Roe v. International Churches of Christ CA2/4
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketB349364
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26 Roe v. International Churches of Christ CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
JANE ROE 6 et al., B349364
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV24432)
v.
INTERNATIONAL CHURCHES OF
CHRIST, INC. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Christian R. Gullon, Judge. Affirmed in
part, vacated in part and remanded with directions.
Samini Block, Bobby Samini, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Manning & Kass Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Eugene J. Egan,
Mark R. Wilson and James A. Harris, for Defendants and
Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
The dissolution of a corporation bars plaintiffs from
asserting claims against it that arose after dissolution. Here, two
plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that they were sexually assaulted by
members of the church they attended. As part of their suit,
plaintiffs sought to hold individual and corporate defendants
vicariously liable for the assaults and subsequent efforts to
dissuade them from going to law enforcement. The defendants
jointly moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing, among
other things, that plaintiffs’ claims against one of the corporate
entities were barred because it dissolved before the assaults
allegedly occurred. The trial court agreed that plaintiffs’ claims
against the corporate entity were barred and, on that basis,
granted judgment on the pleadings for all moving defendants.
Plaintiffs timely appealed from the trial court’s subsequent
judgment for defendants. We vacate the trial court’s judgment,
2
affirm in part and reverse in part the order granting judgment on
the pleadings, and remand for further proceedings in the trial
court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Complaint1
In 2023, a group of individuals filed suit, alleging that they
were adult victims of prior childhood sexual assaults perpetrated
by members of the Los Angeles International Church of Christ
(LA ICOC). Over the next year, the scope of the lawsuit was
narrowed through a combination of pleading amendments and
voluntary dismissals. Ultimately, the operative second amended
complaint (SAC) asserted claims by two plaintiffs identified as
Jane Roe 6 and Jane Roe 7 (collectively, plaintiffs). Both
plaintiffs asserted the same nine causes of action2 against a
1 The factual representations in this section are taken from
plaintiffs’ operative complaint, which we must accept as true in
reviewing defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
(People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59
Cal.4th 772, 777 (Harris).)
2 The causes of action were: sexual assault of a minor,
violation of Penal Code section 647.6, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, sexual battery in violation of Civil Code
section 1708.5, gender violence in violation of Civil Code section
52.4, failure to report suspected child abuse, aggravated sexual
3
combination of corporate church entities and individual
defendants, including LA ICOC, International Church of Christ,
Inc. (ICOC, Inc.), Mike Rock, Elizabeth Rock, Steve Lounsbury,
Carie Lounsbury, Jay Minor, Tracy Minor, Kevin Holland, and
David Bruce (collectively, defendants).3
Roe 6 was sexually assaulted in 2011 by the son of Mike
and Elizabeth Rock. She was six or seven years old at the time.
The Rocks and Lounsburys were members and leaders within LA
ICOC. After learning of the assault, the Rocks and Lounsburys
discouraged Roe 6 and her family from reporting it to the police
and instead pressured Roe 6 to forgive her abuser. In particular,
Steve Lounsbury falsely represented to Roe 6 and her parents
that he reported the assault to the police and to Child Protective
Services.
Roe 7 was sexually assaulted by LA ICOC member Nathan
Chung on two occasions in 2015 when she was 17 years old.
Nathan’s mother, Karen Chung, was an LA ICOC member and
leader. The Minors and Holland worked together with other LA
ICOC members to prevent Roe 7 and her family from reporting
abuse across state lines, negligent supervision of a minor, and
negligence.
3 The SAC named additional individuals as defendants, but
the allegations against those individuals are not relevant to any
issues raised on appeal.
4
the assaults to the police. Roe 7 was punished and shamed by
the LA ICOC for reporting the assault, while LA ICOC took no
action against Nathan Chung.
Both plaintiffs alleged that defendants were vicariously
liable for the sexual assaults because they knew or should have
known that the perpetrators were sexually assaulting minors
within the church, including plaintiffs.
II. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Defendants jointly filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings attacking all the causes of action in the SAC.
Defendants argued the SAC failed to sufficiently plead facts
establishing they could be held vicariously liable for the assaults.
Specifically, they asserted the SAC lacked factual allegations
showing the defendants knew or should have known the
perpetrators would assault plaintiffs. They also argued the
factual allegations of the SAC were insufficient to suggest that
defendants had a special relationship with the plaintiffs or
perpetrators. In the absence of a special relationship, defendants
asserted they had no duty to control the conduct of other LA
ICOC parishioners.
Defendants also argued that ICOC, Inc., was dissolved in
2010, and therefore could not be held liable for sexual assaults
that occurred in 2011 or 2015.
5
Plaintiffs opposed the motion, devoting three sentences to
ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution. Plaintiffs stated in conclusory fashion
that ICOC, Inc., continued operations through a successor entity,
that Corporations Code section 2010 allowed plaintiffs to assert
claims against a dissolved corporation, and that “alter ego and de
facto continuation doctrines apply.” This portion of plaintiffs’
opposition contained no citations to the SAC or to any legal
authority. Plaintiffs also did not attempt to rebut or address the
authority cited in defendants’ motion.
In their reply, defendants addressed plaintiffs’ attempt to
invoke Corporations Code section 2010, subdivision (a).4 They
argued that under section 2010, a corporation may prosecute or
defend actions after dissolution but may not be held liable for
claims arising after dissolution.
The trial court granted the motion, noting that under
California law, a dissolved corporation may not be held liable for
claims which arise entirely post-dissolution. The court stated
that plaintiffs failed to address the cases cited by defendants or
provide their own legal authority on this point. The court
concluded that as ICOC, Inc., dissolved a year before the first
alleged sexual assault, plaintiffs’ claims against ICOC, Inc., were
barred. The court expressly declined to reach the merits of the
4 All further statutory references are to the Corporations
Code.
