Mark Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 26a0217p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ MARK CHARLTON-PERKINS, │ Plaintiff-Appellant, │ > No. 25-3693 │ v. │ │ UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI; KENNETH PETREN, in his │ official and individual capacities; GEORGE UETZ, in │ his official and individual capacities, │ Defendants-Appellees. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati. No. 1:20-cv-00179—Timothy S. Black, District Judge. Argued: May 27, 2026 Decided and Filed: August 5, 2026 Before: SILER, BUSH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Marc D. Mezibov, MARC D. MEZIBOV, LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Evan T. Priestle, TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Marc D. Mezibov, MARC D. MEZIBOV, LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Evan T. Priestle, TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellees. BUSH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which SILER and MURPHY, JJ., concurred. MURPHY, J. (pp. 26–32), delivered a separate concurring opinion.  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 2 _________________ OPINION _________________ JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. While living in the United Kingdom, Dr. Mark Charlton-Perkins applied for an assistant professor position at the University of Cincinnati. A faculty panel recommended him for the position, but after consternation about his gender and an alleged conflict of interest, the University cancelled the job search. Charlton-Perkins brought Title IX and equal-protection claims against the University and two of its administrators. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all claims. Because Title IX protects only persons in the United States, and because sovereign and qualified immunities bar his equal- protection claims, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. I. Dr. Mark Charlton-Perkins is a United States citizen who was born in South Africa. Later he resided in the United States, where he received his PhD in molecular and developmental biology from the University of Cincinnati. In 2015, he moved to the United Kingdom to work as a research assistant at the University of Cambridge. At all times relevant to this case, he resided in the United Kingdom despite being a United States citizen. In September 2017, the University of Cincinnati’s biology department began a hiring search for a new assistant professorship in cell biology. Dr. George Uetz, the Head of the Biology Department, appointed four of the department’s professors to a search committee. He chose one of those professors, Dr. Elke Buschbeck, to chair the committee. The committee interviewed candidates, ranked them, and provided a hiring recommendation to Uetz. Uetz was responsible for sharing the committee’s findings with—and presenting its recommendation to— the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Dr. Ken Petren. The Dean had sole authority to approve hires or cancel a search. Charlton-Perkins applied for the position. Even before the application, Buschbeck was familiar with Charlton-Perkins’s work, having served on his doctoral thesis advisory committee and coauthored multiple scientific publications with him. Sensing that this preexisting  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 3 relationship could create an appearance of favoritism, Buschbeck told a University administrator and the rest of the search committee about her ties to Charlton-Perkins after he interviewed over Skype. The administrator advised Buschbeck that the relationship did not create a conflict of interest. Charlton-Perkins then survived successive rounds of cuts before interviewing in-person in Cincinnati in February 2018. As part of the interview, he gave an hour-long seminar and met with the search committee and Uetz. After this, the committee narrowed its search to four candidates—two women and two men—including Charlton-Perkins. Eventually, by a three-to- one vote, the search committee settled on Charlton-Perkins as its top choice for the position. This endorsement was shared with Uetz. At the same time, Uetz also received feedback about Charlton-Perkins’s candidacy from faculty members not appointed to the search committee, most of which was negative. Some comments concerned Buschbeck’s potential bias toward Charlton-Perkins. Others concerned his race and gender. One faculty member expressed concern to Uetz that Charlton-Perkins, a white male, “would not provide [a] much-needed increase in diversity.” R. 31-6, Ex. to Buschbeck Dep., PageID 1028. Similarly, another detractor told Uetz that Charlton-Perkins “brings the opposite of diversity and . . . demographics” as a candidate. R. 29, Uetz Dep., PageID 473. Finally, an email, described by Uetz as “encapsulat[ing]” the views of several faculty members, discounted Charlton-Perkins’s candidacy for his inability to bring diversity to the department. R. 29-15, Ex. to Uetz Dep., PageID 736. The email’s author also complained that Buschbeck’s advocacy for Charlton-Perkins frustrated the overall aim “of hiring women.” Id. Uetz conferred with Petren, expressing concerns about “[t]he political climate” and “posturing regarding affirmative action” and asking if it were permissible to hire a man over two well-qualified female candidates. R. 29, Uetz Dep., PageID 430. Petren responded that hiring a man would be permissible. Uetz also raised the conflict-of-interest issue, and Petren directed him to investigate further. During Uetz’s investigation, six faculty members expressed concerns about Buschbeck’s relationship with Charlton-Perkins and her advocacy for his hiring.  