Cilus v. NYU Langone Hospitals
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-2902
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
25-2902
Cilus v. NYU Langone Hospitals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 18th day of November, two thousand twenty-six.
PRESENT:
ALISON J. NATHAN,
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
MATTHEW A. SCHWARTZ,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Sophiana Cilus,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 25-2902
NYU Langone Hospitals,
Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Alex Rissmiller, Rissmiller PLLC, New
York, NY (Stephen Bergstein, Bergstein
& Ullrich, New Paltz, NY, on the brief).
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Kimberly Klein (Min Kyung (Michelle)
Cho, on the brief), Moses & Singer LLP,
New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Margaret M. Garnett, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Sophiana Cilus appeals from the judgment of the district court granting summary
judgment in favor of NYU Langone Hospitals on her disability discrimination and
retaliation claims under federal, state, and local law. 1 Cilus contends that NYU failed to
reasonably accommodate her disability and fired her in retaliation for taking protected
medical leave from her position as a physician assistant in the hospital’s Medical
Intensive Care Unit (MICU). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
facts and procedural history, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision
to affirm.
1 Although the district court denied summary judgment with respect to one claim, Cilus
subsequently voluntarily dismissed that remaining claim with prejudice, rendering judgment
final for appellate purposes. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 88 F.4th 369, 379 (2d Cir. 2023).
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We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the
facts in the light most favorable to Cilus and drawing all reasonable inferences in her
favor. See C.R. Corps v. LaSalle, 184 F.4th 104, 117 (2d Cir. 2026). “Although we resolve
ambiguities in favor of the nonmoving party, conclusory statements, conjecture, or
speculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment.”
Raymond v. 1199SEIU Nat’l Benefit Fund, 184 F.4th 42, 53 (2d Cir. 2026) (citation modified).
Rather, there must be sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in
Cilus’s favor. See Truitt v. Salisbury Bank & Tr. Co., 52 F.4th 80, 85 (2d Cir. 2022).
Cilus first contests the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment on her
disability discrimination claims based on its finding that she could not perform an
essential function of her job. Both the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) require a plaintiff bringing failure-to-
accommodate and adverse-employment-action claims to establish, among other things,
that she can perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation.
See Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th 111, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2023); see also McMillan v. City of New
York, 711 F.3d 120, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2013). Under the New York City Human Rights Law
(NYCHRL), an employer may likewise defeat a discrimination claim by showing that the
plaintiff cannot “satisfy the essential requisites of the job.” Williams v. MTA Bus Co., 44
F.4th 115, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107(15)).
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The district court properly granted summary judgment on these claims. There is
no genuine dispute on this factual record that an essential function of Cilus’s role in the
MICU was working 12.5-hour shifts, which she (admittedly) could not do. Cilus
requested an accommodation limiting her shifts to ten hours. But the record
conclusively establishes that working full 12.5-hour shifts is essential in the MICU
because it allows physician assistants to safely hand off patient care at the beginning and
end of each shift.
The evidence Cilus marshals against this conclusion does not create a genuine
dispute of material fact. Cilus asserts that “NYU routinely accommodated [her]
intensive care unit peers with modified schedules,” Appellant’s Br. at 13, but for support,
she points only to two dissimilar individuals: one served in a part-time role and
completed full 12.5-hour shifts (just fewer of them), and the other took a one-hour mid-
shift break, which allowed him to be present for the critical morning and evening patient
rounds. Similarly unhelpful are Cilus’s observations that she worked a shorter shift
while temporarily reassigned to a different unit and that other units in the hospital
operated on shorter shifts. That says nothing about whether 12.5-hour shifts are
essential in the MICU, where patient needs and care levels are most acute. Cilus also
points to four occasions when employees in the MICU worked shifts under 12.5 hours.
The hospital asserts that those employees worked shorter shifts on those specific, limited
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occasions because they were covering for others and could only do so for limited periods.
Even disregarding that explanation, however, these instances are too isolated to create a
genuine issue of fact. There is no evidence that anyone in the MICU ever worked shifts
under 12.5 hours with any consistency.
Cilus next contends that the hospital abandoned its duty under the ADA to
negotiate accommodations in good faith via an interactive process. We have held that
“failure to engage in an interactive process does not form the basis of an ADA claim in
the absence of evidence that accommodation was possible.” McBride v. BIC Consumer
Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2009). Cilus’s requested accommodation was
not possible, so this claim must be rejected as well.
