In re A.H.

Filed 9/23/26 (unmodified opn. attached) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO In re A.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E086667 Plaintiff, (Super. Ct. No. DPRI2300462) v. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING PETITION C.D. et al., FOR REHEARING [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] Defendants; THE SOBOBA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS, Intervener and Appellant. C.R., Objector and Respondent. The petition for rehearing is denied. The opinion filed in this matter on August 31, 2026, is modified as follows: 1  On page 11, last paragraph, first sentence shall be modified to read as follows: Here, under section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(E), (F), and (K), the parties’ attorneys, the juvenile court, and agencies providing treatment and supervision of the minor have presumptive authority to receive and review Guardian’s psychological evaluation, which the trial court ordered “for planning purposes.” On page 13, after the 2nd full paragraph the following paragraphs shall be deleted: Section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(K), provides the Tribe, its social services agency, and social services workers, as members of A.H.s multidisciplinary personnel team with presumptive authorization to view confidential juvenile documents, such as the psychological evaluation under section 18961.7. Section 18961.7, subdivision (a) provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any other law, a county may establish a child abuse multidisciplinary personnel team within that county to allow provider agencies to share confidential information in order for provider agencies to investigate reports of suspected child abuse or neglect . . . or for the purpose of child welfare agencies making a detention determination.” (Italics added.) Subdivision (b)(1)(B)(vii) states that “[t]he team may include, but shall not be limited to:” “In the case of an Indian child, a representative from the child’s tribe, including, but not limited to, a tribal social worker, tribal social services director, or tribal mental health professional.” Section 18961.7, subdivision (d) further states that “[a] person designated as a team member pursuant to this subdivision may receive and disclose relevant 2 information and records, subject to the confidentiality provisions of subdivision (f).” (Italics added.) Tribal representatives and social workers, as members of A.H.’s multidisciplinary personnel team, thus were entitled to receive relevant confidential records, such as the psychological evaluation, because the Tribe was presumptively authorized to do so under section 827, subdivisions (a)(1)(K) and (f). The following paragraphs shall come after the deleted paragraphs on page 13 and shall read as follows: Tribal child welfare and protective agencies and their social workers, which provide supervision, oversight, and care for A.H., are thus entitled to receive relevant confidential records, such as the psychological evaluation, because the Tribe is presumptively authorized to do so under section 827, subdivisions (a)(1)(K) and (f). The record shows that a Tribal social worker was involved in A.H.’s care and supervision throughout the juvenile dependency proceedings and provided recommendations used to develop the case plan. The record further shows that the Tribe was actively involved in A.H.’s juvenile dependency case and monitored his case in probate court for years, even before the dependency case was filed. The Tribe, which intervened in this case, requested the juvenile court to order a psychological evaluation of Guardian because of the Tribe’s concern that Guardian did not have the capability to adequately care for A.H., thereby causing harm to A.H. and risking future serious harm if placed with Guardian. 3  On page 16, first full paragraph is modified to read as follows: Section 827, subdivision (a)(1) states that a “case file” may be inspected only by specified individuals and entities, such as the child, the child’s parents, DPSS and its staff, the parties’ attorneys, the court and persons or agencies providing treatment or supervision of the child. (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(A)-(W).) On page 23, second full paragraph, last sentence, the reference to subdivision (f)(2) shall be replaced with subdivision (f)(1). The following paragraphs shall be deleted on page 24: Federal law is consistent with state law authorizing release of the Guardian’s psychological evaluation to the Tribe. Title 25 U.S.C. §1912(c) of ICWA, provides that “[e]ach party to a foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding under State law involving an Indian child shall have the right to examine all reports or other documents filed with the court upon which any decision with respect to such action may be based.” Even though Guardian’s psychological evaluation was not filed with the court, it is a report upon which the juvenile court and DPSS relied on in determining the case plan and A.H.’s placement. Furthermore, the psychological evaluation was court-ordered and