Feldkamp v. University of Kansas Hospital Authority
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date FiledOctober 20, 2026
Docket25-3185
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Appellate Case: 25-3185 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2026 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 20, 2026
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
MICHAEL FELDKAMP,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 25-3185
(D.C. No. 2:24-CV-02220-JAR)
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS HOSPITAL (D. Kan.)
AUTHORITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, KELLY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Michael Feldkamp sued his former employer alleging violations of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) and wrongful termination under
state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer.
Feldkamp appealed. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
*
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 25-3185 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2026 Page: 2
I. Background
The University of Kansas Hospital Authority (KUHA) employed Feldkamp
from 1991 until his termination on February 6, 2023. At the time of his termination,
he was 63 years old and the Nuclear Cardiology Director under the supervision of
Becky Captain, Director of Cardiovascular Clinical Practice.
Various events preceded Feldkamp’s termination. The Joint Commission, a
certification body responsible for organizational safety surveys, reported out-of-date
protocols and policies in his department. Feldkamp’s supervisors learned he was not
following internal standards to repair a malfunctioning nuclear camera. And several
employees, under his supervision and outside his department, filed complaints with
human resources about Feldkamp’s behavior. These complaints led to an
investigation and interviews revealing allegations of communication issues,
disrespectful behavior, and management issues. His most recent performance
evaluation reflected these same issues.
Following the investigation Feldkamp met with human resources to review the
concerns documented during the investigation. There, human resources and
Feldkamp discussed that he questioned his staff about their interviews with human
resources and the unresolved issues raised in his recent performance evaluation. He
was then put on administrative leave. A month later, Vice President of Cardiac
Services Barbara MacArthur determined Feldkamp’s continued employment with
KUHA was untenable based on his failure to adhere to internal procedures, poor
2
Appellate Case: 25-3185 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2026 Page: 3
communication and management skills, and maltreatment of employees. As the
decisionmaker, MacArthur terminated Feldkamp’s employment in February 2023.
Feldkamp then initiated the underlying lawsuit against KUHA alleging he was
unlawfully terminated because of his age. 1 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of KUHA. Feldkamp appealed.
II. Discussion
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same legal standard as the district court.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Hiett, 22 F.4th 1190,
1193 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under that standard, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual
. . . because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Because Feldkamp
lacks any direct evidence for his ADEA claim, we analyze his claim under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973); Markley v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 59 F.4th
1072, 1081 (10th Cir. 2023). First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
age discrimination. See Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1195
Feldkamp does not challenge the district court’s decision not to exercise
1
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim, so we do not address it here.
3
Appellate Case: 25-3185 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2026 Page: 4
(10th Cir. 2008). If the plaintiff succeeds, the employer must provide a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). If the employer succeeds, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show the employer-provided justification is pretextual. Id. Only the district court’s
conclusion that Feldkamp did not meet his pretext burden is at issue. So, on appeal,
Feldkamp must show the district court erred in concluding there was no genuine issue
of material fact as to whether KUHA’s reason for discharge was pretextual.
“Pretext can be inferred from evidence revealing weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s explanation for
the termination.” Macon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 743 F.3d 708, 714 (10th Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court has identified three typical
methods that show an employer’s stated reason for discharging an individual is
pretextual:
(1) evidence that the defendant’s stated reason for the adverse
employment action was false; (2) evidence that the defendant acted
contrary to a written . . . policy prescribing the action to be taken by the
defendant under the circumstances; or (3) evidence that the defendant
acted contrary to an unwritten policy or contrary to the employer’s
practice when making the adverse employment decision affecting the
plaintiff.
Macon, 743 F.3d at 714 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]solated
or ambiguous comments are too abstract to support a finding of discrimination.”
Mauldin v. Driscoll, 136 F.4th 984, 997 (10th Cir. 2025) (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted). No matter what evidence Feldkamp produces, “[t]he
relevant inquiry is not whether the employer’s proffered reasons were wise, fair or
4
Appellate Case: 25-3185 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2026 Page: 5
correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon
those beliefs.” Macon, 743 F.3d at 714.
