Full Opinion

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 26-1038 JAMES HSIEH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PITCHBOOK DATA, INC., Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:24-cv-12454 — April M. Perry, District Judge. ____________________ ARGUED OCTOBER 29, 2026 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 18, 2026 ____________________ Before RIPPLE, SCUDDER, and TAIBLESON, Circuit Judges. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Earlier this year, in Giovannelli v. Walmart Inc., 164 F.4th 1052 (7th Cir. 2026), we determined, based on applicable Illinois case law, that claims brought un- der the Illinois Right of Privacy Act are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. James Hsieh asks us to revisit that de- termination. He offers new arguments, but little evidence that Illinois courts would come out the other way. So we stand 2 No. 26-1038 behind Giovannelli and affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hsieh’s claim as untimely. I PitchBook owns and operates PitchBook.com, a website through which registered users, often for a fee, may access a database containing information about professionals in pri- vate equity, venture capital, and mergers and acquisitions. James Hsieh is such a professional. On February 8, 2021, Hsieh’s employer shared his name, email, and job title with PitchBook. A week later, on February 15, PitchBook added Hsieh’s information to its database without his consent. More than three years later, in October 2024, Hsieh filed suit in Illinois state court under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, 765 ILCS 1075/1, et seq., on behalf of himself and a puta- tive class, alleging that PitchBook violated the Act by using his identity for commercial purposes without his consent. PitchBook removed the action to federal court, invoking the Class Action Fairness Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). PitchBook then moved for summary judgment, contending that the Right of Publicity Act’s one-year statute of limitations ren- dered Hsieh’s claim untimely. The Act itself contains no express statute of limitations. Il- linois law, however, applies a one-year statute of limitations to “[a]ctions for slander, libel or publication of matter violat- ing the right of privacy.” 735 ILCS § 5/13-201. PitchBook as- serted that claims under IRPA were subject to that one-year limitations period. For his part, Hsieh saw the Act as catego- rizing rights of publicity as “freely transferable” “property rights,” 765 ILCS 1075/15—thereby making claims under the Act subject to the five-year limitations period governing No. 26-1038 3 actions “to recover damages for an injury done to property, real or personal.” 735 ILCS 5/13-205. This position, Hsieh added, also found support in § 205’s catch-all provision, as the five-year limitations period governs “all civil actions not otherwise provided for.” Id. The district court agreed with PitchBook and dismissed Hsieh’s claim. Finding no Illinois Supreme Court precedent on point, the district court looked to and applied the Illinois Appellate Court’s reasoning in Blair v. Nevada Landing Part- nership, 859 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006), which held that § 201’s one-year limitations period applied to claims under the Act. This meant that Hsieh’s claim was untimely, as it was brought more than three years after PitchBook published his information on its website. Hsieh now appeals. II We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment without deference, “construing the facts in the light most fa- vorable to [the non-movant] and drawing reasonable infer- ences in his favor.” Bourke v. Collins, 142 F.4th 918, 921 (7th Cir. 2025). Summary judgment is appropriate when the mov- ing party shows “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). State law provides the relevant statute of limitations for state-law claims before a federal court exercising diversity ju- risdiction. See Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 216 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), we resolve the question before us as we believe the 4 No. 26-1038 Illinois Supreme Court would. But “[w]hen no decision from the state supreme court squarely controls, [we] predict how the relevant state court would rule,” by looking to decisions from intermediate state appellate courts. Giovannelli, 164 F.4th at 1054–55. This inquiry requires “care and caution,” Smith v. RecordQuest, LLC, 989 F.3d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 2021), as our role is to “take state law as it is rather than predicting novel devel- opments.” Knight v. Enbridge Pipelines (FSP) L.L.C., 759 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2014). The district court did not have the benefit of our reasoning in Giovannelli when ruling on PitchBook’s motion. Still, our analysis there mirrored the district court’s here. In Giovannelli, we adopted Blair’s reasoning and held that “[b]ecause the common-law tort of appropriating a likeness had a statute of limitations of one year, and the Act ‘completely supplanted the common-law tort,’” a one-year statute of limitations ap- plies to IRPA claims. Giovannelli, 164 F.4th at 1055. Hsieh asks us to revisit that holding. He reads Giovannelli as leaving open the Act’s statutory designation of the right of publicity as a property right. To be sure, Hsieh advances a po- sition not presented by the parties in Giovannelli. But that is not sufficient reason to revisit our precedent. “Absent signals from the state courts or other developments that call into question an earlier Erie Railroad prediction,” we leave our precedent undisturbed. Wesbrook v. Ulrich, 840 F.3d 388, 399 (7th Cir. 2016). We see no signals that Illinois state courts would come out differently than Blair. In the two decades since its issuance, Illinois courts, as well as federal district courts applying Illi- nois law, have continued to follow its holding. See, e.g., Cant- well v. N.H. Scott & Hebblethwaite Funeral Home, Inc., 2023 WL No. 26-1038 5 4288342, at * 2 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023); Bonilla v. Ancestry.com Op- erations Inc., 628 F. Supp. 3d 812, 817 (N.D. Ill. 2022); Martin v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 3d 925, 930 (N.D. Ill. 2016). Indeed, by our measure, we are aware of no Illinois authority doubting Blair’s reasoning. Even more, the Illinois Supreme Court cited Blair favorably in Ciolino v. Simon, 192 N.E.3d 579, 588–90 (Ill. 2021), albeit for a different substantive proposi- tion. Nowhere in its multiple references to Blair did the Illi- nois Supreme Court suggest that Blair’s reasoning on IRPA’s statute of limitations should be called into question. In these circumstances, we stand by our decision in Gio- vanelli. The district court therefore correctly applied a one- year statute of limitations to Hsieh’s IRPA claim and found it untimely. For these reasons, we AFFIRM.