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 4 Despite receiving a clear recommendation from the search committee, Petren and Uetz put the hiring decision on hold. In early March 2018, Uetz informed the search committee that he and Petren wanted to shift away from Charlton-Perkins and “focus on the women candidates first.” R. 50-1, Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, PageID 1646. That did not sit well with Buschbeck. She protested that this emphasis on hiring women was “plain discrimination” against Charlton-Perkins and might even constitute illegal gender discrimination. R. 31, Buschbeck Dep., PageID 895. Uetz responded that he did not think that the hiring approach was illegal and emphasized that Buschbeck, as head of the search committee, “would need to make the case why a male candidate should be hired over a qualified female candidate.” R. 29-19, Ex. to Uetz Dep., PageID 750. Soon after, Petren met with Buschbeck and told her that he decided not to follow the search committee’s vote in part because “[b]iology is short on women,” so “he thought that it would be better to go with a female candidate.” R. 31-15, Ex. to Buschbeck Dep., PageID 1064. Petren also cited the perceived conflict of interest and the divided support of the faculty beyond the search committee as factors influencing his decision. But later Petren had second thoughts. Rather than proceed with hiring for the new position, Petren cancelled the search altogether and informed the faculty a few days later. Uetz noted that factors supporting the no-go decision included “the gender of the candidates” and the conflict-of-interest concerns raised by faculty members. R. 29-13, Uetz Notes, PageID 728; see also R. 29-14, Uetz Timeline, PageID 731 (“gender balance of the department” was a factor involved in the decision to “focus first on the two women candidates”). A week later, Petren and Uetz met with the faculty regarding the hiring-search cancellation. Buschbeck’s perceived conflict of interest was discussed, but Uetz also emphasized that the biology department was “bereft of female candidates” and that this concern played into the department’s decision. R. 29-7, Meeting Tr., PageID 662. Petren then defended the decision to cancel the search rather than cure the perceived conflict of interest. He argued that, of the three candidates considered good enough to be hired (Charlton-Perkins and the two female candidates), “whoever [was] not offered . . . could come back and . . . file a lawsuit. And this happens all the time. You know, we settled one for about [$]250,000 . . . . Couple months ago it was [$]120,000.” Id. at PageID 664. To Petren, the threat of potential litigation was  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 5 compounded by the fact that “so many accusations” had “flown around” and that, during the process, “emails just started flying with a lot of accusations that can’t be undone.” Id. Soon after the contentious faculty meeting, Petren emailed Charlton-Perkins to inform him of the decision to cancel the hiring search. The position has never been reposted. Charlton-Perkins sued, asserting a claim against the University under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act and claims against Uetz and Petren (in their individual and official capacities) under the Equal Protection Clause via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sought injunctive relief requiring his instatement as Assistant Professor of Cell Biology as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants moved for summary judgment.1 The district court granted summary judgment to the University on the Title IX claim and dismissed the equal-protection claims with prejudice. The district court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the official-capacity equal-protection claims and that qualified immunity barred the personal-capacity equal- protection claims. It further held that all of Charlton-Perkins’s claims failed because he could not show that Defendants’ proffered reason for cancelling the job search—the alleged conflict of interest—was pretextual. Charlton-Perkins timely appealed. II. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Bilyeu v. UT-Battelle, LLC, 154 F.4th 396, 402 (6th Cir. 2025). This includes grants of sovereign and qualified immunities. Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 481 (6th Cir. 2010); Clemons v. Couch, 3 F.4th 897, 902 (6th Cir. 2021). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, no genuine dispute of material fact exists, and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bilyeu, 154 1The district court previously dismissed the suit at the pleadings stage, holding that Charlton-Perkins’s claims were not ripe and that he had failed to state a claim. On appeal, we reversed and remanded, holding that the district court had improperly grafted the prima-facie-case requirement onto the ripeness requirement and that Charlton-Perkins’s claims were ripe for review. Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 35 F.4th 1053, 1058–60 (6th Cir. 2022). We also held that Charlton-Perkins had properly pleaded his claims. Id. at 1060–64.  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 6 F.4th at 402. A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the record presents enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff. Id. We can affirm “on any grounds supported by the record, even if different from those relied on by the district court.” Brown v. Tidwell, 169 F.3d 330, 332 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). III. We begin with the Title IX claim. Charlton-Perkins appeals the district court’s finding that this claim fails because he has failed to show sufficient evidence of pretext. We affirm the district court, but on different grounds: when the alleged discrimination took place and Charlton-Perkins learned of it, he was not a “person in the United States” within the meaning of Title IX.2 Title IX states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Whether a United States citizen living abroad at the time of the alleged discrimination can claim the protection of Title IX is a question of first impression for our circuit, so we must engage in first-principles statutory interpretation. Our “proper starting point lies in a careful examination of the ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself.” Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U.S. 427, 436 (2019). That requires “analyzing the statutory language, assuming that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010) (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009)) (cleaned up). If “the language of the statute is clear,” we “appl[y] the statute as written.” In re Corrin, 849 F.3d 653, 657 (6th Cir. 2017). 2The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split over whether Title IX provides a cause of action for employment discrimination. See Crowther v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. 25-183, 2026 WL 1377024 (U.S. May 18, 2026). Charlton-Perkins’s claim fails on the merits, and the lack of a cause of action is not jurisdictional, Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002), so we need not address the issue.  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 7 As relevant here, at the time of Title IX’s enactment, “in” was most commonly “used as a function word to indicate location or position in space or in some materially bounded object.” In, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1139 (def. 1.a(1)) (1966). This plainly supports the interpretation that “in the United States” is a geographical requirement. True, “in” was also “used as a function word . . . to indicate the fact of belonging to a group or association.” Id. (def. 1.b(1)). But this use of the word does not match how an ordinary person would read the statute. For example, Babe Ruth is in the Baseball Hall of Fame despite not being buried in Cooperstown. Is a citizen like Charlton-Perkins in the United States in the same way a member of the Baseball Hall of Fame is in the Hall of Fame? Answering “yes” would stretch ordinary usage too far. Nobody would say “I am in the United States” to refer to his citizenship status, and responding that way to a question about citizenship status would likely lead the asker to repeat his question. So the ordinary meaning of “person in the United States” is a person physically located within United States territory. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trump v. Barbara confirms this. 609 U.S. ___ (2026) (slip op.). In Barbara, the Court interpreted the meaning of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court interpreted the beginning of the Clause, “born . . . in the United States,” to refer to “territory.” Barbara, slip op. at 10 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1) (emphasis added). And it relied on “the Clause’s territorial focus on those born ‘in’ the United States” to determine that the next requirement of the Citizenship Clause, being “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” referred to “liv[ing] under” our government’s “dominion.” Id. at 11 (emphasis added) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court adopted a similar textual interpretation in another recent decision, Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, 609 U.S. ___ (2026) (slip op.). There, the Court considered “whether an alien who seeks to enter the United States from Mexico ‘arrives in the United States’ when he or she is still in Mexico.” Id. at 1 (footnotes omitted). The Court found that to be a “straightforward question” because “[i]n ordinary speech, no one would say that a person ‘arrives in’ a place—for example, . . . a country—before the person enters that place.” Id.  