summarized in DPSS’s 12-month status review report. It was also relied upon by DPSS in evaluating the adequacy of services provided to Guardian, her compliance with the case plan, and whether A.H. should be returned to Guardian’s custody and care. The 4 statute suggests that its purpose and intent is to allow juvenile dependency parties, which includes the Tribe in this case, to have access to examine all reports or other documents considered and relied upon by the court when deciding an Indian child’s placement or the termination of parental rights. This is consistent with the proposition that the Tribe has a right to view the psychological evaluation under section 827, subdivisions (a) and (f). Except for these modifications, the opinion remains unchanged. These modifications do not effect a change in the judgment. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION CODRINGTON J. We concur: RAMIREZ P. J. MILLER J. 5 Filed 8/31/26 (unmodified opinion) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO In re A.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E086667 Plaintiff, (Super. Ct. No. DPRI2300462) v. OPINION C.D. et al., Defendants; THE SOBOBA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS, Intervener and Appellant. C.R., Objector and Respondent. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dorothy McLaughlin, Judge, and Malvina Ovanezova, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, §21.) Reversed with directions. 1  Berkey Williams, Michele Fahley, and Rovianne A. Leigh, for Intervener and Appellant. Marisa L.D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Respondent. I. INTRODUCTION The Soboba Band of Luiseno Indians (Tribe) appeals the juvenile court’s June 9, 2025, order denying its request for disclosure of A.H.’s legal guardian’s psychological evaluation report (psychological evaluation). The Tribe requested the psychological evaluation because of concerns that the mental health of A.H.’s guardian was interfering with her ability to care for A.H., who is an enrolled tribal citizen child. The Tribe contends that the juvenile court’s denial of its request for the psychological evaluation violated its presumptive right to view the report. The Tribe requests this court to order release of the psychological evaluation to the Tribe. We agree that the Tribe has a right to A.H.’s guardian’s psychological evaluation. We therefore reverse the order denying the Tribe’s request for the psychological evaluation, with directions the juvenile court order release of it to the Tribe. II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A.H. is an enrolled tribal citizen of the Tribe, as are his biological father and his guardian, who is A.H.’s paternal grandmother (Guardian). The Tribe intervened in A.H.’s 2 guardianship proceedings in June 2022, and in the instant dependency proceedings in January 2024. A.H.’s mother is an enrolled citizen of the Pala Band of Mission Indians. At birth in 2010, A.H.’s biological parents were unable to properly care for him, resulting in the Riverside Superior Court, Probate Division, granting Guardian’s petition for guardianship over A.H. in January 2011. During Guardian’s care of A.H., there were six child welfare referrals because of her failure to properly care for A.H., culminating in the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) filing on December 19, 2023, a petition for juvenile dependency against A.H.’s mother, father, and Guardian, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1)1 (failure to protect). The Tribe’s social service department had been involved with A.H. and Guardian since before 2020, when the probate court brought to the Tribe’s attention Guardian’s issues caring for A.H. During the guardianship proceedings, it became apparent to the Tribe that Guardian and A.H. were closely bonded, but Guardian seemed incapable of understanding A.H.’s need for educational and medical services or the probate court’s orders to provide his medical and educational records. This led to the Tribe concluding that the juvenile court should sustain the juvenile dependency petition allegations and order a psychological evaluation of Guardian to determine whether she could properly care for A.H. 1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code. 3  The petition alleged that Guardian failed or was unable to supervise and protect A.H. adequately, and was unable to provide regular care for A.H. because of mental illness, a developmental disability, or substance abuse. The petition further alleged that she demonstrated limited ability to parent A.H. due to instability in housing and failure to meet A.H.’s educational and medical needs. Guardian allegedly failed to obtain educational support services for A.H., to address his academic delays. In addition, Guardian failed to ensure he maintained regular enrollment and attendance at school. A.H. reportedly missed 75 percent of the prior school year. At the January 4, 2024, detention hearing, the court found a prima facie case but did not detain A.H. The court allowed him to remain with Guardian. In violation of court orders, Guardian failed to appear in court