UHG I, LLC v. Tran CA6

Filed 11/2/26 UHG I, LLC v. Tran CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT UHG I, LLC, H053223 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Super. Ct. No. 23CV401041) Appellant, v. ANTHONY KIEM TRAN Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent. In this appeal, we consider the limits of liability, permissible damages, and availability of declaratory and injunctive relief under California’s Identity Theft Act (CITA) (Civ. Code,1 §§ 1798.92–1798.97), where a creditor ceases collection of a consumer debt and dismisses its collection lawsuit upon learning that the debt arose from identity theft. We also examine whether a creditor’s compliance with section 1788.17 of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act) and parallel provisions of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), bars liability under CITA. 1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Civil Code.  UHG I, LLC (UHG), a debt buyer, purchased a debt from the original creditor and filed an action to collect debt (collection action) against Anthony Tran, the debtor identified on the account. Tran in turn filed a cross- complaint against UHG, alleging that UHG’s collection action violated provisions of CITA, the Rosenthal Act, and the FDCPA and seeking, inter alia, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, damages, and attorney fees. In his cross-complaint, Tran asserted that he was the victim of identity theft and had been erroneously sued. After receiving notification—via the cross- complaint—of Tran’s identity theft claim, UHG promptly opened an investigation and, within 30 days, dismissed its collection action against Tran. The matter proceeded to a bench trial on the cross-complaint, and Tran prevailed. The trial court awarded Tran declaratory and injunctive relief under CITA, actual damages of $251 for parking and mileage incurred in meeting with his lawyer, and attorney fees and costs. The court rejected UHG’s bona fide error defense and found UHG liable for actual damages under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act. The court rejected Tran’s claims for a civil penalty under CITA and for statutory damages under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act. On appeal, UHG challenges, inter alia, the trial court’s findings of liability, award of damages under CITA, the FDCPA, and the Rosenthal Act, and Tran’s entitlement to declaratory and injunctive relief under CITA. We decide the trial court did not err in its determination of liability under any of the three statutes but did err in awarding actual damages for costs incurred by Tran in meeting with his attorney regarding the lawsuit. We modify the judgment to strike the damage award and affirm the judgment as modified. 2  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We first set out the relevant factual context and then turn to the procedural history of the suits underlying this appeal. A. Facts2 In 2019, Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) issued a consumer credit account, with an account number ending in 5736 (account 5736), to “Anthony K. Tran.” Charges accrued to account 5736 between January and March 2020, and the account holder made partial payments on the account until April 6, 2020. Tran called Citibank sometime in April or May 2020, and reported the account was fraudulently opened as the result of identity theft. After investigation, Citibank concluded that the account arose from balance transfers from another bank account associated with the same name and social security number and was not the result of identity theft. Citibank later “charged off” account 5736 (which had an outstanding balance of $8,552.26) and sold the debt to UHG.3 Citibank warranted in the purchase and sale agreement with UHG that account 5736 was, “to the best of its knowledge . . . a legal, valid, and binding obligation” and that there was “no dispute, claim, action, suit or proceeding pending or threatened” with respect to the account. 2 The factual background is drawn from the trial court’s written statement of decision, the trial testimony and evidence, and the record on appeal. We recite the essential relevant facts, which are largely undisputed for purposes of this appeal, “ ‘in the manner most favorable to the judgment, resolving all conflicts and drawing all inferences in favor of respondent.’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1233, fn. 2.) 3 “ ‘Charged-off consumer debt’ means a consumer debt that has been removed from a creditor’s books as an asset and treated as a loss or expense.” (§ 1788.50, subd. (a)(2).) 