Full Opinion

25-2644-cv Freckleton v. Ambulnz NY LLC UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER“). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: SUSAN L. CARNEY, MICHAEL H. PARK, EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ Malvia M. Freckleton, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 25-2644 Ambulnz NY LLC, Defendant-Appellee. _____________________________________ FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: MALVIA M. FRECKLETON, pro se, Philadelphia, PA. FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: JOHN T. MILLS, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, New York, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Donnelly, J.). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Malvia M. Freckleton, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment for Ambulnz NY LLC (“Ambulnz”). Freckleton sued Ambulnz, alleging employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”). Ambulnz moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the motion in part, dismissing Freckleton’s discrimination claims, but permitting her Title VII and ADEA retaliation claims to proceed.1 Freckleton v. Ambulnz NY LLC, No. 21-CV-4615, 2022 WL 4644673 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022). Ambulnz moved under Federal Rule of Civil 1 On appeal, Freckleton does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of her discrimination claims. Accordingly, she has abandoned any related arguments. See Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y., 16 F.4th 1070, 1074 (2d Cir. 2021). 2 Procedure 56(a) for summary judgment on the remaining retaliation claims. Freckleton v. Ambulnz NY LLC, No. 21-CV-4615, 2025 WL 2689589 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2025). The district court granted the motion, concluding that Freckleton established a prima facie case of retaliation, but failed to show that Ambulnz’s legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for her transfer and termination were pretextual. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal. 2 “We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment after construing all evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving party.” Sotomayor v. City of New York, 713 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2013). “Summary judgment is appropriate only when ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017). First, even assuming that Freckleton established a prima facie case of retaliation, we agree that no reasonable juror could conclude that Ambulnz’s proffered legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for her transfer and termination were pretextual. The 2 We deny as moot Freckleton’s pending motion to serve because we understand that she has since received Ambulnz’s brief. 3 record was replete with evidence that Ambulnz’s legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for transferring Freckleton was offered contemporaneously—it was not a post hoc invention. Moreover, Freckleton stopped appearing for work only three days after Ambulnz transferred her to the medical billing department on September 17, 2019. And Ambulnz had learned of her discrimination claims only a week prior, on September 11. Given this short period of time, a reasonable juror could not conclude that the confusion over who would lead the investigation and the fact that Ambulnz had yet to conduct an investigation showed that the stated reason for the transfer—to separate Freckleton from those she was alleging of discrimination pending an investigation—was pretextual. Second, as to Freckleton’s termination, we agree that no reasonable juror could conclude that Ambulnz’s proffered reason was pretextual. Ambulnz asserted that its reason for terminating her employment was because she abandoned her job by failing to show up for work for three consecutive days. Freckleton fails to point to any evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that this reason was pretextual. Ambulnz’s reason for her termination was again contemporaneous—it was not post hoc. And Freckleton did not dispute that she violated Ambulnz’s absence policy. Nor did she dispute that the day before she stopped returning to work, she was given a positive assessment of her work in the medical billing department and was explicitly told that Ambulnz did not wish to fire her. 4 We have considered all of Freckleton’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 5