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 8 When used in conjunction with a “geographic location” like the United States, “everyday speech” uses the word “in” as a “preposition . . . mean[ing] ‘[w]ithin the limits, bounds, or area of.’” Id. at 8 (quoting In, American Heritage Dictionary 910 (def. 1.a) (3d ed. 1992)). So being “in a destination”—i.e., the United States—means being “within its area . . . .” Id. The Court noted that “[e]veryday examples confirm that understanding”: a running back is not in the end zone when he is on the one-yard line, and an invading army is not in a city when it is encamped outside the city’s walls. Id. To summarize, in the Supreme Court’s most recent examinations of similar language to that found in Title IX, it found that being “in the United States” referred to physical presence in United States territory. Id. The usage of the phrase “person in the United States” in other statutes is also consistent with this interpretation. The phrase is commonly used in import and export statutes. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 144 (“It shall be unlawful for any person in the United States to receive milk or cream imported into the United States unless the importation is in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter.”); 19 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) (granting the Treasury Secretary the power to “admit articles free of duty and of any tax imposed on or by reason of importation” so long as the value of certain articles is less than an amount specified by the Secretary, which cannot be less than “$100 in the case of articles sent as bona fide gifts from persons in foreign countries to persons in the United States”). In those statutes, it is clear that “in the United States” means “within the physical territory of the United States.” One such provision defines “export,” for purposes of wartime export controls, as “the release or transfer of technology . . . to a foreign person in the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 4801(3)(B). This is particularly instructive because the modifier foreign implies that citizenship is distinct from whether someone is a person in the United States. If “person in the United States” referred to citizenship, a foreigner could never be a person in the United States, and “foreign person in the United States” would be oxymoronic. The phrase also appears in statutes concerning national security. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 3506(a)(4)(D)(iii) (granting authority to certain CIA personnel to carry firearms “within the United States” to protect “defectors and their immediate families, and other persons in the United States under Agency auspices”). Take the statute aimed at frustrating Iranian missile exports,  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 9 which defines “United States person” to mean: “(A) a United States citizen; (B) a permanent resident alien of the United States; (C) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or (D) a person in the United States.” 22 U.S.C. § 9424(4). Although this statute was passed long after Title IX or its amendments, it shows that Congress can and will distinguish “United States citizen” from “person in the United States” when both citizenship and geography are relevant. The final statute we will look at regards certain oaths and acknowledgments required in copyright disputes. Those oaths can be made “(A) before any person in the United States authorized by law to administer oaths; or (B) when made in a foreign country, before any diplomatic or consular officer . . . , or before any official authorized to administer oaths in the foreign country concerned . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 1312(a)(1). Here, the contrast between (A), which concerns oaths taken “before any person in the United States,” and (B), which concerns oaths “made in a foreign country,” makes it clear that “person in the United States” is being used to refer to someone within United States territory. Granted, these statutes are not related to Title IX such that the in pari materia canon applies, see Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243–44 (1972), but they provide strong evidence that the ordinary meaning of “person in the United States” is a “person physically located within the territory of the United States.” They also demonstrate that Congress distinguishes between citizenship and geographical location when constructing statutes and that “person in the United States” refers to the latter. Absent reason to think that “person in the United States” has some other meaning in a civil rights statute like Title IX, plain-language analysis supports Defendants’ position. In fact, the nature of Title IX counsels in favor of the plain-language interpretation. Title IX was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999). The Spending Clause does not permit Congress to directly regulate conduct; instead, it enables Congress to distribute funds. Landor v. La. Dep’t of Corrs. & Pub. Safety, 609 U.S. ___ (2026) (slip op. at 6). Congress can, however, use the Spending Clause to pursue its priorities by “attach[ing] conditions to the funds it distributes.” Id. Spending Clause legislation like Title IX therefore creates a sort of contract where States receive  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 10 federal funds in return for complying with federally imposed conditions. Id. at 6–7. Because knowing acceptance of a putative contract requires awareness of its terms, we “insist[] that Congress speak with a clear voice” when passing Spending Clause legislation so that a State is aware of the conditions it accedes to when it accepts federal funds. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); Landor, slip op. at 7 (“Congress must clearly and unambiguously alert a grant recipient to any condition on federal funds.”). Federalism demands a “clear-statement rule when construing spending legislation as a matter of statutory interpretation” because “Congress can cajole the states to enact policies indirectly (through a spending inducement) that it could never directly order them to perform with its other enumerated powers . . . .” Kentucky v. Yellen, 54 F.4th 325, 347 (6th Cir. 2022) (emphasis omitted). Under this canon, our question here is simple: “Would a prospective funding recipient, at the time it engaged in the process of deciding whether to accept federal dollars, have been aware that it would face” liability for how it treated a person who resided outside of the United States? Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212, 220 (2022) (cleaned up). The answer is no. The clear-statement inquiry always begins with the text. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006). “Nothing in Title IX clearly and unambiguously alerts funding recipients” that they would face liability for discriminating against persons outside of the United States; rather, the plain language of the statute suggests the opposite. West Virginia v. B.P.J. ex rel. Jackson, 146 S. Ct. 2356, 2383 (2026) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Generally, a statute cannot provide a clear statement that goes against its plain language. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 548 U.S. at 296. In fact, “clear statement” and “plain language” are something close to synonyms. Cf. Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 146 S. Ct. 628, 653 (2026) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (describing the requirement that statutory power “be conferred in plain language” as a clear statement rule (quoting Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 194 (1909))). It is questionable whether a State receiving federal funds would be aware that it might be on the hook for any employment- discrimination suits under Title IX, let alone those brought by foreign residents. See Joseph v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 121 F.4th 855, 864 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. granted sub nom., Crowther v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. 25-183, 2026 WL 1377024 (U.S. May 18, 2026). But it is certain that a prospective funding recipient reading a statute that  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 11 prohibits discrimination against persons in the United States would not expect to face liability for discriminating against persons outside of the United States. The consistent usage of the phrase by other statutes, explained above, also supports this application of the clear-statement canon. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 548 U.S. at 300–02. As the district court noted, however, the Supreme Court has suggested that in rare cases we can look past the plain, unambiguous language of the statute when the language leads to an absurd result. See Donovan v. FirstCredit, Inc., 983 F.3d 246, 253 (6th Cir. 2020). An absurd result is one Congress could not possibly have intended; the absurdity must be “so clear as to be obvious to most anyone.” Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470–71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). “[A]voidance of unhappy consequences” is insufficient justification for invoking the absurdity canon. Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). The district court, for its part, considered it absurd that Title IX’s protections could be “turned on and off based on nothing more than where a plaintiff happens to be located at any given moment . . . .” R. 55, Dist. Ct. Order, PageID 1734. This is encapsulated in a hypothetical: suppose a plaintiff lived in the United States, but traveled abroad for a single day, and during that single day the discriminatory decision was made. Under Defendants’ interpretation, that plaintiff may be unprotected by Title IX. The district court thought that such a loophole would undermine the purpose of the statute. We disagree because the truly absurd result likely would never obtain. The district court’s day-traveler hypothetical raises a concerning possibility: that educational institutions could deliberately send their employees abroad and subject them to a discriminatory adverse employment action as soon as they disembark, thus avoiding Title IX liability. But the district court’s relevant inflection point—the time “when a discriminatory decision was made”— eliminates this concern. Id. If sending an employee abroad was part of a discriminatory firing  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 12 scheme, the decision to fire him likely would have been made at the time the conspiracy was hatched, at which point he was presumably stateside.3 What is more, the district court’s interpretation—that the phrase refers to “the location of the conduct rather than the precise location of