3  On June 8, 2022,4 UHG’s counsel, Mandarich Law Group, LLP, sent Tran a debt collection letter notifying him that UHG had authorized a lawsuit to collect the balance owed on account 5736 if the matter remained unresolved. Tran received the letter but did not call the number provided or attempt to respond. Instead, Tran “worried” and “looked for an attorney to protect [himself].” B. Procedural History 1. Complaint and Cross-Complaint On July 11, UHG filed the collection action against Tran. The complaint alleged that Tran was the debtor on account 5736, had a debt balance of $8,552.26 at charge-off, and had not paid the amount owed. On August 29, Tran answered the complaint and filed a cross- complaint, alleging violations of multiple consumer protection statutes. The cross-complaint alleged that Tran was a victim of identity theft and never used or possessed the credit card on account 5736 (referred to by Tran as the “fraudulent account”). Tran asserted that he is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, injunctive relief, and attorney fees and costs under CITA. Tran additionally sought relief under the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act. Tran alleged that UHG violated the FDCPA by, inter alia, making false representations in an attempt to collect the alleged debt and misrepresenting the character or legal status of the alleged debt, including that “the alleged debt is lawfully owed by [Tran].” Tran asserted violations of sections 1692e, 1692e(5), 1692e(10), and 1692f(1) of title 15 of the United States Code. Tran asserted similar claims under the Rosenthal Act, alleging violations of sections 1788.13, subdivision (e), 1788.14, subdivision (b), and 1788.17. Tran 4 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2022. 4 sought actual and statutory damages and reasonable attorney fees and costs under both the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act, and a statutory penalty under the Rosenthal Act. Tran attached and incorporated by reference two exhibits to the cross- complaint. These were a copy of an incident report made to the Gilroy Police Department on August 12 (police report)5 and an identity theft complaint and affidavit, signed and dated on August 29 (the same date that the cross- complaint was filed and served). After conducting an investigation, UHG elected to close account 5736 and dismiss the collection action. On September 28, UHG filed a request for dismissal, and the trial court later ordered the complaint dismissed with prejudice.6 UHG thereafter filed an answer to the cross-complaint, amended answer, and second amended answer to the cross-complaint. 2. Bench Trial and Decision The trial court held a bench trial on Tran’s cross-complaint. The trial commenced on October 1, 2024, with motions in limine, and continued over four court days. Both sides presented evidence and, at the court’s request, filed supplemental trial briefs on the applicable law and issues for decision. 5 Tran’s cross-complaint misstates the date of the police report as filed “[o]n or about August 12, 2020. ” However, the police report is dated August 12, 2022, and includes the following narrative by Tran: “In 2020, [he] did not make a police report because he was unaware of the process.” 6 The request for dismissal filed by UHG sought dismissal “[w]ithout prejudice” and of the “[e]ntire action.” The record on appeal does not reflect an order on the request for dismissal. In a later order, filed on May 21, 2024, which does appear in the appellate record, the trial court granted Tran’s ex parte application to vacate the request for dismissal, stating “The complaint remains dismissed with prejudice. Defendant/[c]ross-complainant did not consent to dismissal of the cross-complaint and it was not dismissed.” 5  On January 14, 2025, the trial court issued a tentative decision and proposed statement of decision. Sixteen days later, on January 30, 2025, the court issued a final statement of decision and entered judgment.7 Several days later—after the court issued its final statement of decision and entered judgment—UHG filed objections to the tentative decision. The record on appeal does not reflect any response by the court or Tran to the objections to the tentative decision. In their briefing, the parties address the final statement of decision and do not raise any arguments related to UHG’s objections. We likewise do not consider them. In its statement of decision, the trial court addressed Tran’s three causes of action under CITA, the FDCPA, and the Rosenthal Act. Starting with CITA, the trial court found that Tran established by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a victim of identity theft as defined in Penal Code section 530.5 and did not open account 5376 or make charges to it. Based on this finding, the court reasoned that Tran was entitled to (1) judgment under CITA, (2) a declaration that he is not obligated to UHG on the claim, and any security interest UHG had purportedly obtained in Tran’s property is void and unenforceable, and (3) an injunction 7 The judgment filed on January 30, 2025, was styled a “[p]roposed [j]udgment” and noted that, absent further action by the trial court, the proposed judgment would “become the [j]udgment of the [c]ourt after the timeline set forth in Cal[ifornia] [Rules of Court, rule] 3.1590(j) has passed.” In supplemental briefing filed at the request of this court, UHG confirmed that the proposed judgment on the cross-complaint is the one final judgment resolving all causes of action between the parties to this appeal. Pursuant to the California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(j), the judgment became final 10 days after the January 31, 2025 mail service and was extended by five additional court days because of mail service. Therefore, the proposed judgment became final on February 17, 2025. UHG’s appeal from the judgment was timely. 