Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0452n.06 No. 26-1045 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 13, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) WILLIAM WOODS, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN, ) Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION ) ) Before: CLAY, NALBANDIAN, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges. CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff William Woods appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action against the City of Detroit. Woods brought Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 and 12203, alleging that the Detroit Police Department involuntarily retired him due to his disability. Because the district court correctly held that Woods’ initial Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) complaint was untimely and that his claims therefore were time-barred, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Woods began working for the City of Detroit as a police officer in 1998. In 2000, he suffered on-duty brain, neck, and lower-back injuries. Due to an on-duty lower-back reinjury in 2016, Woods transitioned to restricted-duty work in Communications Operations, reviewing and processing paperwork in the police department’s administrative office. No. 26-1045, Woods v. City of Detroit In a December 18, 2017 letter, the Police and Fire Retirement System of the City of Detroit (“PFRS”) informed Woods that the police department had filed an application to retire him on non-duty disability. Given his on-duty injuries, Woods applied for a duty disability retirement in January 2018. Woods attended an April 5, 2018 hearing at which the Police and Fire Board of Trustees (the “PFBT” or the “Pension Board”) approved his duty disability retirement application. The PFRS notified Woods in an April 20, 2018 letter of the PFBT’s April 5, 2018 decision, with the caveat that Woods had yet to complete certain forms. Woods then retired on April 30, 2018. B. Procedural History Woods filed a Charge of Discrimination against the City of Detroit Police Department with the EEOC on February 21, 2019, claiming that on April 30, 2018, he “was suddenly denied [his] reasonable accommodation”—restricted-duty Communications work—“and involuntarily retired due to [his] disability, in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.” Charge of Discrimination, R. 26-7, PageID #212. In January 2023, the EEOC issued a Determination stating that “there is reasonable cause to believe” that Woods was “denied a reasonable accommodation and subjected to involuntary retirement, in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.” EEOC Determination, R. 27-11, PageID #444; Summ. J. Order, R. 33, PageID #625. Woods filed a complaint in March 2023 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging ADA claims of discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112, and retaliation, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12203. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that (i) Woods’ claims were time-barred because he did not file his EEOC Charge of Discrimination within 300 days of the relevant alleged adverse action as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), and (ii) Woods had failed to state a claim. -2- No. 26-1045, Woods v. City of Detroit The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the limitations period for Woods’ claims began on April 5, 2018—the date the PFBT approved Woods’ duty disability retirement—and ended January 30, 2019, making Woods’ February 21, 2019 Charge of Discrimination untimely. The district court accordingly dismissed Woods’ claims as time-barred. The district court additionally held that, because Woods’ Charge of Discrimination did not allege and the EEOC Determination did not discuss retaliation, Woods failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his retaliation claim, an additional basis for dismissing it. Because the district court dismissed Woods’ claims as time-barred, it did not address whether there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to their merits. Woods filed a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b), arguing that (i) because there was no evidence provided by either party as to the date of Woods’ receipt of the April 20, 2018 letter notifying him of the PFBT’s April 5, 2018 decision, the district court should not have given the City the presumption of untimeliness on summary judgment, and (ii) the district court should have equitably tolled the limitations period. The district court denied Woods’ motion for reconsideration. The court first rejected Woods’ argument that he was not aware on April 5, 2018 of the PFBT’s approval that day of his duty disability retirement, finding that Woods testified that he had attended the hearing at which the PFBT granted that approval. The district court also rejected Woods’ arguments for equitable tolling, stating that it did not find reasonable “Woods’ possible ignorance of the time for filing his claim.” Order Denying Mot. for Reconsideration, R. 36, PageID #653–56. This timely appeal followed the district court’s denial of Woods’ motion for reconsideration. -3- No. 26-1045, Woods v. City of Detroit II. DISCUSSION On appeal, Woods argues that we should reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment because he timely filed his EEOC Charge of Discrimination or, alternatively, because the district court should have equitably tolled the limitations period. Woods also appears to argue that the City waived its timeliness arguments by raising them on summary judgment instead of a motion to dismiss. We address each argument in turn, reviewing the district court’s judgment de novo. See Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1999). A. Limitations Period Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), an employee generally must file an EEOC charge “within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” But in so-called deferral jurisdictions, which have “a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from” unlawful employment practices, a 300-day limitations period applies if the employee has “instituted proceedings with [the relevant] State or local agency.