Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 1 of 16 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13871 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ STEVEN EPPERSON, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus THE HERTZ CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 2:24-cv-00383-SPC-DNF ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 2 of 16 2 Opinion of the Court 25-13871 Steven Epperson, a fifty-six-year-old corporate security spe- cialist, sued his current employer, The Hertz Corporation, for age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Em- ployment Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment for Hertz. After careful review, we affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Hertz hired Epperson, a former law enforcement officer, as a corporate security specialist in August 2022. During the relevant period, Epperson’s supervisor was Julio Endara, another former law enforcement officer working at Hertz as a corporate security manager. Both men reported to Norm Ryan, a regional corporate security manager. Epperson’s Complaint about Endara In March 2023, Ryan told Endara that several corporate se- curity specialists had approached him to discuss their “pay struc- ture and job status.” Although Epperson denied participating in that discussion, Endara believed he had. This mistaken belief caused Endara and Epperson’s relationship to turn “completely negative.” Things came to a head later that month when Endara called Epperson “in a rage.” Endara told Epperson that he would never get promoted at Hertz, suggested that he apply to jobs at other companies, and said, “[y]ou have a pension, right? You’re [fifty].” At the time, Epperson understood Endara’s comment about his age USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 3 of 16 25-13871 Opinion of the Court 3 to be a “police thing”—referring to the common requirement that law enforcement officers be at least fifty years old to receive pen- sion benefits. The dispute between the two men continued into April. That month, Epperson and Endara attended a corporate training session in Oklahoma City. On April 19, while in a car with Endara and other Hertz employees, Epperson remarked that his personal credit card had been charged for incidentals that Hertz was sup- posed to cover. Two others in the car stated that they had also been charged personally for incidental expenses. For reasons un- known to Epperson, this discussion angered Endara, who yelled, “I don’t know how to say it, f*** Norm [Ryan].” Despite Endara di- recting his expletive toward Ryan, Epperson believed that Endara was angry with him for bringing up the issue. Endara used profanity again later that evening. While Ep- person and Endara were alone in a car, Epperson mentioned work- ing with Krystal Godfrey, the head of Hertz’s fraud unit in Okla- homa City. Endara bristled at the mention of Godfrey’s name and said that she was a “f****** c***.” Epperson, upset with Endara’s behavior, reported him to an- other corporate security manager, John Mattox, on April 26. On May 1, Mattox called Epperson and told him that he should report Endara’s conduct to Ryan and human resources. Epperson called Ryan the same day and told him about Endara’s age-related com- ment, negative attitude toward Epperson, and profane exclama- tions. USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 4 of 16 4 Opinion of the Court 25-13871 Ryan immediately launched an investigation into Epper- son’s allegations. As part of his investigation, Ryan interviewed the other employees who were in the car when Endara yelled about incidental expenses. Based on those interviews, Ryan substantiated Epperson’s allegation concerning the incidental-expenses incident but could not substantiate his other allegations. Ryan emailed the results of his investigation to Benjamin House, Hertz’s senior director for corporate security, on May 3. He explained that he intended to give Endara a “verbal correction” and “have him reach out to [Epperson].” Shortly after, Endara apologized to Epperson and promised to do better. Epperson ac- cepted his apology and Ryan closed the investigation. The Oceanside Incident On August 8, Epperson was tasked with recovering a vehicle that a customer had failed to return on time. Using the vehicle’s tracking software, Epperson located it and blocked it in with his own vehicle. Epperson informed the customer that he was repos- sessing the vehicle, but the customer refused to surrender it. Ep- person backed off and called a tow truck. While Epperson was making that call, however, the customer called Hertz’s Oceanside branch and was instructed to return the car himself. Based on those instructions, the customer maneuvered the vehicle around Epper- son’s vehicle and drove off. In so doing, the customer nearly struck Epperson’s vehicle. Epperson tracked the vehicle to the Oceanside branch and went into the lobby. USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 5 of 16 25-13871 Opinion of the Court 5 Inside the Oceanside branch, Epperson confronted the branch manager, Zaria Quintero, about her employee’s instruc- tions that the customer return the vehicle himself instead of sur- render it to Epperson—instructions Epperson claimed “put [his] life in danger.” Quintero and another Oceanside employee, Selina Smith, described Epperson as “extremely aggressive” and threaten- ing during this confrontation. Both women alleged that Epperson shoved Quintero into an office where he berated her for putting him in a dangerous situation. Hertz’s director of human resources, Matthew Searles, assigned human resources business partner Lexy Motes to investigate the incident. Investigation into Epperson As part of her investigation, Motes obtained witness state- ments from Quintero and Smith. Quintero and Smith’s witness statements both described Epperson’s tone and demeanor as ag- gressive and stated that he pushed Quintero into the Oceanside branch’s back office. Epperson, for his part, admitted that he was “agitated” during the confrontation but denied physically