Full Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-6195 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 16, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court HAILIE NICOLE LUTHER, individually and as the natural mother of G.N.L., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 25-6195 (D.C. No. 5:25-CV-00279-J) THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. (W.D. Okla.) THE OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; CHLOE WALKER, in her individual and official capacities; MICHAEL CASE, in his individual and official capacities; CHRISTIE UPCHURCH, in her individual and official capacities; ALICIA JACKSON, in her individual and official capacities; JENNIFER CASE, in her individual and official capacities; TARYN MONTENEGRO, in her individual and official capacities; DESTENIE MIRAMONTES, in her individual and official capacities, Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________ Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined * unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-6195 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 2 _________________________________ Hailie Nicole Luther, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s dismissal of her civil rights claims against the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) and seven DHS employees (DHS Employees) in their official and individual capacities. 2 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. I. Background Ms. Luther and Noah Riedmann have been engaged in an ongoing custody dispute over their minor child. Ms. Luther had custody of the child and Mr. Riedmann was granted visitation rights. Ms. Luther submitted a referral to DHS, alleging Mr. Riedmann was sexually abusing the child. DHS had learned, among other things, that Ms. Luther repeatedly took the child for invasive medical examinations to substantiate claims that Mr. Riedmann was abusive and regularly took detailed photographs of the child’s anatomy. By court order, DHS removed the minor child from Ms. Luther’s custody after determining there was an imminent safety threat to the child, and it was not in the child’s best interest to remain with Ms. Luther. Several months after losing custody of the child, Ms. Luther filed the underlying action against DHS and the DHS Employees for removing her child. She 1 See United States v. Sjodin, 139 F.4th 1188, 1205 (10th Cir. 2025) (observing the court will liberally construe a pro se litigant’s filings but will not make arguments for a litigant). 2 Ms. Luther named the following DHS Employees in the complaint: Chloe Walker, Michael Case, Christie Upchurch, Alicia Jackson, Jennifer Case, Taryn Montenegro, and Destenie Miramontes. See R. at 645. 2 Appellate Case: 25-6195 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 3 asserted various claims, including civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claims under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), qui tam claims under the False Claims Act (FCA), 3 violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and state fraud claims. She also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court granted Ms. Luther’s motion to proceed IFP and reviewed the complaint. It then dismissed her claims against DHS and the DHS Employees in their official capacities with prejudice without leave to amend. The district court concluded a state agency and its officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983, and even if they were, under these facts, Eleventh Amendment immunity bars her official-capacity suits. See R. at 152-53. The district court also dismissed Ms. Luther’s ICWA claim concluding ICWA does not provide a cause of action for money damages, and it was appropriate to abstain from providing injunctive relief under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971). It also dismissed her qui tam claims under the FCA because she was proceeding pro se and did not follow the procedural requirements to assert a qui tam claim. The district court then dismissed Ms. Luther’s individual-capacity claims against the DHS Employees without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court then granted Ms. Luther leave to amend her individual capacity claims against the DHS Employees. She filed an amended complaint (the Amended Complaint) Ms. Luther does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of her qui tam 3 claims on appeal. 3 Appellate Case: 25-6195 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 4 reasserting her individual capacity claims against the DHS Employees, alleging they violated her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, violated the ADA, and committed state law fraud. 4 She also reasserted her official capacity claims against DHS and the DHS Employees despite the district court’s dismissal with prejudice. DHS and the DHS Employees filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The district court first dismissed the official-capacity claims against DHS and the DHS Employees, concluding the first dismissal order barred Ms. Luther from bringing the official capacity claims a second time. It then dismissed the § 1983, ADA, and state law claims against the DHS Employees in their individual capacities for failure to state a claim and dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice. Ms. Luther timely appealed. II. Discussion Ms. Luther challenges the district court’s dismissal of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment § 1983, ADA, and state law fraud claims against the DHS Employees in their individual capacities. 