Luther v. Oklahoma Department of Human Services
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-6195
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 16, 2026
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
HAILIE NICOLE LUTHER, individually
and as the natural mother of G.N.L.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 25-6195
(D.C. No. 5:25-CV-00279-J)
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. (W.D. Okla.)
THE OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES; CHLOE WALKER,
in her individual and official capacities;
MICHAEL CASE, in his individual and
official capacities; CHRISTIE
UPCHURCH, in her individual and official
capacities; ALICIA JACKSON, in her
individual and official capacities;
JENNIFER CASE, in her individual and
official capacities; TARYN
MONTENEGRO, in her individual and
official capacities; DESTENIE
MIRAMONTES, in her individual and
official capacities,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
*
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 25-6195 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 2
_________________________________
Hailie Nicole Luther, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s dismissal
of her civil rights claims against the Oklahoma Department of Human Services
(DHS) and seven DHS employees (DHS Employees) in their official and individual
capacities. 2 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. Background
Ms. Luther and Noah Riedmann have been engaged in an ongoing custody
dispute over their minor child. Ms. Luther had custody of the child and
Mr. Riedmann was granted visitation rights. Ms. Luther submitted a referral to DHS,
alleging Mr. Riedmann was sexually abusing the child. DHS had learned, among
other things, that Ms. Luther repeatedly took the child for invasive medical
examinations to substantiate claims that Mr. Riedmann was abusive and regularly
took detailed photographs of the child’s anatomy. By court order, DHS removed the
minor child from Ms. Luther’s custody after determining there was an imminent
safety threat to the child, and it was not in the child’s best interest to remain with
Ms. Luther.
Several months after losing custody of the child, Ms. Luther filed the
underlying action against DHS and the DHS Employees for removing her child. She
1
See United States v. Sjodin, 139 F.4th 1188, 1205 (10th Cir. 2025) (observing
the court will liberally construe a pro se litigant’s filings but will not make arguments
for a litigant).
2
Ms. Luther named the following DHS Employees in the complaint: Chloe
Walker, Michael Case, Christie Upchurch, Alicia Jackson, Jennifer Case, Taryn
Montenegro, and Destenie Miramontes. See R. at 645.
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asserted various claims, including civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claims
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), qui tam claims under the False Claims
Act (FCA), 3 violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and state fraud
claims. She also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP).
The district court granted Ms. Luther’s motion to proceed IFP and reviewed
the complaint. It then dismissed her claims against DHS and the DHS Employees in
their official capacities with prejudice without leave to amend. The district court
concluded a state agency and its officials acting in their official capacities are not
“persons” for purposes of § 1983, and even if they were, under these facts, Eleventh
Amendment immunity bars her official-capacity suits. See R. at 152-53.
The district court also dismissed Ms. Luther’s ICWA claim concluding ICWA
does not provide a cause of action for money damages, and it was appropriate to
abstain from providing injunctive relief under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44
(1971). It also dismissed her qui tam claims under the FCA because she was
proceeding pro se and did not follow the procedural requirements to assert a qui tam
claim.
The district court then dismissed Ms. Luther’s individual-capacity claims
against the DHS Employees without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court
then granted Ms. Luther leave to amend her individual capacity claims against the
DHS Employees. She filed an amended complaint (the Amended Complaint)
Ms. Luther does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of her qui tam
3
claims on appeal.
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reasserting her individual capacity claims against the DHS Employees, alleging they
violated her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, violated the ADA, and
committed state law fraud. 4 She also reasserted her official capacity claims against
DHS and the DHS Employees despite the district court’s dismissal with prejudice.
DHS and the DHS Employees filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
The district court first dismissed the official-capacity claims against DHS and
the DHS Employees, concluding the first dismissal order barred Ms. Luther from
bringing the official capacity claims a second time. It then dismissed the § 1983,
ADA, and state law claims against the DHS Employees in their individual capacities
for failure to state a claim and dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice.
Ms. Luther timely appealed.