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 827 (6th Cir. 2019). This case arises in the deferral jurisdiction of Michigan, in which the Michigan Department of Civil Rights (“MDCR”) investigates unlawful employment practices. See Logan, 939 F.3d at 827. Accordingly, because Woods instituted proceedings with the MDCR, he needed to “file a charge within . . . 300 days of the date of the” alleged unlawful employment practice “or lose the ability to recover for it.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002). “[T]he limitations period does not begin to run on a claim for employment discrimination until an employer makes and communicates a final decision to the employee.” EEOC v. UPS, 249 F.3d 557, 561 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980)). “Once the employee is aware or reasonably should be aware of the employer’s decision, the limitations -4- No. 26-1045, Woods v. City of Detroit period commences.” Id. at 562. “Discrete acts” that begin the limitations period are “easy to identify” and include “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. Here, the PFBT made its final employment decision—its approval of Woods’ duty disability retirement—at its hearing on April 5, 2018. The PFBT communicated this decision to Woods that day, as shown by Woods’ testimony that he attended the hearing: Q Did anyone tell you that the Detroit Police Department’s non-duty retirement was approved and then changed? A I’m sure they did, but I don’t remember who it was because it was in front of the Pension Board to be approved, but that was based on the Pension Board doctor making his final decision on my status, duty or non-duty, and he changed it. He came into the Pension Board and he told them I should not be non-duty disabled. I should be disabled and then they voted to change it right there. Q Were you present at a hearing? A I was. Q When was that? A I don’t remember. Q Was it April 5, 2018? A I have no idea. Do you have the record of they accepted the request? Q I gave you the document. Let’s see. I showed you—I’m not sure what exhibit it is, the April 20th letter from the Pension Board? . . . A Okay. Yeah. Right. This was after Dr. O’Neal told them it should be changed. . . . Q Okay. And so you were told there was going to be a hearing regarding your retirement? A Yes. Q And— A Oh, I’m sorry. I remember. It was Dr. O’Neal who told me there would be a hearing. Q Okay. A And he told me when it would be and he told me I should be able to possibly could be there and then I talked to Mark Diaz and he told me in so many words he told me that he’ll let me do it even though it’s not a thing. Q He’ll let you what? -5- No. 26-1045, Woods v. City of Detroit A He’ll let me attend the meeting. Q Did you speak? A No. Woods Dep. Trans., R. 26-2, PageID #186. The PFBT therefore made and communicated to Woods its decision on his retirement application on April 5, 2018, commencing the 300-day limitations period on his claims that ended January 30, 2019. Resisting this conclusion, Woods contends that the limitations period commenced on his last day of work, April 30, 2018, as he continued working after the PFBT’s April 5 decision and could have believed the retirement process to be “ongoing until his actual separation from employment.” Appellant’s Reply Br., ECF. No. 15, 4; see also Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12, 18. But that is precisely the position rejected in Ricks, in which the Supreme Court overturned the Third Circuit’s holding that an employee “should not be expected to resort to litigation until termination actually has occurred” because “the initial decision to terminate an employee sometimes might be reversed.” 449 U.S. at 255–56. Rather, the Court held, “[m]ere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination.” Id. at 257. Woods argues, however, that his case is distinct from Ricks and is “much closer to UPS, where this Court recognized that a claim does not accrue before an ongoing process culminates in a final loss of employment.” Appellant’s Reply Br., ECF. No. 15, 2 (citing UPS, 249 F.3d at 562). This analogy fails. The UPS employee was a Texas UPS driver who requested a location transfer after developing a serious reaction to a local allergen. 249 F.3d at 559. The company refused the transfer but, the employee alleged, suggested that he resign his Texas position and reapply for an Ohio UPS role. Id. The employee then quit his job and applied for a Cincinnati UPS position, but the company did not rehire him. Id. In the ensuing action, we held that the limitations period for -6- No. 26-1045, Woods v. City of Detroit the employee’s claims began when he learned he would not be rehired, as the “ongoing process” between the employee and UPS “ended when [he] found himself without a job.” Id. at 562. Here, Woods uses this holding to argue that the limitations period for his claims also commenced “when [he] found himself without a job,” that is, on April 30, 2018. Id. But the UPS employee’s claims accrued “when [he] found himself without a job,” not because employment discrimination claims accrue upon termination after an ongoing process, but because “it was not until after [he] was denied rehire in Ohio that he was aware of any adverse employment action of which he could complain.” Id. Here, Woods was made “aware of an[] adverse employment action of which he could complain,” id., on April 5, 2018, when he attended the PFBT hearing at which his retirement was approved, see Woods Dep. Trans., R. 26-2, PageID #186. Accordingly, the 300-day limitations period on Woods’ claims began April 5, 2018, and ended January 30, 2019, making his February 21, 2019 Charge of Discrimination untimely. B. Equitable Tolling Woods alternatively argues that his claims should be subject to equitable tolling. “[F]iling a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to . . . equitable tolling.