between a previous EEO complaint and the February 11, 2022, incident. But the EEO complaint, on which Ismail relies, was filed in 2018 and was closed by January 9, 2019. The three-year gap between the EEO disposition and the events of February 2022 is much too great to raise a reasonable inference of causation. See Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 996 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a thirteen-month period between protected activity and an ad- verse action did not create a genuine issue of fact as to causa- tion). Ismail also points to various union grievances he filed, in- cluding one in January 2022. But his grievances complained of overtime and timekeeping processing and approval errors rather than actionable discrimination. Accordingly, they can- not form the basis of his Title VII retaliation claim. See McHale v. McDonough, 41 F.4th 866, 871–72 (7th Cir. 2022) (“The 10 No. 25-1412 charge—whether formal or informal—must be about the dis- crimination.”) (citation omitted). Having failed to show suspicious timing, Ismail points again to Eckler to create an inference of retaliation. See Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 560 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[I]f the time interval standing alone is long enough to weaken an inference of retaliation, the plaintiff is entitled to rely on other circum- stantial evidence to support her claim.”) (citing Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860–61). But nothing in the record indicates that Eckler had filed any EEO complaints, making her an inapt compara- tor. In conclusion, Ismail failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that his protected activity under Title VII motivated the Postal Service’s treatment of him on February 11, 2022. Thus, entry of summary judgment on this claim was appropriate. D. Hostile Work Environment Finally, Ismail did not expressly allege a “hostile work en- vironment” in his complaint. But the district court, out of an abundance of caution, considered the claim because Ismail had alluded to it in his June 2022 EEO complaint and men- tioned it in his response to the Postal Service’s summary judg- ment motion. To prove a hostile work environment claim, Ismail must show that (1) his work environment was both objectively and subjectively offensive; (2) his protected class was the cause of the harassment; (3) the conduct was either severe or perva- sive; and (4) there was a basis for employer liability. Trahanas v. Nw. Univ., 64 F.4th 842, 853 (7th Cir. 2023). When assessing the viability of such a claim, we consider the totality of the No. 25-1412 11 circumstances, including the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it un- reasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). The district court assumed without deciding that the treat- ment Ismail suffered on February 11 was severe, humiliating, and physically threatening. The court also assumed that being escorted off the floor unreasonably interfered with Ismail’s work performance. But, here again, the court did not find any evidence that Calabrese’s actions against Ismail were moti- vated by his race or national origin. We agree. Ismail and Calabrese clearly clashed. But, on this record, no reasonable jury could find that Calabrese’s treatment of Is- mail, however disrespectful or ill-advised, had anything to do with Ismail’s race or national origin. See Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1015 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming summary judgment because, even if supervisors were allegedly disrespectful and hostile, there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that any alleged harassment was based in part on pro- tected characteristics). * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.