with A.H. at hearings on January 4, and 29, 2024, and at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on February 15, 2024. In addition, she failed to contact her attorney, and A.H. missed several medical appointments related to his heart condition. He also continued to miss the majority of school and was failing his classes. Tribal Family Services was very concerned about A.H.’s welfare and safety. As a consequence, on February 15, 2024, the jurisdiction/disposition hearing was continued and A.H. was ordered detained. In March 2024, DPSS filed a first amended petition, alleging that Guardian failed to make A.H. available to the court and DPSS, and his whereabouts were unknown. The amended petition added that Guardian failed to address A.H.’s ongoing medical needs and health condition by not following up with critical medical appointments and failing 4 to give him his prescribed medication for his chronic heart condition. The Tribe’s attorney reported that Guardian’s problematic conduct had been occurring for years, and the Tribe had been trying for years to get a psychological evaluation of Guardian. Upon locating Guardian, in March 2024, DPSS filed a second amended petition, deleting the allegations that A.H. could not be located and that Guardian failed to provide A.H. with his medication. In March 2025, The Tribe filed a declaration stating its concerns with Guardian, including her failure to care for A.H.’s medical condition and support his academic needs. At the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on April 23, 2024, the court found true the allegations in the second amended petition, removed A.H. from Guardian, and ordered reunification services for Guardian. The court found ICWA applied. The parties stipulated to the Tribe’s expert statement, in which the expert stated that the Tribe and DPSS were working together to develop an appropriate case plan for A.H. and Guardian. The Tribal expert agreed with the case plan and concluded that A.H. would suffer serious emotional or physical harm if left in Guardian’s care. The case plan required Guardian to participate in counseling, parenting, and on- demand drug testing. The plan also required medical visits and medication management for A.H. The Tribe’s attorney stated that over the course of the past four years, it became apparent that Guardian was “not capable of understanding the importance and the need for the educational and medical services to be provided.” The Tribe’s attorney further stated that a psychological evaluation of Guardian was necessary to determine what was 5 causing Guardian’s inability to care properly for A.H. Guardian argued that there was no allegation that she suffered from a mental disorder and denied she suffered from any such disorder. At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on April 23, 2024, the court ordered a psychological evaluation for Guardian, “for case planning purposes only.” Guardian did not object to the psychological evaluation or to DPSS’s request that Guardian sign a release of information. Guardian delayed scheduling and completing the psychological evaluation until November 11, 2024. In March 2025, the Tribe filed a declaration stating its concerns about Guardian, including her failures to care for A.H.’s serious medical condition and support his academic needs. The Tribe requested a copy of the psychological evaluation, including at the 12-month review hearing on March 26, 2025. Guardian objected to its release to the Tribe, noting it was not filed with the court. The Tribe stated it was not requesting that the evaluation be filed with the court. The court denied without prejudice release of the evaluation to the Tribe. In April 2025, the Tribe renewed its request for the evaluation by filing a petition 2 request, relying on federal and state law (§ 827, subd. (f); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3 5.552; 25 U.S.C. §1912(c); 25 U.S.C. §3205; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d, et seq., 164.512). 2 All rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 3 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 United States Code section 1320d et seq.; Pub.L. No. 104-191 (Aug. 21, 1996) 110 Stat. 1936. 6  In May 2025, A.H. was removed from his nonrelative extended family member placement because of unsupervised contact between A.H. and Guardian. Also, concerning texts between Guardian and a DPSS social worker reportedly demonstrated that Guadian had not addressed her worsening anger issues. On June 5, 2025, the Tribe filed a motion to terminate guardianship pursuant to section 728 and rule 5.620(e), based on increased concerns with Guardian’s ability to provide safe, stable home and meet A.H.’s medical, social-emotional, mental health, and educational needs. Guardian reportedly had a history of evading DPSS and the court, including by hiding A.H. Guardian’s failure to take A.H., a “medically fragile child,” to his cardiologist appointments and to pick up his medications resulted in A.H. being admitted to the hospital to monitor his condition. Guardian also reportedly acted impulsively and was unable to control her anger. In