Santanyo Lewis v. Laurel Harry
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 12, 2026
Docket26-1834
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
ALD-018 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 26-1834
___________
SANTANYO LEWIS,
Appellant
v.
DR. LAUREL R. HARRY, Secretary of Corrections; MICHAEL WENEROWICZ,
Executive secretary of corrections; CHRISTOPHER H. OPPMAN, Deputy secretary of
administration; ERICA BENNING, Bureau of health care services director; MICHAEL
ZAKEN, Facility manager; MARK DIALESANDRO, Deputy superintendent of
centralized services; JOHN DOE, Chief of clinical services; K. PETTERSON, Business
office manager; ROSS SMITH, Corrections healthcare administrator; JOHN DOE,
Medical records director; JANE DOE, Medical records technician; JENNIFER BEERS,
Nurse; AMY CLARK, Medical Records Staff
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(W.D. Pa. Civil No. 2:25-cv-01010)
District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 22, 2026
Before: SHWARTZ, BOVE, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 12, 2026)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Santanyo Lewis, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the
District Court’s order dismissing his complaint. Because this appeal does not present a
substantial question, we will summarily affirm.
Lewis filed this prisoner civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
he received deficient medical care while incarcerated at State Correctional Institution at
Greene (“SCI-Greene”). Lewis alleged that, over a period of months, non-party Medical
Director Eric Chang ordered certain diagnostic tests for cardiac-related complaints, which
showed “abnormalities,” but that he failed to create a treatment plan for Lewis. ECF No.
8. at ¶¶ 19–54, 64–69. During this period, Lewis was transferred to State Correctional
Institution at Coal Township (“SCI-Coal Township”). Lewis alleged that in preparation
for his transfer, defendant-nurse Jennifer Beers was tasked with reviewing his medical
records. Lewis alleged that Beers failed to note the abnormal test results and lack of
treatment plan and failed to refer the records back to Chang for correction. Because of
these alleged failures, Lewis claimed, he did not receive appropriate care upon arrival at
SCI-Coal Township. However, he also claimed that upon his arrival at SCI-Coal
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
Township, a non-party screening nurse reviewed the entirety of Lewis’s medical records,
including the allegedly abnormal test results.
Lewis alleged that defendants Deputy Superintendent of Centralized Services
Mark Dialesandro; Corrections Healthcare Administrator Ross Smith; Medical Records
Director John Doe; Business Office Manager K. Patterson; Facility Manager Michael
Zaken; Secretary of Corrections Laurel R. Harry; Executive Secretary of Corrections
Michael Wenerowicz; Deputy Secretary of Administration Christopher Oppman; Bureau
of Healthcare Services Director Erica Bennings; Medical Records Technician Jane Doe1;
and Chief of Clinical Services John Doe failed to supervise the medical staff at SCI-
Greene and failed to ensure the proper maintenance of medical records. Lewis claimed
violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and common law negligence for these alleged
failures.
The complaint was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who issued a report,
recommending dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), with leave to amend to
assert claims against Chang if appropriate. While the Report and Recommendation was
pending, Lewis moved for leave to file an amended complaint. The allegations in the
amended complaint were largely the same, and Lewis did not seek to add Chang as a
defendant. The Magistrate Judge again recommended dismissal, this time with prejudice
except as to Lewis’s assertion of “claims against a proper defendant or defendants in the
1
Lewis later amended his complaint to identify Jane Doe as Amy Clark.
3
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania related to his current
medical treatment at SCI-Coal Township.” ECF No. 23 at 21.
Lewis again sought leave to amend his complaint. In his second amended
complaint, Lewis largely restated the allegations in his initial and amended complaints
but clarified his claims against Clark to allege that, like Beers, she reviewed his records
for transfer and failed to refer them to the appropriate official for correction. Lewis also
abandoned his state law claims, raising only violations of the Eighth Amendment against
all defendants. The District Court granted Lewis’s motion but concluded that the
allegations in the second amended complaint, which it also construed as objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, remained insufficient to state a claim.
Accordingly, the District Court dismissed the second amended complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), without prejudice to Lewis’s asserting claims against a proper
defendant or defendants in the Middle District of Pennsylvania related to his current
medical treatment at SCI-Coal Township. Lewis then filed the present appeal and a
motion for appointment of counsel.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a
dismissal order. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may
summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R.
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Lewis’s second amended
complaint. “A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the
alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat
4
superior.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). This is true even
where a plaintiff alleges supervisory liability; he must still allege that the defendant
“participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or as the
person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations” or
“with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy,
practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v.
Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004). Lewis did not allege
any such personal involvement in his medical care by any defendants other than Beers
and Clark.
As for Beers and Clark, the second amended complaint does not meet the stringent
Eighth Amendment standard. To state a claim for deficient medical care in violation of
the Eighth Amendment, “a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his or her medical needs and (2) an objective
showing that those needs were serious.” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526,
534 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). “For claims of
inadequate medical care, we presume the treatment proper and require allegations that it
violates professional standards of care in some extreme way . . . more than mere
malpractice.” DiFraia v. Ransom, 171 F.4th 622, 629–30 (3d Cir. 2026) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). Even assuming Lewis adequately pled a
serious medical need, he alleged only that Beers and Clark were deliberately indifferent
when they failed to refer his records for correction during their pre-transfer review. This
is not the kind of complete denial of care or violation of professional standard of care that
5
constitutes deliberate indifference.2 See id. (collecting cases). Indeed, Lewis conceded
that, despite the alleged failures to have the record corrected, the screening nurse at SCI-
Coal Township was able to review Lewis’s entire medical record to see the abnormal test
results for himself.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Lewis’s motion
for appointment of counsel is denied.
2
Lewis’s contention in his motion for appointment of counsel that he has alleged a
complete denial of medical care is simply untrue, as he expressly pled that he was under
the care of Chang at the time of the alleged pre-transfer review.
6