James Hsieh v. PitchBook Data, Inc.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket26-1038
JudgeScudder
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 26-1038
JAMES HSIEH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PITCHBOOK DATA, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:24-cv-12454 — April M. Perry, District Judge.
____________________
ARGUED OCTOBER 29, 2026 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 18, 2026
____________________
Before RIPPLE, SCUDDER, and TAIBLESON, Circuit Judges.
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Earlier this year, in Giovannelli v.
Walmart Inc., 164 F.4th 1052 (7th Cir. 2026), we determined,
based on applicable Illinois case law, that claims brought un-
der the Illinois Right of Privacy Act are subject to a one-year
statute of limitations. James Hsieh asks us to revisit that de-
termination. He offers new arguments, but little evidence that
Illinois courts would come out the other way. So we stand
2 No. 26-1038
behind Giovannelli and affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Hsieh’s claim as untimely.
I
PitchBook owns and operates PitchBook.com, a website
through which registered users, often for a fee, may access a
database containing information about professionals in pri-
vate equity, venture capital, and mergers and acquisitions.
James Hsieh is such a professional. On February 8, 2021,
Hsieh’s employer shared his name, email, and job title with
PitchBook. A week later, on February 15, PitchBook added
Hsieh’s information to its database without his consent.
More than three years later, in October 2024, Hsieh filed
suit in Illinois state court under the Illinois Right of Publicity
Act, 765 ILCS 1075/1, et seq., on behalf of himself and a puta-
tive class, alleging that PitchBook violated the Act by using
his identity for commercial purposes without his consent.
PitchBook removed the action to federal court, invoking the
Class Action Fairness Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). PitchBook
then moved for summary judgment, contending that the
Right of Publicity Act’s one-year statute of limitations ren-
dered Hsieh’s claim untimely.
The Act itself contains no express statute of limitations. Il-
linois law, however, applies a one-year statute of limitations
to “[a]ctions for slander, libel or publication of matter violat-
ing the right of privacy.” 735 ILCS § 5/13-201. PitchBook as-
serted that claims under IRPA were subject to that one-year
limitations period. For his part, Hsieh saw the Act as catego-
rizing rights of publicity as “freely transferable” “property
rights,” 765 ILCS 1075/15—thereby making claims under the
Act subject to the five-year limitations period governing
No. 26-1038 3
actions “to recover damages for an injury done to property,
real or personal.” 735 ILCS 5/13-205. This position, Hsieh
added, also found support in § 205’s catch-all provision, as
the five-year limitations period governs “all civil actions not
otherwise provided for.” Id.
The district court agreed with PitchBook and dismissed
Hsieh’s claim. Finding no Illinois Supreme Court precedent
on point, the district court looked to and applied the Illinois
Appellate Court’s reasoning in Blair v. Nevada Landing Part-
nership, 859 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006), which held that
§ 201’s one-year limitations period applied to claims under
the Act. This meant that Hsieh’s claim was untimely, as it was
brought more than three years after PitchBook published his
information on its website.
Hsieh now appeals.
II
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
without deference, “construing the facts in the light most fa-
vorable to [the non-movant] and drawing reasonable infer-
ences in his favor.” Bourke v. Collins, 142 F.4th 918, 921 (7th
Cir. 2025). Summary judgment is appropriate when the mov-
ing party shows “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247
(1986).
State law provides the relevant statute of limitations for
state-law claims before a federal court exercising diversity ju-
risdiction. See Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 216 (7th Cir.
2013). Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938), we resolve the question before us as we believe the
4 No. 26-1038
Illinois Supreme Court would. But “[w]hen no decision from
the state supreme court squarely controls, [we] predict how
the relevant state court would rule,” by looking to decisions
from intermediate state appellate courts. Giovannelli, 164 F.4th
at 1054–55. This inquiry requires “care and caution,” Smith v.
RecordQuest, LLC, 989 F.3d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 2021), as our role
is to “take state law as it is rather than predicting novel devel-
opments.” Knight v. Enbridge Pipelines (FSP) L.L.C., 759 F.3d
675, 678 (7th Cir. 2014).
The district court did not have the benefit of our reasoning
in Giovannelli when ruling on PitchBook’s motion. Still, our
analysis there mirrored the district court’s here. In Giovannelli,
we adopted Blair’s reasoning and held that “[b]ecause the
common-law tort of appropriating a likeness had a statute of
limitations of one year, and the Act ‘completely supplanted
the common-law tort,’” a one-year statute of limitations ap-
plies to IRPA claims. Giovannelli, 164 F.4th at 1055.
Hsieh asks us to revisit that holding. He reads Giovannelli
as leaving open the Act’s statutory designation of the right of
publicity as a property right. To be sure, Hsieh advances a po-
sition not presented by the parties in Giovannelli. But that is
not sufficient reason to revisit our precedent. “Absent signals
from the state courts or other developments that call into
question an earlier Erie Railroad prediction,” we leave our
precedent undisturbed. Wesbrook v. Ulrich, 840 F.3d 388, 399
(7th Cir. 2016).
We see no signals that Illinois state courts would come out
differently than Blair. In the two decades since its issuance,
Illinois courts, as well as federal district courts applying Illi-
nois law, have continued to follow its holding. See, e.g., Cant-
well v. N.H. Scott & Hebblethwaite Funeral Home, Inc., 2023 WL
No. 26-1038 5
4288342, at * 2 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023); Bonilla v. Ancestry.com Op-
erations Inc., 628 F. Supp. 3d 812, 817 (N.D. Ill. 2022); Martin v.
Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 3d 925, 930 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
Indeed, by our measure, we are aware of no Illinois authority
doubting Blair’s reasoning. Even more, the Illinois Supreme
Court cited Blair favorably in Ciolino v. Simon, 192 N.E.3d 579,
588–90 (Ill. 2021), albeit for a different substantive proposi-
tion. Nowhere in its multiple references to Blair did the Illi-
nois Supreme Court suggest that Blair’s reasoning on IRPA’s
statute of limitations should be called into question.
In these circumstances, we stand by our decision in Gio-
vanelli. The district court therefore correctly applied a one-
year statute of limitations to Hsieh’s IRPA claim and found it
untimely. For these reasons, we AFFIRM.