Full Opinion

Filed 11/17/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT BAKERSFIELD CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER et al., F089465 Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. BCV-22-102617- TSC) v. DEPARTMENT OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE et al., OPINION Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Thomas S. Clark, Judge. Catherine W. Short and Corrine G. Konczal for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Neli N. Palma, Assistant Attorney General, Karli Eisenberg, Martine D’Agostino and Lauren Zweier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Respondents. -ooOoo- Plaintiffs brought this taxpayer action to challenge the constitutionality of the Abortion Accessibility Act of 2022 (Act), codified at Health and Safety Code section 1367.251 and Insurance Code section 10123.1961. The Act prohibits health care service plans from imposing cost-sharing requirements, such as deductibles and copays, on abortion and abortion-related services while allowing cost sharing to be imposed for services incurred by women who choose to bear a child. Plaintiffs contend the Act violates women’s right to reproductive privacy and the right to equal protection of women who choose to carry their pregnancies to term. After a two-day court trial, the court rejected these constitutional challenges and entered judgment for the state defendants. The trial court analyzed the evidence and stipulated facts and then determined plaintiffs failed to prove that (1) the Act encourages or coerces some women into choosing abortions or (2) the existence and enforcement of the Act in any way interferes with the ability of California women to exercise their constitutional right to choose whether to have an abortion or continue their pregnancy. These failure-of-proof determinations were not challenged by plaintiffs under the standard requiring them to demonstrate on appeal that their evidence was of such a character and weight as to compel, as a matter of law, factual findings in their favor. (See Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838 [standard of review for a failure-of-proof determination].) In short, plaintiffs did not prove their factual claim that the Act will result in unwanted children or unwanted abortions. Furthermore, we reject plaintiffs’ claims that the trial court committed legal error in resolving the privacy cause of action. As explained in part II. of this opinion, the trial court properly applied the rational basis test, did not misallocate the burden of proof, and did not violate any other applicable principle of law. The claim that the Act violated the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions is impacted by the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs failed to prove an actual impairment or significant interference with the fundamental constitutional right to choose. In the absence of such proof, the claim that the Act’s classifications deny equal protection of the laws is reviewed under the rational basis test, not strict scrutiny. That test is extremely difficult to meet because the plaintiff has the burden of establishing 2. the Legislature acted irrationally. As explained in part III. of this opinion, plaintiffs did not carry that burden. We therefore affirm the judgment. FACTS Plaintiff Bakersfield Crisis Pregnancy Center is a California nonprofit religious corporation that does business as Bakersfield Pregnancy Center (Pregnancy Center). The three individual plaintiffs are Erin Rogers, Patrick Baggot, M.D., and Steven Braatz, 1 M.D. The doctors practice obstetrics in Los Angeles County and Lassen County, respectively, and have patients with insurance requiring cost sharing for prenatal and maternity care. The parties stipulated that Rogers and Drs. Baggot and Braatz paid income taxes to the State of California during the one-year period before this action was filed. The defendants are the Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC), the California Department of Insurance, and Rob Bonta, the Attorney General of California. These departments and the Attorney General are responsible for enforcing the Act. The Act began as Senate Bill No. 245 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 245), which was introduced on January 22, 2021, the 48th anniversary of the decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113. The bill proposed prohibiting health plans and insurance policies from imposing cost sharing for all abortion services, including follow-up services such as management of side effects and counseling. The Senate Committee on Health requested the California Health Benefits Review Program (CHBRP) provide the Legislature with an independent analysis of the medical, financial, and public health 1 In December 2023, the trial court dismissed three corporate plaintiffs without prejudice pursuant to their request for dismissal: Mountain Right to Life, Inc., a nonprofit religious California corporation doing business as Pregnancy & Family Resource Center; Obria Medical Clinics of Southern California, Inc., a nonprofit public benefit California corporation; and Pregnancy Care Center, a nonprofit public benefit California corporation. 