Shenbaum v. City of Manhattan Beach
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledOctober 21, 2026
Docket25-3501
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 21 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID SHENBAUM, an individual; No. 25-3501
TIMOTHY O’BRIEN, an individual, D.C. No.
2:22-cv-08062-KS
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF MANHATTAN BEACH,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Karen L. Stevenson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 19, 2026**
Pasadena, California
Before: BUMATAY, VANDYKE, and MENDOZA, JR., Circuit Judges.
Appellants David Shenbaum and Timothy O’Brien appeal the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee the City of Manhattan Beach on
both of Appellants’ First Amendment retaliation claims. The first claim alleges that
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the City entered an agreement altering compensation for the “Battalion Chief”
position (the “2020 Agreement”) in retaliation for Appellants’ role in an early 2018
Vote of No Confidence (“VONC”) against a past fire chief. The second claim
contends that Appellants’ failure on a 2023 promotional exam for the “Division
Chief” position was retaliation for filing this lawsuit. We review grants of summary
judgment de novo. Thompson v. Cent. Valley Sch. Dist. No 365, 163 F.4th 654, 662
(9th Cir. 2025). We affirm.
To allege a First Amendment retaliation claim, public employees must first
show (1) that they “spoke on a matter of public concern,” (2) that they “spoke as a
private citizen or public employee,” (3) and that this “protected speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in the [imposition of] adverse employment action.”
Greisen v. Hanken, 925 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2019) (simplified).
1. The district court’s summary-judgment ruling in favor of the City on
Appellants’ 2020-Agreement claim was proper because they failed to create a triable
issue on adverse action and causation. First, Appellants argue that the 2020
Agreement served as an adverse action because they would face a lower salary if
they were ever promoted to the permanent Battalion Chief position. But it’s
uncontested that the 2020 Agreement had no effect on a position they actually held
and so it could not “negatively affect[]” their compensation. Ellins v. City of Sierra
Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013) (simplified). Appellants cannot create
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a triable issue based on pure speculation on a hypothetical future position that they
did not hold.
Second, even assuming an adverse action, Appellants cannot create a triable
issue on whether the VONC was a “substantial motivating factor” for the 2020
Agreement. Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 979 (9th Cir.
2002). Appellants rely on an alleged March 2018 text exchange between firefighters
regarding the VONC to establish employer opposition to speech, but that exchange
occurred more than two years before the 2020 Agreement. Cf. Keyser v. Sacramento
City Unified Sch. Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 752 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a retaliation
claim failed because an employer’s knowledge of protected speech occurred over
two years before the alleged adverse action). Nor can Appellants show that the
City’s rationale for the 2020 Agreement was pretextual. See Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 980.
Uncertainty surrounding the COVID pandemic bolstered the City’s financial
concerns about the fire chief’s compensation and overtime calculations. Appellants
suggest that the City restored the 2020 Agreement’s cut to longevity pay as soon as
the 2023 Exam rendered them ineligible for the position, but that occurred two years
after the 2020 Agreement was consummated and almost five years after the VONC.
2. Summary judgment was also appropriate on Appellants’ 2023-promotional-
exam claim because of the lack of causation. See Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah
County, 556 F.3d 797, 804 (9th Cir. 2009). For this claim, Appellants alleged that
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the City designed the 2023 exam so that they would fail and that they did in fact fail
the exam. But the 2023 exam utilized outside panelists who all attested that they
lacked any knowledge of Appellants’ lawsuit, and Appellants have not effectively
created a material dispute as to these facts. Those panelists unanimously failed
Appellants based on multiple non-retaliatory reasons. The use of independent
panelists breaks any causation here. See id. (holding that a “final decision maker is
not liable” when an adverse action was based on a reason “sufficiently independent”
from an unlawful motive).
3. Because Appellants’ underlying constitutional claims fail, their claims
against the City under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), also
fail. See Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020).
4. Finally, because Appellants’ claim based on the 2020 Agreement fails even
considering the 2018 text messages by members of the fire department, the district
court’s refusal to accept them into evidence was harmless. Cf. L.V. Sands, LLC v.
Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2011) (subjecting evidentiary ruling to harmless
error standard).
AFFIRMED.
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