March 2024, she was ordered to submit to alcohol and drug testing but did not complete testing until five months later. Therefore, the test results were deemed unreliable. Dr. Garett, the psychological evaluator, recommended Guardian participate in counseling and receive home support services. During the June 9, 2025, hearing on the petition for release of Guardian’s psychological evaluation, Guardian objected to its release to the Tribe, noting that there was no evidence that a “hard copy” of it had been provided to DPSS. It also had not been filed with the court. Guardian’s counsel acknowledged that it had been provided to Guardian’s counsel and county counsel. A.H. and DPSS did not object to release of the 7 report. At the hearing, the Tribe noted that DPSS’s 12-month report contained information from the psychological evaluation, including recommendations. The Tribe later noted that on November 11, 2024, Guardian completed her psychological evaluation performed by Dr. Garett. During the June 9, 2025, hearing, DPSS informed the court that it was likely that a copy of the psychological evaluation was in the social worker’s possession. The Tribe stated that it was requesting a copy of Guardian’s psychological evaluation for purposes of monitoring and maintaining her guardianship, as the Tribe had done for many years. But there was an apparent problem in continuing the guardianship because of Guardian’s failure to address her mental health issues. The Tribe noted that its focus was on the child, and it was entitled to the evaluation because the Tribe was a party entitled to understand what was going on with Guardian and A.H. The Tribe added that the Health 4 Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) authorized disclosure of confidential psychological records when there is a valid court order. The juvenile court denied the Tribe’s request for the psychological evaluation on the grounds that it was ordered “for case planning purposes only and not for any other purpose, as well as the fact that there [weren’t] any compelling reasons to release the information to the tribe.” The court added that “part of the goal is to have the [d]epartment’s social worker to work with the tribal social worker to ensure that there’s 4 42 United States Code section 1320d et seq.; Pub.L. No. 104-191 (Aug. 21, 1996) 110 Stat. 1936. 8 active efforts done with the case plan and reuniting or even placement with this child. I don’t think that psychological report will assist in seeing if whether or not the services are working. They either are working, or they are not. The psychological evaluation will not say, well, what’s the reason why? That is not how that works.” III. ACCESS TO PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION UNDER SECTION 827 The Tribe contends the juvenile court erred in denying its request for Guardian’s court-ordered psychological evaluation. Guardian argues that the Tribe waived this contention by not objecting at the six and 12-month review hearings to the case plan and the juvenile court’s finding of reasonable services. We conclude there was no waiver. Even though the juvenile court ordered Guardian’s psychological evaluation for “case planning purposes only,” there was no waiver because objecting at the six and 12-month hearings to the case plan and reasonableness of services, are matters that are irrelevant and not dispositive of whether the Tribe has a right to the psychological evaluation. Furthermore, regardless of whether the case plan and services were adequate, the Tribe has a continuing right to the psychological evaluation, as discussed below. Therefore, the Tribe did not waive its contention that it is entitled to the psychological evaluation by not objecting at the six and 12-month review hearings to the case plan and services. 9  In addition, without an opportunity to view the psychological evaluation, the Tribe was deprived of knowing the findings and conclusions stated in the evaluation that may have provided the Tribe with grounds to object to the case plan and services. We therefore conclude there was no waiver of the Tribe’s contention it is entitled to the psychological evaluation. A. Release of the Psychological Evaluation Under Section 827 The Tribe contends that under section 827, it is presumptively entitled to the evaluation, without being required to file a petition requesting release of the evaluation to the Tribe. We agree that under section 827, subdivisions (a) and (f), the Tribe is authorized to view Guardian’s psychological evaluation. We also agree that the Tribe was not required to file a petition requesting a court order for authorization because the Tribe is presumptively entitled to the evaluation under section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(K). When construing statutes such as section 827, “[o]ur primary concern is giving effect to the intended purpose of the provisions at issue. [Citation.] In doing so, we first analyze provisions’ text in their relevant context, which is typically the best and most reliable indicator of purpose. [Citations.] We start by ascribing to words their ordinary meaning, while taking account of related provisions and the structure of the relevant statutory and constitutional scheme. [Citations.] . . . Finally, we apply independent judgment when construing constitutional and statutory provisions.” (California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 933-934.) 