Full Opinion

Appellate Case: 26-3020 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 13, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court BRENTON ALLAN HUBBLE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 26-3020 (D.C. No. 6:25-CV-01162-TC-GEB) CITY OF MULVANE, KANSAS, (D. Kan.) Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________ Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ Brenton Allan Hubble, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined * unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Because Mr. Hubble proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his filings but do not act as his advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (1991). Appellate Case: 26-3020 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 2 I. Mr. Hubble was convicted and fined $145 by the municipal court in Mulvane, Kansas, for speeding and failing to provide a drivers’ license. He then filed a complaint in federal district court asserting 23 claims against “United States Corporation,” arising from the municipal court proceedings. R. at 7. After the United States moved to dismiss, Mr. Hubble filed an amended complaint, in which he no longer named the United States as a defendant. Instead, his two-page amended complaint pled four § 1983 claims alleging his constitutional rights had been violated by “the City of Mulvane” and unidentified “John Doe Defendants,” including “municipal officers, clerks, and employees acting under color of state law.” R. at 130. Mr. Hubble’s amended complaint alleged that when he appeared in the municipal court: (1) he “expressly challenged the court’s jurisdiction and requested that the presiding judge provide proof of jurisdiction,” but the court “refused to provide such proof” and “detained [Mr. Hubble] for approximately 82 minutes”; (2) the municipal court denied his request for a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment; and (3) he was “deprived of liberty without due process of law and denied fundamental constitutional protections.” R. at 130. Mr. Hubble requested money damages and a “judgment declaring Defendants’ actions unconstitutional.” R. at 131. The city moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, including that Mr. Hubble’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994), because they 2 Appellate Case: 26-3020 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 3 collaterally challenge his state court conviction, which has not been invalidated. Mr. Hubble filed a response, and the district court held a hearing on the motion. At the hearing, Mr. Hubble argued against dismissal under Heck but acknowledged he had not appealed his municipal court conviction. He also requested leave to further amend his complaint “if further clarification is needed.” Supp. R. at 12. The district court orally granted the motion to dismiss. It reasoned that Mr. Hubble’s claims were barred by Heck because he “alleges that the state conviction was marred by procedural and constitutional violations,” but the conviction has not been invalidated. 2 Id. at 13. The district court denied Mr. Hubble’s request for leave to amend, observing that he had already once amended his complaint, and concluding the court saw no “likelihood that Mr. Hubble’s claims will be capable of being pled.” Id. at 14. The district court entered final judgment, and Mr. Hubble appeals. II. Reviewing the dismissal of Mr. Hubble’s complaint under Heck de novo, we affirm. See Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 521 (10th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he question of whether Heck applies to bar a plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is 2 The district court also concluded that Mr. Hubble’s complaint failed to state any plausible claims, including any viable claims of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and that his claims never accrued under Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022). Because we resolve this appeal based only on Heck, we do not address these alternative grounds for dismissal. 3 Appellate Case: 26-3020 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 4 one of law subject to de novo review.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Butler v. Compton, 482 F.3d 1277, 1278 (10th Cir. 2007)). Heck “prohibits the use of § 1983 to challenge the validity of a prior conviction or sentence so as to obtain release from custody or monetary damages.” Olivier v. City of Brandon, 607 U.S. 552, 556 (2026). Under Heck, therefore, “to be able to proceed under § 1983, a ‘plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.’” Graff, 65 F.4th at 520 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87). Heck bars claims for money damages and claims seeking equitable or declaratory relief. See Graff, 65 F.4th at 520 n. 26 (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005)). We readily conclude that the Heck bar applies here, where Mr. Hubble explicitly claims his conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution— particularly his claimed right to a jury trial—and seeks a federal court judgment declaring as much. 3 Mr. Hubble argues Heck is inapplicable because a judgment in his favor would not necessarily invalidate his conviction. We cannot agree. His efforts to explain 3 Although the Heck bar means we do not address Mr. Hubble’s claims on the merits, we observe that “[t]he Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial for civil cases does not apply in state proceedings,” and that for “minor speeding violations that impose small fines as the only sanction . . . there can be no question that a state may classify such an infraction as civil; thus, there is no Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.” Elliott v. City of Wheat Ridge, 49 F.3d 1458, 1459 (10th Cir. 1995). 4 Appellate Case: 26-3020 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 5 how his claim would not invalidate his conviction are unpersuasive. He asserts that he “challenges the denial of adjudication of a constitutional request and the conduct of municipal officials during the municipal proceedings, rather than the validity of the traffic citation itself,” Opening Br. at 7; that his “claim targets the absence of adjudication itself,” Reply Br. at 1; and that success on his claims “would establish only that a constitutional right was denied without adjudication. It would not require invalidation of the conviction,” id. at 2. He also argues that the district court erred because it “never determined whether any adjudication occurred with respect to the invoked constitutional right,” id., and states that he seeks relief for the “denial of constitutional process,” as an injury that “exists independently of the conviction.” Id. But none of these statements change our conclusion that, at bottom, Mr. Hubble claims his municipal court conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution. Thus, if he were to prevail on his claims, a judgment in his favor would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. III. We also affirm the district court’s denial of leave to amend. We generally review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion, but here we apply de novo review because we construe the district court’s ruling as based on its legal conclusion that amendment would be futile. See Johnson v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 97 F.4th 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2024). However, Mr. Hubble has not shown any basis to reverse. As explained above, because his claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, they are barred by Heck. And Mr. Hubble has not 5 Appellate Case: 26-3020 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 6 identified any facts he might allege that would alter the nature of his claims or avoid application of the Heck bar. Because further amendment would therefore have been futile, we affirm the district court’s denial of leave to amend. IV. We affirm. Entered for the Court Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge 6