Sellars v. Rose

Filed 11/9/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE JOHN SELLARS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, G066234 v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024- 01442186) KAREN ROSE, OPINION Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Bradley Erdosi, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with instructions. Requests for judicial notice denied. Objection to notice of lodging overruled. Rod Pacheco and Irasema Rocha for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Ryan E. Carreon for Defendant and Respondent. Alexandra Sagona for Weitz & Luxenberg as Amica Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.  Plaintiffs John Sellars, his wife Terri Sellars, and their son Christopher Sellars appeal from an order granting defendant Karen Rose’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike their complaint. Plaintiffs sued Rose for slander per se after she appeared on a podcast and accused John, 1 her former ballet teacher, of sexually abusing her and other young dancers in the 1970’s and 1980’s. We hold plaintiffs’ slander claims arise from protected activity. Rose’s statements were made in a public forum (a podcast) in connection with an issue of public interest (newsworthy allegations of recurring sexual abuse by a well-known ballet teacher). We further hold plaintiffs did not establish a probability of prevailing on their claims. Rose’s statements either do not amount to slander per se under Civil Code 2 section 46, or they are privileged under section 47.1, which creates a qualified privilege for sexual assault survivors who speak out about their experiences without malice. We therefore affirm the order striking the complaint. We publish this opinion because no other California appellate court has yet discussed section 47.1, which took effect in 2024. We construe the statute broadly to cover not only the speaker’s statements about her own alleged sexual assault, but also her statements about other alleged victims’ similar experiences with the same actor. We further hold that the speaker’s enduring emotional response to her alleged assault is insufficient to show malice; some wrongful intent separate from the desire to expose the assault and seek justice is required to render the statement unprivileged. 1 We respectfully use plaintiffs’ first names for clarity. 2 All further undesignated statutory references are to this code. 2  FACTS We take the following facts from the complaint, declarations, and other evidence submitted on the anti-SLAPP motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) We do not “make factual findings in ruling on an anti- SLAPP motion.” (All One God Faith, Inc. v. Organic & Sustainable Industry Standards, Inc. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1199.) A former professional dancer, John taught ballet at and later owned Orange County Dance Center (formerly the Phyllis Cyr Dance Academy) in Huntington Beach. According to his complaint, John’s “teaching prowess” attracted Orange County’s top youth dancers to the studio, and he taught “thousands of students,” “many of whom went on to join the best ballet academies in America.” According to Rose, in 1978, when she was 11 years old, she started taking ballet classes with John. Several months later, she began private lessons with him. Rose asserts that during those privates, John made sexual comments and advances toward her, and as time went on, he began to sexually abuse and rape her. The abuse allegedly continued, both at the studio and on John’s boat, until Rose was about 15 or 16 and quit the studio. In the mid-1980’s, John was criminally charged with oral copulation of a different teenage ballet student, who alleged the abuse occurred during private lessons. John’s trial was covered by the Los Angeles Times, which described how the allegations had “bitterly divided” studio parents, many of whom attended the trial daily. Although Rose was prepared to testify, the court reportedly did not permit it because her alleged abuse occurred outside the statute of limitations. Following a three-week trial, John was acquitted. 3  In 2022, the Legislature revived certain time-barred claims for damages for childhood sexual assaults. (Assem. Bill No. 452 (2023−2024 Reg. Sess.) [amending Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1].) When Rose learned of this, she and three other women filed civil suits against the dance studio and John. The Orange County Register ran an article about their lawsuits in early 2023 and included statements by both Rose and her attorney. In 2024, Rose’s childhood friend, who had also danced at John’s studio, invited Rose to appear on her podcast and share her story. Rose agreed, and over the course of four episodes, she spoke about how John had groomed, molested, and sexually assaulted her and other ballet students, identifying five other victims by name. Rose also made various disparaging statements about (1) John’s wife Terri, a former ballet dancer who had helped John run the studio, (2) their adult son Christopher, also a professional dancer, and (3) Christopher’s wife, Catherine Morgan, a former professional ballerina. John, Terri, and Christopher sued Rose, each asserting a separate cause of action for slander per se. In response, Rose filed an anti-SLAPP motion, asserting the claims arose from protected activity and had no merit. Rose also lodged a chart comparing the complaint’s description of her alleged statements on the podcast to a transcript of her actual statements.3 Plaintiffs opposed the 3 Plaintiffs do not dispute