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). This Court “has repeatedly cautioned that equitable tolling relief should be granted only sparingly.” Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 2001). “In determining whether the equitable tolling of the EEOC filing period is appropriate in a given case, we have consistently taken into consideration the following five factors: 1) lack of notice of the filing requirement; 2) lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; 3) diligence in pursuing one’s rights; 4) absence of prejudice -7- No. 26-1045, Woods v. City of Detroit to the defendant; and 5) the plaintiff’s reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement for filing his claim.” Id. These five factors, however, “are neither comprehensive nor material in all cases,” and “a litigant’s failure to meet a legally-mandated deadline due to unavoidab[le] . . . circumstances beyond that litigant’s control is often the most significant consideration in courts’ analyses, rather than any particular factor of the five-part standard.” Zappone v. United States, 870 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2017) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham- Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560–61 (6th Cir. 2000)). Further, “[i]t is well-settled that ignorance of the law alone is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling,” Graham-Humphreys, 209 F.3d at 561 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)), and a litigant’s “failure to show diligence is essentially fatal to [a] request for equitable tolling,” Martin v. Ford Motor Co., No. 21-6089, 2022 WL 17076782, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2022). Finally, a “litigant carr[ies] the burden of establishing [his] entitlement to equitable tolling.” Zappone, 870 F.3d at 556 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 718–19 (6th Cir. 2014)). Woods does not make a sufficient showing for equitable tolling. At the outset, his “failure to show diligence is essentially fatal to his request for equitable tolling.” Martin, 2022 WL 17076782, at *2. He offers no evidence of his diligence, merely stating that “there is no evidence that [he] was not diligent in cooperating with the EEOC process once it began.” Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12, 21. His case hardly fares better with respect to the first two Amini factors, as to which he references his lack of “assistance in filling out the Charge of Discrimination” and this Court’s holding in Dixon v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 2004). Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12, 20. But -8- No. 26-1045, Woods v. City of Detroit Woods’ claimed “ignorance of the law alone is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling,” Graham-Humphreys, 209 F.3d at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rose, 945 F.2d at 1335), and as the district court observed, equitable tolling was not at issue in Dixon. With respect to the fifth factor, Woods discusses his brain injury, severe depression, anxiety, and PTSD. But these difficulties do not establish a specific “unavoidab[le] . . . circumstance[] beyond [Woods’] control” that made him unable to file timely. Zappone, 870 F.3d at 556 (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham-Humphreys, 209 F.3d at 561); see also Jones v. Rutherford Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 17– 5524, 2018 WL 2666682, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2018) (“Nothing in the record suggests that equitable tolling is appropriate. . . . Although Jones claims that her injuries affected her ability to file a timely charge with the EEOC, she does not present evidence sufficient to establish she was unable to file a timely charge.”). Thus, the only factor potentially weighing in Woods’ favor is the fourth, “absence of prejudice to the defendant.” Amini, 259 F.3d at 500. That is insufficient for equitable tolling. See Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984). C. Waiver In the section of his brief concerning the fourth Amini factor, Woods suggests, without citing any authority, that “this Court can consider [his] argument below that by failing to raise this issue by way of motion to dismiss at the outset of the litigation, [the City] demonstrated a lack of prejudice and had waived its ability to raise this issue on summary judgment following discovery.” Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12, 21. This appears to refer to the following portion of Woods’ response to the City’s motion for summary judgment: “[I]f the Court finds that Mr. Woods should have filed based on the December 18, 2017 date, rather than the date of his retirement on April 30, 2018, equitable tolling should be applied. Finally, by failing to raise this issue by way of motion until -9- No. 26-1045, Woods v. City of Detroit now, the City waived its argument.” Pl.’s Resp. to Summ. J. Mot., R. 27, PageID #236. To the extent that Woods argues here that the City waived its timeliness arguments, that contention is meritless: The City’s first affirmative defense was that Woods “failed to exhaust all administrative remedies under the relevant statutes,” and its third affirmative defense states that “[s]ome if not all of [Woods’] claims may be barred by the statute of limitations.” Answer, R. 8, PageID #37–38. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons above, Woods’ EEOC Charge of Discrimination was untimely, and equitable tolling is not warranted. His claims against the City are therefore time-barred. We thus do not reach Woods’ failure-to-exhaust and merits-based arguments. Accordingly, this Court AFFIRMS the district court’s judgment. - 10 -