Full Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two November 10, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II SHEILA SWAN, No. 61743-9-II Appellant, v. NEW HEIGHTS CHURCH, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Respondent. LEE, J. — Sheila Swan appeals the superior court’s order granting summary judgment of her defamation and other personal injury claims against New Heights Church (the Church) for conduct alleged against the Church’s pastor, Matthew Hannan. Swan’s brief fails to properly include any assignments of error; however, it appears she is raising three arguments on appeal: the superior court erred by denying her motion to recuse, the superior court violated her rights to a jury trial and to due process by granting the Church’s motion for summary judgment, and the superior court erred by granting the Church’s motion for summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact. We affirm the superior court. FACTS On December 17, 2024, Swan filed a complaint for damages against the Church alleging defamation, slander, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on statements No. 61743-9-II Hannan made to a law enforcement officer during a police investigation. The complaint also included extensive allegations related to an alleged conspiracy to harm and discredit Swan.1 Swan filed a personal declaration supporting her complaint. Swan also attached the police reports she claimed supported her defamation, slander, libel, and intentional infliction of emotion distress claims. According to the police report, a law enforcement officer was dispatched to Swan’s home after she reported that Hannan had been entering her home in the middle of the night to harass her. The officer advised Swan to complete a written statement and return it when she was done. The officer then contacted Hannan about Swan’s allegations. According to the report, Hannan stated that he “was completely familiar with Swan,” and “had been dealing with Swan for years and described her as [redacted].” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 54. Swan alleged the redacted word was “crazy.” CP at 54. Hannan also stated that Swan had sent him numerous emails that “contained unreasonable claims, odd requests, and outlandish writings.” CP at 54. Hannan stated that “it was apparent from Swan’s emails, she was not of sound mind.” CP at 54. The officer determined that there was no probable cause to believe any criminal activity had occurred and filed the reports for informational purposes. 1 Swan’s allegations of conspiracy are vague and confusing, with no specific acts or evidence identified. Based on these allegations, Swan made a laundry list of additional claims, including trespass, “privacy actions,” stalking, malicious harassment, cyberstalking, retaliation, spiritual and religious discrimination, “ministerial ethical misconduct/abusive breach of ministerial duties,” negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and abuse of power and authority. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 10, 14. Although Swan repeats her allegations of conspiracy throughout her appellate brief, she makes no meaningful argument or citation to authority related to the merits of a challenge to the dismissal of these additional claims. RAP 10.3(a)(6). Thus, we do not consider any assignment of error (to the extent Swan attempted to make any) related to these additional claims. See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). Accordingly, we do not provide extensive factual details related to these additional claims, including the allegations of various conspiracies. 2 No. 61743-9-II In March 2025, Swan filed a motion for a change of venue.2 In her declaration supporting the motion to change venue, Swan claimed there were concerns regarding bias because she alleged that the Church was a court employee. Specifically, Swan claimed that “[a]s a Clark County court employee, [the Church] has professional relationships with judges, clerks, and other court administrators/personnel who could be directly or indirectly involved in handling this case.” CP at 138. The Church denied that any members of the board of directors or staff members were employed by the superior court. Further, the Church’s director of operations submitted a declaration stating that no board members or staff had been employed by the superior court in the last 25 years. On April 11, the superior court heard Swan’s motion to change venue. At the hearing, Swan disputed the Church’s claim that none of their board members or staff worked for the court, although she did not identify any specific person she believed worked for the court. Swan also insisted that a local criminal defense attorney had represented the Church, despite the Church’s attorneys denying this claim. Finally, Swan alleged that the documents supporting her claim had been tampered with through collusion of the police department, the local criminal defense attorney, 2 Swan had previously filed a motion for a change of judge and for a change of venue. That motion was not properly noted and was never heard. Despite this, at the hearing on the motion for change of venue, the superior court judge noted that Swan had raised the issue of bias against the judge based on Swan’s prior family law case and noted that since the family law case, Swan had had no objection to the superior court judge presiding over another of Swan’s cases. Swan did not raise the issue of judicial bias at the hearing or object to the superior court judge deciding the motion to change venue. Around the same time that Swan filed her motion for a change of venue, Swan also filed an amended complaint. However, there is no motion to amend or order granting a motion to amend the complaint in the appellate record. Therefore, the appellate record does not support the premise that the case proceeded on Swan’s amended complaint. 