Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON LISA LOOP No. 89197-9-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION JOHN LOOP, Appellant. HAZELRIGG, C.J. — John “Jack” Loop challenges the trial court’s entry of a domestic violence protection order that protects his ex-wife, Lisa Loop. Jack1 fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that Lisa was subject to domestic violence and entered an order that protects her for five years. Accordingly, we affirm. FACTS Jack and Lisa were married in 2006 and have one adult child together, A.L. On December 7, 2020, when Jack and Lisa were still married and living together and A.L. was a minor, the couple got into an argument. Jack became “very irate,” followed Lisa up the stairs, and backed her into a room. Jack placed his hands around Lisa’s throat, strangled her, and twisted her head. When Lisa cried out to 1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their respective first names. We intend no disrespect. Additionally, while both Jack and John are used in the trial court record, for the sake of consistency with the majority of the prior opinions involving these parties, we refer to him as Jack. No. 89197-9-I/2 A.L. to call 911, Jack lifted her off the ground and covered her mouth with his hand. Jack was arrested and later pleaded guilty to assault in the fourth degree for this incident. After his arrest, Jack moved out of the home and filed for dissolution. On September 7, 2021, a no contact order (NCO) was entered in the criminal proceeding that prohibited Jack from having contact with Lisa and from coming within 1,000 feet of her home, residence, school, workplace, or any place where she was present. Despite the NCO, Jack engaged in an ongoing pattern of surveillance of both Lisa and A.L. Jack’s actions with respect to A.L. are outlined in our prior opinions in In re Marriage of Loop 2 and A.L. v. Loop. 3 On October 10, just over a month after the NCO was entered in the criminal case, Jack came to the marital home to do yard work while Lisa was out of town, which he only knew because he had tracked her credit card purchases. The following month, Jack “dropped in” on an “Alexa device” inside the home. 4 That same month, Jack gained access to Lisa’s e-mail account and changed her password without her knowledge. Lisa observed Jack following her and A.L. on multiple occasions, including but not limited to jogging through her neighborhood (which he had never done during the marriage), waiting at the Starbucks location he knew she frequented, following her in his car, hiding in the bushes to watch her 2 No. 86382-7-I, slip op. (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/863827.pdf. 3 No. 88872-2-I, slip op. (Wash. Ct. App. July 27, 2026) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/888722.pdf. Pursuant to GR 14.1, we may cite to unpublished opinions as necessary for well-reasoned opinions. These cases are referenced here to provide relevant factual context. 4 The record establishes that the device in question contains the Amazon Alexa virtual assistant technology and allows for users to “drop in” on linked devices to both speak or listen through them. -2- No. 89197-9-I/3 and A.L., sending anonymous packages, and appearing at A.L.’s sporting events. Jack was charged with three counts of violation of an NCO; these charges were later dropped as part of his plea agreement. Jack’s surveillance of Lisa increased in frequency in early 2023. The City of Seattle charged Jack with stalking and ordered him to submit to electronic home monitoring; the City later dismissed the charge without official explanation. Lisa obtained a restraining order as part of the dissolution of her marriage to Jack. This order was set to expire on September 1, 2025. As the expiration date of the order approached, Jack began posting online about how he planned to “outlive” Lisa. Lisa found this especially frightening as Jack had been regularly interacting with a woman previously convicted of killing her husband. Lisa filed a petition for a protection order on September 8. In support of her petition, Lisa submitted copies of court orders issued in Jack’s criminal proceedings, police reports, victim impact statements she submitted in John’s criminal proceedings, final orders from the dissolution, the arbitrator’s decision from the dissolution, a domestic violence assessment issued by Anger Control Treatment & Therapies, a visitation report from Jack’s supervised visits with A.L., and Jack’s posts to Facebook, among other documents. Jack submitted a response to which he attached copies of messages from Our Family Wizard, the communication application the parties used as a result of the dissolution, and a transcript of Lisa’s statements to the