Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1080-25 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, INSTITUTIONAL ABUSE INVESTIGATION UNIT, Petitioner-Respondent, v. N.M., Respondent-Appellant. ______________________________ Submitted October 14, 2026 – Decided October 29, 2026 Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek. On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Children and Families, Docket No. 21-0399. Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Deric D. Wu, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Nicholas J. Dolinsky, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM N.M. (Norma)1 appeals from a final agency decision by the State of New Jersey, Department of Children and Families, Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit (DCF) finding that in 2007 she physically abused her then-five-year-old granddaughter, K.M. (Katie) in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). Based on our thorough review and application of prevailing law, we affirm. I. We discern the salient facts from the record developed at the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). At the hearing, the Department proffered the testimony of an Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit (IAIU) Investigator and Norma testified in her own defense. On July 24, 2007, the DCF received a referral that five-year-old Katie had been beaten with a belt by her paternal grandmother, Norma, at the daycare where she worked, because the child had a bowel accident. Among Katie's injuries were welts and marks on her buttocks and legs, and bruising and small abrasions on her fingers. The IAIU commenced an investigation the next day, beginning by interviewing Katie at the hospital, where she reported that her grandmother had 1 We use initials and pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the family. R. 1:38- 3(d)(12). A-1080-25 2 "held her hands behind her back and beat her with a belt," striking her six times in an empty bathroom. The child relayed "her [g]randmother said she would whip her butt again if she [had another accident]." Katie's mother told an investigator she had been unaware Katie was harmed until she saw the marks when preparing her for a bath that evening. The treating physician, Dr. Manuel Nigalan, stated Katie's injuries were minor and would resolve on their own without treatment or follow-up care. The hospital records reflect "[her] injury has resulted in a contusion – a crushing of the deep tissues," but noted "[n]o injury to important structures was detected during the physician's exam." Following the hospital visit, the IAIU contacted Detective Joseph Jasiecki of the Atlantic City Police Department (ACPD) to report the incident. The ACPD commenced an investigation beginning with a visit to the daycare, where they interviewed several children and some staff. The daycare director reported she knew Norma had "discipline[d] her grand child [sic]" after working hours for having a bathroom accident. Although the director insisted the other children would not have observed anything because they were not there, the daycare's sign-out sheet revealed otherwise. Additionally, one child told investigators she saw Norma "with a brown belt" and watched Katie leave the bathroom crying. A-1080-25 3 Although the teacher initially denied providing Norma with the belt, she then admitted "that [Norma] asked for a belt [and] she gave her a belt she had in the car and left." When Norma was interviewed, she reported she discovered Katie had soiled herself, asked a teacher for a belt, took Katie into the bathroom, and hit her with the belt "about 4 or 5 times." Norma stated her son, Katie's father, "t[old] her she can discipline [Katie]" and that "she does [and] . . . will continue to beat her [g]randchildren." Norma also admitted that she had beaten Katie "about 4 or 5 other times in the past" and attempted to justify her actions by asserting her granddaughter "is too big to be using the bathroom on herself." The IAIU concluded its investigation and substantiated physical abuse against Norma as follows: The results of the investigation indicate that [Norma] utilized corporal punishment to discipline [Katie], age 5. [Katie] had an accidental bowel movement while at the day care. [Norma] hit [Katie] with a belt at least five times on her inner and outer right thigh. On July 25th 2007 [Katie] was medically examined and diagnosed at Atlantic Care Regional Medical Center with bruises. Although [Norma] is [Katie]'s paternal grandmother[,] at the time of the incident she was in the role of administrative assistant and supervising children at the day care center. [Norma]'s actions utilized excessive force and placed [Katie] at serious risk of harm. [Norma]'s actions met the statutory requirement to find physical