II. Discussion
Ms. Luther challenges the district court’s dismissal of her Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment § 1983, ADA, and state law fraud claims against the DHS
Employees in their individual capacities. 5 She also challenges the district court’s
dismissal of the Amended Complaint with prejudice.
4
Ms. Luther does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of her First
Amendment claim on appeal.
5
In the Opening Brief, Ms. Luther argues the district court erred by dismissing
the federal claims by abstaining under Younger. But the district court applied
Younger abstention only when analyzing Ms. Luther’s claim under ICWA. She does
not challenge her ICWA claim on appeal, so we need not address Younger abstention
here.
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We review a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Nixon v. City & Cnty. of
Denv., 784 F.3d 1364, 1368 (10th Cir. 2015). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
we “accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construe
them in the light most favorable to” Ms. Luther. Id. (ellipsis and internal quotation
marks omitted). “To survive a [12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted).
We review the district court’s “dismissal with prejudice for an abuse of
discretion.” Seale v. Peacock, 32 F.4th 1011, 1027 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal
quotation marks omitted). But when dismissal rests on the futility of further
amendment, we review the legal basis for that determination de novo. See id.
A. Individual Capacity Claims
i. § 1983 Claims
Ms. Luther challenges the district court’s dismissal of her Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims. To state a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure
claim, she must show “that a seizure occurred and that the seizure was unreasonable.”
Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted). And a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process
claim requires Ms. Luther to show she had a constitutionally cognizable liberty or
property interest, and that the DHS Employees deprived her of that interest without
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the appropriate process or procedural safeguards. 6 Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque,
448 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006).
Ms. Luther contends that the DHS Employees’ removal of her child without a
written court order did not comply with Oklahoma law and was therefore an
unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment. She also argues no exigent
circumstance existed, undermining any claim of immediate danger. She asserts the
district court’s dismissal was erroneous because it resolved the factual question of
whether exigent circumstances existed.
As for the Fourteenth Amendment claim, Ms. Luther argues the DHS
Employees “deprived her of her fundamental parental rights without notice or a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 13. She claims again that
the district court erred by relying on the state court record attached to the Amended
Complaint to resolve factual disputes. She contends the district court was supposed
to accept the factual allegation that no exigent circumstances existed to justify the
removal.
Although the district court relied on the state court record Ms. Luther filed
with the Amended Complaint, doing so was not error. See Commonwealth Prop.
Advocs., LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir.
2011) (“In evaluating a motion to dismiss, we may consider not only the complaint,
6
Ms. Luther also invokes substantive due process, asserting “conscience-
shocking conduct.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 7; see also id. at 2, 13. But she does not
develop the argument beyond these passing references, and we will not do so for her.
See Sjodin, 139 F.4th at 1205.
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but also the attached exhibits and documents incorporated into the complaint by
reference.”). Nor did doing so resolve factual disputes. Rather the district court
determined that, based on the record supplied by Ms. Luther, the underlying
allegations that her child was removed without a court order and that she was not
afforded the appropriate process were patently false. We agree.
Oklahoma law permits a district court, on application by the district attorney,
to issue a verbal custody order when “the circumstances or surroundings of the child
are such that continuation in the child’s home or in the care or custody of the parent
. . . would present an imminent safety threat to the child.” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10A,
§ 1-4-201(A)(2)(b). And when the order is obtained verbally, a written application
and order shall be submitted to the court for the court to approve and file within one
day. See id. The record shows the district attorney followed the statutory procedure.
And the district court was not required to accept as true a factual allegation that was
in direct conflict with the record submitted with the Amended Complaint. We find
no error in the district court’s conclusion.
ii. ADA Claim
To state an ADA claim, Ms. Luther must show that (1) “she is a qualified
individual with a disability,” (2) “she was otherwise discriminated against by the
public entity,” and (3) the “discrimination was by reason of [her] disability.” J.V. v.
Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 813 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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The district court determined that Ms. Luther’s broad accusations against the
DHS Employees failed to allege a “causal connection between the alleged perceived
disability and the purported discrimination,” rendering her ADA claim conclusory.