police on November 23, 2021, among other documents. -3- No. 89197-9-I/4 A hearing was conducted on November 25, 2025, where the superior court commissioner heard arguments from both parties. Thereafter, the commissioner issued a domestic violence protection order (DVPO) that protects Lisa from Jack until November 25, 2030. In the order, the commissioner found that Lisa “was assaulted and strangled on 12/7/2020 as alleged in the petition,” Jack “violated the criminal no contact order” on three occasions, “was surveilling” Lisa even after the criminal case concluded, continuing litigation 5 “heighten[ed] concerns about [Lisa’s] safety,” and Jack never completed a domestic violence intervention program despite being court ordered to do so. Jack filed a motion for revision that challenged the commissioner’s decision on multiple grounds. After reviewing the record, including audio of the hearing, the superior court denied the motion for revision and adopted the commissioner’s order as its own. Jack timely appealed. ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review “Whether to grant or deny a domestic violence protection order is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Rodriguez v. Zavala, 188 Wn.2d 586, 590, 398 P.3d 1071 (2017). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is based on untenable grounds or reasons or is otherwise manifestly unreasonable. In re 5 At the time the commissioner entered the DVPO, Jack’s appeal of the final dissolution orders was still pending. That appeal has since been resolved in Lisa’s favor. In re Marriage of Loop, No. 88157-4-I, slip op. (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2026) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/881574.pdf. As with the other unpublished opinions cited supra, this case is offered to establish procedural history. -4- No. 89197-9-I/5 Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). When, as here, the underlying order was entered by a commissioner and later adopted on a motion for revision, “[o]ur review focuses on the actions of the trial court, rather than the commissioner, because a trial court’s order on a motion for revision supersedes any rulings by a commissioner.” In re Domestic Violence Prot. Ord. for Timaeus, 34 Wn. App. 2d 670, 678, 574 P.3d 127 (2025). “When a trial court denies a motion for revision, it adopts the commissioner’s findings, conclusions, and rulings as its own.” Id. at 678-79. “We review a trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence, generally deferring to the trier of fact on questions of witness credibility, conflicting testimony, and persuasiveness of the evidence.” Id. at 679. Substantial evidence is “evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted.” In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014). II. Sufficient Evidence Jack asserts that the trial court’s findings underlying its decision to issue a protection order were not based on substantial evidence. Specifically, Jack claims that the trial court’s finding of domestic violence was based solely on prior events and “RCW 7.105.225(1)(a) explicitly requires a finding of reasonable fear of imminent harm.” It does not. RCW 7.105.225(1)(a) states: The court shall issue a protection order if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner has proved the required criteria specified in (a) through (f) of this subsection for obtaining a protection order under this chapter. (a) For a domestic violence protection order, that the petitioner has been subjected to domestic violence by the respondent. -5- No. 89197-9-I/6 (Emphasis added.) RCW 7.105.225(2)(e) further states that a trial court may not deny a protection order because the “conduct at issue did not occur recently or because of the passage of time since the last incident of conduct giving rise to the petition.” Domestic violence is defined as “[p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; nonconsensual sexual conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration; coercive control; unlawful harassment; or stalking of one family or household member by another family or household member.” RCW 7.105.010(10)(b). It cannot be disputed that Jack committed domestic violence against Lisa. Jack admitted, both in the trial court and his brief on appeal, that he pleaded guilty to a domestic violence offense with Lisa as the named victim. This is all the statute requires. 