Bakersfield Crisis Pregnancy Center v. Dept. of Managed Health Care
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketF089465
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/17/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
BAKERSFIELD CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER
et al., F089465
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. BCV-22-102617-
TSC)
v.
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGED HEALTH
CARE et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Thomas S.
Clark, Judge.
Catherine W. Short and Corrine G. Konczal for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Neli N. Palma, Assistant Attorney General, Karli
Eisenberg, Martine D’Agostino and Lauren Zweier, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Defendants and Respondents.
-ooOoo-
Plaintiffs brought this taxpayer action to challenge the constitutionality of the
Abortion Accessibility Act of 2022 (Act), codified at Health and Safety Code section
1367.251 and Insurance Code section 10123.1961. The Act prohibits health care
service plans from imposing cost-sharing requirements, such as deductibles and copays,
on abortion and abortion-related services while allowing cost sharing to be imposed for
services incurred by women who choose to bear a child. Plaintiffs contend the Act
violates women’s right to reproductive privacy and the right to equal protection of
women who choose to carry their pregnancies to term. After a two-day court trial, the
court rejected these constitutional challenges and entered judgment for the state
defendants.
The trial court analyzed the evidence and stipulated facts and then determined
plaintiffs failed to prove that (1) the Act encourages or coerces some women into
choosing abortions or (2) the existence and enforcement of the Act in any way interferes
with the ability of California women to exercise their constitutional right to choose
whether to have an abortion or continue their pregnancy. These failure-of-proof
determinations were not challenged by plaintiffs under the standard requiring them to
demonstrate on appeal that their evidence was of such a character and weight as to
compel, as a matter of law, factual findings in their favor. (See Dreyer’s Grand Ice
Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838 [standard of review for a
failure-of-proof determination].) In short, plaintiffs did not prove their factual claim that
the Act will result in unwanted children or unwanted abortions. Furthermore, we reject
plaintiffs’ claims that the trial court committed legal error in resolving the privacy cause
of action. As explained in part II. of this opinion, the trial court properly applied the
rational basis test, did not misallocate the burden of proof, and did not violate any other
applicable principle of law.
The claim that the Act violated the equal protection guarantees of the federal and
state constitutions is impacted by the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs failed to
prove an actual impairment or significant interference with the fundamental constitutional
right to choose. In the absence of such proof, the claim that the Act’s classifications deny
equal protection of the laws is reviewed under the rational basis test, not strict scrutiny.
That test is extremely difficult to meet because the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
2.
the Legislature acted irrationally. As explained in part III. of this opinion, plaintiffs did
not carry that burden.
We therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Plaintiff Bakersfield Crisis Pregnancy Center is a California nonprofit religious
corporation that does business as Bakersfield Pregnancy Center (Pregnancy Center). The
three individual plaintiffs are Erin Rogers, Patrick Baggot, M.D., and Steven Braatz,
1
M.D. The doctors practice obstetrics in Los Angeles County and Lassen County,
respectively, and have patients with insurance requiring cost sharing for prenatal and
maternity care. The parties stipulated that Rogers and Drs. Baggot and Braatz paid
income taxes to the State of California during the one-year period before this action was
filed.
The defendants are the Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC), the
California Department of Insurance, and Rob Bonta, the Attorney General of California.
These departments and the Attorney General are responsible for enforcing the Act.
The Act began as Senate Bill No. 245 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 245),
which was introduced on January 22, 2021, the 48th anniversary of the decision in Roe v.
Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113. The bill proposed prohibiting health plans and insurance
policies from imposing cost sharing for all abortion services, including follow-up services
such as management of side effects and counseling. The Senate Committee on Health
requested the California Health Benefits Review Program (CHBRP) provide the
Legislature with an independent analysis of the medical, financial, and public health
1 In December 2023, the trial court dismissed three corporate plaintiffs without
prejudice pursuant to their request for dismissal: Mountain Right to Life, Inc., a
nonprofit religious California corporation doing business as Pregnancy & Family
Resource Center; Obria Medical Clinics of Southern California, Inc., a nonprofit public
benefit California corporation; and Pregnancy Care Center, a nonprofit public benefit
California corporation.