3. impact of the bill. CHBRP’s report to the Legislature on Senate Bill 245 (Report) was dated March 23, 2021. The trial court took judicial notice of the entire Report, which was attached as Exhibit B to a stipulation filed by the parties. In early 2022, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 245. (Stats. 2022, ch. 11, §§ 1, 2 2.) The Act was filed with the Secretary of State on March 22, 2022; became effective on January 1, 2023; and was codified at Health and Safety Code section 1367.251 and Insurance Code section 10123.1961. It prohibits health care service plans from “impos[ing] a deductible, coinsurance, copayment, or any other cost-sharing requirement on coverage for all abortion and abortion-related services, including preabortion and followup services.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1367.251, subd. (a)(1); Ins. Code, § 10123.1961, subd. (a)(1).) The Act defines abortion as “any medical treatment intended to induce the termination of a pregnancy except for the purpose of producing a live birth.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1367.251, subd. (d); Ins. Code, § 10123.1961, subd. (d).) Stipulated Facts from the Report In December 2023, the parties executed a stipulation of facts for purposes of this litigation only. The parties stipulated to the truth of the Report’s statements that are set forth in the next three paragraphs. The stipulation included definitions of the terms abortion, abortion services, the act, and insured that appear in those paragraphs. Within California, 132,680 abortions were completed in 2017. About half of the abortions completed in California were covered by Medi-Cal, which, even before the Act, covered abortion without cost sharing. In 2022, before the Act, the average total cost of all utilized abortion services per Insured user was $1,601. The average total cost of a medication abortion per user was $741. The average total cost of a procedural abortion per user was $2,763. The average cost of associated services per user was $574. 2 In June 2022, Roe v. Wade was overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) 597 U.S. 215, 302. Thus, the Act was introduced and passed before Roe v. Wade was overruled. 4. In 2022, before the Act, the average out of pocket cost for insured patients with cost sharing for abortion services was $306 for medication abortion, $887 for procedural abortion, and $182 for associated services. This equates to an average of $543 in out-of- pocket costs for all utilized abortion services per user. In 2022, among insured patients who used their insurance coverage for their abortions, there were 13,840 users of abortion services without cost sharing and 9,652 users of abortion services with cost sharing. In the first year post-mandate, 2023, the Report estimates there would be 23,589 insured users of abortion services without cost sharing. Accordingly, an “estimated ‘additional 97 women would be new users of 3 abortion services due to the elimination of cost sharing.’ (CHBRP Report at p. ii.)” Stipulated Facts from Kaiser The parties also stipulated to the truth of the following statements contained in an article dated July 13, 2022, that was published online by the Kaiser Family Foundation Health System Tracker. The article estimated that “pregnant women of reproductive age (ages 15 to 49) enrolled in large group health plans incur an average of $18,865 more in health care costs than women who do not give birth. This additional health spending associated with pregnancy, delivery, and post-partum care includes both the amount paid by insurance (an average of $16,011) and that paid out-of-pocket by the enrollee (an average of $2,854).” “While pregnant women typically have frequent outpatient office visits prior to giving birth, most pregnancy-related health spending is for the delivery.” The study explicitly excluded data from any patient whose pregnancy ended in abortion or miscarriage. 3 The 97 estimated new users equals the difference between the estimated 23,589 users of abortion services in the first year post-mandate and the 23,492 users of abortion services in 2022 (13,840 without cost sharing plus 9,652 with cost sharing equals 23,492). Accordingly, the estimate of 97 new users is for the Act’s first year. 5. Other Stipulated Facts For pregnant patients, health care service plans must cover and may not impose cost sharing for (1) all preventive prenatal visits (billed as well-woman visits); (2) participation in California’s prenatal screening program; and (3) services specified in the “Women’s Preventive Services Initiative” “Well-Woman chart” (attached to the 4 stipulation as Exhibit A). For other types of prenatal care, plans must cover, but may impose cost sharing. Most insured patients who continue their pregnancies incur out-of- pocket costs related to their pregnancy before labor and delivery. Health care service plans may impose cost sharing for prenatal ultrasounds unless the ultrasounds are performed as part of California’s prenatal screening program. Ultrasounds are not a medically necessary component of most abortions in California. Under the Act, some insured patients who choose abortion will obtain an ultrasound, which will be provided without cost sharing. Before the Act became effective, for insured Californians, the average out-of-pocket cost for an abortion was less than the average out-of-pocket cost for carrying a pregnancy to