6 restraining UHG from collecting or attempting to collect on the claim. The court rejected UHG’s argument that these remedies were inapplicable because UHG had already dismissed its lawsuit and closed the account. The court reasoned that, although the collection action had been dismissed with prejudice, dismissal does not preclude future collection activity. Thus, “Tran is appropriately entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief as stated in section 1798.93.” The trial court further ruled that, by providing notice of the identity theft to UHG via the cross-complaint, Tran was entitled to actual damages under section 1798.92, subdivision (c)(5) of CITA. The court found Tran’s travel mileage and parking fees incurred in visiting his lawyer were “appropriate and recoverable” as damages, for a total of $251. The court rejected Tran’s request for emotional distress damages. It also rejected Tran’s request for a civil penalty under section 1798.92, subdivision (c)(6), finding that he had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that UHG had failed to diligently investigate the notification of identity theft and continued to pursue its claim against him. The court found that UHG “diligently investigated the notice of identity theft provided in Tran’s cross- complaint and abandoned its claim against Tran by ceasing its collection efforts and dismissing its action to recover on the claim.” Turning to the FDCPA, the trial court found that Tran satisfied the elements of liability under sections 1692e and 1692f of title 15 of the United States Code for UHG’s attempts to collect a debt that Tran had not incurred and did not owe. The court found that UHG did not establish the “ ‘bona fide error defense’ ” to liability under title 15 United States Code section 1692k(c) because, while UHG had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the statutory violation was not intentional and any error was in good faith, “it 7 fail[ed] to meet the third element of the defense” requiring a showing that it “maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the violations Tran has established.” The court found that UHG lacked processes to avoid violations and “simply assume[d] that any debt bought from Citibank [wa]s valid.” Citing case authority from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, including Reichert v. National Credit Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2008) 531 F.3d 1002 (Reichert), the court explained that such “assumption and blind reliance” defeats application of the bona fide error defense. Having decided that UHG was liable for violations under the FDCPA, the trial court found that Tran could recover his damages, but the damages (totaling $251) had been awarded pursuant to Tran’s CITA claim and could only be recovered once. Therefore, the court did not award them under the FDCPA. The trial court rejected Tran’s claim for statutory damages. Citing the factors stated in Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc. (W.D.N.Y. 1988) 682 F.Supp. 174, 179, the court found that, although UHG should have had policies and procedures in place to discover the identity theft claim before pursuing collection, the “facts surrounding the frequency, persistence, nature of noncompliance, and the lack of intentional noncompliance do not warrant a statutory penalty.” The trial court drew similar conclusions on Tran’s Rosenthal Act claims. Citing California case authority holding that any violation of the federal statute “is per se a separate violation” of the Rosenthal Act, the court found UHG liable under section 1788.17. The court also concluded that UHG could not establish the bona fide error defense under the state statute (because of the failure to maintain procedures, as described ante), and that Tran could not recover duplicate damages and had not shown entitlement to 8 statutory damages. The court found that Tran, as the prevailing party, was entitled to attorney fees and costs under all three statutes. The judgment granted Tran declaratory and injunctive relief against UHG and damages of $251, and ruled he was entitled to attorney fees and costs. II. DISCUSSION UHG challenges the trial court’s decision and judgment on seven grounds. UHG contends that (1) UHG’s compliance with statutory procedures to address a debtor’s claim of identity theft under the Rosenthal Act barred liability for noncompliance under CITA; (2) declaratory relief was improper absent evidence of an actual controversy; (3) injunctive relief was unauthorized because there was no evidence establishing a probability the conduct would recur; (4) mileage and parking were not recoverable as compensatory damages; (5) the record supported application of the bona fide error defense in this case and showed that UHG’s procedures constituted more than “blind reliance”; (6) the court erred in finding liability under the Rosenthal Act, because UHG complied with the provisions of section 1788.18 regarding debt collection efforts after receiving written notice of identity theft; and (7) absent liability under any of the three statutes, Tran is not entitled to attorney fees. Tran counters that the judgment, award of damages, and rulings under CITA and on UHG’s bona fide error defense under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act were proper based on the evidence presented at trial. A. Statutory Background In 1977, Congress enacted the FDCPA to address the “abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors.” (15 U.S.C. § 1692(a); see Wade v. Regional Credit 9 Ass’n (9th Cir. 1996) 87 F.3d 1098, 1099; Rotkiske v. Klemm (2019) 589 U.S. 8, 10 (Rotkiske).) The FDCPA regulates the conduct of debt collectors by, among other things, forbidding “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” (15 U.S.C. § 1692e.) Courts apply what is commonly termed the “ ‘least sophisticated debtor’ standard” to claims arising under the FDPCA. (Wade, at p. 1100.) The FDCPA “authorizes private civil actions against debt collectors who engage in certain prohibited practices.” (Rotkiske, supra, 589 U.S. at p. 9; see 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.) However, a debt collector will not be held civilly liable for an FDCPA violation “if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).) As a “broadly remedial” statute, courts “liberally construe the FDCPA in favor of consumers.” (McAdory v. M.N.S. & Associates, LLC (9th Cir. 2020) 952 F.3d 1089, 1092.) California’s Rosenthal Act is modeled on and applies more broadly than the federal FDCPA. (Best v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 568, 576 (Best).) Also enacted in 1977, its purpose is “to prohibit debt collectors from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the collection of consumer debts and to require debtors to act fairly in entering into and honoring such debts.” (§ 1788.1, subd. (b); see Stats. 1977, ch. 907, § 1.) Like the FDCPA, courts interpret the Rosenthal Act broadly to effectuate its protective purpose. (Davidson v. Seterus, Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 283, 295.) The Rosenthal Act “incorporates the FDCPA, so that a violation of the FDCPA is per se a violation of the Rosenthal Act.” (Best, at 10 p. 576; § 1788.17.) Amendments to the Rosenthal Act in 2003, added section 1788.18, establishing procedures to protect identity theft victims from collection activities upon notification to the debt collector. (Stats. 2003, ch. 287, § 1.) In 2001—prior to the amendments to the Rosenthal Act that added section 1788.18’s identity theft protections—the California Legislature added identity theft provisions, commonly known as CITA, to the Civil Code. (§§ 1798.92–1798.97; Stats. 2001, ch. 354, § 21.) Section 1798.93 of CITA authorizes the filing of a civil action, or a cross-complaint, permitting a person to establish they are a victim of identity theft if subjected to a debt collector’s attempt to collect on a debt resulting from identity theft. B. Appellate Standards of Review On appeal, we presume the judgment is correct. “ ‘All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision after a bench trial, we review the trial court’s factfinding for substantial evidence. (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581 (Schmidt).) Under substantial evidence review, we liberally construe the court’s factual findings to support the judgment and consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings. (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981 (Thompson).) “Under this standard of review, parties challenging a trial court’s factfinding bear an ‘enormous burden.’ ” (Schmidt, at p. 582.) 11  On the other hand, “[w]hen the decisive facts are undisputed, we are confronted with a question of law and are not bound by the findings of the trial court.” (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799.) We review de novo questions of law arising from the judgment and statement of decision. (Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.) Where the issue on appeal raises a mixed question of law and fact, the proper degree of deference varies based on the nature of the inquiry. (Ghirardo, at pp. 800–801; Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175 (Connerly).) C. Liability Under the Identity Theft Act UHG contends that, in evaluating the claims of an identity theft victim against a debt collector, CITA must be reconciled with the more recently enacted Rosenthal Act. UHG asserts that CITA’s provisions governing notice of identity theft and recovery against a debt collector are ambiguous and less specific than the Rosenthal Act provisions, and therefore section 1788.18 “prevails over” section 1798.93. 