Full Opinion

25-2902 Cilus v. NYU Langone Hospitals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: ALISON J. NATHAN, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, MATTHEW A. SCHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ Sophiana Cilus, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 25-2902 NYU Langone Hospitals, Defendant-Appellee. _____________________________________ FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Alex Rissmiller, Rissmiller PLLC, New York, NY (Stephen Bergstein, Bergstein & Ullrich, New Paltz, NY, on the brief). FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Kimberly Klein (Min Kyung (Michelle) Cho, on the brief), Moses & Singer LLP, New York, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Margaret M. Garnett, Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Sophiana Cilus appeals from the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of NYU Langone Hospitals on her disability discrimination and retaliation claims under federal, state, and local law. 1 Cilus contends that NYU failed to reasonably accommodate her disability and fired her in retaliation for taking protected medical leave from her position as a physician assistant in the hospital’s Medical Intensive Care Unit (MICU). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 1 Although the district court denied summary judgment with respect to one claim, Cilus subsequently voluntarily dismissed that remaining claim with prejudice, rendering judgment final for appellate purposes. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 88 F.4th 369, 379 (2d Cir. 2023). 2 We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Cilus and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. See C.R. Corps v. LaSalle, 184 F.4th 104, 117 (2d Cir. 2026). “Although we resolve ambiguities in favor of the nonmoving party, conclusory statements, conjecture, or speculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment.” Raymond v. 1199SEIU Nat’l Benefit Fund, 184 F.4th 42, 53 (2d Cir. 2026) (citation modified). Rather, there must be sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in Cilus’s favor. See Truitt v. Salisbury Bank & Tr. Co., 52 F.4th 80, 85 (2d Cir. 2022). Cilus first contests the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment on her disability discrimination claims based on its finding that she could not perform an essential function of her job. Both the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) require a plaintiff bringing failure-to- accommodate and adverse-employment-action claims to establish, among other things, that she can perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation. See Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th 111, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2023); see also McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2013). Under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), an employer may likewise defeat a discrimination claim by showing that the plaintiff cannot “satisfy the essential requisites of the job.” Williams v. MTA Bus Co., 44 F.4th 115, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107(15)). 3 The district court properly granted summary judgment on these claims. There is no genuine dispute on this factual record that an essential function of Cilus’s role in the MICU was working 12.5-hour shifts, which she (admittedly) could not do. Cilus requested an accommodation limiting her shifts to ten hours. But the record conclusively establishes that working full 12.5-hour shifts is essential in the MICU because it allows physician assistants to safely hand off patient care at the beginning and end of each shift. The evidence Cilus marshals against this conclusion does not create a genuine dispute of material fact. Cilus asserts that “NYU routinely accommodated [her] intensive care unit peers with modified schedules,” Appellant’s Br. at 13, but for support, she points only to two dissimilar individuals: one served in a part-time role and completed full 12.5-hour shifts (just fewer of them), and the other took a one-hour mid- shift break, which allowed him to be present for the critical morning and evening patient rounds. Similarly unhelpful are Cilus’s observations that she worked a shorter shift while temporarily reassigned to a different unit and that other units in the hospital operated on shorter shifts. That says nothing about whether 12.5-hour shifts are essential in the MICU, where patient needs and care levels are most acute. Cilus also points to four occasions when employees in the MICU worked shifts under 12.5 hours. The hospital asserts that those employees worked shorter shifts on those specific, limited 4 occasions because they were covering for others and could only do so for limited periods. Even disregarding that explanation, however, these instances are too isolated to create a genuine issue of fact. There is no evidence that anyone in the MICU ever worked shifts under 12.5 hours with any consistency. Cilus next contends that the hospital abandoned its duty under the ADA to negotiate accommodations in good faith via an interactive process. We have held that “failure to engage in an interactive process does not form the basis of an ADA claim in the absence of evidence that accommodation was possible.” McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2009). Cilus’s requested accommodation was not possible, so this claim must be rejected as well. The district court also properly granted summary judgment on Cilus’s retaliation claims after finding the evidence insufficient to create a triable issue regarding the hospital’s retaliatory intent. Cilus’s contentions to the contrary are unpersuasive. First, she asserts that her termination letter expressly mentioned her use of protected leave as a reason for her firing, thereby providing “direct evidence” of retaliation. Appellant’s Br. at 17–18. The letter states in relevant part: “Prolonged absence from the unit negatively impacted patient care and burdened your coworkers.” J. App’x 1008. The district court read the “prolonged absence” language as referring to the single day Cilus failed to return to the MICU as scheduled. We need not decide whether that is the only 5 permissible reading. Accepting Cilus’s interpretation—that “prolonged absence” refers to her six months of leave and her roughly four months of temporary reassignment—the letter still does not support an inference that the decision to terminate her employment was based in “any part” on retaliation. Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreau N. Am. Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 116 (2d Cir. 2013). The letter explains that after almost a year of being understaffed, the MICU was “unable to continue to hold a vacancy,” so Cilus either had to return to her position or lose it. J. App’x 1008. In other words, even on Cilus’s preferred reading, it is clear that the relevance of her “prolonged absence” was that she was unable to return from it, leaving the important position vacant. She was fired not because she took protected leave, but because she was unable to do her job. Cilus separately argues that retaliation can be inferred from “an unbroken mosaic of hostility” against her. Appellant’s Br. at 18. Her arguments on this front fare no better, as they also rest on unsupported factual assertions and unreasonable inferences. To start, Cilus states that when she first requested leave, her manager “summoned [her] into a meeting” “[j]ust eight minutes later” and dismissed her injury as “no big deal.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. The record shows that the meeting was prescheduled. And even assuming Cilus’s manager made passing remarks downplaying her condition, that does not establish an inference of retaliatory intent where Cilus’s leave request was then granted in full—and she went on to receive a second period of full-time leave, and then 6 a four-month temporary reassignment. Along similar lines, the fact that Cilus’s manager asked human resources (HR) if Cilus could “vacate” her position so that it could be filled by someone else does not support an inference of retaliation because HR informed the manager that the position would not be vacated and that Cilus would be permitted to take additional leave. The circumstances regarding Cilus’s performance improvement plan (PIP) likewise fail to support an inference of retaliation. Cilus notes that her manager issued an off-cycle PIP shortly after she requested leave. But Cilus’s leave request coincided with a meeting, scheduled almost a month earlier, to discuss her ongoing performance issues stretching back several months before that. We have declined to infer retaliation where the “adverse employment actions were both part, and the ultimate product, of an extensive period of progressive discipline” beginning months before any protected activity. Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation modified). That is the case here. Cilus’s contention that her manager “weaponize[d]” her PIP against her by entering it into NYU’s internal hiring database, thereby effectively “blacklist[ing]” her from obtaining a lateral transfer, is also unsupported. Appellant’s Br. at 3, 17. The undisputed evidence shows that the manager entered the PIP into NYU’s electronic document platform—not the hiring database—at HR’s direction, and that information 7 from the document platform then automatically populated into the hiring database. Furthermore, assuming the manager entered the PIP while Cilus was on leave, that cuts against a finding of retaliation, because at that point Cilus was no longer seeking a transfer. Cilus adds that NYU’s internal dashboard noted her as “not eligible” for a transfer and subject to an “Evaluation Score/Warning Notice,” which she cites as proof that the PIP blocked her from transferring. J. App’x 1366, 1369. But those notations were added after Cilus was fired, at which point she was clearly ineligible for a transfer. Next, Cilus asserts that her termination came only five days after she complained to HR about intimidation and harassment. Her complaint responded directly to HR’s warning that if she were “unable to return to [her] home unit on the standard shift schedule,” she “may be released from employment[.]” J. App’x 1101–02. Consistent with that warning, Cilus was fired shortly thereafter for declining to return to the MICU. The fact that Cilus complained after receiving the warning does not create a triable issue regarding the hospital’s retaliatory intent. Cilus also asserts that retaliation can be inferred from the fact that the hospital “abandoned its own procedures to target [her].” Appellant’s Br. at 19. Specifically, she states that the hospital fired her without first issuing “corrective action.” The policy Cilus cites, however, addresses when employees can be fired for performance issues; it does not purport to establish a blanket rule for all terminations. Cilus’s contention that 8 HR refused to investigate her complaint is also unsupported by the record. HR asked her for more details regarding the incidents, and, based on those details, it determined that no issues required further response. No genuine issues of fact preclude summary judgment on the retaliation claims. Lastly, citing our decision in Mihalik, 715 F.3d 102, Cilus contends that the district court failed to analyze her NYCHRL claims independently from her federal ones. Cilus acknowledges that the district court discussed these claims separately, but she faults the court for concluding that they nonetheless failed “for the same reasons.” Appellant’s Br. at 21. The requirement that courts analyze NYCHRL claims separately from federal claims, and that different standards may apply to those analyses, does not preclude courts from finding that the same considerations apply to, and are even dispositive of, both claims. While the standards may be different, the considerations here are overlapping, because each of Cilus’s NYCHRL claims relies on the same unsupported factual contentions detailed above. CONCLUSION We have considered Cilus’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 9