term and delivering a child. The average total dollar value of the health care services that are provided without cost sharing to an insured patient continuing a pregnancy to term is greater than the average total dollar value of the services that are provided without cost sharing under the Act to an insured patient choosing abortion. The Act does not change the already existing government programs that assist parents and patients who continue their pregnancies. The State of California is not responsible for paying the cost of the abortions and abortion-related services that must be provided without cost sharing under the Act. Some miscarriages progress naturally and do not require health care services such as prescription of mifepristone and/or misoprostol or a dilation and curettage procedure, 4 Some of these services may to utilized by insured patients who ultimately choose abortion. 6. vacuum suction aspiration, or dilation and evacuation procedure to complete. Some miscarriages do require such health care services. PROCEEDINGS In October 2022, plaintiff filed this action to challenge the constitutionality of the Act, which was scheduled to become effective on January 1, 2023. The operative pleading, plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, was filed in June 2023 (complaint). The complaint’s causes of action asserted the Act (1) violated the equal protection clause in section 7, article I of the California Constitution and (2) violated the right to privacy protected by section 1, article I of the California Constitution. The complaint’s prayer sought a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional and an injunction permanently enjoining both the enforcement of the Act and the adoption of regulations thereunder. In September 2024, the trial court held a two-day court trial. Plaintiffs called two witnesses, Dr. Braatz and Rebecca Busch. Dr. Braatz is a certified obstetrician and gynecologist who graduated from medical school in 1984 and estimated he had provided obstetric care to approximately 8,000 patients in his 40 years of practice. Busch is a registered nurse and was qualified as an expert on medical billing and coding practices. Defendants called three witnesses—Karen Meckstroth, M.D., Sarah S. Roberts, Ph.D., and Daniel Southard. Dr. Meckstroth has practiced obstetrics and gynecology since her residency in 1995; has certificates in epidemiology and biostatistics as part of her fellowship in family planning at the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF); and has a master’s degree from University of California at Berkeley in health policy and management. Dr. Meckstroth is the medical director of the Center for Pregnancy Options at the UCSF Medical Center and also works at Zuckerberg San Francisco General Hospital, where as a generalist obstetrician and gynecologist she works in labor and delivery, gynecologic surgery, inpatient care, and clinic care. Professor Roberts has a master’s degree in public health from the University of Michigan and a doctorate degree in public health from the University of California at 7. Berkeley. Her opinion testimony addressed whether the specific costs eliminated by the Act affect the decisions of pregnant individuals to have an abortion or to continue their pregnancy and have a child and whether financial factors are barriers to obtaining abortion care. Professor Roberts testified before the Legislature in support of the Act. Her testimony described her research, which found that difficulty in paying for an abortion was a barrier to obtaining an abortion and the Act’s elimination of cost would likely reduce that barrier. Southard has worked for the DMHC since 2009 and has served as its chief deputy director since March 2021. In that role, he oversees the DMHC’s operations and budget, a position he described as similar to the chief operating officer of a company. The DMHC licenses and regulates health service plans, which includes interpreting the Act and ensuring health plans comply with the Act. When new legislation is signed, the DMHC’s Office of Plan Licensing prepares an “all plan letter” outlining the information health plans need to provide to demonstrate compliance with the new laws. The DMHC review health plans’ evidence of coverage on an annual basis. The evidence of coverage provides information to enrollees about what their coverage includes and what it excludes. Southard also testified about the meaning of cost sharing terms such as copay, deductible, and co-insurance and when these types of payments were charged. Cost sharing is a general term that refers to the amount paid by a patient to receive services. Copay is a specific term that refers to the amount a patient needs to pay at the time of service before obtaining those services. A deductible generally is the amount an enrollee is responsible for paying before the health plan starts paying for services; deductibles might be billed after services are provided. When plans have preferred providers, co- insurance is the amount the patient is responsible for after the health care provider bills the health plan for the amount covered by the plan. Southard stated that when a law eliminates cost sharing, the patient pays no out-of-pocket cost for the service. 