abuse. A-1080-25 4 During the course of the investigation an issue arose [sic] regarding the teacher . . . providing the belt that was used to discipline [Katie]. This case was reviewed and approved for closing by [the] Chief of Investigations . . . . The IAIU transmitted its findings to the daycare director on August 17, 2007, reiterating that Norma's "actions met the statutory requirement to find abuse" and "recommen[d]ed that appropriate disciplinary action be taken against [Norma]." The letter went on to state, "[h]owever, every person against whom a substantiation has been made is also entitled to appeal those findings[, so] no action should be taken . . . until you are notified by the Office of Licensing. " In undated correspondence to the IAIU, the daycare director detailed corrective action taken against Norma: I met with [Norma] and explained that she would have to leave the building immediately. I explained to her that she would not be paid from July 25, 2007 until I received a report stating-it was okay for her to return to work. Please be advised that we received a telephone call from the agency on Thursday, July 26, 2007, stating that she could return to work but ·was not allowed to supervise any children. I informed [Norma] of the agencies [sic] decision, however, I made the decision to have her remain off the premises without pay as part of a corrective action to ensure that this would not happen again. On, July 30, 2007, [Norma] entered the hospital where she remained until her release on August 9, 2007, due A-1080-25 5 to the stress of this incident. In order to reiterate the seriousness of this matter I chose not to pay her for the time off. In addition when she did return to the office on August 23, 2007, she did not receive her first forty hours in pay until September 21, 2007. I am advising you of the steps we took, which was denying [m]onetary payments, [r]efusal of participation in the [w]orkforce, and [c]ounseling as steps for corrective action in this situation. Norma sent a September 11, 2007 letter to the IAIU, asking the Department to "accept this written statement as an appeal to the findings against [her]." In her letter, Norma explained that physical discipline "has been a part of [her] life" due to her "ethnic background." Norma suggested the child was not harmed because "she was still standing next to [her] and talking until [her father's] arrival." She then expressed regretting her decision to punish Katie physically and asked that the "agency see beyond this one mistake and offer . . . forgiveness." On January 7, 2008, Norma pled guilty to a charge of simple assault in Atlantic County Superior Court as "amended from a [charge of] fourth degree child abuse." During her plea allocution, Norma stated she "hit her [granddaughter] like three times with the belt." She was sentenced to two years of probation and ordered to complete a parenting class. A July 11, 2008 "IAIU Central Office Appeal Review" form stated the A-1080-25 6 substantiated finding as to Norma was affirmed. There is no evidence in the record Norma was notified of the disposition of her appeal. No further action occurred until October 27, 2021, when Norma emailed DCF, requesting the matter be "taken off of [her] record." Claiming she was "not even sure really what the final charge was," Norma wrote she had "never abused [a]ny of [her] grandchildren" and that she "work[s] with the children [a]nd [she] would like to get go [sic] back to work." She later testified she was motivated to contact DCF after she was fired from her job at a foster parent/grandparent program following the charge being revealed on a search of the Child Abuse Record Information (CARI) service. The matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) on November 22, 2021. On December 27, 2023, Norma moved to dismiss the case and remove her name from the CARI system. The ALJ denied the motion, finding the matter should proceed to an evidentiary hearing. The ALJ also denied DCF's motion for a summary decision, finding questions of fact existed concerning both whether there was excessive corporal punishment and whether Norma had received due process. At the May 6 and May 8, 2025 hearings, the DCF proffered the testimony of an IAIU investigator, who testified consistently with their written report as to A-1080-25 7 Katie's statements, the doctor's findings, and Norma's initial admission that she had perpetrated the beating without remorse. Norma also testified, stating she was instructed to discipline Katie by her son. She also testified she continued to work for the daycare for three or four years following the incident, until she was no longer able due to illness. Norma then called several DCF employees as witnesses, nearly all of whom had little or no firsthand knowledge of the case. On September 10, 