Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 Roe v. International Churches of Christ CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR JANE ROE 6 et al., B349364 Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23STCV24432) v. INTERNATIONAL CHURCHES OF CHRIST, INC. et al., Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Christian R. Gullon, Judge. Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded with directions. Samini Block, Bobby Samini, for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Manning & Kass Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Eugene J. Egan, Mark R. Wilson and James A. Harris, for Defendants and Respondents. INTRODUCTION The dissolution of a corporation bars plaintiffs from asserting claims against it that arose after dissolution. Here, two plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that they were sexually assaulted by members of the church they attended. As part of their suit, plaintiffs sought to hold individual and corporate defendants vicariously liable for the assaults and subsequent efforts to dissuade them from going to law enforcement. The defendants jointly moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing, among other things, that plaintiffs’ claims against one of the corporate entities were barred because it dissolved before the assaults allegedly occurred. The trial court agreed that plaintiffs’ claims against the corporate entity were barred and, on that basis, granted judgment on the pleadings for all moving defendants. Plaintiffs timely appealed from the trial court’s subsequent judgment for defendants. We vacate the trial court’s judgment, 2 affirm in part and reverse in part the order granting judgment on the pleadings, and remand for further proceedings in the trial court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Complaint1 In 2023, a group of individuals filed suit, alleging that they were adult victims of prior childhood sexual assaults perpetrated by members of the Los Angeles International Church of Christ (LA ICOC). Over the next year, the scope of the lawsuit was narrowed through a combination of pleading amendments and voluntary dismissals. Ultimately, the operative second amended complaint (SAC) asserted claims by two plaintiffs identified as Jane Roe 6 and Jane Roe 7 (collectively, plaintiffs). Both plaintiffs asserted the same nine causes of action2 against a 1 The factual representations in this section are taken from plaintiffs’ operative complaint, which we must accept as true in reviewing defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777 (Harris).) 2 The causes of action were: sexual assault of a minor, violation of Penal Code section 647.6, intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual battery in violation of Civil Code section 1708.5, gender violence in violation of Civil Code section 52.4, failure to report suspected child abuse, aggravated sexual 3 combination of corporate church entities and individual defendants, including LA ICOC, International Church of Christ, Inc. (ICOC, Inc.), Mike Rock, Elizabeth Rock, Steve Lounsbury, Carie Lounsbury, Jay Minor, Tracy Minor, Kevin Holland, and David Bruce (collectively, defendants).3 Roe 6 was sexually assaulted in 2011 by the son of Mike and Elizabeth Rock. She was six or seven years old at the time. The Rocks and Lounsburys were members and leaders within LA ICOC. After learning of the assault, the Rocks and Lounsburys discouraged Roe 6 and her family from reporting it to the police and instead pressured Roe 6 to forgive her abuser. In particular, Steve Lounsbury falsely represented to Roe 6 and her parents that he reported the assault to the police and to Child Protective Services. Roe 7 was sexually assaulted by LA ICOC member Nathan Chung on two occasions in 2015 when she was 17 years old. Nathan’s mother, Karen Chung, was an LA ICOC member and leader. The Minors and Holland worked together with other LA ICOC members to prevent Roe 7 and her family from reporting abuse across state lines, negligent supervision of a minor, and negligence. 3 The SAC named additional individuals as defendants, but the allegations against those individuals are not relevant to any issues raised on appeal. 4 the assaults to the police. Roe 7 was punished and shamed by the LA ICOC for reporting the assault, while LA ICOC took no action against Nathan Chung. Both plaintiffs alleged that defendants were vicariously liable for the sexual assaults because they knew or should have known that the perpetrators were sexually assaulting minors within the church, including plaintiffs. II. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Defendants jointly filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings attacking all the causes of action in the SAC. Defendants argued the SAC failed to sufficiently plead facts establishing they could be held vicariously liable for the assaults. Specifically, they asserted the SAC lacked factual allegations showing the defendants knew or should have known the perpetrators would assault plaintiffs. They also argued the factual allegations of the SAC were insufficient to suggest that defendants had a special relationship with the plaintiffs or perpetrators. In the absence of a special relationship, defendants asserted they had no duty to control the conduct of other LA ICOC parishioners. Defendants also argued that ICOC, Inc., was dissolved in 2010, and therefore could not be held liable for sexual assaults that occurred in 2011 or 2015. 5 Plaintiffs opposed the motion, devoting three sentences to ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution. Plaintiffs stated in conclusory fashion that ICOC, Inc., continued operations through a successor entity, that Corporations Code section 2010 allowed plaintiffs to assert claims against a dissolved corporation, and that “alter ego and de facto continuation doctrines apply.” This portion of plaintiffs’ opposition contained no citations to the SAC or to any legal authority. Plaintiffs also did not attempt to rebut or address the authority cited in defendants’ motion. In their reply, defendants addressed plaintiffs’ attempt to invoke Corporations Code section 2010, subdivision (a).4 They argued that under section 2010, a corporation may prosecute or defend actions after dissolution but may not be held liable for claims arising after dissolution. The trial court granted the motion, noting that under California law, a dissolved corporation may not be held liable for claims which arise entirely post-dissolution. The court stated that plaintiffs failed to address the cases cited by defendants or provide their own legal authority on this point. The court concluded that as ICOC, Inc., dissolved a year before the first alleged sexual assault, plaintiffs’ claims against ICOC, Inc., were barred. The court expressly declined to reach the merits of the 4 All further statutory references are to the Corporations Code. 6 other arguments raised in defendants’ motion, as it determined that ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution was “dispositive of the motion.” Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion in its entirety without leave to amend as to all the moving defendants. On June 20, 2025, the trial court entered a judgment in defendants’ favor on all of plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs timely appealed. DISCUSSION I. Legal Standards “‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of review.’ [Citation.] ‘All properly pleaded, material facts are deemed true, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.’” (Harris, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 777.) “As when ruling on a demurrer, the court is required to consider only allegations contained within the complaint . . . or facts of which it may take judicial notice. [Citations.]” (Tung v. Chicago Title Co. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 734, 758–759.) II. ICOC, Inc. Section 2010, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part, “A corporation which is dissolved nevertheless continues to exist for 7 the purpose of winding up its affairs” and “prosecuting and defending actions by or against it,” “but not for the purpose of continuing business except so far as necessary for the winding up thereof.” Our Supreme Court has recognized that while section 2010 allows a corporation to be sued after its dissolution, it may only be sued “for injury or damage that is caused by the corporation’s predissolution activities but occurs or is discovered after the dissolution.” (Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1180, 1194.) In other words, dissolved corporations may not be sued for claims arising wholly post-dissolution. Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in concluding that ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution barred them from asserting claims against it arising from the 2011 and 2015 sexual assaults. Having failed to substantively address this argument below, plaintiffs attempt to do so for the first time on appeal, raising new arguments and authority that were never presented to the trial court. Defendants argue plaintiffs have forfeited these arguments by failing to raise them below. Plaintiffs have not filed a reply brief or otherwise responded to defendants’ forfeiture argument. We agree that plaintiffs have forfeited their arguments on this point. “It is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal.” (Kern County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Camacho (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1038; 8 Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1192 [arguments not raised in opposition to demurrer deemed forfeited on appeal].) The record before us on appeal does not contain a reporter’s transcript from the hearing on defendants’ motion. In the absence of a transcript or settled statement from the hearing, we have no record of what arguments were presented to the trial court regarding ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution. “‘“[I]f the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.”’” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) Additionally, plaintiffs have not attempted to rebut defendants’ forfeiture argument, nor do they ask us to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of their forfeited arguments. In the absence of any argument on that point, we can only conclude plaintiffs have tacitly conceded the issue. (See Wisner v. Dignity Health (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 35, 45 [appellant “tacitly conced[ed]” forfeiture by failing to respond to respondent’s argument]; accord The Police Retirement System of St. Louis v. Page (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 336, 346, fn. 3.) We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in ICOC, Inc.’s favor without leave to amend. III. The Remaining Defendants 9 In moving for judgment on the pleadings, defendants did not contend that ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution barred plaintiffs’ claims against the other defendants. On appeal, defendants appear to concede that ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution does not bar plaintiffs from asserting claims against the other defendants. It is therefore undisputed that ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution does not bar plaintiffs from asserting causes of action against the remaining defendants. While the trial court concluded otherwise, it did not explain how it reached its result or provide any authority suggesting that ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution bars plaintiffs from asserting claims against the other defendants as a matter of law. Nor have we located any authority supporting the trial court’s reasoning.5 We can only conclude the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of all the moving defendants based solely on ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution. We therefore vacate the judgment in defendants’ favor and reverse the order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of the remaining individual and corporate defendants. Defendants argue we should affirm the trial court’s order and ensuing judgment based on the alternative grounds asserted in their motion. We decline to reach defendants’ other arguments 5 For example, we note that under section 2011, plaintiffs are expressly permitted to assert claims against shareholders of dissolved corporations “whether arising before or after the dissolution of the corporation.” 10 for the first time on appeal. Defendants’ alternative arguments largely turn on whether the factual allegations of the SAC are sufficient to state a theory of vicarious liability against the defendants. “That is a matter properly addressed to the trial court in the first instance, which court could conclude that even if the causes of action in the SAC did not state facts sufficient to state a cause of action, they were still susceptible to further amendment.” (Datig v. Dove Books (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 964, 983; City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. State of California (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 13, 23 [“The decision whether to grant leave to amend a complaint is a discretionary one for the trial court”].) We therefore exercise judicial restraint and remand the matter to the trial court to consider the alternative bases asserted in defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, including whether to grant leave for further amendment. (Garver v. Brace (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 995, 1003 [remanding matter to the trial court to consider alternative arguments raised in demurrer]; accord City of Riverside v. RLI Ins. Co. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 405, 416–417.) DISPOSITION The judgment is vacated. The trial court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend is affirmed as to defendant ICOC, Inc., and is otherwise reversed. The matter 11 is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate its order granting judgment on the pleadings for defendants LA ICOC, Mike Rock, Elizabeth Rock, Steve Lounsbury, Carie Lounsbury, Jay Minor, Tracy Minor, Kevin Holland, and David Bruce. On remand, the trial court shall consider the alternative grounds for judgment on the pleadings asserted in defendants’ motion. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS ZUKIN, P. J. We concur: MORI, J. TAMZARIAN, J. 12