assault- ing Quintero. Epperson was suspended with pay pending Motes’s investi- gation, from August 8 to August 21. After Ryan notified him of the suspension, Epperson contacted House and claimed the suspension was retaliation for his complaint against Endara. On August 10, Epperson sent Motes an email detailing his issues with Endara and criticizing Ryan’s investigation of his May complaint as inadequate. USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 6 of 16 6 Opinion of the Court 25-13871 On August 16, Motes sent Searles, House, and Ryan her “In- ternal Investigation Summary.” In it, she wrote: Based on the findings my recommendation is, we should issue [] Epperson a First and Final Warning for his tone and demeanor with [Quintero], and [he] should re-take the de-escalation course on Learning Connection. The allegations regarding him physi- cally touching [Quintero] have been unsubstantiated. Neither Ryan nor Endara were involved in the decision to suspend Epperson or issue the warning. On August 21, Ryan emailed the warning to Epperson. The warning explained that Epperson’s conduct at the Oceanside branch was “unprofessional” and did not “meet the standards of the Hertz Code of Professional and Personal Conduct.” It cau- tioned that “should [Epperson] fail to follow company policy/pro- cedure, there will be further disciplinary action taken, up to and including termination.” Despite the warning, Epperson later re- ceived a merit-based salary increase. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Epperson’s lawsuit followed. He asserted claims for age dis- crimination and retaliation under both the Age Discrimination in USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 7 of 16 25-13871 Opinion of the Court 7 Employment Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act. 1 After discov- ery, Hertz moved for summary judgment on Epperson’s claims. The district court granted Hertz’s motion. Epperson did not establish his age-discrimination or retaliation claims, according to the district court, because he did not show that the warning was an adverse employment action. The district court also concluded that Epperson had failed to establish a causal connection between his alleged protected activity—complaining about Endara—and the alleged adverse employment action—the warning. After the dis- trict court entered final judgment in favor of Hertz, Epperson ap- pealed. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment.” Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any ma- terial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 1 The district court properly analyzed Epperson’s federal and state law claims together because both are governed by the same substantive standard. See Mazzeo v. Color Resols. Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[A]ge- related discrimination actions under the FCRA are analyzed under the same framework as the . . . ADEA[.] . . . As a result, our discussion of the . . . ADEA governs the FCRA claims.”). They are both analyzed under the same frame- work as Title VII claims. See Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993) (as to federal age-discrimination claims); Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010) (as to Florida age-discrimi- nation claims). USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 8 of 16 8 Opinion of the Court 25-13871 law.” Id. (citation modified). “[W]e review the evidence in the light most favorable to the . . . nonmoving party, and draw all jus- tifiable inferences in its favor.” Id. at 1097 n.1. DISCUSSION On appeal, Epperson challenges the summary judgment for Hertz on both his age-discrimination and retaliation claims. We address each challenge in turn. Age-Discrimination Claim Federal and state law prohibit employment discrimination against individuals who are at least forty years old. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a). To establish an age-discrimination claim, “a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the em- ployer’s adverse decision.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). “This standard aligns with the single-motive framework under Title VII, which asks whether discrimination was the outcome-determinative reason for the employment ac- tion.” McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). The Warning Was Not an Adverse Employment Action The district court entered summary judgment for Hertz on Epperson’s age-discrimination claim because it concluded that Ep- person had not suffered an adverse employment action—a neces- sary element of that claim. See Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 946 (11th Cir. 2023) (“A plaintiff who fails to prove that [he] . . . suffered an adverse employment action, will be unable to USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 9 of 16 25-13871 Opinion of the Court 9 prove that [he] was unlawfully discriminated against. . . . [T]he [ ] fundamental problem with such a failure of evidence is that it means the plaintiff cannot prove a necessary element for his em- ployment discrimination case.”). We agree. In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024), the Su- preme Court clarified the appropriate standard for determining what constitutes an adverse employment action. Id. at 350. There, a female police sergeant was transferred out of a specialized intelli- gence unit, against her wishes, and replaced by a male. Id. at 350– 51. While Muldrow’s rank and pay stayed the same, she had fewer responsibilities, forfeited her status as a deputized task force officer with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, lost access to the take- home vehicle associated with that status, and was placed on a ro- tating schedule that involved weekend shifts. Id. at 351. Muldrow sued the city for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII. Id. The district court granted summary judgment for the city and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Muldrow had not shown that the transfer caused her a “materially significant disadvantage.” Id. at 