2025, the ALJ issued a decision, finding Norma struck Katie three to five times with a belt, causing "cuts, bruises, welts and abrasions to her right ring finger[ and] left and right thighs and buttocks. " The ALJ concluded the injuries inflicted by Norma constituted excessive corporal punishment and DCF had proven abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. The ALJ also found that although there was a significant delay in processing Norma 's appeal, she had not established a due process violation because she did not vigorously pursue the appeal and was eventually afforded a full hearing. DCF adopted the ALJ's initial decision. This appeal follows. On appeal, Norma argues the substantiation should be reversed because DCF's fourteen-year delay in transmitting her case to the OAL deprived her of due process. She further contends her conduct did not rise to excessive corporal punishment because Katie did not suffer serious injury or require medical A-1080-25 8 treatment. DCF conversely argues the decision should be affirmed because the record supports the finding that Katie suffered abuse at the hands of Norma and there was no violation of Norma's due process rights because she knew of the substantiation against her, did not pursue her appeal until 2021, and ultimately received a full hearing. II. In reviewing final decisions of State administrative agencies, we "must 'defer to an agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Dep't of Child. & Fams., Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. K.A., 413 N.J. Super. 504, 509 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)). Thus, reviewing courts will not disturb an administrative decision "unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record. " McKnight v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 476 N.J. Super. 154, 162 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)); see also Dep't. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.L., 410 N.J. Super. 159, 166 (App. Div. 2009). "'Appellate courts, however, are not bound by an agency interpretation of a strictly legal issue . . . when that interpretation is inaccurate or contrary to legislative objectives.'" J.L., 410 N.J. Super. at 166 (quoting G.S. v. Dep't of A-1080-25 9 Hum. Servs., Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 170 (1999)). III. Through this lens, we turn to the arguments raised on appeal. Norma primarily argues that the substantiated finding against her did not comport with constitutional due process requirements. Norma appears to contend that although she sought review in 2007, DCF's failure to transfer her appeal to OAL until 2021 warrants her removal from the CARI system. Because due process is satisfied as to a substantiated finding of child abuse where the caregiver asks for and receives a contested hearing before the OAL, we discern no deprivation here. See, e.g., S.C. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 242 N.J. 201, 237 (2020). The delay in adjudication did not inherently violate Norma's due process rights, especially where she made no efforts to follow up with the DCF on her appeal until fourteen years later. We conclude Department of Children & Families, Division of Child Protection & Permanency v. E.D.-O., 223 N.J. 166 (2015), and Department of Children & Families, Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit v. E.L., 454 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 2018), relied on by Norma as support for her position, are distinguishable. While those cases involved a four-year and an eight-year delay, respectively, neither case was decided solely on those facts. See E.D.-O., 223 N.J. at 194-95; E.L., 454 N.J. A-1080-25 10 Super at 13. In E.D.-O., where the appellant mother apparently made no argument regarding the delay in her case, the Court reversed a substantiated finding of child abuse because, inter alia, DCF did not "evaluat[e] . . . the totality of the circumstances . . . through a hearing." 223 N.J. at 170-71, 194. The dictum in E.D.-O. regarding the length of the proceedings that Norma presents as dispositive was not the Court's primary holding. See id. at 194-95. In E.L., we determined DCF "acted arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably in determining the ALJ abused her discretion in dismissing [a child-abuse administrative proceeding]," where the mother was able to show prejudice resulting from the Department's delays. 454 N.J. Super. at 25. While Norma attempts to characterize the discovery process in her case as similarly "egregious," nothing in the record suggests it was out of the ordinary. See id. at 10, 14-16. While the ALJ granted Norma's motion to compel discovery at one point in this case, the discovery problems did not seem to "persist[]" as they did in E.L., where the record included an ALJ admonition of DCF for producing documents that were "not relevant." See id. at 17-18. Thus, while administrative delays are disfavored 2 and can sometimes 2 Indeed, "[n]o one . . . is served when an issue as important as whether an adult abused or neglected a child remains unresolved for years." E.D.