The district court concluded that Feldkamp met his prima facie burden of age
discrimination and KUHA met its burden to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for terminating his employment. But when it came to determining pretext, the
district court concluded Feldkamp failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether KUHA’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual. It
determined Feldkamp’s arguments “either lack[ed] record support or [did] not render
[KUHA’s] proffered reasons to be so weak, implausible, inconsistent, incoherent, or
contradictory that a reasonable fact finder could find them unworthy of credence.”
Aplt. App. vol. IV at 925 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Specifically, the district court determined that Feldkamp’s evidence about
fixing the malfunctioning nuclear camera did not address MacArthur’s assertion that
he did not adhere to hospital guidelines for malfunctioning equipment. It also
determined that Feldkamp’s argument that KUHA did not offer a progressive
improvement plan (PIP) did not demonstrate that KUHA’s policies required the
hospital to put him on one. Finally, it determined that Feldkamp failed to establish
temporal proximity between Becky Captain’s comment about replacing older
managers and his termination or have record support to show a nexus between the
comment and termination. In sum, the district court observed that Feldkamp’s
arguments were disagreements about, not refutations to, MacArthur’s perception
about the underlying employee complaints, HR investigation results, and internal
5
Appellate Case: 25-3185 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2026 Page: 6
policy requirements. Thus, the district court concluded Feldkamp failed to
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that any of KUHA’s examples of
performance issues, as they appeared to the ultimate decision maker, MacArthur,
served as pretext for his discharge.
To refute the district court’s conclusions, Feldkamp first argues he presented
significant information in his deposition testimony related to the malfunctioning
camera, explaining any tweaking done to the camera was on the software and not the
hardware, posing no risk to the patient safety. He also asserts he regularly reported
the camera issues to Captain and MacArthur through email as they requested. But he
doesn’t offer evidence to show that he adhered to hospital guidelines for
malfunctioning equipment, or that MacArthur’s perception of his failure to do so was
incorrect. Thus, he does not establish a genuine issue of material fact on this issue.
Next, Feldkamp argues the Joint Commission findings that he did not maintain
updated protocols were related to a department not under his supervision. Even if
true, however, the McDonnell Douglas framework does not call for us to analyze his
perception of the facts, but rather MacArthur’s perception of the facts. Feldkamp
fails to refute MacArthur’s reliance on the Joint Commission’s findings to conclude
he did not keep the protocols up to date.
Third, Feldkamp contends he provided an opposing factual basis for the
employee complaints made against him. He also asserts Captain encouraged the
employees to make complaints. But he does not address MacArthur’s perception of
the complaints, nor does he point to record support that Captain encouraged the
6
Appellate Case: 25-3185 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2026 Page: 7
employees. We conclude this argument is unavailing as to whether MacArthur’s
reasons for termination were pretextual.
Fourth, he contends KUHA did not consider a PIP despite having done so for
other employees in the past. But Feldkamp does not refute that PIPs were only an
available tool, not a stringent policy used formally or otherwise. Nor does he point to
evidence that similarly situated employees were put on a PIP. He merely states that
he knew they had been used. Thus, the decision not to implement a PIP does not
support pretext.
And finally, Feldkamp contends “Becky Captain threatened [him] when she
openly stated that she wished to replace all the ‘older managers.’” Aplt. Opening Br.
at 19. But he does not argue she said this in temporal proximity to his termination.
Nor does he point to evidence showing Captain directly stated this. At most, in his
declaration he asserts they were “rumors.” See Aplt. App. vol. II at 500. Feldkamp
does not point to evidence in the record to show Captain’s alleged comment was
more than an isolated comment or that she served as the decisionmaker in his
termination. Alone, the comment does not give rise to pretext.
In sum, Feldkamp asserts that the record evidence supports a reasonable
inference that KUHA’s policies, practices and decision-making patterns contribute to
a finding of pretext. But he fails to point to anything in the record to support this.
Thus, we agree with the district court that he failed to establish a genuine issue of
material fact that KUHA’s reasons for dismissal were pretextual.
7
Appellate Case: 25-3185 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 10/20/2026 Page: 8
III. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
8