6
other arguments raised in defendants’ motion, as it determined
that ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution was “dispositive of the motion.”
Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion in its entirety
without leave to amend as to all the moving defendants.
On June 20, 2025, the trial court entered a judgment in
defendants’ favor on all of plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards
“‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a
demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of
review.’ [Citation.] ‘All properly pleaded, material facts are
deemed true, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of
fact or law.’” (Harris, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 777.) “As when
ruling on a demurrer, the court is required to consider only
allegations contained within the complaint . . . or facts of which it
may take judicial notice. [Citations.]” (Tung v. Chicago Title Co.
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 734, 758–759.)
II. ICOC, Inc.
Section 2010, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part, “A
corporation which is dissolved nevertheless continues to exist for
7
the purpose of winding up its affairs” and “prosecuting and
defending actions by or against it,” “but not for the purpose of
continuing business except so far as necessary for the winding up
thereof.” Our Supreme Court has recognized that while section
2010 allows a corporation to be sued after its dissolution, it may
only be sued “for injury or damage that is caused by the
corporation’s predissolution activities but occurs or is discovered
after the dissolution.” (Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991)
53 Cal.3d 1180, 1194.) In other words, dissolved corporations
may not be sued for claims arising wholly post-dissolution.
Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in concluding that
ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution barred them from asserting claims
against it arising from the 2011 and 2015 sexual assaults.
Having failed to substantively address this argument below,
plaintiffs attempt to do so for the first time on appeal, raising
new arguments and authority that were never presented to the
trial court. Defendants argue plaintiffs have forfeited these
arguments by failing to raise them below. Plaintiffs have not
filed a reply brief or otherwise responded to defendants’ forfeiture
argument.
We agree that plaintiffs have forfeited their arguments on
this point. “It is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the trial
court are forfeited on appeal.” (Kern County Dept. of Child
Support Services v. Camacho (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1038;
8
Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1192 [arguments
not raised in opposition to demurrer deemed forfeited on appeal].)
The record before us on appeal does not contain a reporter’s
transcript from the hearing on defendants’ motion. In the
absence of a transcript or settled statement from the hearing, we
have no record of what arguments were presented to the trial
court regarding ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution. “‘“[I]f the record is
inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the
decision of the trial court should be affirmed.”’” (Jameson v.
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.)
Additionally, plaintiffs have not attempted to rebut
defendants’ forfeiture argument, nor do they ask us to exercise
our discretion to reach the merits of their forfeited arguments. In
the absence of any argument on that point, we can only conclude
plaintiffs have tacitly conceded the issue. (See Wisner v. Dignity
Health (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 35, 45 [appellant “tacitly
conced[ed]” forfeiture by failing to respond to respondent’s
argument]; accord The Police Retirement System of St. Louis v.
Page (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 336, 346, fn. 3.)
We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of judgment on
the pleadings in ICOC, Inc.’s favor without leave to amend.
III. The Remaining Defendants
9
In moving for judgment on the pleadings, defendants did
not contend that ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution barred plaintiffs’ claims
against the other defendants. On appeal, defendants appear to
concede that ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution does not bar plaintiffs from
asserting claims against the other defendants. It is therefore
undisputed that ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution does not bar plaintiffs
from asserting causes of action against the remaining defendants.
While the trial court concluded otherwise, it did not explain how
it reached its result or provide any authority suggesting that
ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution bars plaintiffs from asserting claims
against the other defendants as a matter of law. Nor have we
located any authority supporting the trial court’s reasoning.5
We can only conclude the trial court erred in granting
judgment on the pleadings in favor of all the moving defendants
based solely on ICOC, Inc.’s dissolution. We therefore vacate the
judgment in defendants’ favor and reverse the order granting
judgment on the pleadings in favor of the remaining individual
and corporate defendants.
Defendants argue we should affirm the trial court’s order
and ensuing judgment based on the alternative grounds asserted
in their motion. We decline to reach defendants’ other arguments
5 For example, we note that under section 2011, plaintiffs are
expressly permitted to assert claims against shareholders of
dissolved corporations “whether arising before or after the
dissolution of the corporation.”
10
for the first time on appeal. Defendants’ alternative arguments
largely turn on whether the factual allegations of the SAC are
sufficient to state a theory of vicarious liability against the
defendants. “That is a matter properly addressed to the trial
court in the first instance, which court could conclude that even if
the causes of action in the SAC did not state facts sufficient to
state a cause of action, they were still susceptible to further
amendment.” (Datig v. Dove Books (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 964,
983; City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. State of California (2025) 114
Cal.App.5th 13, 23 [“The decision whether to grant leave to
amend a complaint is a discretionary one for the trial court”].)
We therefore exercise judicial restraint and remand the
matter to the trial court to consider the alternative bases
asserted in defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings,
including whether to grant leave for further amendment. (Garver
v. Brace (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 995, 1003 [remanding matter to
the trial court to consider alternative arguments raised in
demurrer]; accord City of Riverside v. RLI Ins. Co. (2026) 119
Cal.App.5th 405, 416–417.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is vacated. The trial court’s order granting
judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend is affirmed as
to defendant ICOC, Inc., and is otherwise reversed. The matter
11
is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate its order
granting judgment on the pleadings for defendants LA ICOC,
Mike Rock, Elizabeth Rock, Steve Lounsbury, Carie Lounsbury,
Jay Minor, Tracy Minor, Kevin Holland, and David Bruce. On
remand, the trial court shall consider the alternative grounds for
judgment on the pleadings asserted in defendants’ motion. The
parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
12