-O., 454 N.J. at 194. A-1080-25 11 "take on the specter of the absurd," E.D.-O., 223 N.J. at 194, such delays are not on their own a deprivation of due process, especially where a substantiated caregiver does not attempt to vindicate their own rights. In Department of Children & Families, Division of Child Protection & Permanency v. G.R., we "disagree[d] that [a substantiated parent] was denied due process" by a delay of several years caused by DCF's failure to transmit an appeal to the OAL. 435 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (App. Div. 2014). In that case, we concluded the parent's "failure to exercise available judicial remedies . . . militates against her claim that she was deprived of procedural due process." Ibid. Similarly, Norma "could have applied to compel [DCF] to schedule and conduct an OAL hearing," but did not. See id. at 402 (citing Hosp. Ctr. at Orange v. Guhl, 331 N.J. Super. 322, 340 (App. Div. 2000)) ("[T]he availability of . . . judicial remed[ies] may negate any claim that a party has been deprived of a constitutionally protected interest as a result of agency inaction."). While Norma cites to G.R., she does not make a similar fundamental fairness argument or assert any specific prejudice resulting from substantial delay, such as the fading of witnesses' memories, that would render the hearing she was afforded inherently unfair. See, e.g., In re Kallen, 92 N.J. 14, 31 (1983); Ararat, Inc. v. Dep't of Env't Prot., 132 N.J. Super. 305, 309-10 (App. Div. 1975). Instead, she A-1080-25 12 argues the delay itself categorically warrants reversal of the ALJ's decision, an argument unsupported by prevailing law. See, e.g., G.R., 435 N.J. Super. at 404 (quoting Kallen, 92 N.J. at 27) ("[D]elay alone 'will not generally affect the validity of an administrative determination . . . where no prejudice is shown. '"). Although Norma initially asserted she was not even aware "of her substantiated finding, that she had a right to request an OAL hearing or that her substantiated finding could be released to persons and employers ," the record belies her claim. In the September 11, 2007 letter Norma sent to IAIU, she plainly and unambiguously states she is asking for "an appeal to the findings against [her] by the Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit." Because Norma did not pursue remedies available to her and ultimately received a full hearing on the OAL appeal she requested, we conclude her due process rights were not violated and the final agency decision was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. IV. Prevailing law does not support Norma's position the ALJ's finding that she used excessive corporal punishment was improper because "[h]er actions did not leave her granddaughter with any serious injury or require any medical intervention" and she has not "used punishment in a similar fashion since the A-1080-25 13 incident with [Katie]." DCF is vested with the statutory authority "[t]o provide for the protection of children under [eighteen] years of age who have had serious injury inflicted upon them by other than accidental means." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(a). Where there has been a report of potential child abuse, DCF will investigate the referral and make a finding of whether the allegations are "substantiated" or "unfounded." See N.J.A.C. 10:129-5.3(a). "Substantiated" means a finding when the available information, as evaluated by the child protective investigator, indicates by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is an abused or neglected child as defined in N.J.A.C. 10:133-1.3 because the alleged child victim has been harmed or placed at risk of harm by a parent or guardian. [N.J.A.C. 10:129-1.3.] When there has been such a finding, the individual is entered into the confidential CARI system maintained by DCF. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11. An inquiry into child abuse or neglect "should focus on harm to the child, rather than on the intent of the caregiver." Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. S.H., 439 N.J. Super. 137, 145 (App. Div. 2015) (citing G.S., 161 N.J. at 180). The governing statute defines an "abused or neglected child" as one less than eighteen years old: A-1080-25 14 whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or guardian, as herein defined, to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment. [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b); see also J.L., 410 N.J. Super. at 166-67.] "'Excessive corporal punishment' is not defined by statute, but is determined on a case-by-case basis." S.H., 439 N.J. Super. at 145 (citing K.A., 413 N.J. Super. at 511). Indeed, this State does not ban a parent from employing any corporal punishment at all; "a parent may inflict moderate correction as is reasonable under the circumstances of a case." K.A., 413 N.J. Super. at 510 (quoting State v. T.C., 347 N.J. Super. 