3.
impact of the bill. CHBRP’s report to the Legislature on Senate Bill 245 (Report) was
dated March 23, 2021. The trial court took judicial notice of the entire Report, which
was attached as Exhibit B to a stipulation filed by the parties.
In early 2022, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 245. (Stats. 2022, ch. 11, §§ 1,
2
2.) The Act was filed with the Secretary of State on March 22, 2022; became effective
on January 1, 2023; and was codified at Health and Safety Code section 1367.251 and
Insurance Code section 10123.1961. It prohibits health care service plans from
“impos[ing] a deductible, coinsurance, copayment, or any other cost-sharing requirement
on coverage for all abortion and abortion-related services, including preabortion and
followup services.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1367.251, subd. (a)(1); Ins. Code, §
10123.1961, subd. (a)(1).) The Act defines abortion as “any medical treatment intended
to induce the termination of a pregnancy except for the purpose of producing a live
birth.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1367.251, subd. (d); Ins. Code, § 10123.1961, subd. (d).)
Stipulated Facts from the Report
In December 2023, the parties executed a stipulation of facts for purposes of this
litigation only. The parties stipulated to the truth of the Report’s statements that are set
forth in the next three paragraphs. The stipulation included definitions of the terms
abortion, abortion services, the act, and insured that appear in those paragraphs.
Within California, 132,680 abortions were completed in 2017. About half of the
abortions completed in California were covered by Medi-Cal, which, even before the Act,
covered abortion without cost sharing. In 2022, before the Act, the average total cost of
all utilized abortion services per Insured user was $1,601. The average total cost of a
medication abortion per user was $741. The average total cost of a procedural abortion
per user was $2,763. The average cost of associated services per user was $574.
2 In June 2022, Roe v. Wade was overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization (2022) 597 U.S. 215, 302. Thus, the Act was introduced and passed before
Roe v. Wade was overruled.
4.
In 2022, before the Act, the average out of pocket cost for insured patients with
cost sharing for abortion services was $306 for medication abortion, $887 for procedural
abortion, and $182 for associated services. This equates to an average of $543 in out-of-
pocket costs for all utilized abortion services per user.
In 2022, among insured patients who used their insurance coverage for their
abortions, there were 13,840 users of abortion services without cost sharing and 9,652
users of abortion services with cost sharing. In the first year post-mandate, 2023, the
Report estimates there would be 23,589 insured users of abortion services without cost
sharing. Accordingly, an “estimated ‘additional 97 women would be new users of
3
abortion services due to the elimination of cost sharing.’ (CHBRP Report at p. ii.)”
Stipulated Facts from Kaiser
The parties also stipulated to the truth of the following statements contained in an
article dated July 13, 2022, that was published online by the Kaiser Family Foundation
Health System Tracker. The article estimated that “pregnant women of reproductive age
(ages 15 to 49) enrolled in large group health plans incur an average of $18,865 more in
health care costs than women who do not give birth. This additional health spending
associated with pregnancy, delivery, and post-partum care includes both the amount paid
by insurance (an average of $16,011) and that paid out-of-pocket by the enrollee (an
average of $2,854).” “While pregnant women typically have frequent outpatient office
visits prior to giving birth, most pregnancy-related health spending is for the delivery.”
The study explicitly excluded data from any patient whose pregnancy ended in abortion
or miscarriage.
3 The 97 estimated new users equals the difference between the estimated 23,589
users of abortion services in the first year post-mandate and the 23,492 users of abortion
services in 2022 (13,840 without cost sharing plus 9,652 with cost sharing equals
23,492). Accordingly, the estimate of 97 new users is for the Act’s first year.
5.
Other Stipulated Facts
For pregnant patients, health care service plans must cover and may not impose
cost sharing for (1) all preventive prenatal visits (billed as well-woman visits); (2)
participation in California’s prenatal screening program; and (3) services specified in the
“Women’s Preventive Services Initiative” “Well-Woman chart” (attached to the
4
stipulation as Exhibit A). For other types of prenatal care, plans must cover, but may
impose cost sharing. Most insured patients who continue their pregnancies incur out-of-
pocket costs related to their pregnancy before labor and delivery.
