Morton v. O'Donnell

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Morton v. O’Donnell LINDSEY MORTON v. MIRIAM O’DONNELL (AC 48616) Elgo, Suarez and Seeley, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment dismissing her com- plaint alleging defamation by the defendant. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 15-8) because the court misapplied and/or misstated the law of defamation. Held: The trial court misapplied the applicable law of defamation when it con- cluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant’s statements were made with actual malice, as the plaintiff was not a public official and, as a private person, was required to prove only a negligent misstatement of fact, and neither party asserted that the court properly applied the standard of actual malice. Although the trial court misapplied the law of defamation, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the alternative ground that the court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s action under Practice Book § 15-8 for her failure to make out a prima facie case of defamation, as, with respect to certain of the defendant’s statements that arguably could be considered actionable state- ments of fact, the plaintiff failed to put forth sufficient evidence of damages. Argued April 21—officially released November 3, 2026 Procedural History Action to recover damages for defamation, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the court, Gould, J., granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed. George K. Guarino, with whom, on the brief, was Edward N. Lerner, for the appellant (plaintiff). Dennis M. Durao, with whom was Keith T. Trumbo, for the appellee (defendant). Opinion SUAREZ, J. In this defamation action, the plaintiff, Lindsey Morton, appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Miriam  Morton v. O’Donnell O’Donnell. On appeal, the plaintiff claims, inter alia,1 that the court improperly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Practice Book § 15-82 by, among other things, misapplying and/or misstating the law of defamation. The defendant contends that, even if this court were to agree with the plaintiff that the trial court misapplied and/or misstated the law of defamation, the court’s judgment should nevertheless be affirmed on the alternative ground that the court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s action under § 15-8 for failure to make out a prima facie case. Although we conclude that the court improperly applied the law of defamation in dismissing the plaintiff’s action, we affirm the judgment of the trial court on the basis of the alternative grounds put forth by the defendant. In a trial to the court, the plaintiff presented evidence in support of her case-in-chief, that, if believed, estab- lished the following facts. See Briarwood of Silvermine, LLC v. Yew Street Partners, LLC, 209 Conn. App. 271, 274, 267 A.3d 905 (2021) (under Practice Book § 15-8, 1 In her principal appellate brief, the plaintiff characterizes her claims raised on appeal as follows: The trial court “applied [an erroneous] legal standard for defamation,” “erred in finding that the defendant was a public official,” erroneously ruled that the plaintiff had not shown a prima facie case for malice “[d]espite the plaintiff not being required to establish malice,” “erred . . . [by] failing to view the evidence at trial in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,” “erred in granting the defendant’s motion in limine to preclude a witness who the defendant had sent the defamatory letter to from testifying,” and “erred in pre- cluding the plaintiff from soliciting evidence at trial on the ground of relevancy that would have established that . . . the defendant recklessly disregarded the truth . . . .” We have reframed the plaintiff’s claims, in some instances condensing closely related claims, to more accurately reflect the arguments in her briefs. See, e.g., Doe v. Quinnipiac University, 218 Conn. App. 170, 173 n.4, 291 A.3d 153 (2023). 2 Practice Book § 15-8 provides: “If, on the trial of any issue of fact in a civil matter tried to the court, the plaintiff has produced evidence and rested, a defendant may move for judgment of dismissal, and the judicial authority may grant such motion if the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. The defendant may offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made.”  Morton v. O’Donnell standard is whether plaintiff presented sufficient evi- dence that, if believed, would establish prima facie case). In 2022, the plaintiff, a former elementary school teacher,3 was actively involved with the Fairfield Police Athletic League (league) as both a coach for her son’s sev- enth grade basketball team and a member of the league’s board of directors (board).4 At that time, the defendant was employed by the Board of Education for the Town of Fairfield (town) as a reservations coordinator for the town’s public schools. As a reservations coordinator, the defendant was responsible for, inter alia, overseeing the rental of school facilities for outside organizations. On March 1, 2022, between 7 and 8 p.m., the plaintiff and her brother, Dan Reilly, who was the assistant coach of the plaintiff’s team, were holding a practice in the Tomlinson Middle