Full Opinion

Appellate Case: 26-3025 Document: 6-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 29, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court KYLE JOHNSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 26-3025 (D.C. No. 2:26-CV-02005-EFM-ADM) STEPHANIE GOODENOW; CHIEF (D. Kan.) JUDGE OF THE 10TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT; JOHNSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT; JOHNSON COUNTY, KANSAS, Defendants – Appellees. _________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________ Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ Kyle Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined * unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 26-3025 Document: 6-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 2 § 1291, we affirm the decision to dismiss Mr. Johnson’s claims, but we reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss certain claims without prejudice. BACKGROUND Mr. Johnson sued Stephanie Goodenow, a state-court judge presiding over his ongoing family-law proceeding, in her official and individual capacities. He also sued the state district court, the state district court’s chief judge in his/her official capacity, and the county in which the state district court sits. He alleged that rulings and failures to rule in the family-law case violated his right to due process, and that the state district court’s failures to accommodate his disabilities constituted discrimination in violation of Title II of the ADA. For relief, he requested declaratory and injunctive relief as well as money damages. The magistrate judge granted Mr. Johnson leave to proceed without prepaying fees or costs. But she recommended that the district court dismiss his complaint on screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii). She identified several reasons for dismissing the § 1983 claims, including Eleventh Amendment immunity, judicial immunity, and failure to plead sufficient facts to state a claim. She also discussed why the district could not grant injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). As for the ADA claims, the magistrate judge determined that Mr. Johnson did not allege sufficient facts to show he has a “disability” as the ADA defines that term. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (prohibiting exclusion of or discrimination against a “qualified individual with a disability”); id. § 12102(1)(A) (defining “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 2 Appellate Case: 26-3025 Document: 6-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 3 major life activities of such individual”). In addition, she recommended applying judicial immunity to dismiss the ADA claim against Judge Goodenow in her personal capacity. The district court overruled Mr. Johnson’s objections. It adopted the recommendation in its entirety regarding the claims against Judge Goodenow, the chief judge of the state district court, and the state district court. It declined to adopt certain portions of the magistrate judge’s analysis regarding the § 1983 claim against the county, but it did adopt the recommendation to dismiss the claims against the county for failure to state a claim. Finally, having dismissed all Mr. Johnson’s claims, it deemed the request for injunctive relief to be moot. DISCUSSION Our review is de novo. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007) (reviewing § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal de novo); see also Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Anderson, 119 F.4th 732, 735 (10th Cir. 2024) (noting de novo review of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1153 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting de novo review of judicial immunity). Because Mr. Johnson proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his filings. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). Mr. Johnson asserts the district court erred in (1) applying judicial immunity to his § 1983 claims; (2) finding no allegations of ongoing ADA violations in his complaint; (3) dismissing his § 1983 claim against the county for failure to state a 3 Appellate Case: 26-3025 Document: 6-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 4 claim; and (4) declaring the requests for injunctive relief to be moot. 1 Having carefully reviewed Mr. Johnson’s opening brief and the record, we are not persuaded that the district court erred in concluding the claims should be dismissed. We therefore affirm the dismissals for substantially the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, as adopted by the district court. It is well-established, however, that “[d]ismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Hardy v. Rabie, 147 F.4th 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). The magistrate judge concluded that it would be futile to allow Mr. Johnson to amend. The district court did not discuss the possibility of amendment, nor did it specify whether its dismissals were with or without prejudice. The dismissals for failure to state a claim therefore act as decisions on the merits, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), foreclosing Mr. Johnson from attempting to muster sufficient facts to state a claim. But it is not readily apparent that it would be futile to allow Mr. Johnson the opportunity to amend the claims the court dismissed for failure to state a claim (particularly the claims under Title II of the ADA). Accordingly, we 1 Mr. Johnson’s opening brief reflects misunderstandings of portions of the district court’s ruling. Contrary to his assertion that the district court “[m]isapplied” the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “to bar independent ADA claims,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 3, neither the magistrate judge nor the district court cited the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Nor did the district court “overlook[] abrogation of immunity for [ADA] Title II access-to-courts claims,” as he asserts. Id. at 4. The district court applied sovereign immunity only to certain § 1983 claims, not to the ADA claims. 4 Appellate Case: 26-3025 Document: 6-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 5 reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss without prejudice all claims that the court dismissed for failure to state a claim, with the exception of the ADA claim against Judge Goodenow in her individual capacity. 2 CONCLUSION We affirm the district court’s judgment in part. We reverse the with-prejudice dismissal of all claims dismissed for failure to state a claim (other than the ADA claim against Judge Goodenow in her individual capacity) and remand with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice. Entered for the Court Timothy M. Tymkovich Circuit Judge 2 It would be futile to allow amendment of the ADA claim against Judge Goodenow in her individual capacity because “[o]nly public entities are subject to Title II.” City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 610 (2015). 5