Health care service plans may impose cost sharing for prenatal ultrasounds unless
the ultrasounds are performed as part of California’s prenatal screening program.
Ultrasounds are not a medically necessary component of most abortions in California.
Under the Act, some insured patients who choose abortion will obtain an ultrasound,
which will be provided without cost sharing. Before the Act became effective, for
insured Californians, the average out-of-pocket cost for an abortion was less than the
average out-of-pocket cost for carrying a pregnancy to term and delivering a child.
The average total dollar value of the health care services that are provided without
cost sharing to an insured patient continuing a pregnancy to term is greater than the
average total dollar value of the services that are provided without cost sharing under the
Act to an insured patient choosing abortion.
The Act does not change the already existing government programs that assist
parents and patients who continue their pregnancies. The State of California is not
responsible for paying the cost of the abortions and abortion-related services that must be
provided without cost sharing under the Act.
Some miscarriages progress naturally and do not require health care services such
as prescription of mifepristone and/or misoprostol or a dilation and curettage procedure,
4 Some of these services may to utilized by insured patients who ultimately choose
abortion.
6.
vacuum suction aspiration, or dilation and evacuation procedure to complete. Some
miscarriages do require such health care services.
PROCEEDINGS
In October 2022, plaintiff filed this action to challenge the constitutionality of the
Act, which was scheduled to become effective on January 1, 2023. The operative
pleading, plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, was filed in June 2023 (complaint). The
complaint’s causes of action asserted the Act (1) violated the equal protection clause in
section 7, article I of the California Constitution and (2) violated the right to privacy
protected by section 1, article I of the California Constitution. The complaint’s prayer
sought a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional and an injunction permanently
enjoining both the enforcement of the Act and the adoption of regulations thereunder.
In September 2024, the trial court held a two-day court trial. Plaintiffs called two
witnesses, Dr. Braatz and Rebecca Busch. Dr. Braatz is a certified obstetrician and
gynecologist who graduated from medical school in 1984 and estimated he had provided
obstetric care to approximately 8,000 patients in his 40 years of practice. Busch is a
registered nurse and was qualified as an expert on medical billing and coding practices.
Defendants called three witnesses—Karen Meckstroth, M.D., Sarah S. Roberts,
Ph.D., and Daniel Southard. Dr. Meckstroth has practiced obstetrics and gynecology
since her residency in 1995; has certificates in epidemiology and biostatistics as part of
her fellowship in family planning at the University of California at San Francisco
(UCSF); and has a master’s degree from University of California at Berkeley in health
policy and management. Dr. Meckstroth is the medical director of the Center for
Pregnancy Options at the UCSF Medical Center and also works at Zuckerberg San
Francisco General Hospital, where as a generalist obstetrician and gynecologist she
works in labor and delivery, gynecologic surgery, inpatient care, and clinic care.
Professor Roberts has a master’s degree in public health from the University of
Michigan and a doctorate degree in public health from the University of California at
7.
Berkeley. Her opinion testimony addressed whether the specific costs eliminated by the
Act affect the decisions of pregnant individuals to have an abortion or to continue their
pregnancy and have a child and whether financial factors are barriers to obtaining
abortion care. Professor Roberts testified before the Legislature in support of the Act.
Her testimony described her research, which found that difficulty in paying for an
abortion was a barrier to obtaining an abortion and the Act’s elimination of cost would
likely reduce that barrier.
Southard has worked for the DMHC since 2009 and has served as its chief deputy
director since March 2021. In that role, he oversees the DMHC’s operations and budget,
a position he described as similar to the chief operating officer of a company. The
DMHC licenses and regulates health service plans, which includes interpreting the Act
and ensuring health plans comply with the Act. When new legislation is signed, the
DMHC’s Office of Plan Licensing prepares an “all plan letter” outlining the information
health plans need to provide to demonstrate compliance with the new laws. The DMHC
review health plans’ evidence of coverage on an annual basis. The evidence of coverage
provides information to enrollees about what their coverage includes and what it
excludes.
Southard also testified about the meaning of cost sharing terms such as copay,
deductible, and co-insurance and when these types of payments were charged. Cost
sharing is a general term that refers to the amount paid by a patient to receive services.