School gymnasium (gym). Around 7:55 p.m., David Glass, who was waiting in the hallway with his teammates before their 8 p.m. rental reserva- tion, entered the gym to remind the plaintiff’s group to leave on time. After the plaintiff assured Glass that she would respect his reservation and moved toward the door- way, Glass exited the gym. Approximately two to three minutes later, Glass reentered the gym, and shouted, “okay, 8 [o’clock], get the fuck out of the gym.” Glass repeated this phrase and started to walk in circles around the gym, while telling the boys to “[t]ake their shit and get outta here.” Glass then began berating and belittling Reilly. The plaintiff testified that she then intervened in an attempt to defuse the situation. Glass then turned to the plaintiff and began “body shaming” her, got in her face, and called her a “fat loser.” In response, the plaintiff stated that Glass should “go back to the home- less shelter.” Shortly thereafter, the players collected their belong- ings and exited through a side door. Before leaving, the 3 The plaintiff left teaching in 2008, after two years. As of the time of trial, the plaintiff testified that she has not sought employment as a teacher since March 1, 2022, but she intends to return to work in the future. 4 The league has since dissolved.  Morton v. O’Donnell plaintiff took two photos of Glass and proceeded to show Glass her phone’s home screen, which read 8 p.m. Once outside, the plaintiff and Reilly spoke with Dana Banores, the custodian on duty, who had heard the commotion, and he encouraged the plaintiff to call the defendant to inform her of what had happened. The following morning, the defendant became aware of the incident and began contacting the individuals who were directly involved or who had witnessed it. After speaking with Glass and Banores, the defendant emailed Scott Torello, who served as the main point of contact between the defendant and the league. In her email, the defendant indicated that a “[l]ittle dust up” had occurred and asked Torello to remind coaches that they should leave the gym when their scheduled time expired. The defendant then spoke to the plaintiff for the first time. During their twenty-six-minute phone conversation, the plaintiff urged the defendant to ban Glass from the town’s facilities. The defendant informed the plaintiff that she did not have the authority to do so, while also communicating that Glass was a longtime renter who had never had any prior problems and who was not in the “right state of mind.” Subsequently, the defendant sent a follow-up email to Torello, stating that “[she] just talked to [the plaintiff] . . . [and] after speaking with her and catching her in a number of lies, [she is] inclined to think [the plaintiff] is part of the problem if there really was a blow-up.” Torello replied: “[The plaintiff] is one of the WORST human beings [he had] ever met. She is rude, entitled, and is always combative,” and stating that the “mere mention of her name tweaks [him].” On March 3, 2022, Torello requested that the defendant document her previous interaction with the plaintiff so that he could show it to Gary Wikman, the president of the league, and another board member. The defendant then sent a letter to Torello via email (letter) with the understanding that it would be shared with Wikman. In the letter, the defendant states: “I have worked with the [league] for over [twenty-one] years . . . and I have  Morton v. O’Donnell never felt that I needed to address the behavior of any individual until yesterday.” The defendant then sum- marizes the circumstances surrounding the incident, identifies four “lies” that the plaintiff allegedly told her concerning the incident,5 and concludes by stating that she “[could not] see any value in [the plaintiff’s] coaching 5 Specifically, the defendant’s letter states in relevant part: “On March 2, I emailed [Torello] because there had been what I called a ‘dust up’ at Tomlinson Middle School involving [the plaintiff] and a local individual, [Glass]. The [plaintiff’s] group had the gym until 8 [p.m.] and [Glass’] group had [the] gym from 8 [p.m. to] 10 [p.m.]. [Glass] entered the gym while [the plaintiff’s group] was still playing to be sure he would get in on time, an ugly exchange soon followed and I received an email from the [h]ead [c]ustodian at Tomlinson asking that I look into it. “[Glass] had already left me a voicemail stating that he was 100 [per- cent] in the wrong, should have stayed outside, and should most defi- nitely not [have] cursed at [the plaintiff], and especially not in front of children, [and] he apologized profusely to all. He has used the gyms for about [twenty] years without incident and I have never heard a negative comment about his group. He did state that [the plaintiff] screamed at him that ‘he should return to the homeless shelter he came from,’ and he did not think she was a good candidate to coach children. “I then received a call from [the plaintiff] who was absolutely incensed and demanded to know if [Glass] was a Fairfield resident because she wanted him banned from using the schools. She stated that she had to let the children out a side door because they were terrified by [Glass] and ‘fled in terror.’ The custodian, [Banores], said the children regularly use the side door to leave, and left making jokes about [Glass]. That was the first lie. “Second [l]ie, [the plaintiff] said [Banores] told her that he was glad to see someone confront [Glass] because he is a constant problem, [Banores] says he never said that to her, nor has [Glass] ever been a problem. “Lie [n]umber [t]hree, [the plaintiff] said she planned to report the incident to the Fairfield Police and I agreed that that was her preroga- tive, but asked her to let me know if she went forward with the complaint so that I could inform my [d]irector and loop in [Torello]. She told me that [Torello] had left the [league] in October, and I told her I deal with him on a weekly basis, so that cannot possibly be true. “Number [f]our, [the plaintiff] said she took a picture of [Glass] at 8 [p.m.] but [Glass] states they were still in the gym at 8:10 [p.m.] when she took the picture. [Banores] said it was well after 8 [p.m.] because [the plaintiff] and [Glass] had been arguing for several minutes after 8 [p.m.]. “I believe children learn from what they see and having spoken to [the plaintiff], I cannot see any value in her coaching and life skills. She was demanding, dictatorial, abrasive and she lied consistently, I fail to see those qualities as beneficial to the children she is instructing. I respect and admire the great work that is being done by the [league] and  Morton v. O’Donnell and life skills. She was demanding, dictatorial, abrasive and she lied consistently, I fail to see those qualities as beneficial to the children she is instructing. I respect and admire the great work that is being done by the [league] and do not think one individual should be allowed to undo the good that is being done.” Approximately two weeks after the incident, Wikman handed the plaintiff a copy of the letter. Thereafter, Reilly went to the defendant’s place of work with a copy of the letter to confirm that the defendant had written it. The defendant then emailed Torello and another board member about the encounter, stating that, although Reilly was polite and pleasant, “[the plaintiff] is a bully and these are bully tactics, and [the defendant did] not have any intention of being bullied by [Reilly] or anyone else.” On June 8, 2022, Wikman sent the plaintiff written correspondence, informing her of the board’s decision to dismiss her from her position on the board and to remove her as a coach. The letter set forth several reasons for the board’s decision, including “[the plaintiff’s] incom- plete and inaccurate account of the incident that [she] shared with [the defendant],” along with several other incidents involving the plaintiff with respect to which the board stated that her conduct had been “question- able, at best.” The plaintiff, through counsel, contacted the board to contest the removal, and the board, after consulting with an attorney, reinstated the plaintiff as a board member and coach. In July 2022, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant. In her one count complaint sound- ing in defamation, the plaintiff identifies seventeen allegedly defamatory statements made by the defendant. The defendant filed an answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and asserting six special defenses alleging, inter alia, that the alleged defamatory statements were true and/or were merely statements of do not think one individual should be allowed to undo the good that is being done. . . .”  Morton v. O’Donnell opinion and were a complete defense to the plaintiff’s claim.6 On January 17, 2025, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the plaintiff from introducing any testimony or documentation regarding “statements not claimed as defamatory in discovery, reputational injury . . . from witnesses to whom the alleged libelous state- ments were published and damages not produced to date.” A trial before the court, Gould, J., commenced on January 23, 2025. As a preliminary matter, the court heard arguments on the defendant’s January 17, 2025 motion in limine and orally granted the motion in part, limiting the alleged defamatory statements to the fol- lowing: (1) “[The defendant] cannot see any value in [the plaintiff’s] coaching and life skills”; (2) “[The plaintiff] was demanding, dictatorial, abrasive and she lied con- sistently, [the defendant] fail[s] to see those qualities as beneficial to the children [that] she is instructing”; (3) The defendant “[does] not think one individual should be allowed to undo the good that is being done”; (4) “[The plaintiff] lied about several things”; (5) “[The plain- tiff] says the kids fled in terror out a side door”; (6) The defendant “[caught the plaintiff] in a number of lies”; (7) The plaintiff and Reilly “are schoolyard bullies”; and (8) “[The plaintiff] is a bully.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) At the close of plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the defendant’s counsel made an oral motion for a judgment of dismissal pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8. The court granted the judgment of dismissal from the bench, concluding that 6 The plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendant’s first and second special defenses, which alleged that the statements were barred by the relevant statute of limitations, and that the plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. On March 27, 2023, the court issued an order (1) indicating that the plaintiff withdrew the motion to strike the first special defense, and (2) granting the plaintiff’s motion to strike the second special defense. The defendant thereafter filed an amended answer and special defenses in April 2023, and the plaintiff filed a reply denying the material allegations therein. The defendant also filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court denied in December 2024. The disposition of that motion is not at issue in this appeal.  