6 Jack nevertheless asserts that the trial court’s finding of domestic violence was not supported by the evidence because he has now moved out of state. However, a court cannot deny a protection order because the respondent no longer lives near the petitioner. RCW 7.105.225(2)(f). Although he acknowledges this statutory provision, Jack contends in briefing that relocation is a “material factor in assessing current risk” and should still be considered by the court. The unpublished case Jack relies on in support of this contention concerned a 6 Additionally, the trial court’s finding that Jack strangled Lisa was supported by the evidence presented, including Lisa’s sworn declaration, her victim impact statements, police reports, and the uncontested findings by the arbitrator in the dissolution matter. Jack’s argument to the contrary asks this court to reweigh the evidence to give more weight to his plea agreement. We decline to do so. See In re Marriage of Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 714, 986 P.2d 144 (1999) (“We will not substitute our judgment for the trial court's, weigh the evidence, or adjudge witness credibility.”). -6- No. 89197-9-I/7 protection order granted in 2021, prior to the enactment of RCW 7.105.225. See Foster v. Foster, No. 83599-8-I, slip op. at 1-2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2023) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/835998.pdf. 7 Foster was decided under former RCW 26.50.130(3)(c) (2019); in fact, while the controlling statute here, RCW 7.105.225 was enacted in the laws of 2021, it did not become effective until July 2022. Accordingly, Foster does not control here. Jack also cites In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 327 P.3d 644 (2014); however, that case concerned the issuance of a parenting plan, not a DVPO. Because neither case supports his argument and he cites no other authority, Jack fails to demonstrate any abuse of discretion by the trial court when it declined to afford any significance to his alleged relocation. Jack also asserts that the trial court failed to consider his evidence of Lisa’s actions that he claims undermine her credibility. We do not review credibility determinations on appeal. Miles v. Miles, 128 Wn. App. 64, 70, 114 P.3d 671 (2005). Further, both the commissioner and the judge on revision stated that they had considered the entire record prior to entering their findings, which necessarily included Jack’s argument and written submissions. Jack’s assertion that the trial court failed to consider his evidence is simply without merit. III. Duration of Protection Order Jack next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by setting the duration of the protection order for five years. Specifically, Jack asserts in his 7 Foster is cited and analyzed here solely because of Jack’s reliance on the case in his opening brief. -7- No. 89197-9-I/8 opening brief that “RCW 7.105.315 allows broad discretion for duration but requires evidence-based justification.” RCW 7.105.315(1) states: When issuing an order after notice to the respondent and a hearing, the court may either grant relief for a fixed period of time or enter a permanent order of protection. Other than for antiharassment orders, the court shall not grant relief for less than one year unless the petitioner has specifically requested relief for a shorter period of time. Contrary to his assertion, nowhere in the language of the controlling statute is “evidence-based justification” for the duration of a protection order referenced, much less required. Jack cites no other authority to support his argument. Where a party fails to cite to relevant authority, we “assume that counsel after diligent search has found none.” In re Marriage of Clark, 13 Wn. App. 805, 812, 538 P.2d 145 (1975). And pro se litigants are held to the same standard as attorneys. In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). Jack thus fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion by setting the duration for the protection order for five years. IV. Domestic Violence Treatment Jack asserts that the trial court erred when it ordered him to participate in a domestic violence perpetrator treatment program. Specifically, he contends that the trial court may not order domestic violence treatment without findings of present danger and necessity. Once again, the authority Jack cites does not support his contention. Jack relies primarily on RCW 7.105.310(1)(i). This subsection concerns protection orders between students attending the same school and has no -8- No. 89197-9-I/9 application here. He also cites RCW 43.20A.735 and chapter 388-60B WAC, but those statutes govern the certification standards that the Department of Social and Health Services must apply to its approval of domestic violence treatment programs; neither dictates what a court may order in a DVPO. In addition to its lack of precedential value, see GR 14.1, Foster’s holding concerning the renewal of a DVPO has no application to the standards for the issuance of a DVPO. Jack also states that “[c]onditions untethered to current findings exceed the preventative purpose of RCW 7.105,” though he does not expand on this any further. We do not consider conclusory arguments unsupported by citation to authority. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). Jack fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to participate in a domestic violence perpetrator treatment program. V. Other Arguments In his opening brief, Jack asserts that the trial court’s finding of strangulation is unsupported by the “sworn criminal record.” He fails to cite any authority in support of this argument. RAP 10.3(a)(6) requires appellants to provide argument supporting the issues presented and to cite relevant legal authority. Again, we will not consider conclusory arguments unsupported by citations. Id. Jack also asserts that the trial court “failed to distinguish” the parties’ dispute over sale of the marital home “from DV findings” and RCW 7.105.225(2)(c)-(d) “requires separation” of the issues. The statute says nothing of the sort. 8 Notably, 8 RCW 7.105.225(2)(c)-(d) reads: The court may not deny or dismiss a petition for a protection order on the grounds that: -9- No. 89197-9-I/10 Jack also cites the case “Stocks v. Porter, 27 Wn. App. 2d 571, 519 P.3d 240 (2022)” to support his argument on this point; however, this case does not exist. We will not consider arguments supported by fictional authority. See, West v. Thurston County, 168 Wn. App. 162, 187, 275 P.3d 1200 (2012) (“In making bald assertions lacking cited factual and legal support, West has failed to present developed argument for our consideration on appeal; accordingly, we do not address his . . . challenge.”); Douglas v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., __ U.S. App. D.C. __, 363 A.3d 1088, 1094 (2026) (“A hallucinated citation is, at best, no citation at all; indeed, it is worse.”). Jack also avers that the trial court’s “findings imply Appellant’s motions and appeals contribute to risk, but exercising rights under RCW 7.105.225(2)(c) cannot be deemed abusive.” Jack’s argument consists entirely of this single sentence. “‘Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit [this court’s] consideration.’” Nelson v. Duvall, 197 Wn. App. 441, 387 P.3d 1158 (2017) (quoting Palmer v. Jensen, 81 Wn. App. 148, 153, 913 P.2d 413 (1996). As such, we decline to consider this argument. In his reply brief, Jack presents a number of new arguments that he did not raise in his opening brief, including his assertions that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution precluded consideration of certain actions, the trial court was required to explain why it rejected his arguments, and the court was required .... (c) A no-contact order or a restraining order that restrains the respondent’s contact with the petitioner has been issued in a criminal proceeding or in a domestic relations proceeding; (d) The relief sought by the petitioner may be available in a different action or proceeding, or criminal charges are pending against the respondent. - 10 - No. 89197-9-I/11 to find that a Washington-approved domestic violence treatment program was “reasonably available” to him before ordering him to engage in such treatment. “An issue raised and argued for the first time in a reply brief is too late to warrant consideration.” Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (citing In re Marriage of Sacco, 114 Wn.2d 1, 5, 784 P.2d 1266 (1990)). We therefore decline to consider any of Jack’s arguments presented for the first time in reply. VI. Attorney Fees on Appeal Lisa requests an award of attorney fees on appeal under RAP 18.9 or RCW 7.105.310(j). Under RAP 18.9(a), this court may award attorney fees as sanctions, terms, or compensatory damages to the respondent if the appellant has filed a frivolous appeal or failed to comply with the rules of appellate procedure. “[A]n appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ, and it is so totally devoid of merit that there was no reasonable possibility of reversal.” In re Marriage of Lee, 176 Wn. App. 678, 692, 310 P.3d 845 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tiffany Family Trust Corp. v. City of Kent, 155 Wn.2d 225, 241, 119 P.3d 325 (2005)). Jack’s opening brief is rife with factual assertions presented without citation to the record, conclusory arguments, repeated attacks on Lisa’s credibility, misrepresentations of legal authority, and citations to nonexistent cases. His reply brief fares little better as it relies entirely on conclusory assertions and mischaracterization of authority. Accordingly, we award Lisa attorney fees and costs, subject to her continued compliance with the procedural requirements of RAP 18.1. - 11 - No. 89197-9-I/12 Affirmed. WE CONCUR: - 12 -