219, 239-40 (App. Div. 2002)). Thus, in the absence of "serious" injury "where medical intervention proves to be necessary," courts will examine the circumstances of the case to see whether the adult's actions "go[] beyond what is proper and reasonable." Id. at 511-12. We are unconvinced K.A. supports Norma's position that the record lacks evidence of excessive corporal punishment sufficient to substantiate the final agency decision against her. In K.A., we reversed the substantiation of abuse or neglect against a mother who struck her eight-year-old daughter "with a closed A-1080-25 15 fist." 413 N.J. Super. at 506, 512-13. The child in K.A. had a "pervasive development disorder," and we concluded the mother did not act excessively because she was "confronted with a psychologically disruptive child," was effectively without familial support, and her daughter's injuries were not permanent and were not part of a pattern of abuse. Id. at 512. K.A. "accepted full responsibility for her actions, was contrite, and complied with Division - sponsored counseling," which supported this court's finding that "labeling K.A. a child abuser is factually unwarranted and legally unsustainable." Id. at 512- 13. Norma also distinguishes the bruising and superficial cuts she inflicted on her granddaughter from the injuries this court considered to be "excessive" in S.H. In S.H., we affirmed the substantiation of abuse or neglect where a mother had beaten her son with a golf club and left him with bite marks that necessitated prompt medical treatment. 439 N.J. Super. at 147. Norma overlooks that courts must examine the reasonableness, not just the severity, of the corporal punishment to determine if it was "excessive." K.A., 413 N.J. Super. at 512. We are unpersuaded that K.A. and S.H. dictate the outcome here. Here, Norma beat five-year-old Katie with a belt after the child had a bathroom accident. Young children routinely have such accidents. Therefore, given the A-1080-25 16 facts established in the record, it was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable for the ALJ to have found punishing a five-year-old for such an accident by beating her with a belt is "excessive." Indeed, the mundane nature of Katie's accident mirrors the situations this court contemplated in K.A., where we stated "common sense dictates that if K.A. had done what she did here in response to [her child's] request for a glass of water or to stay up past her bedtime, no reasonable person would dispute that her actions were 'excessive.'" 413 N.J. Super. at 512. Norma further argues her "contrit[ion] and willing[ness] to comply with services" itself could warrant reversal of the substantiated finding against her. While, in K.A., we did consider that the mother "accepted full responsibility for her actions" and expressed remorse as support for its ultimate reversal of the substantiation of child abuse or neglect, that alone was not dispositive. See id. at 512-13. Even considering this factor, Norma's regret for her actions has not been consistent. Far from K.A.'s "sobbing throughout the interview [with DCF]," id. at 507, Norma said "she knew what she was doing by beating [Katie] because [Katie] is too big to be using the bathroom on herself." In stark contrast to K.A., where we reversed the substantiated finding as the "incident . . . appear[ed] to be aberrational to th[e] family," id. at 513, here, Norma admitted A-1080-25 17 she routinely conducted such beatings: [Norma] stated she is the disciplinarian in her family. [Norma] stated she does beat her [g]randchildren. [Norma] stated when her [g]randchildren come to her home they know if they don't do what they are supposed to do she will beat them. [Norma] stated her children bring her [g]randchildren to her just so she can discipline them. [Norma] stated she assumes all responsibility for beating [Katie] and she will continue to beat her [g]randchildren because she won't have the State come to her in [five] years because her [g]randchildren are out of control. Norma's circumstances do not resemble those we have previously considered as warranting reversal of substantiated findings of abuse and neglect. Because there was substantial credible evidence in the record to support the final agency decision affirming the ALJ's finding of excessive corporal punishment, we conclude it was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Affirmed. A-1080-25 18