353. The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that a plaintiff al- leging employment discrimination “must show some harm re- specting an identifiable term or condition of employment,” but need not show that the harm was “significant.” Id. at 354–55. The Court reasoned that Muldrow had met this standard because her responsibilities were reduced, she lost access to her take-home ve- hicle, and her schedule became less regular and often required her to work weekends. Id. at 359. USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 10 of 16 10 Opinion of the Court 25-13871 Epperson’s alleged harms do not meet the Muldrow stand- ard. He does not point to any term or condition of his employ- ment—such as his responsibilities, schedule, or pay—that was al- tered as a result of the warning. Instead, Epperson focuses on hy- pothetical harms he might suffer because of the warning—such as the risk of termination for future violations of Hertz’s code of con- duct or a reduced likelihood of promotion. But these forecasted harms are speculative. Epperson has not been terminated, he has not been denied a promotion, and he has not demonstrated any other ill effect from the warning’s presence in his personnel file. Speculative harms such those Epperson relies on cannot form the basis of an adverse employment action. See Jefferson v. Sewon Am. Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 921 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating that the harm under- lying an adverse employment action “cannot be speculative”). Muldrow did not alter the requirement that a plaintiff suffer actual harm with respect to a term or condition of his employment to prevail on a discrimination claim. See 601 U.S. at 355 (requiring a plaintiff to show that an employment decision caused “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment”). Epperson’s focus on “enhanced oversight” is likewise insuf- ficient. Increased oversight, without evidence that it altered his re- sponsibilities, schedule, or some other identifiable term or condi- tion of his employment, does not establish the harm that Muldrow requires. See id. at 359; see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 75 (2006) (Alito, J., concurring) (“There is reason to doubt that Congress meant to burden the federal courts with claims involving relatively trivial differences in treatment” such as USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 11 of 16 25-13871 Opinion of the Court 11 whether an employee “was subjected to any more or less supervi- sion[.]”). 2 Because Epperson has failed to identify any harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of his employment, he cannot es- tablish that he suffered an adverse employment action. Without one, the district court properly entered summary judgment for Hertz. The District Court’s Analytical Approach Was Not Errone- ous Epperson also challenges the district court’s analytical ap- proach. He contends that the district court erroneously treated his lack of pretext evidence as dispositive and should have instead eval- uated the totality of his evidence under what’s often referred to as the “convincing mosaic standard.” Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752, 760 (11th Cir. 2025). For two reasons, we disagree. First, the district court did not enter summary judgment for Hertz based on Epperson’s lack of pretext evidence. The reason the district court provided for granting summary judgment for Hertz on his age-discrimination claim was his “fail[ure] to establish 2 Epperson also claims that the warning changed his employment status from “good standing” to “precarious” because future violations of Hertz’s code of conduct may result in his termination. But this is not a change in an employ- ment term or condition because Epperson’s employment was always contin- gent on compliance with Hertz’s code of conduct, as he acknowledged when he signed onboarding paperwork recognizing “that failure to follow [Hertz’s] Code may result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination.” USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 12 of 16 12 Opinion of the Court 25-13871 an adverse employment action.” The word “pretext” does not even appear in the district court’s summary-judgment order. Second, the district court was not required to proceed fur- ther after concluding that Epperson’s age-discrimination claim lacked a necessary element—an adverse employment action. See Tynes, 88 F.4th at 946 (explaining that failure to establish an adverse employment action precludes liability for a discrimination claim). Epperson’s argument to the contrary, based on Ismael, is mistaken. In Ismael, we explained that the McDonnell Douglas pre- text inquiry and the convincing mosaic standard are distinct meth- ods of showing discriminatory intent. See Ismael, 161 F.4th at 761 (“Though we recognize that both inquiries are probative of the same ultimate question, we are persuaded that they are not identi- cal.”). But Ismael did not require courts to evaluate circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent when a necessary element of a discrimination claim—such as membership in a protected class or an adverse employment action—is lacking. See generally id; accord McCreight, 117 F.4th 1322, 1335–36 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[T]o the ex- tent the term ‘convincing mosaic’ has become a distraction, we again reiterate that this approach to analyzing the evidence treats an employment discrimination suit in the same way we would treat any other case—jumping directly to the ultimate question of liability and deciding whether the moving party is entitled to judg- ment at that stage of the case.”). Epperson correctly observes that the district court cast its analysis in terms of the McDonnell Douglas framework rather than USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 13 of 16 25-13871 Opinion of the Court 13 stating clearly that Epperson failed to establish a necessary element of his claim. But regardless of the label employed, the district court properly concluded that Epperson’s age-discrimination claim was not viable because he did not establish that he suffered an adverse employment action. Cf. Ismael, 161 F.4th at 763 (explaining that conflating the McDonnell Douglas analysis with the standard to sur- vive summary judgment may be harmless error if the “error was in name only”). Thus, the district court did not err in granting sum- mary judgment for Hertz. Retaliation Claim Epperson next argues that the district court erred by grant- ing summary judgment for Hertz on his retaliation claim. He in- sists a causal connection links his complaint about Endara with the warning. Employers are prohibited from discriminating against an employee because he “has opposed any practice made unlawful” by federal and state anti-discrimination law. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). “To that end, employers cannot retaliate against employees who have complained about—that is, opposed—discrimination based on sex, age, or other protected characteristics.” McCreight, 117 F.4th at 1339 (citation modified). Three elements are required to establish a retaliation claim: “(1) a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection between them.” Id. (citation modified). We focus on the causation element. USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 14 of 16 14 Opinion of the Court 25-13871 There Was No Causal Connection Between Epperson’s Complaint and the Warning Causation “requires more than some sort of temporal prox- imity between the employee’s complaint and the adverse employ- ment action.” Id. “Proof of the decisionmaker’s knowledge or awareness of [that] complaint[] is also required.” Id. (citing Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1054 (11th Cir. 2020)). Here, the parties agree that Motes was the decisionmaker regard- ing the warning. But Epperson has failed to establish—or even ar- gue—that Motes knew about his alleged protected activity before she commenced her investigation.3 Epperson argues that Motes’s lack of knowledge is not fatal to his claim because Ryan, “who knew about Epperson’s age and complaints,” was “involved in the process” of issuing the warning. But Epperson offers no evidence that Ryan’s alleged bias infected Motes’s investigation or her decision to issue the warning. See Pen- nington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Where a decisionmaker conducts [her] own evaluation and makes an independent decision, [her] decision is free of the taint of 3 Epperson’s August 10 email to Motes does not change the calculus. By then, Epperson had already been suspended and the disciplinary process was under- way. An employer “proceeding along lines previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no evidence whatever of causality.” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001). Regardless, Epperson him- self insists that “the temporal proximity runs from [his] May 2023 complaint, not his August 10 email.” USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 15 of 16 25-13871 Opinion of the Court 15 a biased subordinate employee.”). In fact, the unrebutted sum- mary-judgment evidence shows that Ryan was not involved in the decision to issue Epperson’s warning. At most, the evidence shows that human resources asked Ryan to deliver the warning to Epper- son after the decision to issue it had already been made. Moreover, the district court correctly concluded that the temporal proximity between Epperson’s May complaint and the August warning was too attenuated to support a reasonable infer- ence of retaliation. See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[M]ere temporal proximity, without more, must be very close. . . . A three to four month disparity be- tween the statutorily protected expression and the adverse employ- ment action is not enough.” (citation modified)). Epperson tries to bridge the gap between his complaint and the warning by claiming that he was “exclu[ded] from important emails and duties [that he] was particularly qualified for” between May and August. But he does not tie his alleged exclusion to Motes or her decision to issue the warning.4 He also tries to overcome the temporal gap between his complaint and the warning by pointing to Ryan’s statement during a July 2023 team meeting that “Hertz [is] corporate America, and if corporate America does not like you they will get rid of you.” But Ryan’s comment is neither protected activity by Epperson nor an adverse employment action against him and is therefore irrelevant 4 Epperson does not claim that his alleged exclusion from emails and duties itself constituted an adverse employment action. USCA11 Case: 25-13871 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 16 of 16 16 Opinion of the Court 25-13871 to the temporal gap between the complaint and warning. In any event, even if Epperson had established a sufficiently close tem- poral proximity between his complaint and the warning, the dis- covery of Epperson’s misconduct at the Oceanside branch would have “sever[ed] the causal inference created by close temporal proximity.” Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2023). The District Court Did Not Draw Adverse Inferences Against Epperson In response, Epperson contends that the district court “made [k]ey [i]nferences” and “[c]redibility [d]eterminations” against him as to both of his claims. But we do not see these inferences and credibility determinations in the district court’s summary-judg- ment order. As we have said, the district court concluded as a mat- ter of law that Epperson’s warning was not an adverse employment action and that the temporal proximity between Epperson’s com- plaint and the warning was insufficient to establish causation. Nei- ther conclusion required the district court to weigh evidence, draw adverse factual inferences, or assess credibility. Because the district court did not err in concluding, as a mat- ter of law, that Epperson failed to establish a causal connection be- tween his complaint and the warning, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment for Hertz on Epperson’s retaliation claim. AFFIRMED.