3 No. 61743-9-II and unidentified court employees. The superior court found there was no evidence supporting any of Swan’s claims and denied Swan’s motion to change venue. On April 21, the superior court entered a case scheduling order for a 4-day, 6-person jury trial. Discovery cutoff was set for September 2025, and the deadline for filing dispositive pretrial motions was October. Trial was set for December. On June 24, the Church filed a motion for summary judgment with supporting declarations. The Church’s director of operations submitted a declaration stating that the local criminal defense attorney Swan repeatedly asserted was involved with the Church and was the Church’s counsel was not employed by the Church, was not a member of the Church, and was not the Church’s counsel. As to Swan’s claims based on the statements Hannan made to the police, the Church argued they were privileged under RCW 4.24.510.3 The Church also requested statutory damages and attorney fees. The hearing on the motion for summary judgment was noted for July 18. Swan did not file any written response to the motion for summary judgment. Instead, on July 11, Swan filed a motion for the recusal of the assigned superior court judge alleging that the 3 RCW 4.24.510 provides immunity for civil liability for communications to state agencies: A person who communicates a complaint or information to any branch or agency of federal, state, or local government, or to any self-regulatory organization that regulates persons involved in the securities or futures business and that has been delegated authority by a federal, state, or local government agency and is subject to oversight by the delegating agency, is immune from civil liability for claims based upon the communication to the agency or organization regarding any matter reasonably of concern to that agency or organization. A person prevailing upon the defense provided for in this section is entitled to recover expenses and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in establishing the defense and in addition shall receive statutory damages of ten thousand dollars. Statutory damages may be denied if the court finds that the complaint or information was communicated in bad faith. 4 No. 61743-9-II judge had an “intimate partner relationship” with the local criminal defense attorney Swan believed was involved with the Church and integral to her allegations of conspiracy. CP at 188. The superior court addressed Swan’s motion to recuse at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The superior court judge denied having an intimate relationship with anyone involved in the case and denied the motion to recuse. Because Swan had not filed any written response to the motion for summary judgment, the superior court allowed her to make a sworn statement opposing summary judgment. The superior court then granted the Church’s motion for summary judgment and awarded the Church attorney fees and $10,000 in mandatory statutory damages under RCW 4.24.510. Later, the superior court entered an order determining the amount of attorney fees. Swan filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Swan appeals. ANALYSIS Swan appeals, arguing that the superior court erred by granting summary judgment and that this case should be remanded for a trial. Although her brief fails to properly include any assignment of error and generally fails to make any comprehensible legal argument, Swan appears to be raising three arguments that we can address.4 First, Swan argues that the superior court erred by denying her motion to recuse. Second, Swan argues that the superior court violated her rights 4 As noted above, Swan alleged various other claims in her complaint but, to the extent Swan intended to assign error to the dismissal of those claims, she presents no argument or citation to legal authority relevant to the merits of those claims. Supra, n.1. Swan also references errors related to her motion for reconsideration, the award of attorney fees, and other motions that appear to have been filed but never properly noted and heard. To the extent, Swan attempted to assign error to additional decisions by the superior court, they are also unsupported by comprehensible argument or citations to legal authority. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy, 118 Wn.2d at 809. Accordingly, we decline to consider any additional assignments of error Swan attempted to include in her appellate brief. 5 No. 61743-9-II to a jury trial and to due process by granting the Church’s motion for summary judgment. Third, Swan argues that the superior court erred by granting the Church’s motion for summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact. We affirm the superior court. A. CHANGE OF JUDGE Swan argues that the superior court erred by refusing to recuse itself while involved as an “‘intimate partner’” with the local criminal defense attorney who represented the Church in prior cases. Br. of Appellant at 27. We disagree.5 “Under the appearance of fairness doctrine, a judicial proceeding is valid only if a reasonably prudent, disinterested observer would conclude that the parties received a fair, impartial and neutral hearing.” State v. Gamble, 168 Wn.2d 161, 187, 225 P.3d 973 (2010). “Evidence of a judge’s actual or potential bias is required.” In re Marriage of Meredith, 148 Wn. App. 887, 903, 201 P.3d 1056, review denied, 167 Wn.2d 1002 (2009). “A trial court is presumed to perform its functions regularly and properly without bias or prejudice.” Id. Here, Swan presented no evidence supporting her allegation that the superior court judge was involved in an intimate relationship with anyone involved in the case or the local criminal defense attorney that Swan identified. Thus, Swan failed to present any evidence showing the superior court judge was actually or potentially biased. Accordingly, the superior court did not err by denying Swan’s motion to recuse. 