the chart’s accuracy. The chart reveals that a few of the complaint’s descriptions of Rose’s statements are inaccurate. For example, some statements attributed to Rose were in fact made by the podcast host; another statement described as being about Christopher was in fact about his wife. 4 motion. They denied any abuse occurred and submitted evidence that Rose’s rape allegations were not plausible. The trial court heard Rose’s motion, took it under submission, and granted it in a well-reasoned, seven-page minute order. It found plaintiffs’ claims arise from protected activity because they are based on Rose’s statements in connection with issues of public interest—e.g., whether sexual abuse occurred at the studio, whether there was a coverup of that abuse, and whether there are more victims or any current danger. It further found that not all of Rose’s statements on the podcast constitute slander per se, but the ones that do are privileged under section 47.1. DISCUSSION “Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. (Ibid.) Second, if the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a probability of prevailing. (Ibid.) We review a trial court’s order denying an anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325.) I. STEP ONE: THE CLAIMS ARISE FROM PROTECTED ACTIVITY Under step one, we first consider whether Rose made a threshold showing that the challenged claims arise from an act in furtherance of her right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) As is relevant here, the anti-SLAPP statute defines protected activity to include “any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” (Id., subd. (e)(3).) 5  Plaintiffs rightly concede the podcast is a public forum. (See Gallagher v. Philipps (S.D. Cal. 2021) 563 F.Supp.3d 1048, 1078 [“Statements made in a podcast . . . satisfy the public forum requirement”]; see also Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 807 [radio talk show is public forum].) The sole issue is thus whether Rose’s statements were made in connection with an issue of public interest. We conclude they were. We join courts across California and the country holding that “accusations of inappropriate sexual relations between minors and adults involved in youth activities are ‘a matter of public interest.’” (Doe v. California Assn. of Directors of Activities (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 796, 813 (Doe); see also Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, 375 (Cross) [“preventing child sexual abuse and protecting children from sexual predators are issues of widespread public interest”]; M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 623, 629 [“child molestation in youth sports . . . is significant and of public interest”]; Johnson v. Freborg (Minn. 2023) 995 N.W.2d 374, 385 (Johnson) [dance student’s Facebook post accusing three dance instructors of sexual assault “involved a matter of public concern, namely, sexual assault in the context of the #MeToo movement”]; Button v. Jimison (W.D. Wash., Jan. 20, 2026, No. 3:25-cv-05622-DGE) 2026 WL 149016, at *4 [Instagram post about ballet teachers molesting students constituted “matter of public concern” under Washington anti-SLAPP statute].) Further, Rose’s statements were not about childhood sexual abuse in the abstract, but about an alleged coverup of recurring sexual abuse by a well-known ballet teacher at a prominent Orange County studio. According to his own complaint, John was well known in the dance world, 6 was a sought-after ballet teacher, and has taught “thousands” of students in Orange County. Rose’s statements concerned not only whether John had sexually abused her personally, but also whether he had abused other students, whether the studio covered up that abuse, and, at least briefly, whether John should be allowed to continue to teach ballet 4 and the role of the #MeToo movement in exposing the abuse. 5 These issues are relevant not only to Rose and her fellow civil plaintiffs, but also to the thousands of students who also attended the studio, their parents, and perhaps even the Orange County ballet community at large. Indeed, the abuse allegations against John were the subject of a 1986 Los Angeles Times article and a 2023 Orange County Register article. (See Cross, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 378, fn. 13 [media coverage supports public interest finding].) 6 4 During episode 4 of the podcast, Rose bemoaned that Christopher’s wife, Catherine Morgan, had not told “Christopher, I’m sorry, but your father cannot teach in this studio.” 5 During episode 4, Rose commented: “[H]e’s gotten away with it. Nobody’s ever held him accountable. Look at what it took. It took an entire gymnastics team to take down, to take [Larry] Nassar down. [¶] . . . [¶] To bring [Harvey] Weinstein down, it took the Me Too movement. Out of all of us, only four of us are willing to come forward right now.” 6 Citing FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, plaintiffs argued in their briefing and at oral argument that Rose’s statements did not further or contribute to any ongoing public discourse. (See id. at p. 154 [courts must consider whether statement “contributes to or furthers the public conversation on an issue of public interest”].) But that case involved the application of the anti-SLAPP statute’s catchall definition of protected activity (Code Civ. Proc, § 425.16, subd. (e)(4)), and this case instead involves subdivision (e)(3). In any event, the multiple newspaper articles over the years would be sufficient to reflect an ongoing public interest in and discussion of the abuse allegations. 