8. Final Trial Court Decision In December 2024, the trial court issued its decision, which included a statement of findings and conclusions on each cause of action. Addressing the right to privacy claim, the court determined the plaintiffs had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the existence and enforcement of the Act in any way interferes with the ability of California women to exercise their right to choose whether to have an abortion or continue their pregnancy; (2) “the provisions of the Act constitute ‘state interference’ with this right exercised by California women”; or (3) the Act “encourages or coerces some women into choosing abortions.” Addressing the equal protection claim, the court stated strict scrutiny was not triggered because plaintiffs had not shown the Act significantly interferes with reproductive decision making and, therefore, the rational basis standard applied. The court found there was a rational basis for treating other pregnant women in a different manner than pregnant women seeking elective abortions and, as a result, rejected the equal protection challenge to the Act. In January 2025, the court entered a judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs contend the judgment in defendants favor should be reversed and the matter returned to the trial court with directions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their privacy and equal protection claims. Alternatively, they contend the judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court with directions to evaluate those claims under the correct legal standards. I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW Appellate courts reviewing a judgment following a court trial apply the de novo standard of review to questions of law resolved in the statement of decision. (Veiseh v. Stapp (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1104; Brewer v. Murphy (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 928, 9. 936 (Brewer).) Under the de novo standard, appellate courts decide questions of law without deference to how it was answered below. (Brewer, supra, at p. 936.) In comparison, appellate courts review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact by applying the substantial evidence standard. (Brewer, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 935.) Under that deferential standard, appellate courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in support of the challenged findings. Evidence is “substantial” for purposes of this standard of review if it is of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs’ opening brief acknowledges that this court is bound by the trial court’s express findings that are supported by the evidence. A third standard of review is mentioned here because it provides important context for the specific claims of legal error raised by plaintiff. When a trial court determines that the party with the burden of proof at trial did not carry that burden, the de novo or substantial evidence standards do not apply. In Valero v. Board of Retirement of Tulare County Employees’ Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 960, this court noted that “ ‘it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.’ ” (Id. at p. 965.) Rather, failure-of-proof determinations are reviewed on appeal to determine whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 966.) Under this demanding standard, the appellant’s evidence must be (1) uncontradicted and unimpeached and (2) of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding. (Ibid.; accord, Davis v. Fresno Unified School District (Oct. 22, 2026, F089619) __ Cal.App.5th __ [2026 WL 3168346, pp. 11, 14]; Tulare Medical Center Property Owners Assn. v. Valdivia (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 967, 1002; Jones v. Solgen Construction, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1196; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 6354 Figarden General Partnership (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 370, 390; 10. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 838.) Here, plaintiffs have not referred to this demanding standard and argued that the evidence compels, as a matter of law, a finding of any disputed fact in its favor. Rather, plaintiffs contend the court committed legal error in its analysis of the claims. As a result of plaintiffs’ approach to this appeal, we are bound by the trial court’s determinations that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof on disputed issues of fact and, thus, and, thus, limit our review the trial court’s resolution of questions of law. II. VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY A. Historical Background on the State Constitutional Right to Choose In 1969, the California Supreme Court concluded the right to privacy protected by the California Constitution includes the “fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear children.” (People v. Belous (1969) 71 Cal.2d 954, 963 [right was part of the implied constitutional right to privacy] (Belous).) In 1972, California voters added an explicit right to privacy to the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1 [privacy listed among the inalienable rights]; see White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 773.) In 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. 