5 She also challenges the district court’s dismissal of the Amended Complaint with prejudice. 4 Ms. Luther does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of her First Amendment claim on appeal. 5 In the Opening Brief, Ms. Luther argues the district court erred by dismissing the federal claims by abstaining under Younger. But the district court applied Younger abstention only when analyzing Ms. Luther’s claim under ICWA. She does not challenge her ICWA claim on appeal, so we need not address Younger abstention here. 4 Appellate Case: 25-6195 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 5 We review a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denv., 784 F.3d 1364, 1368 (10th Cir. 2015). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal we “accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to” Ms. Luther. Id. (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). “To survive a [12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). We review the district court’s “dismissal with prejudice for an abuse of discretion.” Seale v. Peacock, 32 F.4th 1011, 1027 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). But when dismissal rests on the futility of further amendment, we review the legal basis for that determination de novo. See id. A. Individual Capacity Claims i. § 1983 Claims Ms. Luther challenges the district court’s dismissal of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. To state a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim, she must show “that a seizure occurred and that the seizure was unreasonable.” Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). And a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim requires Ms. Luther to show she had a constitutionally cognizable liberty or property interest, and that the DHS Employees deprived her of that interest without 5 Appellate Case: 25-6195 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 6 the appropriate process or procedural safeguards. 6 Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006). Ms. Luther contends that the DHS Employees’ removal of her child without a written court order did not comply with Oklahoma law and was therefore an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment. She also argues no exigent circumstance existed, undermining any claim of immediate danger. She asserts the district court’s dismissal was erroneous because it resolved the factual question of whether exigent circumstances existed. As for the Fourteenth Amendment claim, Ms. Luther argues the DHS Employees “deprived her of her fundamental parental rights without notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 13. She claims again that the district court erred by relying on the state court record attached to the Amended Complaint to resolve factual disputes. She contends the district court was supposed to accept the factual allegation that no exigent circumstances existed to justify the removal. Although the district court relied on the state court record Ms. Luther filed with the Amended Complaint, doing so was not error. See Commonwealth Prop. Advocs., LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2011) (“In evaluating a motion to dismiss, we may consider not only the complaint, 6 Ms. Luther also invokes substantive due process, asserting “conscience- shocking conduct.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 7; see also id. at 2, 13. But she does not develop the argument beyond these passing references, and we will not do so for her. See Sjodin, 139 F.4th at 1205. 6 Appellate Case: 25-6195 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 7 but also the attached exhibits and documents incorporated into the complaint by reference.”). Nor did doing so resolve factual disputes. Rather the district court determined that, based on the record supplied by Ms. Luther, the underlying allegations that her child was removed without a court order and that she was not afforded the appropriate process were patently false. We agree. Oklahoma law permits a district court, on application by the district attorney, to issue a verbal custody order when “the circumstances or surroundings of the child are such that continuation in the child’s home or in the care or custody of the parent . . . would present an imminent safety threat to the child.” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10A, § 1-4-201(A)(2)(b). And when the order is obtained verbally, a written application and order shall be submitted to the court for the court to approve and file within one day. See id. The record shows the district attorney followed the statutory procedure. And the district court was not required to accept as true a factual allegation that was in direct conflict with the record submitted with the Amended Complaint. We find no error in the district court’s conclusion. ii. ADA Claim To state an ADA claim, Ms. Luther must show that (1) “she is a qualified individual with a disability,” (2) “she was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity,” and (3) the “discrimination was by reason of [her] disability.” J.V. v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 813 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 Appellate Case: 25-6195 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 8 The district court determined that Ms. Luther’s broad accusations against the DHS Employees failed to allege a “causal connection between the alleged perceived disability and the purported discrimination,” rendering her ADA