Moran v. Ecdao CA2/3

Filed 11/13/26 Moran v. Ecdao CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE RACHEL MORAN, B342784 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24SMRO00225) v. ORDER MODYFING PHILIP ECDAO, OPINION [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] Defendant and Appellant. It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on November 9, 2026, be modified to reflect counsel listing on the caption page as follows: Philip Ecdao, in pro. per.; Darren S. Young; Law Offices of Anthony E. Colombo and Anthony E. Colombo for Defendant and Appellant. Rachel Moran, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent. [There is no change in judgment.] _______________________________________________________ ASHWORTH, J.* ADAMS, P. J. HANASONO, J. * Retired Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. Filed 11/9/26 Moran v. Ecdao CA2/3 (unmodified opinion) NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE RACHEL MORAN, B342784 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24SMRO00225) v. PHILIP ECDAO, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Patricia A. Young, Judge. Affirmed. Philip Ecdao, in pro. per.; Darren S. Young, for Defendant and Appellant. Law Offices of Anthony E. Colombo and Anthony E. Colombo for Plaintiff and Respondent. ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗  Defendant and appellant Philip Ecdao challenges a domestic violence restraining order issued against him in favor of plaintiff and respondent Rachel Moran following an evidentiary hearing. The trial court found that Ecdao recklessly caused bodily injury to Moran during a confrontation over a dog. On appeal, Ecdao contends the evidence did not support that finding, that the court failed to make the required findings, and that the order exceeded the scope of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. Finding no error, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On June 20, 2024, Moran had an altercation with Ecdao and Melanie Ortiz over possession of Ollie, a shepherd dog. According to Moran, Ecdao and Ortiz attempted to retrieve the dog using physical force or threats. Moran sought a civil harassment restraining order against Ortiz and a domestic violence restraining order against Ecdao.1 Moran, Ortiz, Ecdao, and Officer Brandon Leon testified during the November 5, 2024 evidentiary hearing on both requests. I. Testimony of Moran Moran dated Ecdao for eight years, and they lived together. While Moran was dating Ecdao, they both had possession of the dog. The dog was part of Moran’s “family.” The relationship ended in 2021 or 2022. After the breakup, she and Ecdao alternated custody of the dog every other week for two and a half years. She paid $15,000 toward care of the dog. In May 2024, after Ecdao had told Moran that he was going to move out of state, she refused to give him the dog. 1 Ortiz’s appeal from the civil harassment restraining order issued against her in the same proceeding is pending as case No. B342778. We resolve that appeal by separate opinion. 2  At the time of the incident, she was outside her house on the street. She was putting the dog in the back seat of her car using the passenger side rear door when Ortiz, Ecdao’s fiancée, opened the driver’s side rear door. Ortiz grabbed the dog’s harness and attempted to take him. At the same time, Ecdao, wearing a hood over his head, came at Moran from behind. While Ortiz and Moran were “wrestling in the back of the car,” clutching the dog’s harness, Moran “g[o]t . . . slammed against the car.” Moran repeatedly screamed for help. Ecdao gained possession of the dog, after which Moran went around the car to go after Ecdao. Ortiz cut Moran off and brandished pepper spray, “fumbling to open it to get [Moran] to back away.” Moran then saw that the dog had broken free and bit Ecdao in the face. She and the dog ran back into the house and called the police. Moran then presented video from a neighbor’s doorbell camera to the court. At first, the court did not “even see anything,” having “expect[ed] to see something obvious.” After some explanation of the video from Moran, the court said that it could not “even see the dog” and that the video was “not very helpful.” After more explanation from Moran, the court explained that the video showed Moran running, the dog running after Moran, and then someone in black and someone else in a black- hooded sweatshirt running after the dog. The court admitted the video into evidence. Moran also presented two pictures to the court. One picture showed bruising on her left shin, and the other showed bruising on her left knee. The bruising occurred after “[Ecdao] came up from behind [her],” causing her to fall. At some point while the parties were wrestling to get the dog, Moran’s body was “slammed into the car.” Moran took the pictures on June 23, 3 2024, three days after the incident. The court admitted the pictures into evidence. During