Full Opinion

25-636 Yameogo v. Macaron Paris, LLC UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER“). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 20th day of October, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ PATRICE YAMEOGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 25-636 MACARON PARIS, LLC, MACARON CAFE, LLC, MACARON, LLC, Defendants-Appellees. _____________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellant: PATRICE YAMEOGO, pro se, Queens, NY. For Defendants-Appellees: Christopher R. Travis, Travis Law PLLC, New York, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Analisa Torres, Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the February 19, 2025 judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Patrice Yameogo, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of his former employer – Macaron Paris, LLC; Macaron Cafe, LLC; and Macaron, LLC (collectively, “Macaron”) – on his claims of discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in violation of federal and state law, which the court found were resolved by a previously executed settlement agreement between the parties. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision. “We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment after construing all evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non- moving party.” Sotomayor v. City of New York, 713 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2013). “Summary judgment is appropriate only when ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “We review a district court’s factual conclusions related to a settlement agreement, such as whether an agreement exists or whether a party assented to the agreement, under the clearly erroneous standard of review,” and “review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions with respect to its interpretation of the terms of a settlement agreement, and its interpretation of state law.” Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 432 F.3d 437, 443 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). Finally, “[t]his court construes appellate briefs submitted by pro se litigants liberally and reads such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Ortiz v. McBride, 323 F.3d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2003). As a threshold matter, Yameogo appears to challenge the district court’s conversion of Macaron’s motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. When “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, [a] motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,” 3 and “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). In particular, “pro se parties must have unequivocal notice of the meaning and consequences of conversion to summary judgment.” Hernandez v. Coffey, 582 F.3d 303, 307–08 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Yameogo received precisely the notice contemplated by Rule 12(d). When the magistrate judge determined that Macaron’s motion should be converted to one for summary judgment, he ordered Macaron to provide notice to Yameogo in compliance with Rule 12(d). As reflected on the district court’s docket, Macaron provided such notice to Yameogo on August 9, 2024. That notice expressly advised Yameogo that he could not “oppose the defendant’s motion simply by relying upon the allegations in [his] complaint” and that he had to “submit evidence, such as witness statements or documents, countering the facts asserted by the defendant.” Yameogo v. Macaron Paris, LLC, No. 23-cv-8981 (AT) (HJR), Doc. No. 34 at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2024). The district court gave Yameogo ample opportunity to respond with his own materials, and Yameogo in fact submitted an affidavit and fifteen exhibits alongside his opposition to 4 Macaron’s motion. We therefore discern no procedural error in the district court’s treatment of Macaron’s motions. As to the merits of Yameogo’s claims, the district court correctly concluded that Macaron was entitled to summary judgment. Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, the parties entered a settlement agreement to resolve a separate trademark infringement action brought by Macaron against Yameogo. See Yameogo, No. 23-cv-8981, Doc. No. 12-2 at ¶ 5b. As part of that agreement, Yameogo released Macaron from “any and all claims, rights, . . . actions, and causes of action of every nature, known or unknown, matured or unmatured, whether at law or in equity, from the beginning of time to the date of this release,” which was November 23, 2021. Id. The plain language of that release clearly encompasses all claims of any kind arising during the period in which Yameogo was working for Macaron. Yameogo’s argument that the release only extinguished the trademark claims asserted against him is therefore baseless. Yameogo counters that his execution of the agreement was not knowing and voluntary, but the record makes clear that Yameogo was counseled during the proceedings that culminated in the settlement agreement and that he specifically conferred with his attorney about the scope of the release. And though he claims, 5 in conclusory fashion, that the general release in the settlement agreement was contrary to public policy, he cites no authority for that proposition. 1 In fact, New York courts have recognized that “[s]trong policy considerations favor the enforcement of settlement agreements.” Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 82 N.Y.2d 375, 383 (1993); see also Smith v. City of New York, 45 N.Y.3d 1025, 1026–27 (2025) (enforcing release of “any and all state and federal tort claims . . . whatsoever, known or unknown,” to bar a claim based on an incident separate from the settled lawsuit); Stevens v. Town of Chenango, 89 N.Y.S.3d 418, 419–20 (3d Dep’t 2018) (enforcing general release of “all manner of . . . claims and demands . . . in law or in equity that against [defendant]” the plaintiff “ever had” to bar a claim unrelated to settled litigation); Ortiz v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.S.3d 306, 306 (1st Dep’t 2015) (“The general release executed by plaintiff contained no limiting language from which it could be inferred that it was only meant to apply to the specific claims made in the original action.”). 1 The settlement agreement contained a choice-of-law provision providing New York law as the governing substantive law. See Yameogo, No. 23-cv-8981, Doc. No. 12-2 at ¶ 12. The parties are also domiciled in New York, and by all indications the negotiations of the settlement agreement occurred in New York. Yameogo does not dispute that New York law governs the agreement. 6 For all these reasons, the district court correctly concluded that Yameogo’s employment discrimination claims were extinguished by the release contained in the November 2021 settlement agreement. * * * We have considered all of Yameogo’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 7