Morton v. O’Donnell the plaintiff had failed to establish that the statements were made with actual malice.7 The court reasoned that, “[a]s a public official, the standard for proving libel or defamation against [the defendant] is a much higher stan- dard than if she were a private citizen. . . . The standard [is] actual malice on that level. Based on the testimony that I’ve heard in the plaintiff’s case, which has now been rested, the plaintiff has not proven that the defendant knew the statement was false or that she recklessly disre- garded the truth of the statements.” From the judgment rendered thereon, this appeal followed. Before addressing the plaintiff’s claims, we set forth the following relevant legal principles, including our standard of review. Practice Book § 15-8 provides in relevant part: “If, on the trial of any issue of fact in a civil matter tried to the court, the plaintiff has produced evidence and rested, a defendant may move for judgment of dismissal, and the judicial authority may grant such motion if the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. . . .” “This court has explained that [t]he standard for deter- mining whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, under Practice Book § 15-8, is whether the plaintiff put forth sufficient evidence that, if believed, would establish a prima facie case, not whether the trier of fact believes it. . . . For the court to grant the motion [for a judgment of dismissal pursuant to . . . § 15-8], it must be of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. In testing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court compares the evidence with the allega- tions of the complaint. . . . In order to establish a prima facie case, the proponent must submit evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove. . . . [T]he evidence offered by the plaintiff is to be taken as true and interpreted in the light 7 Although the court stated that it was granting the defendant’s motion for a “directed verdict,” when a directed verdict is granted in a case tried before the court, it is treated as judgment of dismissal under Practice Book § 15-8. J. R. v. N. K., 232 Conn. App. 434, 439–40, 337 A.3d 14, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 901, 341 A.3d 958 (2025).  Morton v. O’Donnell most favorable to [the plaintiff], and every reasonable inference is to be drawn in [the plaintiff’s] favor. . . . Whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case is a question of law, over which our review is plenary. . . . The plaintiff’s evidence must meet a relatively low standard in order to withstand the defendant’s § 15-8 motion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Eccleston v. Waterbury, 241 Conn. App. 750, 755–56, ___ A.3d ___ (2026). “At common law, [t]o establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiff’s reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement. . . . A defamatory statement is defined as a communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him . . . . Defamation is comprised of the torts of libel and slander: slander is oral defamation and libel is written defamation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Rosen, 351 Conn. 120, 130, 329 A.3d 913 (2025). We now turn to the issues raised on appeal. I We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the court improperly dismissed her action pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8 on the basis of an improper application of the law of defamation. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly required her to prove that the defendant’s statements were made with actual malice. We agree with the plaintiff that the court misconstrued the applicable law. In addition to the general common-law principles out- lined previously in this opinion, “there are numerous federal constitutional restrictions that govern the proof of the tort of defamation, the applicability of which varies  Morton v. O’Donnell with (a) the status of the plaintiff as a public or private figure, and (b) whether the subject of the speech is a mat- ter of public or private concern. . . . [I]f the plaintiff is a public figure . . . the plaintiff also must prove that the defamatory statement was made with actual malice such that the statement, when made, [was] made with actual knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gleason v. Smolinski, 319 Conn. 394, 431, 125 A.3d 920 (2015); see also Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 580, 606 A.2d 693 (1992) (“a public official is prohibited from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves by clear and convincing evidence that the falsehood was published with ‘actual malice’ ”). In contrast, when an action for defamation is brought by a private person, the governing standard of fault merely requires a plaintiff to prove a negligent misstatement of fact. Miles v. Perry, 11 Conn. App. 584, 588–89, 529 A.2d 199 (1987). In the present case, the court misapplied the law when it concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove actual malice. To elevate a required showing of fault from neg- ligence to actual malice, the plaintiff, not the defendant, must be a public figure under the law. Indeed, the defen- dant’s counsel conceded at oral argument before this court that the court made a “misstatement of the law” concerning this issue. “Concessions made during oral argument may be properly considered by the appellate courts in rendering their decision.