Full Opinion

RENDERED: OCTOBER 23, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0980-MR MARTIN CHESTER APPELLANT APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE MELISSA L. BELLOWS, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CI-002357 LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT AND CORY EVANS APPELLEES OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; EASTON AND A. JONES, JUDGES. THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Martin Chester appeals from two orders which granted summary judgment to the Louisville-Jefferson County Metropolitan Government (“Metro”) and Cory Evans. The court’s orders found that Mr. Chester filed his complaint outside the one-year statute of limitations timeframe applicable to his claims. On appeal, Mr. Chester argues that the statute of limitations time should have been tolled or that Appellees should have been estopped from raising it as a defense. We believe that the trial court’s conclusions in this case were correct and affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On the night of May 31, 2020, Mr. Chester was in downtown Louisville, Kentucky participating in racial justice protests surrounding the death of Breonna Taylor. At approximately 9:30-10:00 p.m., Mr. Chester was present near the intersection of Brook and Broadway, where Louisville Metro Police Department (“LMPD”) officers were ordering protesters to disperse. Mr. Chester separated from the other protestors and recalls more than 15 law enforcement officers coming toward him, shooting pepper bullets, and yelling at him to get on the ground. He immediately went to his knees and raised his hands in surrender. While Mr. Chester was kneeling, he was struck in the back of the head with an object he believed to be a police baton. Mr. Chester did not see who struck him, but it was later revealed that LMPD Officer Evans had struck him. The blow caused Mr. Chester to fall forward to the ground as he bled from the back of his head. He was then tackled by other officers and arrested. LMPD officers eventually transported Mr. Chester to the University of Louisville Hospital to treat his wound. Mr. Chester was diagnosed with a subarachnoid hemorrhage, subdural hematoma, scalp laceration, and hearing loss. -2- Mr. Chester was treated and taken to jail. He was released shortly thereafter and all charges against him were later dismissed and expunged. On June 9, 2020, Mr. Chester went to the LMPD Professional Standards Unit (“PSU”) and filed a complaint about his arrest. He stated that he did not know who had struck him and indicated he believed he was struck by a police baton. The PSU officer took his statement and informed him the incident would be investigated. Unbeknownst to Mr. Chester, due to his injury, an investigation was already ongoing and had identified Officer Evans as his assailant. At all relevant points, Officer Evans lied to multiple superior officers about striking Mr. Chester and stated that Mr. Chester fell off a fence and hit the ground. For the next year, the LMPD PSU, FBI, and federal prosecutors investigated Officer Evans and the events of May 31, 2020. Mr. Chester had contact with multiple people working for these entities. At no time did any official tell Mr. Chester who hit him. In addition, at no time did Mr. Chester ask any of these officials if they knew who struck him. In late May of 2021, nearly one year after the assault, Assistant United States Attorney Amanda Gregory contacted Mr. Chester about the federal investigation and identified Officer Evans as the officer who assaulted him. On June 9, 2021, the United States filed a criminal information -3- charging Officer Evans with crimes regarding his assault on Mr. Chester. Officer Evans eventually pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on February 1, 2022. On May 11, 2022, Mr. Chester filed the underlying lawsuit against Appellees and raised the following causes of action: 42 U.S.C.1 §1983 civil rights violations; 42 U.S.C. §1985 conspiracy; use of excessive force; assault; battery; and false imprisonment. On June 14, 2023, Mr. Chester filed an amended complaint raising additional allegations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights violations. After some discovery, Appellees filed motions for summary judgment based on the relevant statute of limitations. Appellees argued that Mr. Chester’s complaint should have been filed before May 31, 2021, one year after his arrest. In this case, all parties agree that Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 413.140(1)(a) applies. That statute requires all claims regarding personal injury to be brought within one year. Id. The federal claims, being related to the personal injury, must also be brought within that same timeframe. Million v. Raymer, 139 S.W.3d 914, 919 (Ky. 2004). Mr. Chester argued that the statute of limitations should have been tolled because he did not know specifically who injured him. He also argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled or that Appellees should be estopped from using it as a defense because Appellees concealed Officer Evans’ involvement. 1 United States Code. -4- On March 13, 2025, the trial court entered an order granting Metro’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the tolling and estoppel rules which could prolong the statute of limitations did not apply. On July 23, 2025, the trial court entered an order granting Officer Evans’s motion for summary judgment for the same reasons. This appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review on appeal when a trial court grants a motion for summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and summary judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that the nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor. The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and then the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to present at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The trial court must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists. The word “impossible,” as set forth in the standard for summary judgment, is meant to be used in a practical sense, not in an absolute sense. Because summary judgment involves only legal questions and the existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s decision and will review the issue [de novo]. -5- Blackstone Mining Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 351 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Ky. 2010), as modified on denial of reh’g (Nov. 23, 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). ANALYSIS This appeal revolves around the tolling and estoppel rules which could prolong the statute of limitations. Those rules are KRS 413.190(2), the discovery rule, equitable estoppel, and equitable tolling. KRS 413.190(2) states: When a cause of action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160 accrues against a resident of this state, and he by absconding or concealing himself or by any other indirect means obstructs the prosecution of the action, the time of the continuance of the absence from the state or obstruction shall not be computed as any part of the period within which the action shall be commenced. But this saving shall not prevent the limitation from operating in favor of any other person not so acting, whether he is a necessary party to the action or not. In addition, “[o]bstruction might also occur where a defendant conceals a plaintiff’s cause of action so that it could not be discovered by the exercise of ordinary diligence on the plaintiff’s part.” Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Ky. App. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Pursuant to the discovery rule, “a cause of action will not accrue until the plaintiff discovers (or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered) not only that he has been injured, but also that this injury may have -6- been caused by the defendant’s conduct.” Fluke Corp. v. LeMaster, 306 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). As for equitable estoppel, [t]he essential elements of equitable estoppel are (1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by, or influence, the other party or other persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. And, broadly speaking, as related to the party claiming the estoppel, the essential elements are (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice. Electric and Water Plant Bd. of City of Frankfort v. Suburban Acres Development, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Ky. 1974) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Finally, “[e]quitable tolling pauses the running of, or tolls, a statute of limitations when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.” Williams v. Hawkins, 594 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Ky. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). -7- All of these theories have one thing in common; a plaintiff must diligently pursue his or her rights and investigate his or her injury. “A person who knows he has been injured has a duty to investigate and discover the identity of the tortfeasor within the statutory time constraints.” Combs v. Albert Kahn Associates, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 190, 199 (Ky. App. 2006) (footnote and citation omitted). “Reasonable diligence means that a plaintiff must be as diligent as the great majority of persons would [be] in the same or similar circumstances[.]” R.T. Vanderbilt Co., Inc. v. Franklin, 290 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Ky. App. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the trial court held, among other things, that Mr. Chester did not diligently pursue the matter. Mr. Chester did file a complaint with the PSU, but then did nothing else. While it is true Officer Evans concealed his involvement in Mr. Chester’s injuries, the LMPD and other officials knew of his identity before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Mr. Chester was in contact with the PSU, FBI, and federal prosecutors throughout 2020 and 2021, yet he never inquired as to whether they knew the identity of his assailant. In addition, Mr. Chester did not attempt to file a freedom of information act request to seek information regarding his arrest and injury. Finally, Mr. Chester knew that LMPD was involved with his injuries, such as false imprisonment, because LMPD was the entity that arrested him; therefore, he could have filed suit against them early on -8- and used discovery to identify Officer Evans. After filing the complaint with PSU, Mr. Chester did nothing for almost two years to try and identify Officer Evans. This is not reasonable diligence. Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Mr. Chester, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that Mr. Chester’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. There is one final issue we must address in this appeal. Mr. Chester argues that, even if his other claims are barred by the statute of limitations issue, his Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), claims should still be viable. In Monell, the United States Supreme Court held that local governments may be sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for constitutional violations of their employees when the local governments’ policies or customs led to the violation. Id., 436 U.S. at 690-91. A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations. Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). In the case at hand, the FBI released a report on March 8, 2023, which concluded that the LMPD and Metro engaged in a pattern or practice of conduct that violated the United States Constitution and federal laws. Such conduct -9- included discrimination, use of excessive force, unlawful searches, and other police conduct issues. This report is what led Mr. Chester to amend his complaint. Mr. Chester argues that until this report was filed, he could not have known about the illegal policies or customs utilized by the LMPD and Metro; therefore, the Monell claim was timely raised. Unfortunately for Mr. Chester, we must disagree. Given that Monell claims allow for municipal liability for the constitutional violations of their employees only where the municipality’s policy or custom led to the violation, there can be no liability under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation. In other words, Monell-related arguments on appeal rise and fall with the success of . . . § 1983 claims. Codrington v. Dolak, 142 F.4th 884, 896 (6th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, all of Mr. Chester’s other claims have been barred as untimely; therefore, there cannot be liability under Monell. CONCLUSION While we are extremely sympathetic to Mr. Chester, we must follow the law. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. EASTON, JUDGE, CONCURS. JONES, A., JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. -10- BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON Martha Marie Eastman COUNTY METROPOLITAN Louisville, Kentucky GOVERNMENT: Ed Monarch Bruce Paul Katy Harvey Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CORY EVANS: Kenneth A. Bohnert Bradley R. Palmer Louisville, Kentucky -11-