R. at 650. Ms. Luther contends that the DHS Employees perceived her as mentally
disabled, denied her reunification services based on that perception, and failed to
provide reasonable accommodations to participate in child-welfare services.
Ms. Luther’s failure to include specific facts in her allegations is fatal to her
ADA claim. The Amended Complaint only generally alleges the DHS Employees
perceived her as having a mental impairment and used that “perceived disability as a
pretext to justify custody interference.” R. at 348. She also claims they did all this
without a documented diagnosis, report, or therapist involvement. But the allegations
in the Amended Complaint do not draw a connection between Ms. Luther’s
alleged-perceived disability and the DHS Employees’ conduct. Nor does the
Amended Complaint specify which DHS Employee engaged in what conduct. At
most, Ms. Luther specifically alleges one DHS Employee implied she needed a
psychological evaluation. But she does not show how this implication led to
discriminatory conduct. Under these circumstances, we conclude Ms. Luther failed
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
iii. State Law Fraud Claim
In Oklahoma, a successful fraud claim requires Ms. Luther to show
1) a false material misrepresentation, 2) made as a positive assertion
which is either known to be false or is made recklessly without knowledge
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of the truth, 3) with the intention that it be acted upon, and 4) which is
relied on by the other party to his (or her) own detriment.
Bowman v. Presley, 212 P.3d 1210, 1218 (Okla. 2009) (footnote omitted). Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires fraud claims to be alleged with particularity.
Particularity means the complaint “set[s] forth the time, place and contents of the
false representation, the identity of the party making the false statements and the
consequences thereof.” Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1236 (10th Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court found Ms. Luther failed to meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened
pleading requirement because she did not state her claims with particularity. The
district court concluded that Ms. Luther’s “allegations lack[ed] the specificity
necessary to state a plausible fraud claim against any individual DHS employee.”
R. at 652.
Ms. Luther argues she did plead her fraud claims with sufficient particularity
for a pro se litigant to satisfy Rule 9(b) by identifying who engaged in what
misconduct. She also argues the district court improperly weighed evidence to
resolve factual disputes.
It’s true, contrary to Ms. Luther’s other claims, she did associate specific DHS
Employees with the alleged fraudulent conduct. But the allegations in the Amended
Complaint lacked the specificity needed to provide the time, place, and contents of
the false representations and the consequences that flowed from them. Similarly,
many of her allegations directly conflicted with the exhibits Ms. Luther attached to
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the Amended Complaint. Although we construe her pleadings liberally as a pro se
litigant, Ms. Luther remains bound to comply with the procedural rules. See Sjodin,
139 F.4th at 1205. Thus, Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement applies, and
Ms. Luther’s complaint fails to reach it.
B. Dismissal with Prejudice
Ms. Luther contends the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the
Amended Complaint with prejudice. She asserts that the dismissal “rested largely on
legal doctrines rather than incurable factual defects.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 15. She
claims that, because she was proceeding pro se, the district court should have made a
“meaningful finding that further amendment would be futile as to each claim.” Aplt.
Reply Br. at 8.
Although the district court did not expressly conclude that further amendment
would be futile in the final order, that conclusion is implicit in the procedural history.
See Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 2018) (“Although the judge
did not explicitly address futility of amendment, it is implicit in his treatment of the
case . . . that he considered further amendment futile.”). In the order dismissing the
initial complaint, the district court determined amendment would not be futile for
Ms. Luther’s claims against the DHS Employees in their individual capacities,
instructed Ms. Luther on the specific deficiencies in the complaint, and allowed her
an opportunity to amend. Thus, when those deficiencies continued to plague the
Amended Complaint, the district court dismissed it with prejudice. See R. at 649-52.
On de novo review, we conclude that further amendment would be futile. This court
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has concluded that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate “where it is obvious that
the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts she has alleged and it would be futile to give
her an opportunity to amend.” Knight v. Mooring Cap. Fund, LLC, 749 F.3d 1180,
1190 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Such is the
case here. Ms. Luther was told how the initial complaint was deficient, see R.
at 160-61, and failed to remedy those deficiencies in the Amended Complaint.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the
Amended Complaint with prejudice.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Chief Judge
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