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maner v. Commissioner of Correction, 236 Conn. App. 472, 483, 349 A.3d 21 (2025), cert. denied, 354 Conn. 909, 349 A.3d 1094 (2026). Moreover, neither party alleged that the plaintiff is a public official or has asserted that the court properly applied the stan- dard of actual malice in the present case. Accordingly, in order to survive a Practice Book § 15-8 motion, the plaintiff was merely required to put forth evidence of a negligent misstatement of fact. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court improperly granted the judgment of  Morton v. O’Donnell dismissal on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove actual malice.8 II We next turn to the defendant’s alternative ground to affirm the court’s judgment, which is that, even if the court misstated the applicable law, any error was harmless because the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case.9 For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendant that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case and that the defendant is entitled to a judg- ment of dismissal under Practice Book § 15-8. A First, we must consider the defendant’s contention that we should affirm the judgment on the ground that the statements constitute nonactionable opinions. Our Supreme Court has stated that “[a] defamatory state- ment is defined as a communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estima- tion of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him . . . . But it is not enough that the statement inflicts reputational harm. To be actionable, the statement in question must convey an 8 Our conclusion that the trial court applied an improper legal stan- dard in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss is also dispositive of the plaintiff’s claims that (1) the court improperly found that the defendant is a public official, (2) the plaintiff did, in fact, prove actual malice, and (3) the court failed to apply the proper standard under Practice Book § 15-8. Accordingly, we need not address separately the merits of those claims. 9 Although the defendant did not file a preliminary statement of issues on appeal raising her alternative grounds for affirmance in accordance with Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (1) (A), an affirmance on an alternative ground is appropriate when the issue presents a question of law and was briefed by both parties, thereby not subjecting the appellant to prejudice or unfair surprise. See Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Fontaine, 278 Conn. 779, 784 n.4, 900 A.2d 18 (2006). The plaintiff argued that she established a prima facie case in her principal appellate brief, had an opportunity to respond to the defendant’s arguments in her reply brief, and has not argued that she would be prejudiced by this court’s consideration of the defendant’s alternative ground to affirm the court’s judgment.  Morton v. O’Donnell objective fact, as generally, a defendant cannot be held liable for expressing a mere opinion. . . . A statement can be defined as factual if it relates to an event or state of affairs that existed in the past or present and is capable of being known. . . . In a libel action, such statements of fact usually concern a person’s conduct or character. . . . An opinion, on the other hand, is a personal comment about another’s conduct, qualifications or character that has some basis in fact.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) NetScout Systems, Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., 334 Conn. 396, 410–11, 223 A.3d 37 (2020). Ultimately, “[t]he determination of whether a statement is opinion or rhetorical hyperbole as opposed to a factual representation is a question of law for the court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 417. It is well settled that the fact/opinion inquiry turns on what a reasonable reader would understand the words to convey, not on the manner in which the statement is phrased. See Gleason v. Smolinski, supra, 319 Conn. 435 n.34 (“mere recitation of prefatory phrases such as in my opinion or I think will not render innocent an otherwise defamatory statement” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, a statement clothed as an opinion will remain actionable if the “negative char- acterization of a person is coupled with a clear but false implication that the author is privy to facts about the person that are unknown to the general reader.