Copay is a specific term that refers to the amount a patient needs to pay at the time of
service before obtaining those services. A deductible generally is the amount an enrollee
is responsible for paying before the health plan starts paying for services; deductibles
might be billed after services are provided. When plans have preferred providers, co-
insurance is the amount the patient is responsible for after the health care provider bills
the health plan for the amount covered by the plan. Southard stated that when a law
eliminates cost sharing, the patient pays no out-of-pocket cost for the service.
8.
Final Trial Court Decision
In December 2024, the trial court issued its decision, which included a statement
of findings and conclusions on each cause of action. Addressing the right to privacy
claim, the court determined the plaintiffs had failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) the existence and enforcement of the Act in any way interferes with the
ability of California women to exercise their right to choose whether to have an abortion
or continue their pregnancy; (2) “the provisions of the Act constitute ‘state interference’
with this right exercised by California women”; or (3) the Act “encourages or coerces
some women into choosing abortions.”
Addressing the equal protection claim, the court stated strict scrutiny was not
triggered because plaintiffs had not shown the Act significantly interferes with
reproductive decision making and, therefore, the rational basis standard applied. The
court found there was a rational basis for treating other pregnant women in a different
manner than pregnant women seeking elective abortions and, as a result, rejected the
equal protection challenge to the Act.
In January 2025, the court entered a judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs
filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs contend the judgment in defendants favor should be reversed and the
matter returned to the trial court with directions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs on
their privacy and equal protection claims. Alternatively, they contend the judgment
should be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court with directions to evaluate
those claims under the correct legal standards.
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellate courts reviewing a judgment following a court trial apply the de novo
standard of review to questions of law resolved in the statement of decision. (Veiseh v.
Stapp (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1104; Brewer v. Murphy (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 928,
9.
936 (Brewer).) Under the de novo standard, appellate courts decide questions of law
without deference to how it was answered below. (Brewer, supra, at p. 936.)
In comparison, appellate courts review the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the trial court’s findings of fact by applying the substantial evidence standard. (Brewer,
supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 935.) Under that deferential standard, appellate courts view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing every reasonable
inference and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in support of the challenged findings.
Evidence is “substantial” for purposes of this standard of review if it is of ponderable
legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs’
opening brief acknowledges that this court is bound by the trial court’s express findings
that are supported by the evidence.
A third standard of review is mentioned here because it provides important context
for the specific claims of legal error raised by plaintiff. When a trial court determines
that the party with the burden of proof at trial did not carry that burden, the de novo or
substantial evidence standards do not apply. In Valero v. Board of Retirement of Tulare
County Employees’ Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 960, this court noted that “ ‘it is
misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence
supports the judgment.’ ” (Id. at p. 965.) Rather, failure-of-proof determinations are
reviewed on appeal to determine whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 966.) Under this demanding standard, the
appellant’s evidence must be (1) uncontradicted and unimpeached and (2) of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding. (Ibid.; accord, Davis v. Fresno Unified School District
(Oct. 22, 2026, F089619) __ Cal.App.5th __ [2026 WL 3168346, pp. 11, 14]; Tulare
Medical Center Property Owners Assn. v. Valdivia (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 967, 1002;
Jones v. Solgen Construction, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1196; Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. v. 6354 Figarden General Partnership (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 370, 390;
10.
Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 838.)
Here, plaintiffs have not referred to this demanding standard and argued that the evidence
compels, as a matter of law, a finding of any disputed fact in its favor. Rather, plaintiffs
contend the court committed legal error in its analysis of the claims. As a result of
plaintiffs’ approach to this appeal, we are bound by the trial court’s determinations that
plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof on disputed issues of fact and, thus, and,
thus, limit our review the trial court’s resolution of questions of law.
II. VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Historical Background on the State Constitutional Right to Choose
In 1969, the California Supreme Court concluded the right to privacy protected by
the California Constitution includes the “fundamental right of the woman to choose
whether to bear children.” (People v. Belous (1969) 71 Cal.2d 954, 963 [right was part of
the implied constitutional right to privacy] (Belous).) In 1972, California voters added an
explicit right to privacy to the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1 [privacy
listed among the inalienable rights]; see White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 773.)
