Peo in Interest of SRF

26CA0823 Peo in Interest of SRF 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 26CA0823 Arapahoe County District Court No. 24JV252 Honorable Bonnie McLean, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of S.R.F. and K.G.C., Children, and Concerning A.C.C., Appellant. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division III Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Brenton and Martinez*, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 John Christofferson, Acting County Attorney, Alison A. Bettenberg, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee Robert G. Tweedell, Guardian Ad Litem Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026. ¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, A.C.C. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment revoking her deferred adjudication and adjudicating S.R.F. and K.G.C. (the children) dependent or neglected. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 Following a referral raising concerns about the “unsafe” and “unsanitary” conditions of mother’s home, mother and the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services agreed to a safety plan whereby the children would be placed with a family friend until mother could make the home suitable for their return. Nine days later, the Department returned the children to mother’s care. But after an unannounced home visit shortly thereafter revealed unsanitary conditions, the Department again placed the children with the family friend while mother cleaned the home. After the children’s return home one week later, the Department created a support plan for mother. ¶3 Nearly four months later, a caseworker conducted another unannounced home visit and observed out of place “piles of trash, prescription medications, marijuana paraphernalia, cleaning supplies, knives, cat litter and cockroaches.” The Department 1  requested temporary custody of the children for placement in foster care, which the court granted. The Department then filed a petition in dependency or neglect citing concerns about the condition of the home and mother’s mental health. ¶4 Mother entered into a deferred adjudication based upon a no- fault admission. As a condition of the deferred adjudication, mother agreed to comply with a treatment plan requiring her to, as relevant to this appeal, maintain a safe, “reasonably tidy[,] and clean” residence by, among other things, regularly and properly disposing of trash to ensure it did not accumulate on the floors and furniture. ¶5 Eleven months later, the Department moved to revoke the deferred adjudication, arguing that mother had not complied with her treatment plan. Following a contested hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion and adjudicated the children dependent or neglected. II. Treatment Plan Compliance ¶6 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by adjudicating the children dependent or neglected because the Department failed 2  to prove that she had not complied with her treatment plan. We are not persuaded. A. ICWA Compliance ¶7 On appeal, Mother states that “[t]he juvenile court failed to make the required [Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)], 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963,] inquiries at almost every hearing, inquiring only a few times over the two and a half years.” But mother goes on to state that she is not challenging “ICWA compliance as [it] pertains to the revocation of [the] deferred adjudication.” Based on our review of the record, it appears that some inquiries were made concerning the children’s possible Indian heritage and there was no indication that the children were enrolled members of a federally recognized Indian tribe or eligible for enrollment. ¶8 The Colorado Indian Child Welfare Act places specific due diligence requirements on a department when it has information that “the child may have Indian heritage.” § 19-1.2-107(4)(a)-(b), C.R.S. 2026; see also H.J.B. v. People in Interest of A-J.A.B., 2023 CO 48, ¶ 5 (concluding that the general assertion of Indian heritage was sufficient to trigger statutory due diligence requirements under CICWA's predecessor). Under such circumstances, the court shall 3  direct the department to “exercise due diligence in gathering additional information” and “to make a record, either in writing or orally on the record, of the due diligence efforts taken to determine whether there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child.” § 19-1.2-107(4)(a). While we discern no ICWA issue in this case as currently postured, we remind the parties and the juvenile court of their continuing due diligence obligations under CICWA and ICWA. Id. B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶9 “The purpose of an adjudicatory hearing is to determine whether the factual allegations in a dependency or neglect petition are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and whether the status of the subject child or children warrants intrusive protective or corrective state intervention into the familial relationship.” People in Interest of A.M., 786 P.2d 476, 479 (Colo. App. 1989). Alternatively, the juvenile court may accept a parent’s admission at an adjudicatory hearing. People in Interest of J.W. v. C.O., 2017 CO 105, ¶ 32. The “court’s acceptance of [a parent’s] admission establishe[s] the status of the children as dependent or neglected . . . .” Id. 4 ¶ 10 Section 19-3-505(5), C.R.S. 2026, provides for a process that courts and practitioners often refer to as “deferred adjudication.” Specifically, it allows a juvenile court, with the consent of all parties, to defer entry of judgment and continue the adjudicatory hearing for up to six months when a parent admits the children are dependent or neglected. § 19-3-505(5)(a)-(b). Following the initial six-month period, the juvenile court may continue the hearing for another six months, after which the court must dismiss or sustain the petition. § 19-3-505(5)(b). ¶ 11 Whether a child is dependent or neglected presents a mixed question of fact and law because it requires the application of statutory criteria to evidentiary facts. See People in Interest of E.R., 2018 COA 58, ¶ 5. We review the court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. ¶ 12 In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain an adjudication, “we review the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and draw every inference fairly deducible from the evidence in favor of the juvenile court’s decision.” People in Interest of D.M.F.D., 2021 COA 95, ¶ 13. 