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) NetScout Systems, Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., supra, 334 Conn. 416; see also Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 118, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982) (“an opinion must be based upon facts; if the facts are neither known nor stated, then a defamatory opinion implies that there are undis- closed defamatory facts which justify the opinion”). Likewise, a personal comment remains an opinion “if it is clear from the context that the maker is not intending to assert another objective fact but only his personal comment on the facts which he has stated.” (Emphasis  Morton v. O’Donnell in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., supra, 111. Given that “context is a vital consideration” in the determination; NetScout Systems, Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., supra, 334 Conn. 412; our Supreme Court has supplied “three basic, overlapping considerations” to aid in the analysis: “(1) whether the circumstances in which the statement is made should cause the audience to expect an evaluative or objective meaning; (2) whether the nature and tenor of the actual language used by the declarant suggests a statement of evaluative opinion or objective fact; and (3) whether the statement is subject to objective verification.” Id., 414. In Murphy, our Supreme Court relied on these factors in evaluating whether calling someone a “white supremacist” could constitute defama- tion. Murphy v. Rosen, supra, 351 Conn. 131. The court first determined that the term lacked a settled meaning in common usage; therefore, it could not be verified and did not imply specific wrongful conduct. Id., 133–36. It then considered the statement in context, which involved a heated online exchange, and concluded that an observer of such an exchange would not expect the comments or the name-calling contained therein to be factual or be based on inside knowledge. Id., 136–37. Against this legal framework, we consider the chal- lenged statements in the present case. First, we con- clude that most of the challenged statements constitute nonactionable opinions. Specifically, the defendant’s descriptions of the plaintiff as “demanding, dictato- rial, [and] abrasive,” her comments about the value of the plaintiff’s life skills, and her implication that the plaintiff is “undo[ing] the good that is being done” by the league conveyed her subjective impressions concerning the plaintiff’s conduct and demeanor, rather than con- crete factual assertions susceptible to verification. See, e.g., Perruccio v. Arseneault, 7 Conn. App. 389, 394, 508 A.2d 831 (1986) (union member’s characterization of union president as “dictator” was opinion as it was not able to be proven true or false); see also, e.g., Morrison  Morton v. O’Donnell v. Poullet, 227 App. Div. 2d 599, 599, 643 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1996) (letter stating interviewer was [unprofessional] . . . disrespectful, rude, and even accusatory was nonaction- able (internal quotation marks omitted)). When the letter is viewed in context, the challenged statements are exclusively found within the concluding paragraph that begins with the words, “I believe . . . .” Additionally, in the final sentence of the letter, the defen- dant gives the recipient permission to “share this letter and my thoughts with whomever you please.” (Emphasis added.) Although that language alone does not compel a conclusion that the remainder of the statements in the letter are nonactionable opinions, it does indicate to the reader that the statements are more likely intended to be personal comments rather than objective facts. See Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., supra, 188 Conn. 111. Moreover, the defendant’s char- acterizations of the plaintiff do not purport to rest on unstated facts and do not imply that the defendant had any inside knowledge concerning the plaintiff. Instead, the defendant expressly disclosed the basis for these observations, writing that she could not see any value in the plaintiff’s coaching and life skills after “having spoken [with the plaintiff],” indicating her assessment draws from how the defendant perceived the plaintiff’s tone and attitude during their phone call, rather than from an undisclosed fact.10 The statements that the plaintiff is a “bully” and used “bully tactics,” found in the emails to Torello, fail for similar reasons. First, the defendant makes these asser- tions on the basis of a disclosed event, namely, Reilly’s visit to her place of work, the accuracy of which is not disputed by the plaintiff. Second, the statements are of a “loose, figurative or hyperbolic” nature; (internal 10 In support of her argument, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant had no knowledge of who she was prior to writing the letter and that the only interaction between the parties consisted of a single twenty-six minute phone call. Rather than supporting the plaintiff’s position, this assertion supports the conclusion that the remarks were statements of opinion concerning the single interaction between the parties.  