5 We note that the Church claims that the motion to recuse is outside the scope of this appeal because the order denying the motion to recuse was not designated in the notice of appeal. However, under RAP 2.4(b)(1), we will review a ruling not designated in the notice if the ruling prejudicially affected the decision designated in the notice. The superior court’s order denying the motion to recuse is reviewable under RAP 2.4(b)(1). 6 No. 61743-9-II B. DUE PROCESS AND RIGHT TO JURY Swan also argues the superior court violated her right to due process by dismissing the case after the case scheduling order already set a date for a jury trial. It appears Swan is alleging that her right to due process was violated when the superior court rushed the April hearing on Swan’s motion for a change of venue. It also appears that Swan is arguing that the superior court’s summary judgment decision violated due process by violating her right to a jury trial. Swan’s arguments fail. Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. In re Marriage of Tsarbopoulos, 125 Wn. App. 273, 281, 104 P.3d 692 (2004). Swan does not dispute that she had notice of the April hearing on her motion to change venue and that she appeared at the hearing. Although Swan claims the hearing was rushed, the superior court gave Swan an opportunity to present her allegations and arguments supporting her motion for a change of venue. Accordingly, Swan’s claim that the April hearing violated due process fails.6 Under Article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution, “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” “But the right of trial by jury is not limitless.” Davis v. Cox, 183 Wn.2d 269, 289, 351 P.3d 862 (2015). Also, “it is well-established that ‘when there is no genuine issue of material fact, . . . summary judgment proceedings do not infringe upon a litigant’s constitutional right to a jury trial.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting LaMon v. Butler, 112 Wn.2d 193, 200 6 To the extent Swan is attempting to argue her due process rights were violated because the superior court denied the motion to change venue, this claim must also fail. Swan presented no evidence, or even specific allegations, supporting her broad assertion that the Church or its leaders or members worked for the superior court or that the superior court had engaged in fraudulently manipulating documents. Therefore, there was no basis for the superior court to grant the motion to change venue. 7 No. 61743-9-II n.5, 770 P.2d 1027, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989)). Therefore, to the extent Swan argues that the granting of summary judgment violated her right to a jury trial, this argument fails. C. SUMMARY JUDGMENT Finally, Swan argues that the superior court erred by granting the Church’s motion for summary judgment on her claims related to Hannan’s statements to the police. Swan summarily addresses First Amendment protection, privilege, and qualified common interest privilege. However, Swan does not address RCW 4.24.510 at all; instead, she simply states, “Nor does the defendants[’] claims of ‘immunity’ stand as there are no grounds for immunity for criminal actions by the defendant.” Br. of Appellant at 30. We are not persuaded by Swan’s argument. “Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scotsman Guide, Inc. v. Simmons, 35 Wn. App. 2d 203, 209, 574 P.3d 584 (2025); CR 56(c). “‘A genuine issue of material fact exists where reasonable minds could differ on the facts controlling the outcome of the litigation.’” Sutton v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 180 Wn. App. 859, 864-65, 324 P.3d 763 (2014) (quoting Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008)). We review summary judgment rulings de novo, standing in the same position as the trial court and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scotsman Guide, 35 Wn. App. 2d at 209. And, “we may affirm summary judgment ‘on any ground supported by the record.’” Id. (quoting Pac. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 181 Wn. App. 730, 737, 329 P.3d 101 (2014)). RCW 4.24.510 provides immunity from civil liability for communications to government agencies. Specifically, a person is immune from liability for communicating information to an 8 No. 61743-9-II agency of local government regarding any matter reasonably of concern to that agency. RCW 4.24.510. Here, Hannan provided information to a local government agency (the police) about Swan. And the information was related to a matter reasonably of concern to the agency because the officer was gathering information to evaluate the allegations Swan made in her report. Accordingly, RCW 4.24.510 provides civil immunity from claims based on Hannan’s statements to the police. Swan did not provide a written response to the Church’s motion for summary judgment and her sworn statements in court failed to show any issue of material fact. Based on the record, the superior court properly granted the Church’s motion for summary judgment on the claims arising from the statements Hannan made to the police. CONCLUSION Swan has failed to show that the superior court erred by denying Swan’s motion to recuse, the superior court violated due process or the right to a jury trial, or the superior court improperly granted the Church’s motion for summary judgment on Swan’s claims arising from the statements Hannan made to the police. Accordingly, we affirm. 9 No. 61743-9-II A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. Lee, J. We concur: Maxa, P.J. Che, J. 10