7  Plaintiffs assert there is no ongoing controversy because the allegations against John are “decades old” and involve charges on which John has been acquitted. But as we read the record, John was acquitted in connection with only one alleged victim. And the passage of time has not diminished the significance of the alleged survivors’ ongoing trauma or the dance community’s concerns about a coverup. (Doe, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 813 [finding public interest in decades-old child rape accusations, noting the plaintiff “still presents a sufficient potential danger to students to create a public interest in his previous misconduct”]; Dickinson v. Cosby (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1161 [observing press release issued by Bill Cosby’s attorney “in the immediate wake of numerous women publicly accusing Cosby of sexual misconduct” in past decades “was a topic of considerable public interest”].) II. STEP TWO: PLAINTIFFS DID NOT SHOW A PROBABILITY OF PREVAILING In step two of the anti-SLAPP analysis, plaintiffs must demonstrate a probability of prevailing on their claims for slander per se. Their burden is not high; we do not weigh credibility, nor do we evaluate the weight of the evidence. (Edward v. Ellis (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 780, 789.) Instead, we accept as true all evidence favorable to plaintiffs and determine whether they have demonstrated their claims are both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts that, if credited, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. (Id. at pp. 789−790.) Only a claim that lacks even minimal merit is stricken as a SLAPP. (Id. at p. 789.) Section 46 defines slander as “a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered,” that falls within any of five categories. Based on the nature of the complaint’s allegations and its causes of action for “slander 8 per se,” we infer plaintiffs allege the statements fall under the first category of slander: “a false and unprivileged publication” that “1. Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime.” (Ibid.; see also Regalia v. The Nethercutt Collection (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 361, 367 (Regalia) [“A slander that falls within the first four subdivisions of Civil Code section 46 is slander per se”].) 7 Accordingly, to prevail on their claims, plaintiffs must each make a prima facie showing that Rose made (1) a false and unprivileged statement that (2) charged them with a crime. They have not done so. A. John Has Not Shown Rose’s Statements Were Unprivileged At least some of Rose’s comments did accuse of John of criminal conduct. On the one hand, much of what she said—e.g., that he is “sick” and “pansexual” and that she would not “trust him with the dog” or his own “grandchildren”—though inflammatory and repugnant, is “the type of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language” that is constitutionally protected and cannot support a slander cause of action. (See Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 280 (Rosenaur).) On the other hand, in stating that John is a “pedophile” who molested and raped her and other ballet students and who even victimized his own wife, Rose effectively accused John of criminal conduct so as to 7 Plaintiffs assert for the first time on appeal that category (5) is also potentially applicable. But that category covers “slander per quod,” not slander per se. (Regalia, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 367.) And it requires plaintiffs to plead special damages that they did not allege—“e.g., discharge from employment, loss of opportunity for employment, loss of business customers or professional clients.” (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2026) Torts, § 649, p. 891.) 9 support his claim for slander per se. 8 (See § 46, subd. (1).) And as the trial court noted, plaintiffs provided evidence (e.g., their own declarations and deposition testimony from other purported victims in a different case) to support the element of falsity. Our analysis of John’s claim does not end there, however. 9 To support a cause of action for slander, the statement must also be “unprivileged.” (§ 46.) And this, John cannot show. In 2023, the Legislature enacted section 47.1, which created a qualified privilege for certain statements made by sexual assault victims. (§ 47.1, subd. (a).) The statute was enacted in response to the #MeToo movement 10 and is designed to “curb any unnecessary, and ultimately unsuccessful, litigation against individuals who choose to come forward with their stories of sexual assault . . . .” (Assem. Floor Analysis, Concurrence in 8 We disagree with Rose’s additional assertion that Christopher needed to plead slander with particularity. Unlike written libel, which “‘must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim,’” spoken slander “may ‘be charged by alleging the substance of the defamatory statement.’” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 893, italics omitted.) 9 Plaintiffs assert they satisfied prong two because the trial court found they established “‘minimal merit’” as to the element of falsity, a finding plaintiffs characterize as “dispositive.” But plaintiffs had to show the entire cause of action has minimal merit, which requires demonstrating “each element of [their] cause of action has at least minimal merit.” (Dunning v. Clews (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 156, 170, italics added.) Plaintiffs therefore had to also show the statement was unprivileged. 