113 and acknowledged a comparable constitutional right of procreative choice under the Fourteenth Amendment. In June 2022, Roe v. Wade was overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 302. The court concluded the United States “Constitution does not prohibit the citizens of each State from regulating or prohibiting abortion” and stated its decision “return[ed] that authority to the people and their elected representatives.” (Ibid.) As a result, plaintiffs’ cause of action asserting a violation of the right of privacy is governed entirely by state law. To clarify the scope of this decision, we note that in November 2022 California voters exercised the authority of states to regulate abortion recognized in Dobbs by amending the California Constitution to include the following section: 11. “The state shall not deny or interfere with an individual’s reproductive freedom in their most intimate decisions, which includes their fundamental right to choose to have an abortion and their fundamental right to choose or refuse contraceptives. This section is intended to further the constitutional right to privacy guaranteed by Section 1, and the constitutional right to not be denied equal protection guaranteed by Section 7. Nothing herein narrows or limits the right to privacy or equal protection.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.1) This provision is not mentioned in plaintiffs’ pleadings, even though the operative amended complaint was filed more than six months after the 2022 election. It also is not mentioned in the other papers filed in the trial court or in the appellate briefing. Therefore, based on the parties’ presentation of the case, this decision addresses only the right to choose embedded in the explicit constitutional right of privacy and does not address the “right to choose” contained in section 1.1 of article I of the California Constitution. (See Anderson, The Principle of Party Presentation (2022) 70 Buff. L. Rev. 1029, 1033, 1094–1100 [the principle of party presentation provides that courts generally refrain from deciding issues the litigant did not choose to present].) This limitation on the issues raised and addressed does not appear to have affected the outcome of this appeal because the new constitutional provision explicitly states it does not narrow or limit the right to privacy or equal protection. Nonetheless, this opinion is not authority for how section 1.1 of article I of the California Constitution applies to the Act. (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered].) The protections afforded women’s privacy interest in choosing whether to continue a pregnancy or have an abortion has been addressed in two decisions of the California Supreme Court. (Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252 (Myers); American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307 (Lungren).) 12. In Myers, the court considered the constitutionality of three consecutive state budget acts that limited Medi-Cal funding for abortions. (Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 256.) The budget acts provided “full funding of medical expenses incurred by indigent women who decide to bear a child, but, except in a few limited circumstances, den[ied] funding to those indigent women who choose to have an abortion.” (Ibid.) The court stated it had described the constitutional right of procreative choice included in the explicit right of privacy as “clearly among the most intimate and fundamental of all constitutional rights.” (Id. at p. 275.) The court explained this conclusion by stating: “This right of personal choice is central to a woman’s control not only of her own body, but also to the control of her social role and personal destiny.” (Ibid.) In Lungren, the California Supreme Court considered whether a statute requiring a pregnant minor to obtain parental consent or judicial authorization before obtaining an abortion violated the minor’s right of privacy. (Lungren, supra, 16 Cal.4th 307.) The court stated its past “cases firmly and unequivocally establish that the interest in autonomy privacy protected by the California constitutional privacy clause includes a pregnant woman’s right to choose whether or not to continue her pregnancy.” (Id. at p. 332.) Addressing the relative importance of the right, the court confirmed its statement in Myers “that a pregnant woman’s constitutional right of choice is ‘clearly among the most intimate and fundamental of all constitutional rights.’ ” (Lungren, supra, at p. 333.) B. Elements of a Privacy Cause of Action In 1994 (i.e., before Lungren and after Myers), the Supreme Court stated: “Our cases do not contain a clear statement of the elements of a cause of action for invasion of the state constitutional right to privacy.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. 