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S.
113 and acknowledged a comparable constitutional right of procreative choice under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In June 2022, Roe v. Wade was overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Organization, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 302. The court concluded the
United States “Constitution does not prohibit the citizens of each State from regulating or
prohibiting abortion” and stated its decision “return[ed] that authority to the people and
their elected representatives.” (Ibid.) As a result, plaintiffs’ cause of action asserting a
violation of the right of privacy is governed entirely by state law.
To clarify the scope of this decision, we note that in November 2022 California
voters exercised the authority of states to regulate abortion recognized in Dobbs by
amending the California Constitution to include the following section:
11.
“The state shall not deny or interfere with an individual’s
reproductive freedom in their most intimate decisions, which
includes their fundamental right to choose to have an abortion and
their fundamental right to choose or refuse contraceptives. This
section is intended to further the constitutional right to privacy
guaranteed by Section 1, and the constitutional right to not be denied
equal protection guaranteed by Section 7. Nothing herein narrows or
limits the right to privacy or equal protection.” (Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 1.1)
This provision is not mentioned in plaintiffs’ pleadings, even though the operative
amended complaint was filed more than six months after the 2022 election. It also is not
mentioned in the other papers filed in the trial court or in the appellate briefing.
Therefore, based on the parties’ presentation of the case, this decision addresses only the
right to choose embedded in the explicit constitutional right of privacy and does not
address the “right to choose” contained in section 1.1 of article I of the California
Constitution. (See Anderson, The Principle of Party Presentation (2022) 70 Buff. L.
Rev. 1029, 1033, 1094–1100 [the principle of party presentation provides that courts
generally refrain from deciding issues the litigant did not choose to present].) This
limitation on the issues raised and addressed does not appear to have affected the
outcome of this appeal because the new constitutional provision explicitly states it does
not narrow or limit the right to privacy or equal protection. Nonetheless, this opinion is
not authority for how section 1.1 of article I of the California Constitution applies to the
Act. (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [an opinion is not authority for a
proposition not therein considered].)
The protections afforded women’s privacy interest in choosing whether to
continue a pregnancy or have an abortion has been addressed in two decisions of the
California Supreme Court. (Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981)
29 Cal.3d 252 (Myers); American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th
307 (Lungren).)
12.
In Myers, the court considered the constitutionality of three consecutive state
budget acts that limited Medi-Cal funding for abortions. (Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p.
256.) The budget acts provided “full funding of medical expenses incurred by indigent
women who decide to bear a child, but, except in a few limited circumstances, den[ied]
funding to those indigent women who choose to have an abortion.” (Ibid.) The court
stated it had described the constitutional right of procreative choice included in the
explicit right of privacy as “clearly among the most intimate and fundamental of all
constitutional rights.” (Id. at p. 275.) The court explained this conclusion by stating:
“This right of personal choice is central to a woman’s control not only of her own body,
but also to the control of her social role and personal destiny.” (Ibid.)
In Lungren, the California Supreme Court considered whether a statute requiring a
pregnant minor to obtain parental consent or judicial authorization before obtaining an
abortion violated the minor’s right of privacy. (Lungren, supra, 16 Cal.4th 307.) The
court stated its past “cases firmly and unequivocally establish that the interest in
autonomy privacy protected by the California constitutional privacy clause includes a
pregnant woman’s right to choose whether or not to continue her pregnancy.” (Id. at p.
332.) Addressing the relative importance of the right, the court confirmed its statement in
Myers “that a pregnant woman’s constitutional right of choice is ‘clearly among the most
intimate and fundamental of all constitutional rights.’ ” (Lungren, supra, at p. 333.)
B. Elements of a Privacy Cause of Action
In 1994 (i.e., before Lungren and after Myers), the Supreme Court stated: “Our
cases do not contain a clear statement of the elements of a cause of action for invasion of
the state constitutional right to privacy.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.
5
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 32 (Hill).) The court clarified the essential elements by concluding
5 In Hill, the plaintiff challenged a drug testing program of a nongovernmental
entity, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, that required student athletes to
provide urine samples under closely monitored conditions. (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p.