cross-examination, Moran testified that prior to the incident, she never had any incidents of domestic violence with Ecdao. She also testified that Ecdao said nothing to her during the incident. Moran indicated that to her knowledge, neither Ecdao nor Ortiz were arrested or faced criminal charges arising from the incident. II. Testimony of Officer Leon Officer Leon reported to the scene of the incident on June 20, 2024 and investigated for a possible battery. Officer Leon testified that while there was an allegation of pepper spray, there was no evidence of pepper spray at the scene. He did not search Ecdao or Ortiz for pepper spray because there were no signs of Moran having been sprayed, including red, watery eyes or the smell of pepper spray. Although Moran claimed that Ecdao pushed her, Officer Leon did not notice any injuries to Moran. He only noticed that Ecdao had a bloody right lip. Neither Ecdao nor Ortiz were arrested at the scene of the incident. Officer Leon and his partner requested an emergency protective order for Moran, but the criteria for one had not been met. III. Testimony of Ortiz Ortiz testified that on the night of the incident, she was driving with Ecdao as a passenger. She and Ecdao noticed Moran remove the harness from the dog, place him in the car using the driver’s side front door, leave the door open, and go to the trunk to load some items. Ortiz then pulled over, removed the harness from the front seat, and pulled the dog out. The dog then rolled 4 over to Ecdao, who was standing at the driver’s side rear door a foot apart from Ortiz. Moran then went from the trunk to the passenger side doors, opened the doors, and saw Ecdao putting a leash on the dog. Moran then ran to the driver’s side rear door screaming for help. Agitated, the dog rolled out from Ecdao’s arms and head butted him. The dog then ran to the sidewalk, after which Ortiz and Moran both chased after him. The court noted that the neighbor’s doorbell camera showed Moran running, then the dog after Moran, then Ortiz, then Ecdao. Ortiz maintained that she never opened any car door, she never had pepper spray, and that she and Ecdao never talked to Moran or made any physical contact with Moran. IV. Testimony of Ecdao Ecdao testified that after Ortiz parked, he followed Ortiz, noticed Ortiz had the dog, and the dog flailed from Ortiz to him. After the dog head butted him, Ecdao dropped the dog. Ecdao then saw Moran running, then the dog running behind her, and then Ortiz behind the dog, after which he ran after Ortiz. He denied the dog bit him and attributed his lip injury to the dog’s head butt. Ecdao denied trying to take the dog by physical force. He claimed there was no pepper spray and no threats. While dating Moran, Ecdao adopted the dog as an emotional support dog. He never shared custody of the dog with Moran and denied having an alternating weekly custody schedule with Moran. While Ecdao and Moran were dating, Moran made clear that she did not want to be co-owner of the dog. After she and Ecdao broke up, Moran watched the dog every two to three 5 weeks for five days while Ecdao travelled for work but she did not own the dog. Other friends also watched the dog. During cross-examination, Ecdao admitted that Moran took the dog to the veterinarian 80 percent of the time and that Moran took an insurance policy out on the dog while they were together. Ecdao also admitted that he was wearing a hoodie when he approached Moran. V. Small Claims Case The trial court judge inquired about the small claims case Ecdao had initiated to secure the return of the dog. In the small claims case, Ecdao claimed that Moran was a dog sitter. Ecdao did not mention that Moran was his girlfriend or that they shared custody of the dog. The small claims court held that Ecdao shall take nothing and did not grant Ecdao ownership of the dog. VI. Trial Court’s Orders After testimony and closing arguments, the trial court issued a domestic violence restraining order against Ecdao. The trial court found that Moran had met her burden of proof and that she was credible. The trial court determined that Ortiz and Ecdao gave “incomplete stories” of the incident and were not credible. Concerning Ortiz, the trial court found that she made a credible threat of violence against Moran by “holding up something that looks like pepper spray and acting like she was going to spray somebody in the face.” The trial court found Moran’s account was corroborated by Officer Leon’s testimony that Moran accused Ortiz of threatening to use pepper spray against her. The trial court also observed that Ortiz’s version of events was inconsistent with the video from the doorbell camera. 