5  C. Analysis ¶ 13 The juvenile court determined that mother had not complied with the safe and clean housing objective of her treatment plan. The court noted that “one of the main reasons that this . . . case came to the attention of the Department was [the] unsafe and unsanitary conditions of the home.” And the court found that, at the time of the revocation hearing, mother’s home had “a substantial amount of trash, dirty dishes, [and] dirty clothes” and was, overall, “in disarray.” The court also expressed concern that mother did not keep her marijuana paraphernalia and prescription medication “safe and away from . . . where [the] children may be.” ¶ 14 Although limited, the record contains evidence supporting the court’s findings. The caseworker testified that during her recent monthly visits she observed mother’s home to be “in disarray” with lots of trash as well as dirty dishes in the sink, on the counters, and on the couch. She also described that the bathroom had “some overflow of . . . trash” and mother’s bedroom was “very dirty” with trash on the bed and floor. At almost every home visit the caseworker observed mother’s prescription medication “in the couch area” and marijuana in various locations throughout the 6  apartment, primarily in the living room. Based on her observations, the caseworker expressed concern that mother had not been able to maintain a consistently clean environment as required by her treatment plan. ¶ 15 Nevertheless, focusing on the caseworker’s testimony that mother (1) was doing “okay” on the safe and clean housing objective of her treatment plan; (2) had been “able to kind of get the apartment back into place” when she cleaned; and (3) kept the home sufficiently clean to continue exercising in-person family time there, mother asserts that the evidence “established that the home was reasonably tidy as required by the deferred agreement.” The juvenile court acknowledged that mother had made some progress and had, at times, been able to get the home cleaned up. The court specifically recognized that mother had been “very capable” in cleaning up her apartment in the past and expressed hope that with continued support and more time mother could comply with the treatment plan objective. But after considering and weighing all the evidence, the court found that, at the time of the revocation hearing, mother had not complied with the safe and clean housing objective of her treatment plan. And it is not our role to reweigh the 7  evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court when the court’s findings are supported by the record. People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62. ¶ 16 Still, mother contends that she complied with her treatment plan because it was undisputed that her home was sufficiently clean for an eight-month period and her treatment plan measured success by, among other things, her ability to comply with the safe and clean housing objective “for at least 90 days.” ¶ 17 The juvenile court specifically considered this argument but concluded that, because the plan stated “at least 90 days” and “common-sense [counsels that] if the children are going to be there . . . that home needs to be clean, safe, and sanitary,” the fact that mother had previously maintained a clean home for more than ninety days did not mean that mother was in compliance with the treatment plan at the time of the termination hearing. Essentially, the court determined that the ninety-day language meant at least ninety days prior to a hearing regarding mother’s compliance. ¶ 18 Reviewing the deferred adjudication agreement and treatment plan as a whole, it is clear that the goal was for mother to demonstrate an ability to maintain a “reasonably tidy” residence for 8 a sustained period so the children could return to a “safe, sanitary, and hygienic environment.” See In re Marriage of Clark, 2025 COA 75, ¶ 14 (explaining that we evaluate an agreement “as a whole” to “give effect to all provisions” and “construe the agreement’s terms in accordance with their plain and generally accepted meanings” (citations omitted)). Indeed, interpreting the agreement as mother suggests would contravene the purposes of the Children’s Code. See § 19-1-102(1)(a) (declaring the Code’s purpose, in part, as securing “for each child subject to these provisions such care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve his welfare and the interests of society”). For purposes of illustration, if a parent’s treatment plan required at least ninety days of sobriety, the plain intent would be to provide for a child’s safety by ensuring their parent’s ability to maintain sobriety for a sufficient time to reflect the parent’s continuing ability to maintain their sobriety. If the parent could not demonstrate sobriety at the time of a revocation hearing, it would be contrary to a child’s welfare and the interests of society to dismiss a petition in dependency or neglect simply because the parent had previously demonstrated sobriety for an extended period. These principles apply equally to the objective 9  requiring mother to maintain safe and clean housing for at least ninety days. ¶ 19 Finally, we reject mother’s assertion that the juvenile court’s findings were unsupported by the evidence because the caseworker’s testimony was contradictory and lacked sufficient specificity. The juvenile court found the caseworker to be credible. And it was for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to make credibility findings, resolve any evidentiary conflicts, consider the evidence, and draw any inferences or conclusions therefrom. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15; see also People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 250 (Colo. 2010) (“[I]t is important to defer to the [juvenile] court, particularly when it hears contradictory testimony on material issues . . . .”). ¶ 20 For these reasons and reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the Department, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s order revoking mother’s deferred adjudication and adjudicating the children dependent or neglected. D.M.F.D., ¶ 13. III. Disposition ¶ 21 The judgment is affirmed. JUDGE BRENTON and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur. 10