the plaintiff”—would produce even more absurd results. Id. Imagine a Chinese national living in China. She has never left China but would like to work at an American university. So she applies online to an open position at Miskatonic University in Arkham, Massachusetts.4 Miskatonic has lost many male professors to unexplained disappearances, insane asylums, and sundry supernatural horrors. It would thus prefer to hire a man to fix the resulting gender imbalance in its Eldritch Studies Department. Miskatonic’s hiring committee dismisses the Chinese national’s application out of hand for no other reason than that she is female. She does not, at any time, visit America. She does not get a virtual interview. She does not even get an email from Miskatonic informing her that her application has been rejected. Clearly, the Chinese national has been discriminated against on the basis of her gender. Under the district court’s interpretation, she would have a slam-dunk Title IX discrimination suit. That cannot be right, because it would mean that anyone in the entire world could bring a Title IX claim so long as the position he or she was applying for was in the United States. That would go against the plain language of Title IX, and no recipient of federal funds would understand themselves to be open to liability from anyone, anywhere on the planet. In support of its interpretation, the district court points to Supreme Court dicta suggesting that Title IX was intended to protect citizens regardless of location. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress enacted Title IX “to provide individual citizens effective protection against [discriminatory] practices.” 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). 3This analysis raises another difficult question: at what point do we determine physical location for purposes of Title IX protection? Is it when the plaintiff finds out that he has been fired? Is it when the administrator privately decides to fire him? We need not resolve this issue because Charlton-Perkins was abroad when Petren made the decision to cancel the job search, when Petren announced the cancellation, and when Charlton-Perkins learned that the job search was cancelled. In other words, no matter where one wishes to draw the line, Charlton-Perkins was not a “person in the United States.” 4See H. P. Lovecraft, The Shadow over Innsmouth, The H. P. Lovecraft Archive, https://hplovecraft.com/writings/texts/fiction/soi.aspx (Aug. 20, 2009).  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 13 Several problems arise from relying on this language. One, dicta is not binding. Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695, 700–01 (6th Cir. 2019); see Olivier v. City of Brandon, 607 U.S. 552, 565 (2026). Two, although Cannon’s private-right-of-action holding was later ratified by statute, its underlying reasoning has been disclaimed by the Court. Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 606 U.S. 357, 369 n.1 (2025). Three, the language itself raises the question of whether the Court was referring to all citizens or only those residing within America’s borders. In sum, Cannon’s dicta is too thin a reed on which to rest an argument. At oral argument, Charlton-Perkins suggested that he could be a “person in the United States” under any number of theories: his citizenship, his physical presence in the United States during the interview process, and the fact that the job would be in the United States. The location of the job does not help him for the reasons stated above. His presence in the United States during the interview process cannot be enough either. The statute states that “no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be . . . subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). That language strongly suggests that the presence in the United States must be linked to being “subjected to discrimination.” And he was not subjected to any gender discrimination at the time of the in-person interview. Further, Charlton-Perkins’s reference to his citizenship suggests that he would like us to define the relevant phrase to refer to both physical location and citizenship. We decline. To define “person in the United States” as “anyone physically located in the United States, and citizens of the United States located abroad” would twist statutory language far beyond its ordinary meaning. That Congress would use “in” to simultaneously refer to physical presence in the United States, regardless of citizenship, and United States citizenship, despite physical presence outside of the United States, beggars belief. This is especially true considering other statutes in which Congress addresses citizenship and physical location separately when both considerations are relevant. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 9424(4); 17 U.S.C. § 1312(a)(1).  