5 (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 32 (Hill).) The court clarified the essential elements by concluding 5 In Hill, the plaintiff challenged a drug testing program of a nongovernmental entity, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, that required student athletes to provide urine samples under closely monitored conditions. (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 13. that the plaintiff must establish “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Id. at pp. 39–40.) In addition, the court addressed the defenses that might be raised by stating: “A defendant may prevail in a state constitutional privacy case by negating any of the three elements just discussed or by pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense, that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests.” (Id. at p. 40.) C. Plaintiffs’ Privacy Claim Plaintiffs’ cause of action for a violation of the constitutional right of privacy contained in section 1 of article I of the California Constitution asserts (1) the right of privacy guarantees women the right to choose whether to bear or beget a child without intrusion or interference by the government and (2) women have a reasonable expectation of privacy in deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy or carry it to term. It also alleges the Act does not treat abortion and childbirth neutrally because it mandates health care services for pregnant women who choose abortion be provided without any copays, deductibles, or cost sharing while allowing copays, deductibles, and cost sharing to be imposed for prenatal care obtained by women who choose to continue their pregnancies. More generally, the cause of action alleges the Act intrudes on or interferes with the right to choose and impedes the free choice of women with limited resources. The trial court’s statement of decision described the factual basis for plaintiffs’ claim of intrusion or interference by stating plaintiffs interpreted the stipulated facts to mean “that the State is intruding into private matters by encouraging (or worse) 97 women who would not otherwise desire or choose an abortion to have an abortion.” The decision also acknowledged plaintiffs’ alternate or additional factual claim that the Act’s elimination of cost sharing “forced women to delay obtaining abortions when chosen, 8.) The court concluded the “drug testing program does not violate plaintiffs’ state constitutional right to privacy.” (Id. at p. 9.) 14. including to the point of having children they do not want.” In other words, plaintiffs argued that the stipulated facts and evidence proved the Act causes some women to have an abortion they would not otherwise desire (i.e., freely choose), causes other women who desire an abortion to have children they do not want, and causes some wanted abortions to be delayed. The trial court addressed plaintiffs’ factual claims by stating: “Plaintiffs have certainly not shown by any standard of proof that the Act interferes with the right of California women to choose to continue their pregnancies and Plaintiffs have certainly not shown that the Act interferes with the right of California women to choose to have an abortion.” In closing its discussion of plaintiffs’ privacy cause of action, the court reiterated that plaintiffs had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the existence and enforcement of the Act in any way interferes with the ability of California women to exercise their right to choose whether to have an abortion or continue their pregnancy; (2) “the provisions of the Act constitute ‘state interference’ with this right exercised by California women”; or (3) the Act “encourages or coerces some women into choosing abortions.” In short, the court determined plaintiffs had not proven the factual grounds needed to establish the third element of their privacy cause of action—that is, “a serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40.) D. The First Two Elements The first two elements of plaintiffs’ privacy claim have been established as a matter of law. Defendants do not dispute the existence of these elements. They are mentioned here to provide context to our discussion of the parties’ disputes about the third element and the “affirmative defense” of justification by “countervailing interests.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40.) The existence of the first element—a legally protected privacy interest—presents a question of law. (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40.) That question of law is answered by our Supreme Court’s decisions in Belous, Myers, and Lungren. A pregnant woman’s 15. right to choose whether or not to continue a pregnancy is unequivocally among the interests in autonomy privacy protected by the California Constitution. (Lungren, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 332; see People v. Belous, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 963 [“fundamental right of the woman to choose”].) This protected right to choose is properly classified as autonomy privacy because it involves “making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or interference.” (Hill, supra, at p. 35.) In contrast, informational privacy refers to an individual’s interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information. (Ibid.) The second element—a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances— presents a mixed question of law and fact. (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40.) Here, the second element is predominately a legal question that also is resolved by our Supreme Court’s decisions. The right to choose is as among “the most intimate” of constitutional rights. (Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 275.) Therefore, we conclude as a matter of law that women within California’s jurisdiction have a reasonable expectation of autonomy privacy when choosing whether to continue a pregnancy or to have an abortion. E. Allocation of the Burden of Proof Before considering the disputed third element, we address legal issues involving the burden of proof. Some of plaintiffs’ arguments assert the trial court erred in requiring them to prove certain facts. For instance, plaintiffs’ opening brief contends the trial court erroneously imposed on them “the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Act ‘interferes with the right of California women to choose to continue their pregnancies’ or that the Act ‘encourages or coerces some women into choosing abortion.’ ” Also, their reply brief asserts: “When it comes to the right of privacy, the burden is not on Plaintiffs to show ‘evidence of government intrusion’ or to meet any particular ‘standard of proof.’ [Citations.] Rather, the burden is on the State to show that the conditions of the new law ‘relate to the purposes of the legislation which confers the benefit or privilege’, that the ‘utility of imposing the conditions’ outweighs the ‘resulting 16. impairment of constitutional rights’ and that there are ‘no less offensive alternatives’ to achieving the state’s objective.” Based on our Supreme Court’s decisions, including Hill, and the general rules of law governing the allocation of the burden of proof, we reject this argument to the extent it asserts that a plaintiff claiming a violation of the right to privacy does not have the burden of proving the claim’s third element. In Hill, after the court identified the three elements of a privacy claim, it stated a defendant could prove, “as an affirmative defense, that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40.) From this explicit statement about an affirmative defense that a defendant must prove, we infer that the factual basis for the three essential elements of a privacy claim must be proven by the plaintiff asserting the claim. This interpretation of Hill is supported by the rules of law defining the normal allocation of the burden of proof. Those rules of law include Evidence Code section 500, which provides: “Except as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting.” In other words, “ ‘the burden of proof as to a particular fact is normally on the party to whose case the fact is essential.’ ” (In re Marriage of Hein (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 519, 537.) Accordingly, “the plaintiff normally bears the burden of proof to establish the elements of his or her cause of action.” (Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 234; see Quesada v. County of Los Angeles (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 880, 888 [customary approach].) Similarly, the defendant normally bears the burden of proving an affirmative defense. (E.g., Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40.) Having identified the normal allocation of the burden of proof, we next consider whether the burden of proving the elements of a privacy claim has been altered by law— that is, a constitutional provision, statute, or judicial decision. (See Masellis v. Law Office of Leslie F. Jensen (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1087; Evid. Code, § 160 17. [definition of law].) First, we have not located, and plaintiffs have not cited, any constitutional provision or statute specifically addressing the burden of proof for privacy claims. Second, we have not located, and plaintiffs have not cited, any judicial decision explicitly analyzing the burden of proof for privacy claims and altering the normal allocation. In the absence of a constitutional provision, statute, or published judicial decision, a question presented is whether we should create new law and conclude the normal allocation of the burden of proof does not apply to the third element of a privacy claim. California courts resolve the reallocation issue by applying a specific methodology that evaluates four factors. (Masellis v. Law Office of Leslie F. Jensen, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 1087, citing Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 660–661.) Here, we need not recite and analyze the four factors identified in Lakin because plaintiffs have not addressed the factors and explained why they favor reallocating the burden of proof of the third element of a privacy cause of action to a defendant. (See Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [burden is on appellant to demonstrate reversible error].) Consequently, we conclude the normal allocation of the burden of proof applies to privacy claims and, as a result, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the facts necessary to establishing the third element. (See Evid. Code, § 500.) We also consider plaintiffs’ argument that they need not meet any particular standard of proof. This argument can be interpreted as asserting the trial court erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard to their privacy claims. “Burden of proof” is defined as “the obligation of a party to establish by evidence a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the trier of fact or the court.” (Evid. Code, § 115.) Unless the law provides otherwise, the level of proof required is a preponderance of the evidence. (Ibid.) Due to the absence of authority imposin