13.
that the plaintiff must establish “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a
serious invasion of privacy.” (Id. at pp. 39–40.) In addition, the court addressed the
defenses that might be raised by stating: “A defendant may prevail in a state
constitutional privacy case by negating any of the three elements just discussed or by
pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense, that the invasion of privacy is justified
because it substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests.” (Id. at p. 40.)
C. Plaintiffs’ Privacy Claim
Plaintiffs’ cause of action for a violation of the constitutional right of privacy
contained in section 1 of article I of the California Constitution asserts (1) the right of
privacy guarantees women the right to choose whether to bear or beget a child without
intrusion or interference by the government and (2) women have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy or carry it to term. It also alleges
the Act does not treat abortion and childbirth neutrally because it mandates health care
services for pregnant women who choose abortion be provided without any copays,
deductibles, or cost sharing while allowing copays, deductibles, and cost sharing to be
imposed for prenatal care obtained by women who choose to continue their pregnancies.
More generally, the cause of action alleges the Act intrudes on or interferes with the right
to choose and impedes the free choice of women with limited resources.
The trial court’s statement of decision described the factual basis for plaintiffs’
claim of intrusion or interference by stating plaintiffs interpreted the stipulated facts to
mean “that the State is intruding into private matters by encouraging (or worse) 97
women who would not otherwise desire or choose an abortion to have an abortion.” The
decision also acknowledged plaintiffs’ alternate or additional factual claim that the Act’s
elimination of cost sharing “forced women to delay obtaining abortions when chosen,
8.) The court concluded the “drug testing program does not violate plaintiffs’ state
constitutional right to privacy.” (Id. at p. 9.)
14.
including to the point of having children they do not want.” In other words, plaintiffs
argued that the stipulated facts and evidence proved the Act causes some women to have
an abortion they would not otherwise desire (i.e., freely choose), causes other women
who desire an abortion to have children they do not want, and causes some wanted
abortions to be delayed. The trial court addressed plaintiffs’ factual claims by stating:
“Plaintiffs have certainly not shown by any standard of proof that the
Act interferes with the right of California women to choose to
continue their pregnancies and Plaintiffs have certainly not shown
that the Act interferes with the right of California women to choose
to have an abortion.”
In closing its discussion of plaintiffs’ privacy cause of action, the court reiterated
that plaintiffs had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the
existence and enforcement of the Act in any way interferes with the ability of California
women to exercise their right to choose whether to have an abortion or continue their
pregnancy; (2) “the provisions of the Act constitute ‘state interference’ with this right
exercised by California women”; or (3) the Act “encourages or coerces some women into
choosing abortions.” In short, the court determined plaintiffs had not proven the factual
grounds needed to establish the third element of their privacy cause of action—that is, “a
serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40.)
D. The First Two Elements
The first two elements of plaintiffs’ privacy claim have been established as a
matter of law. Defendants do not dispute the existence of these elements. They are
mentioned here to provide context to our discussion of the parties’ disputes about the
third element and the “affirmative defense” of justification by “countervailing interests.”
(Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40.)
The existence of the first element—a legally protected privacy interest—presents a
question of law. (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40.) That question of law is answered by
our Supreme Court’s decisions in Belous, Myers, and Lungren. A pregnant woman’s
15.
right to choose whether or not to continue a pregnancy is unequivocally among the
interests in autonomy privacy protected by the California Constitution. (Lungren, supra,
16 Cal.4th at p. 332; see People v. Belous, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 963 [“fundamental right
of the woman to choose”].) This protected right to choose is properly classified as
autonomy privacy because it involves “making intimate personal decisions or conducting
personal activities without observation, intrusion, or interference.” (Hill, supra, at p. 35.)
In contrast, informational privacy refers to an individual’s interests in precluding the
dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information. (Ibid.)
The second element—a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances—
presents a mixed question of law and fact. (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40.) Here, the
second element is predominately a legal question that also is resolved by our Supreme
Court’s decisions. The right to choose is as among “the most intimate” of constitutional
rights. (Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 275.) Therefore, we conclude as a matter of law
that women within California’s jurisdiction have a reasonable expectation of autonomy
privacy when choosing whether to continue a pregnancy or to have an abortion.
