Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-12339 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 1 of 6 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-12339 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ SHIRLEY A. REED, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus MIKE WILLIAMS, in his individual capacity as former Sheriff of the Consolidated City of Jacksonville, Florida, DETECTIVE T.C. MCKENZIE, individually, Defendants-Appellees, OFFICER J.A. TAYLOR, individually, Defendant. USCA11 Case: 25-12339 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 2 of 6 2 Opinion of the Court 25-12339 ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-00419-MMH-PDB ____________________ Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Shirley A. Reed challenges the district court’s denial of her Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for relief. As she sees it, the district court lacked authority to rule on a motion to dismiss without also considering a pending motion for summary judg- ment. We disagree and affirm. I. Reed was arrested on a warrant for unauthorized practice of law. While her case was pending, Reed was declared incompetent to stand trial, and the state entered a nolle prosequi. Afterwards, Reed filed a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 complaint against the arresting officer, Detective T.C. McKenzie, and then-Sheriff Mike Williams for false arrest, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and false impris- onment. On Detective McKenzie and Sheriff Williams’s motion, the district court dismissed Reed’s complaint with leave to amend her malicious prosecution claim. In doing so, the district court ex- plained that her malicious prosecution claim failed because she did not allege “facts suggesting that any officer knew or should have USCA11 Case: 25-12339 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 3 of 6 25-12339 Opinion of the Court 3 known that the warrant [for her arrest] was not founded on proba- ble cause . . . [or] any facts suggesting that any officer made false statements or omissions in order to secure the warrant.” It acknowledged Reed’s argument that she had a power of attorney but explained that “a power of attorney does not authorize a non- lawyer to prepare papers, file petitions and briefs, or generally act as a lawyer on behalf of another.” Her remaining claims were dis- missed with prejudice because, as the district court concluded, “more careful drafting of th[o]se [claims] would not transform them from insufficient to plausible.” Reed filed an amended complaint, alleging only her mali- cious prosecution claims against Detective McKenzie and Sheriff Williams. McKenzie and Williams again moved to dismiss and, while the motion to dismiss was still pending, also moved for sum- mary judgment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. Once again, Reed failed to allege any facts supporting that her ar- rest warrant lacked probable cause. The order reiterated that Reed’s power of attorney did not authorize her to prepare and file motions on behalf of another. It also directed the clerk to “termi- nate all pending motions and deadlines as moot . . . .” Reed ap- pealed, but the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. Reed then filed a rule 60(b) motion for relief, arguing that the district court erred by failing to rule on the summary judgment motion instead of dismissing the complaint. The district court de- nied the motion, noting that “Reed’s arguments, all premised on USCA11 Case: 25-12339 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 4 of 6 4 Opinion of the Court 25-12339 her failure to accurately understand the record are misplaced and lacking in merit.” Reed appeals the denial of her rule 60(b) motion. II. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a rule 60(b) motion. Galbert v. W. Caribbean Airways, 715 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2013). III. Rule 60(b) “sets forth the grounds on which a court, in its discretion, can rescind or amend a final judgment or order.” Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 679 (11th Cir. 1984). “The first five provisions of [r]ule 60(b) provide relief in specific circum- stances” while “[r]ule 60(b)(6) provides a catch-all, authorizing a [district] court to grant relief from a judgment for ‘any other reason that justifies relief.’” Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 741 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2014). “Our case precedent has carefully constrained th[e catch-all provision’s] open-ended language.” Id. “The party seeking relief has the burden of showing that absent such relief, an ‘extreme’ and ‘unexpected’ hardship will result.” Griffin, 722 F.2d at 680 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)). A party cannot rely on the catch-all provision where relief is available under any of the first five provisions. Mills v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 102 F.4th 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2024) (“Much authority establishes that clause (6) and the first five clauses of [r]ule 60(b) are mutually exclusive.” (citation modified)). Reed argues that, once Detective McKenzie and Sheriff Wil- liams filed a motion for summary judgment, the district court had USCA11 Case: 25-12339 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 5 of 6 25-12339 Opinion of the Court 5 to apply the summary judgment standard and review Reed’s evi- dence. But she gets the sequence wrong. A later-filed motion for summary judgment does not supersede a pending motion to dis- miss. District courts generally cannot consider evidence and “must limit their consideration to the pleadings and any exhibits attached to the pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Swinford v. Santos, 121 F.4th 179, 186–87 (11th Cir. 2024); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The citations Reed relies on explain the standard a district court should apply when considering a motion for summary judg- ment. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986); Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656–57 (2014). But they have no application to a motion to dismiss. The district court identified and applied the well-established standards for reviewing a motion to dismiss. It liberally construed Reed’s complaint, accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and drew all reasonable inferences in Reed’s favor to deter- mine whether the complaint contained “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified); Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998); Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Once the district court dismissed Reed’s case, the summary judgment motion was rendered moot and there was no reason for the district court to consider Reed’s evidence. Reed mistakenly at- tributes the district court’s directive for the clerk to terminate as USCA11 Case: 25-12339 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 11/02/2026 Page: 6 of 6 6 Opinion of the Court 25-12339 moot any pending motions as stemming from the filing of the amended complaint. But it was the dismissal itself that rendered all pending motions—including the motion for summary judg- ment—moot. Reed’s remaining arguments that the district court missed genuine disputes of material fact in the summary judgment motion are outside of the scope of this appeal. Our review of a rule 60(b) motion is limited to “the propriety of the denial or grant of relief and does not raise issues in the underlying judgment for review.” Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999). As to what we can review—the propriety of the denial of Reed’s rule 60(b) motion—the district court did not abuse its dis- cretion. AFFIRMED.