The district court also properly granted summary judgment on Cilus’s retaliation
claims after finding the evidence insufficient to create a triable issue regarding the
hospital’s retaliatory intent. Cilus’s contentions to the contrary are unpersuasive. First,
she asserts that her termination letter expressly mentioned her use of protected leave as
a reason for her firing, thereby providing “direct evidence” of retaliation. Appellant’s
Br. at 17–18. The letter states in relevant part: “Prolonged absence from the unit
negatively impacted patient care and burdened your coworkers.” J. App’x 1008. The
district court read the “prolonged absence” language as referring to the single day Cilus
failed to return to the MICU as scheduled. We need not decide whether that is the only
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permissible reading. Accepting Cilus’s interpretation—that “prolonged absence” refers
to her six months of leave and her roughly four months of temporary reassignment—the
letter still does not support an inference that the decision to terminate her employment
was based in “any part” on retaliation. Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreau N. Am. Inc.,
715 F.3d 102, 116 (2d Cir. 2013). The letter explains that after almost a year of being
understaffed, the MICU was “unable to continue to hold a vacancy,” so Cilus either had
to return to her position or lose it. J. App’x 1008. In other words, even on Cilus’s
preferred reading, it is clear that the relevance of her “prolonged absence” was that she
was unable to return from it, leaving the important position vacant. She was fired not
because she took protected leave, but because she was unable to do her job.
Cilus separately argues that retaliation can be inferred from “an unbroken mosaic
of hostility” against her. Appellant’s Br. at 18. Her arguments on this front fare no
better, as they also rest on unsupported factual assertions and unreasonable inferences.
To start, Cilus states that when she first requested leave, her manager “summoned [her]
into a meeting” “[j]ust eight minutes later” and dismissed her injury as “no big deal.”
Appellant’s Br. at 19. The record shows that the meeting was prescheduled. And even
assuming Cilus’s manager made passing remarks downplaying her condition, that does
not establish an inference of retaliatory intent where Cilus’s leave request was then
granted in full—and she went on to receive a second period of full-time leave, and then
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a four-month temporary reassignment. Along similar lines, the fact that Cilus’s
manager asked human resources (HR) if Cilus could “vacate” her position so that it could
be filled by someone else does not support an inference of retaliation because HR
informed the manager that the position would not be vacated and that Cilus would be
permitted to take additional leave.
The circumstances regarding Cilus’s performance improvement plan (PIP)
likewise fail to support an inference of retaliation. Cilus notes that her manager issued
an off-cycle PIP shortly after she requested leave. But Cilus’s leave request coincided
with a meeting, scheduled almost a month earlier, to discuss her ongoing performance
issues stretching back several months before that. We have declined to infer retaliation
where the “adverse employment actions were both part, and the ultimate product, of an
extensive period of progressive discipline” beginning months before any protected
activity. Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation
modified). That is the case here.
Cilus’s contention that her manager “weaponize[d]” her PIP against her by
entering it into NYU’s internal hiring database, thereby effectively “blacklist[ing]” her
from obtaining a lateral transfer, is also unsupported. Appellant’s Br. at 3, 17. The
undisputed evidence shows that the manager entered the PIP into NYU’s electronic
document platform—not the hiring database—at HR’s direction, and that information
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from the document platform then automatically populated into the hiring database.
Furthermore, assuming the manager entered the PIP while Cilus was on leave, that cuts
against a finding of retaliation, because at that point Cilus was no longer seeking a
transfer. Cilus adds that NYU’s internal dashboard noted her as “not eligible” for a
transfer and subject to an “Evaluation Score/Warning Notice,” which she cites as proof
that the PIP blocked her from transferring. J. App’x 1366, 1369. But those notations
were added after Cilus was fired, at which point she was clearly ineligible for a transfer.
Next, Cilus asserts that her termination came only five days after she complained
to HR about intimidation and harassment. Her complaint responded directly to HR’s
warning that if she were “unable to return to [her] home unit on the standard shift
schedule,” she “may be released from employment[.]” J. App’x 1101–02. Consistent
with that warning, Cilus was fired shortly thereafter for declining to return to the MICU.
The fact that Cilus complained after receiving the warning does not create a triable issue
regarding the hospital’s retaliatory intent.
Cilus also asserts that retaliation can be inferred from the fact that the hospital
“abandoned its own procedures to target [her].” Appellant’s Br. at 19. Specifically, she
states that the hospital fired her without first issuing “corrective action.” The policy
Cilus cites, however, addresses when employees can be fired for performance issues; it
does not purport to establish a blanket rule for all terminations. Cilus’s contention that
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HR refused to investigate her complaint is also unsupported by the record. HR asked
her for more details regarding the incidents, and, based on those details, it determined
that no issues required further response. No genuine issues of fact preclude summary
judgment on the retaliation claims.
Lastly, citing our decision in Mihalik, 715 F.3d 102, Cilus contends that the district
court failed to analyze her NYCHRL claims independently from her federal ones. Cilus
acknowledges that the district court discussed these claims separately, but she faults the
court for concluding that they nonetheless failed “for the same reasons.” Appellant’s Br.
at 21. The requirement that courts analyze NYCHRL claims separately from federal
claims, and that different standards may apply to those analyses, does not preclude
courts from finding that the same considerations apply to, and are even dispositive of,
both claims. While the standards may be different, the considerations here are
overlapping, because each of Cilus’s NYCHRL claims relies on the same unsupported
factual contentions detailed above.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Cilus’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are
without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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