Morton v. O’Donnell quotation marks omitted) NetScout Systems, Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., supra, 334 Conn. 413; similar to the terms “white supremacist” and “dictator,” which have been rejected by reviewing courts as constituting nonaction- able statements of opinion. See Murphy v. Rosen, supra, 351 Conn. 131, 135 (“white supremacist” was nonaction- able opinion); Perruccio v. Arseneault, supra, 7 Conn. App. 394 (“dictator” was nonactionable opinion). A fact finder, however, could reasonably conclude that the defendant’s remarks accusing the plaintiff of being dishonest, found in the letter and an email exchange with Torello, were statements of fact. In contrast to the statements analyzed in the preceding paragraphs, the statement that the plaintiff lied consistently could be understood to convey a factual imputation of spe- cific, dishonest conduct that is objectively verifiable. Although, generally, an opinion based on disclosed facts is nonactionable,11 “if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if [the speaker’s] assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of fact.”12 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990); see also Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1439 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[a] statement of opinion based on fully disclosed facts can be punished only if the stated facts are themselves false and demeaning”). The circumstances, along with the nature and tenor of the letter, weigh in favor of concluding that the defen- dant’s remarks accusing the plaintiff of being dishonest are actionable statements of fact. The letter drafted by the defendant begins by indicating that she was asked to 11 See Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d 724, 730 (1st Cir.) (when factual bases for statement are disclosed and not disputed, statement is opinion), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 974, 112 S. Ct. 2942, 119 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1992). 12 See 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 566, comment (c), p. 175 (1977) (“[i]f the defendant bases his expression of a derogatory opinion of the plaintiff on his own statement of false and defamatory facts, he is subject to liability for the factual statement but not for the expression of opinion”).  Morton v. O’Donnell investigate the “ugly exchange” that took place, signaling that she may have had firsthand knowledge concerning the incident. A fact finder reasonably could regard a narrative of the incident, written by a long serving town employee, to contain factual representations, and, by virtue of the defendant’s position and experience, credit her as a reliable source. The body of the letter consists of the defendant accus- ing the plaintiff of making seemingly innocuous lies, list- ing each as “the first lie,” “[s]econd [l]ie,” “[l]ie [n]umber [t]hree,” and “[n]umber [f]our,” leading to the defendant’s conclusion that the plaintiff “lied consistently . . . .” Although a fact finder may not find the alleged “lies” listed in the letter to be particularly damaging standing alone, collectively, a fact finder may conclude that they amount to an accusation that the plaintiff deliberately falsified the events. “Where the court cannot reasonably characterize the allegedly [defamatory] words as either fact or opinion because, for example, innuendo is present, this becomes an issue of fact for the jury, which would preclude a directed verdict.” Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican- American, Inc., supra, 188 Conn. 112 n.5. We conclude that, because reasonable minds could differ as to whether these specific statements related to the plaintiff’s alleged untruthfulness, found in both the letter and emails, were simply statements of the defendant’s opinion, or were factual in nature, this determination should have been left to the fact finder after the presentation of all the evidence. This, however, does not end our inquiry because, even if the plaintiff can establish that the defen- dant published a defamatory statement that identified the plaintiff to a third person, the plaintiff must show that her reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement. See Murphy v. Rosen, supra, 351 Conn. 130. B We now address the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff failed to put forth sufficient evidence of  Morton v. O’Donnell damages. Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case because she did not establish a case of libel per se, and, having failed to do so, she failed to establish a prima facie case of libel per quod because she failed to prove actual damages. We agree with the defendant that the challenged state- ments are not libelous per se, and that the plaintiff did not adduce evidence of economic damages to support a claim of libel per quod. 1 To determine whether the plaintiff made the requisite showing of damages, we must first address the threshold question of whether the statements constitute libel per se or libel per quod. “To prevail on a common-law defa- mation claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant published false statements about her that caused pecuni- ary harm.” Daley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 795, 734 A.2d 112 (1999). If, however, a plaintiff establishes “that the words are false and actionable per se, barring any statutory provision to the contrary, she is entitled under Connecticut law to recover general damages without proof of spec