10  We accordingly look to the applicable statutes and the juvenile dependency scheme as a whole, particularly as to tribes. There does not appear to be any case law directly on point, but juvenile dependency statutory law, construed in the context of the state and federal juvenile dependency scheme as a whole, is sufficiently clear that the Tribe is entitled to view confidential juvenile records that are material to a dependency case, such as the psychological evaluation. We begin with the understanding that DPSS is the county agency with administrative responsibility for providing child welfare services. As such, it is the custodian of confidential child welfare and social services records pertaining to minors. (§ 10850; Pen.Code, § 11167) The Legislature has enacted a statutory scheme governing access to juvenile records. There is a strong public policy of confidentiality of juvenile records. Section 827 sets forth detailed provisions to protect this confidentiality and specifies who is authorized to inspect juvenile records. (J.E. v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1337.) Section 827’s confidentiality provisions apply broadly to petitions, reports, and other documents compiled in a juvenile dependency investigation or proceeding. (§ 827, subd. (e); In re Elijah S. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1549-1553 (Elijah S.).) Here, under section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(E), (F), and (K), the parties’ attorneys, the juvenile court, and the children’s multidisciplinary personnel team members have presumptive authority to receive and review Guardian’s psychological evaluation, which the trial court ordered “for planning purposes.” The trial court ordered a psychological 11 evaluation of Guardian’s ability to care for A.H. and provide a safe home environment for him because there was evidence that she was not providing him with adequate, proper care. Although the Tribe is not listed in section 827, subdivision (a)(1) as one of the persons authorized to inspect confidential juvenile case file records, subdivision (f) provides presumptive authorization for the Tribe. Section 827, subdivision (f) states that “[t]he persons described in subparagraphs (A), (E), (F), (H), (K), (L), (M), and (N) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) include persons serving in a similar capacity for an Indian tribe, reservation, or tribal court when the case file involves a child who is a member of, or who is eligible for membership in, that tribe.” Section 827, subdivision (a)(1), in relevant part, authorizes inspection of a confidential case file by the following individuals: “(E) The attorneys for the parties, judges, . . . and law enforcement officers who are actively participating in . . . juvenile proceedings involving the minor.” “(F)(i) The county counsel, city attorney, or any other attorney representing the county child welfare agency in dependency proceedings. [¶] (ii) The county counsel or city attorney representing the child welfare agency . . . in connection with the administration or review of child welfare . . . services provided by the agency or department to the subject of the case file or to that person’s sibling, parent, or legal guardian.” 12  “(K) Members of children’s multidisciplinary personnel teams, persons, or agencies providing treatment or supervision of the minor.” Section 827, subdivisions (a)(1) and (f), provide the Tribe, its social services agency, and its social workers with presumptive authorization to inspect A.H.’s confidential juvenile case file, because the Tribe’s social services agency, social services workers, and attorneys act in the same or similar capacity as does DPSS, its social workers, and attorneys. Section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(K), provides the Tribe, its social services agency, and social services workers, as members of A.H.s multidisciplinary personnel team with presumptive authorization to view confidential juvenile documents, such as the psychological evaluation under section 18961.7. Section 18961.7, subdivision (a) provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any other law, a county may establish a child abuse multidisciplinary personnel team within that county to allow provider agencies to share confidential information in order for provider agencies to investigate reports of suspected child abuse or neglect . . . or for the purpose of child welfare agencies making a detention determination.” (Italics added.) Subdivision (b)(1)(B)(vii) states that “[t]he team may include, but shall not be limited to:” “In the case of an Indian child, a representative from the child’s tribe, including, but not limited to, a tribal social worker, tribal social services director, or tribal mental health professional.” Section 18961.7, subdivision (d) further states that “[a] person designated as a team member pursuant to this subdivision may receive and disclose relevant 13 information and records, subject to the confidentiality provisions of subdivision (f).” (Italics added.) Tribal representatives and social workers, as members of A.H.’s multidisciplinary personnel team, thus were entitled to receive relevant confidential records, such as the psychological evaluation, because the Tribe was presumptively authorized to do so under section 827, subdivisions (a)(1)(K) and (f). The record shows that a Tribal social worker and representative attended multidisciplinary personnel team meetings. The team was referred to as a Child and Family Team, which met throughout the juvenile dependency proceedings and provided recommendations used to develop the case plan. The record further shows that the Tribe was actively involved in A.H.’s juvenile dependency case and monitored his probate case for years, even before the dependency case was filed. The Tribe, which intervened in this case, requested the juvenile court to order a psychological evaluation of Guardian because of the Tribe’s concern that Guardian did not have the capability to adequately care for A.H., thereby causing harm to A.H. and risking future serious harm if placed with Guardian. Under ICWA, tribes have the right to look after their Indian children based on the tribes’ inherent sovereign authority over internal domestic affairs, such as child rearing and protection of the health, safety, and welfare of its members or citizens. (§ 224, subd. (a)(1); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 56.) Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 in response to “rising concern in the mid–1970’s over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted 14 in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.” (Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield (1989) 490 U.S. 30, 32; In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8.) ICWA therefore declared that “it is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .” (25 U.S.C. § 1902; In re Isaiah W., supra, at pp. 8-9.) Consistent with these policies and legislative intent to allow Tribes to protect the best interests of Indian children, we conclude that the Tribe was entitled to inspect Guardian’s psychological evaluation without filing a petition request or obtaining a court order. The juvenile court thus erred in requiring the Tribe to file a petition requesting the evaluation and then denying it. B. Filing the Psychological Evaluation in the Case File Guardian argues that the Tribe has not established that section 827 applies because there is no psychological evidence the evaluation was filed with the juvenile court in the “case file.” In addition, it is unknown if the evaluation is in DPSS’s possession, if there was a written, rather than verbal report, or if the written report still exists. 15  Section 827, subdivision (a)(1) states that a “case file” may be inspected only by specified individuals and entities, such as the child, the child’s parents, DPSS and its staff, the parties’ attorneys, the court, members of the child’s multidisciplinary personnel team, and persons or agencies providing treatment or supervision of the child. (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(A)-(W).) Consistent with section 827, rule 5.552 (a) similarly provides: “[A] living child’s juvenile dependency case file may be obtained or inspected, and information from the file may be disclosed, only in accordance with section[] 827 . . . . With the exception of those persons permitted to inspect juvenile case files without court authorization under section[] 827 . . . , every person or agency seeking to inspect or obtain . . . a living child’s dependency case file must petition the court for authorization using . . . a Living Child’s Juvenile Dependency Case File (form JV-570).” (Italics added.) Guardian argues that subdivision (e) of section 827, does not require disclosure of the psychological evaluation because there is no evidence in the record that the evaluation was “retained by” by the social worker. Section 827, subdivision (e) provides: “a ‘juvenile case file’ means a petition filed in a juvenile court proceeding, reports of the probation officer, and all other records . . . filed in that case or made available to the probation officer in making the probation officer’s report, or to the judge . . . , and thereafter retained by the probation officer, judge . . . .” 16  This statute refers to “all other documents” in the “case file,” which would include the psychological evaluation retained or available to judges and probation officers. Probation officers are considered the equivalent of social workers under rule 5.502 (31), which states that “‘Probation officer,’ in section 300 proceedings, includes a social worker in the county agency responsible for the administration of child welfare.” As explained in In re Ashley M. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1, at page 8, “The duties to furnish child welfare services and to provide reports and recommendations to the juvenile court are actually placed by statute upon ‘the social worker.’ The juvenile court law originally called for various tasks to be performed by the probation officer. [Citation.] . . . Later, the Legislature authorized each county board of supervisors to delegate the duties of the probation officer under the juvenile dependency laws to the county welfare department. (§§ 272, 306.) Now, by statute, each county’s welfare department is required to have a specialized unit for the administration of child welfare services. (§§ 10800, 16500, 16501.) And most provisions of the juvenile dependency law have been changed so that the term ‘probation officer’ is replaced by ‘social worker.’ (Stats.1998, ch. 1054.) The terms are now deemed interchangeable. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1401(a)(21) & (29).) The term ‘social worker’ within the juvenile dependency law obviously means the county’s social services agency to which the duties formerly assigned to the probation officer have been delegated.” Section 827, subdivision (e), which states that “all other records . . . filed in that case or made available to the probation officer in making the probation officer’s report, or 17 to the judge . . . , and thereafter retained by the probation officer, judge . . . ,” would thus encompass the court ordered psychological evaluation, which was available to the court and DPSS social workers, and likely retained by DPSS. It is undisputed that, consistent with the juvenile court’s common practice, Guardian’s psychological evaluation was not filed with the court. There is evidence, however, that DPSS was provided with Guardian’s written psychological evaluation, DPSS reviewed it, and DPSS has a copy of it in its possession or has access to it from the evaluator. Neither DPSS nor Guardian has provided any evidence to the contrary. DPSS’s 12-month hearing report filed with the court summarizes information in the psychological evaluation. DPSS states in the 12-month hearing report filed on March 13, 2025, that “[o]n November 11, 2024, [Guardian] completed a Psychological Evaluation with Dr. Garett. Dr. Garett recommended that [Guardian] should complete ongoing counseling with a Licensed Therapists[sic]. Dr. Garett indicated that [Guardian] will have to display a stable attitude about [A.H.] regarding both his medical care and his schooling in order to be a long-term Guardian of her grandson moving forward.” DPSS further states in the report that, “[a]lthough [Guardian] has completed Parenting Education, as well as [s]he completed a Psychological Evaluation, and Medically Fragile training[,] [t]he Department remains concerned for [Guardian’s] mental health stability as Dr. Garett recommended that she continue[] counseling and in home support services. He also report[ed] that [Guardian] would need support to learn how to cope with her current living situation while providing appropriate parenting for [A.H.], 18 including meeting all of his medical needs as [A.H.] is a medically fragile child.” In addition, during the June 9, 2025, hearing on the Tribe’s petition for release of the psychological evaluation, DPSS’s counsel informed the court that it was likely that a copy of the psychological evaluation was in the DPSS social worker’s possession. Guardian has not provided any persuasive authority for the proposition that section 827 does not apply merely because the psychological evaluation was not filed with the court. If that were the case, parties could avoid disclosing reports to the Tribe simply by not filing them with the court. Even though the psychological evaluation was not filed with the juvenile court, its contents were summarized in DPSS’s 12-month hearing report filed on March 13, 2025. Therefore, the Tribe was entitled to inspect it because the evaluation was court-ordered, DPSS reviewed the psychological evaluation report, and the report recommendations were relied upon by DPSS and the juvenile court. Elijah S., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pages 1551-1552, supports this proposition. In Elijah S., the court concluded that, on its face, the statutory definition of “juvenile case file,” within the meaning of section 827, subdivision (e), “necessarily include reports or other written statements by social workers, probation officers, child protective investigators and public agency personnel involved in investigating a suspected case of neglect or abuse concerning a child coming within the scope of section 300.” (Elijah S., supra, pp. 1551-1552.) 19  As noted in Elijah S., “[t]hese sorts of written reports and documentation are not always required to be filed directly with the juvenile court, and are frequently under the control of the applicable county agencies rather than in the possession of the juvenile court. [Citations.]” (Elijah S., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1552.) The Elijah S. court added that, “By the same token, neither is there any indication that documents generated or maintained by social workers, probation officers and public agency personnel with respect to suspected cases of child neglect or abuse must be filed with the juvenile court before they may be included