10 The #MeToo “movement is characterized by survivors of sexual abuse creating social media posts disclosing their experiences with sexual violence and identifying their abusers.” (Johnson, supra, 995 N.W.2d at p. 386; see Elliott v. Donegan (E.D.N.Y. 2020) 469 F.Supp.3d 40, 51−52 [providing brief history of movement].) 10 Sen. Amendments of Assem. Bill No. 933 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2023, p. 2; see Lively v. Wayfarer Studios LLC (S.D.N.Y. 2025) 786 F.Supp.3d 695, 757.) The statute “is intended to prevent SLAPP suits against actual victims of sexual abuse . . . [and] provide victims who are considering coming forward with greater assurances that they will not be the target of a baseless revenge suit.” (Sen. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 933 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) June 16, 2023, p. 4.) The section 47.1 privilege applies to “communication[s] made by an individual, without malice, regarding an incident of sexual assault . . . .” (§ 47.1, subd. (a).) The statute defines “communication” to include “factual information related to an incident of sexual assault . . . experienced by the individual making the communication.” (Id., subd. (d).) The privilege applies only if the speaker “has, or at any time had, a reasonable basis to file a complaint of sexual assault, . . . whether the complaint is, or was, filed or not.” (Id., subd. (c).) Rose’s statements that John molested and raped her fall squarely within the statute: they were communications of factual information regarding alleged incidents of sexual assault experienced by a speaker who had a reasonable basis 11 to file a complaint for sexual assault. 11 As a statutory prerequisite to filing her civil complaint, Rose was interviewed by a licensed mental health practitioner and obtained a “certificate of merit” declaring that in the practitioner’s professional opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe Rose was subject to childhood sexual abuse. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (f)(2).) The certificate of merit from that case was filed under seal in this case as an exhibit to Rose’s anti-SLAPP motion. Although the certificate was erroneously omitted from the original record on appeal, Rose’s counsel belatedly lodged at this court’s request. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.224, subd. (d).) Plaintiffs’ counsel initially objected to the lodging but conceded at oral argument that we have discretion to 11  Plaintiffs contend Rose’s statements went beyond discussing “an incident of sexual assault . . . experienced by” her, “the individual making the communication.” (§ 47.1, subd. (d).) They note Rose also claimed John abused other victims. We hold section 47.1 broadly applies to those statements as well. In defining “communication” to include “factual information related to an incident of sexual assault . . . experienced by the individual making the communication” (§ 47.1, subd. (d), italics added), the Legislature employed language that is regularly given a broad construction. (See San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Yee (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 723, 733 [“The Legislature’s use of the phrase ‘relating to’ compels our conclusion” that the statute should be given a broad interpretation].) 12 Further, the fact that the Legislature enacted section 47.1 in response to the #MeToo movement suggests it intended that statements about other victims’ alleged similar experiences with the same alleged abuser could fall within the privilege’s scope. 13 In this case, Rose’s statement that John abused other victims was “related to” her own experience because it suggests John systematically abused young dancers like her, corroborating her own account. consider the exhibit and the fact it was filed in the trial court. 12 “Related to” is also given a broad interpretation in contracts. (See, e.g., Diamond v. Schweitzer (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 866, 887 [release agreement’s use of “arising out of or related to” was “broad, not narrow” and extends to injuries having a causal or logical connection to events].) 13 As its name suggests, the #MeToo movement “seeks to connect survivors, encourage victims to tell their story, and increase awareness of the scope of the problem of sexual assault.” (Johnson, supra, 995 N.W.2d at p. 386.) 12  Plaintiffs assert section 47.1 is inapplicable because Rose acted with actual malice when making the statements, and the privilege only applies to communications made “without malice.” (§ 47.1, subd. (a).). The statute does not define “malice.” Indeed, “it provides no instructions for how courts are to determine whether . . . the communications were made without malice.” (Wayfarer Studios LLC v. Lively (S.D.N.Y., June 12, 2026, Nos. 25-cv-449, 24-CV-10049) 2026 WL 1707052, at *5 [applying California law and construing § 47.1].) However, the statute’s legislative history references the case law definition for “malice” used in a related statute: “malice” means “the speaker (1) was motivated by hatred or ill will toward the plaintiff, or (2) lacked reasonable grounds for [their] belief in the truth of the publication and therefore acted in reckless disregard of the subject’s rights.” (Sen. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 933 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) June 16, 2023, p. 2 (cleaned up), citing Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1337.) Plaintiffs assert Rose acted with “hatred or ill will,” as evidenced by her 2023 statement to the Orange County Register that she was “devastated” by the abuse, which changed “the entire trajectory of [her] life.”14 According to plaintiffs, “a person who genuinely believes that she was subjected to such egregious conduct at the age of twelve, and whose life trajectory she claims was permanently altered as a result, would almost certainly harbor profound resentment, anger, and ill will toward the alleged perpetrator.” They further assert Rose’s statement reflects “a deeply personal 14 Plaintiffs do not contend Rose lacked reasonable grounds to believe her statements were true. 13 and life-long enduring emotional response that . . . has been festering for nearly half a decade,” and this “implies a corresponding high degree of animus” and “long held hostility” that are “highly probative of actual malice.” We are not persuaded that Rose’s genuine belief in her statements and her “enduring emotional response,” if she has one, would render the statements unprivileged. Privilege law has long required that for a communication to be malicious, the speaker must have “entertained . . . a feeling of hatred or ill will going beyond that which the occasion for the communication apparently justified and different from that motive which prima facie rendered the communication privileged.” (Smith v. Hatch (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 39, 47–48 (Smith) [construing § 47’s common interest privilege]; see also Doe, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 815 [malice “may not be inferred from the mere fact that a communication was made”].) Section 47.1 contemplates the speaker is publicly discussing their own sexual assault or information related to it; the “occasion for the communication” is one that would understandably justify an emotional response. (Smith, supra, 271 Cal.App.2d at p. 47.) We decline to interpret section 47.1’s malice exception to subsume the very privilege it creates. (See Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1037 [statutory interpretations that lead to absurd results are to be avoided].) It follows that something more—some wrongful intent separate from the desire to expose the assault and seek justice—must be present to show “malice” under section 47.1. While we cannot exhaustively delineate the exact parameters of that separate wrongful intent here—and invite the Legislature to do so—we can recognize that plaintiffs have not made any such showing. 14  Accordingly, because Rose’s statements accusing John of criminal conduct are privileged under section 47.1, they cannot support a claim for slander per se. The trial court therefore correctly struck John’s slander cause of action. B. Terri and Christopher Have Not Shown Rose Accused Them of a Crime Unlike John, Terri and Christopher did not show Rose accused them of a crime. According to the chart of podcast statements, Rose made a number of insulting and inflammatory statements about Terri—e.g., that Terri is a “narcissist” and a “hot mess” who “let herself go”; that Terri, together with John, played “psychological games” with their students; that Terri is “worse than” John because she “knew what [John] had done to [Terri]” and “to others”; and that Terri would not let Rose use the studio telephone and told her not to “spill[ ] studio secrets.” But none of those statements accuses Terri of criminal activity. 15 The trial court therefore correctly struck Terri’s slander claim. The same goes for Christopher. According to the chart of podcast statements, Rose said Christopher “left a coveted job in Utah with Ballet West where he had a stellar career,” married ballerina Catherine Morgan, and then moved with her back to Huntington Beach because “[h]e had to come and save his daddy.” None of that alleges criminal activity so as to support Christopher’s slander cause of action. In fact, Rose added in the same episode, “There is no evidence that Chris himself has done anything, any 15 Rose did not suggest Terri knew about any alleged crimes before they occurred, encouraged their execution, or destroyed evidence after the fact. As plaintiffs acknowledge in their briefing, Rose did not claim Terri “witnessed the alleged act itself, but only that she allegedly saw the aftermath.” 15 impropriety. I’m not saying that.” Accordingly, the trial court also correctly struck Christopher’s slander claim. 16 C. Rose’s Demand for Fees Incurred on Appeal A defendant who prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to recover her attorney fees and costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) Courts have interpreted this provision “to include an attorney fees award on appeal.” (Rosenaur, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 287.) Rose is therefore entitled to “attorney fees on this appeal in an amount to be determined by the trial court on remand.” (Ibid.) 16 In episode 4, Rose did accuse Christopher’s wife, Catherine Morgan, of “harboring and abetting a pedophile” and failing to say, “yes, my father-in-law is a pedophile and Christopher, I’m sorry, but your father cannot teach in this studio.” The complaint inaccurately describes those statements as being about Christopher, when in fact they are only about Morgan, who is not a plaintiff. 16  DISPOSITION The order granting Rose’s special motion to strike the complaint is affirmed. Rose is awarded her costs (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)) and attorney fees on appeal. The matter is remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of attorney fees. SCOTT, J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J. SERVINO, J. 17