claim conclusory. R. at 650. Ms. Luther contends that the DHS Employees perceived her as mentally disabled, denied her reunification services based on that perception, and failed to provide reasonable accommodations to participate in child-welfare services. Ms. Luther’s failure to include specific facts in her allegations is fatal to her ADA claim. The Amended Complaint only generally alleges the DHS Employees perceived her as having a mental impairment and used that “perceived disability as a pretext to justify custody interference.” R. at 348. She also claims they did all this without a documented diagnosis, report, or therapist involvement. But the allegations in the Amended Complaint do not draw a connection between Ms. Luther’s alleged-perceived disability and the DHS Employees’ conduct. Nor does the Amended Complaint specify which DHS Employee engaged in what conduct. At most, Ms. Luther specifically alleges one DHS Employee implied she needed a psychological evaluation. But she does not show how this implication led to discriminatory conduct. Under these circumstances, we conclude Ms. Luther failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. iii. State Law Fraud Claim In Oklahoma, a successful fraud claim requires Ms. Luther to show 1) a false material misrepresentation, 2) made as a positive assertion which is either known to be false or is made recklessly without knowledge 8 Appellate Case: 25-6195 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 9 of the truth, 3) with the intention that it be acted upon, and 4) which is relied on by the other party to his (or her) own detriment. Bowman v. Presley, 212 P.3d 1210, 1218 (Okla. 2009) (footnote omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires fraud claims to be alleged with particularity. Particularity means the complaint “set[s] forth the time, place and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party making the false statements and the consequences thereof.” Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court found Ms. Luther failed to meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement because she did not state her claims with particularity. The district court concluded that Ms. Luther’s “allegations lack[ed] the specificity necessary to state a plausible fraud claim against any individual DHS employee.” R. at 652. Ms. Luther argues she did plead her fraud claims with sufficient particularity for a pro se litigant to satisfy Rule 9(b) by identifying who engaged in what misconduct. She also argues the district court improperly weighed evidence to resolve factual disputes. It’s true, contrary to Ms. Luther’s other claims, she did associate specific DHS Employees with the alleged fraudulent conduct. But the allegations in the Amended Complaint lacked the specificity needed to provide the time, place, and contents of the false representations and the consequences that flowed from them. Similarly, many of her allegations directly conflicted with the exhibits Ms. Luther attached to 9 Appellate Case: 25-6195 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 10 the Amended Complaint. Although we construe her pleadings liberally as a pro se litigant, Ms. Luther remains bound to comply with the procedural rules. See Sjodin, 139 F.4th at 1205. Thus, Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement applies, and Ms. Luther’s complaint fails to reach it. B. Dismissal with Prejudice Ms. Luther contends the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the Amended Complaint with prejudice. She asserts that the dismissal “rested largely on legal doctrines rather than incurable factual defects.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 15. She claims that, because she was proceeding pro se, the district court should have made a “meaningful finding that further amendment would be futile as to each claim.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 8. Although the district court did not expressly conclude that further amendment would be futile in the final order, that conclusion is implicit in the procedural history. See Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 2018) (“Although the judge did not explicitly address futility of amendment, it is implicit in his treatment of the case . . . that he considered further amendment futile.”). In the order dismissing the initial complaint, the district court determined amendment would not be futile for Ms. Luther’s claims against the DHS Employees in their individual capacities, instructed Ms. Luther on the specific deficiencies in the complaint, and allowed her an opportunity to amend. Thus, when those deficiencies continued to plague the Amended Complaint, the district court dismissed it with prejudice. See R. at 649-52. On de novo review, we conclude that further amendment would be futile. This court 10 Appellate Case: 25-6195 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 11 has concluded that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate “where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts she has alleged and it would be futile to give her an opportunity to amend.” Knight v. Mooring Cap. Fund, LLC, 749 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Such is the case here. Ms. Luther was told how the initial complaint was deficient, see R. at 160-61, and failed to remedy those deficiencies in the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the Amended Complaint with prejudice. III. Conclusion We affirm the district court’s judgment. Entered for the Court Jerome A. Holmes Chief Judge 11