E. Allocation of the Burden of Proof
Before considering the disputed third element, we address legal issues involving
the burden of proof. Some of plaintiffs’ arguments assert the trial court erred in requiring
them to prove certain facts. For instance, plaintiffs’ opening brief contends the trial court
erroneously imposed on them “the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the Act ‘interferes with the right of California women to choose to
continue their pregnancies’ or that the Act ‘encourages or coerces some women into
choosing abortion.’ ” Also, their reply brief asserts:
“When it comes to the right of privacy, the burden is not on
Plaintiffs to show ‘evidence of government intrusion’ or to meet any
particular ‘standard of proof.’ [Citations.] Rather, the burden is on
the State to show that the conditions of the new law ‘relate to the
purposes of the legislation which confers the benefit or privilege’,
that the ‘utility of imposing the conditions’ outweighs the ‘resulting
16.
impairment of constitutional rights’ and that there are ‘no less
offensive alternatives’ to achieving the state’s objective.”
Based on our Supreme Court’s decisions, including Hill, and the general rules of
law governing the allocation of the burden of proof, we reject this argument to the extent
it asserts that a plaintiff claiming a violation of the right to privacy does not have the
burden of proving the claim’s third element. In Hill, after the court identified the three
elements of a privacy claim, it stated a defendant could prove, “as an affirmative defense,
that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers one or more
countervailing interests.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40.) From this explicit statement
about an affirmative defense that a defendant must prove, we infer that the factual basis
for the three essential elements of a privacy claim must be proven by the plaintiff
asserting the claim. This interpretation of Hill is supported by the rules of law defining
the normal allocation of the burden of proof.
Those rules of law include Evidence Code section 500, which provides: “Except
as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence
or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is
asserting.” In other words, “ ‘the burden of proof as to a particular fact is normally on the
party to whose case the fact is essential.’ ” (In re Marriage of Hein (2020) 52
Cal.App.5th 519, 537.) Accordingly, “the plaintiff normally bears the burden of proof to
establish the elements of his or her cause of action.” (Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 234; see Quesada v. County of Los Angeles
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 880, 888 [customary approach].) Similarly, the defendant
normally bears the burden of proving an affirmative defense. (E.g., Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th
at p. 40.)
Having identified the normal allocation of the burden of proof, we next consider
whether the burden of proving the elements of a privacy claim has been altered by law—
that is, a constitutional provision, statute, or judicial decision. (See Masellis v. Law
Office of Leslie F. Jensen (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1087; Evid. Code, § 160
17.
[definition of law].) First, we have not located, and plaintiffs have not cited, any
constitutional provision or statute specifically addressing the burden of proof for privacy
claims. Second, we have not located, and plaintiffs have not cited, any judicial decision
explicitly analyzing the burden of proof for privacy claims and altering the normal
allocation.
In the absence of a constitutional provision, statute, or published judicial decision,
a question presented is whether we should create new law and conclude the normal
allocation of the burden of proof does not apply to the third element of a privacy claim.
California courts resolve the reallocation issue by applying a specific methodology that
evaluates four factors. (Masellis v. Law Office of Leslie F. Jensen, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1087, citing Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 660–661.)
Here, we need not recite and analyze the four factors identified in Lakin because
plaintiffs have not addressed the factors and explained why they favor reallocating the
burden of proof of the third element of a privacy cause of action to a defendant. (See
Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [burden is on appellant to demonstrate
reversible error].) Consequently, we conclude the normal allocation of the burden of
proof applies to privacy claims and, as a result, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
facts necessary to establishing the third element. (See Evid. Code, § 500.)
We also consider plaintiffs’ argument that they need not meet any particular
standard of proof. This argument can be interpreted as asserting the trial court erred in
applying the preponderance of the evidence standard to their privacy claims. “Burden of
proof” is defined as “the obligation of a party to establish by evidence a requisite degree
of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the trier of fact or the court.” (Evid. Code, §
115.) Unless the law provides otherwise, the level of proof required is a preponderance
of the evidence. (Ibid.) Due to the absence of authority imposin