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 14 For these reasons, therefore, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the University on the Title IX claim.5 IV. Charlton-Perkins also challenges the district court’s dismissal of his official-capacity equal-protection claims. As discussed below, we hold that sovereign immunity bars these claims because (1) instatement is an impermissible burden on the state treasury, and (2) a suit in equity for an instatement injunction is too far removed from the suits in equity that could have been brought against a State at the Founding. A. Charlton-Perkins’s Requested Injunction Impermissibly Burdens the State Treasury Unless waived or abrogated, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity deprives the court of subject-matter jurisdiction when an individual sues a State. Russell v. Lundergan- Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1046 (6th Cir. 2015); Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 577 n.2 (6th Cir. 2020). “However, under the Ex parte Young exception, ‘a federal court may, without violating the Eleventh Amendment, issue a prospective injunction against a state officer to end a continuing violation of federal law.’” Doe v. DeWine, 910 F.3d 842, 848 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Price v. Medicaid Dir., 838 F.3d 739, 746–47 (6th Cir. 2016)). 5For similar reasons, Charlton-Perkins’s presence in England at the time of the alleged discriminatory conduct may also impact his equal-protection claims. The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. am. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has clarified that this “guarantee” extends to all persons “within a State’s boundaries, and to all upon whom the State would impose the obligations of its laws.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214 (1982). As explained above, Charlton-Perkins was not within Ohio’s boundaries when the alleged discriminatory acts occurred. And it is not obvious that applying to work for the State of Ohio otherwise “subject[ed]” Charlton-Perkins to “obligations imposed by the State’s civil and criminal laws.” Id. at 215. Further cause for concern is the Supreme Court’s recent construction of another clause in the same section of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court found that a phrase in the Citizenship Clause, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” U.S. Const. am. XIV, § 1, “uses jurisdiction in its ordinary sense—referring to the power of the United States to govern those within its territory.” Trump v. Barbara, 609 U.S. ___ (2026) (slip op. at 11) (emphasis added). Taken together, Plyer and Barbara cast doubt on whether any person who was outside of a State’s borders when an alleged equal-protection violation by that State occurred could maintain an equal-protection claim against that State when the State has not affirmatively imposed the obligations of its laws on that person. But we decline to reach this issue because (1) it was not raised nor briefed by the parties and (2) it would not control the outcome of the equal-protection claims for the reasons discussed in Sections IV and V.  No. 25-3693 Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of Cincinnati, et al. Page 15 Generally, “a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). However, a suit in equity to end a continuing violation of federal law is not barred when the requested injunction would have “only an incidental or ancillary effect on a state’s treasury.” Turker v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., 157 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1998). This “ancillary-effect exception” is “narrow . . . .” Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 368 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (cleaned up). “While an injunction order may have an ‘ancillary’ effect on the state treasury, it may not directly require payments from the state treasury.” Id. at 370. Ultimately, “[t]he dividing line” between permissible and impermissible relief is whether the burden on the public treasury “is the primary thrust of the suit.” Barton v. Summers, 293 F.3d 944, 949 (6th Cir. 2002). To that end, we have held that expunging workplace disciplinary records is permissible relief because a state university, in complying with the injunction, “would incur expenses that are, at most, minimal and ancillary to [the] main goals of” preventing future employment consequences due to the negative entries on the plaintiff’s record. Ashford v. Univ. of Mich., 89 F.4th 960, 969–70 (6th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But when certain state-court judges sought an injunction requiring Michigan to equalize their retirement benefits with other, more handsomely compensated state-court judges, we denied that relief as a direct burden on the public fisc. Ernst, 427 F.3d at 372. We did so because the thrust of the requested injunction was to force the State to internally reallocate dollars. Id. at 370–71. That meant the remedy would “directly require payments from the state treasury.” Id. at 370. We have previously held that a request for reinstatement to a prior employment position is an appropriate Ex parte Young action because it has only ancillary treasury effect. Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 964 (6th Cir. 2013). We have not held the same as it relates to instatement. Instatement actions cannot exploit the Ex parte Young exception because they are a form of relief materially different in kind from reinstatement. Charlton-Perkins is asking us to force the State of Ohio to create and fund, via the public treasury, a posi