6  Concerning Ecdao, the trial court found that he recklessly caused bodily injury to Moran when he struggled with her to get the dog back. The court found Moran’s claim that she and Ecdao shared custody of the dog to be credible. Moran’s account of events was corroborated by her claim to Officer Leon that Ecdao pushed her. The court “[took] issue with the way that [Ecdao] presented this case,” including claiming in the small claims court that Moran was “just a dog babysitter.” The court stated that it had “no belief whatsoever that if these two walk out they’re not going to try to do this again” and that “[a] restraining order is what’s going to prevent them.” The restraining order expires November 5, 2026 at 11:59 p.m. The court awarded possession, care, custody, and control of the dog to Moran. The court also ordered Ecdao to remove a “stolen dog” notice alert that he placed on the dog’s microchip. Ecdao timely appealed. DISCUSSION This opinion concerns the domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) issued against Ecdao. We determine that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Ecdao recklessly caused bodily injury to Moran. We also find that the court’s order complies with Family Code sections 6320, subdivision (b) and 6340, subdivision (a)(1).2 I. Standard of Review and Legal Principles Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Act), a court may issue a protective order to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and abuse and ensuring a period of separation of the persons involved. (§§ 6220, 6300.) The Act defines “ ‘abuse’ ” to include 2 Subsequent statutory references are to the Family Code. 7 “recklessly caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause bodily injury.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(1).) The Act defines “ ‘[d]omestic violence’ ” to include abuse perpetrated against a person by someone who previously dated the person. (§ 6211, subd. (c).) A court may issue a restraining order when it is shown “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse” by a preponderance of the evidence. (§§ 6200, 6300, subd. (a); In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 116.) Orders granting or denying domestic violence restraining orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (K.T. v. E.S. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1114, 1126.) Factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 1127.) Whether the trial court applied the correct standard is reviewed de novo. (Ibid.) II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that Ecdao Recklessly Caused Bodily Injury Ecdao contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the issuance of a DVRO. He also argues that the trial court failed to apply the proper legal standard. We disagree. Moran testified that while she was placing the dog in the back of her car, Ecdao and Ortiz ambushed her to retrieve the dog. Specifically, Moran testified that Ecdao ambushed her from behind, resulting in her falling and slamming her body against the car. The struggle between Ecdao and Moran caused Moran to sustain bruising on her shin and knee, as reflected in two pictures admitted into evidence. The trial court found Moran credible. Moran’s testimony and pictures are substantial evidence that Ecdao recklessly caused Moran bodily injury. The same evidence supports the recklessness element, not causation alone. On the account the trial court credited, Ecdao 8 approached Moran from behind at the open rear door of her car while Ortiz pulled at the dog’s harness from the opposite side, and the three struggled over the animal in that confined space. Applying physical force in those circumstances carried an obvious risk that Moran would fall or strike the vehicle. The trial court could reasonably find that Ecdao disregarded that risk, and that it materialized in the bruising Moran photographed. Ecdao contends that 1) Moran could not identify who slammed her against the car, indicating that she “fell” when Ecdao came up behind her, 2) Officer Leon declined to make any arrest at the scene of the incident, 3) there were no verbal threats during the incident and no prior incidents of domestic violence, 4) the photos of Moran’s bruising were taken three days after the incident, and 5) the court indicated that it could not determine what was happening in the doorbell camera video. These are conflicts in the evidence which the trial court is charged with resolving. It did so, finding Moran to be credible. We do not determine credibility or reweigh the evidence. (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12.) Ecdao’s contentions also do not preclude the finding that he caused her injury. As to the first contention, the trial court could reasonably find that Ecdao recklessly caused Moran’s injuries when he came at her from behind and caused her body to be slammed against the car. As to the second and third contentions, they do not prevent the court from nevertheless finding Moran credible. As to the fourth contention, the bruising could still be the result of the struggle even if the pictures were taken three days after the incident. As to the fifth contention, while the trial court initially had difficulty discerning the events in the video, it 9 ultimately was able to ascertain what the video depicted after explanation from Moran. Ecdao also argues that the trial court issued the restraining order without adequately making statutorily required findings, including what conduct by Ecdao constituted abuse or how Moran’s injury occurred. The authority Ecdao cites does not establish that specific factual findings are required before issuance of a DVRO. Section 6300 contains no requirement for the trial court to make detailed factual findings. (Cf. § 6305, subd. (a)(2) [“detailed findings of fact” required for issuance of mutual restraining order].) Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327 (Nakamura), cited by Ecdao, contains no holding that a DVRO must be supported by “detailed findings of fact.” (See id. at pp. 334–335 [applicable legal principles for DVRO].) In Nakamura, the First District observed that the trial court’s lack of explanation for denying the requested temporary restraining order was “highly imprudent” and made review for legal insufficiency difficult. (Id. at pp. 335–336.) Nevertheless, the appellate court confirmed that trial courts are not “explicitly required by law to state reasons for the decision rendered” in DVRO petitions and “the integrity of adjudication does not necessarily require an explanation.” (Id. at p. 335.)3 The 3 After Nakamura, the Legislature enacted section 6320.5 and added subdivision (b) to section 6340, which require the court to state its reasons for denying a request for an ex parte temporary restraining order (§ 6320.5, subd. (a)) or for a DVRO after notice and a hearing (§ 6340, subd. (b)). (Stats. 2008, ch. 263, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2009; Stats. 2014, ch. 635, § 7, eff. Jan. 1, 2015.) Neither statute applies here because the DVRO was issued, not denied. 10 Nakamura court found abuse of discretion on another ground. (Id. at p. 337.) Ecdao cites Alafi v. Cohen (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 46 for the assertion that courts are required to make adequate findings of fact to facilitate appellate review. Ecdao’s reliance is misplaced. Alafi only stands for the proposition that upon a trial of a question of fact, the trial court is required to provide a statement of decision upon the request of any party. (Id. at pp. 60–61.) The record here does not reflect any request for a statement of decision. In any event, Ecdao’s premise is incorrect; the trial court also made findings that Ecdao claimed were missing. Here, the trial court found that Ecdao recklessly caused bodily injury to Moran when he struggled with her to retrieve the dog. Read with the evidence the court had just heard, that finding identifies the conduct, the resulting injury, and the statutory ground for relief. The record therefore permits meaningful appellate review, and the trial court’s reasons for issuing the DVRO were not as opaque as those in Nakamura. Based on Moran’s testimony and the pictures of her bruising, substantial evidence supported the finding that Ecdao recklessly caused her bodily injury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the DVRO. III. The Trial Court’s Order Complied with Section 6320, Subdivision (b) and Section 6340, Subdivision (a)(1) Ecdao also argues that the court exceeded the scope of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act by determining the ownership of the dog. Under section 6320, subdivision (b), on a showing of good cause, the court may grant “exclusive care, possession, or control” of an animal to a party seeking a restraining order. (See 11 also id., § 6340, subd. (a)(1) [allowing orders described in section 6320 et seq. to be issued after notice and hearing].) The respondent may be ordered to stay away from the animal and to not take the animal. (Id., § 6320, subd. (b).) The record supports the good cause section 6320, subdivision (b) requires. The confrontation that produced the restraining order arose from Ecdao’s and Ortiz’s effort to take the dog from Moran. The trial court credited Moran’s account that she and Ecdao shared custody of the dog and rejected Ecdao’s characterization of her as a dog sitter. Both continued to claim the dog, and the court found Ecdao and Ortiz were likely to attempt to retrieve it again absent an order. Granting Moran exclusive possession for the term of the order addressed the conduct that produced the confrontation. The DVRO awarded possession, care, and control of the dog to Moran. The court’s DVRO complied with sections 6320, subdivision (b) and 6340, subdivision (a)(1). Ecdao fails to establish that the trial court acted outside the authority of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. 12  DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. Costs are awarded to plaintiff Rachel Moran. ASHWORTH, J.* We concur: ADAMS, P. J. HANASONO, J. * Retired Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 13