1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review a. CITA Under CITA, a “victim of identity theft” can bring an action—or a cross- complaint—for damages, civil penalties, and injunctive relief “against a claimant to establish that the person is a victim of identity theft in connection with the claimant’s claim against that person.” (§ 1798.93, subd. (a).) A “ ‘[c]laimant’ ” is defined as “a person who has or purports to have a claim for money or an interest in property in connection with a transaction procured through identity theft.” (§ 1798.92, subd. (a).) A “ ‘[v]ictim of identity theft’ ” is defined as a “person who had his or her personal identifying information used without authorization by another to obtain credit, goods, services, money, or property, and did not use or possess the 12 credit, goods, services, money, or property obtained by the identity theft, and filed a police report in this regard.” (Id., subd. (d).) “A person shall establish that he or she is a victim of identity theft by a preponderance of the evidence.” (§ 1798.93, subd. (b).) Section 1798.93, subdivision (c) provides remedies to which a person who proves that they are a victim of identity theft “shall be entitled . . ., as appropriate.” These remedies include (1) a declaratory judgment that the victim of identity theft “is not obligated to the claimant on that claim” and that any security interest purportedly acquired by the claimant against the victim’s property “is void and unenforceable”; (2) an injunction preventing the claimant from collecting on the claim or from enforcing a judgment against the plaintiff on the claim; and (3) actual damages, attorney fees, and costs. (Id., subd. (c)(1)–(3), (5).) To recover actual damages or attorney’s fees, the victim of identity theft must “show that they provided written notice to the claimant” as detailed in the statute “at least 30 days before filing the action, or within their cross- complaint pursuant to this section” or, alternatively, “may provide a valid copy of a police report or of a Department of Motor Vehicles . . . investigative report, filed pursuant to [s]ection 530.5 of the Penal Code, at least 30 days before filing the action or within their cross-complaint pursuant to this section.” (§ 1798.93, subd. (c)(5).) b. The Rosenthal Act The Rosenthal Act also establishes procedures to protect identity theft victims from collection activities. Section 1788.18, subdivision (a) provides that a debt collector who receives one of the enumerated forms of notice of 13 identity theft8 “shall cease collection activities” until it has completed the review specified in subdivision (d) of the statute. Section 1788.18, subdivision (d) states that, within 10 business days of receiving the required notice, “the debt collector shall, . . . initiate a review considering all of the information provided by the debtor and other information available to the debt collector in its file or from the creditor. The debt collector shall send notice of its determination to the debtor no later than 10 business days after concluding the review.” The Rosenthal Act allows the debt collector to “recommence debt collection activities only upon making a good faith determination that the information does not establish that the debtor is not responsible for the specific debt in question.” (Ibid.) That determination must be made in a manner consistent with specified provisions of the FDCPA, as incorporated by section 1788.17. (Ibid.) Whether these statutory provisions “must be reconciled,” as UHG contends, presents an issue of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. (Jackson v. LegalMatch.com (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 760, 767.) 2. Analysis UHG premises its argument on a purported conflict between the Rosenthal Act and CITA that it maintains presents “ ‘irreconcilable’ ” directives. UHG argues that section 1788.18 of the Rosenthal Act “provides a more detailed description of the information required for an identity theft 8 The required notice consists of “a copy of a Federal Trade Commission . . . identity theft report, completed and signed by the debtor,” or, alternatively, a copy of a police report alleging that the debtor is the victim of identity theft for the debt being collected (§ 1788.18, subd. (a)(1)) and a “written statement that the debtor claims to be the victim of identity theft with respect to the specific debt being collected by the debt collector” (id., subd. (a)(2)) that comports with additional specifications in the statute for the written statement (id., subd. (b)(1)–(2)). 14 notice, when debt collection should cease, what notices are necessary before and after a reasonable investigation, and when debt collection can recommence,” whereas section 1798.93 of CITA “provides for notice requirements (without the same level of detail), and fails to address when debt collection ceases and can recommen[ce].” Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute “ ‘ “is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” [Citation.] “Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.” ’ ” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 616–617 (City of San Jose).) Having independently reviewed the language of both statutes, we perceive no conflict between them.9 Section 1798.93, subdivision (c)(5) pertains exclusively to the recovery of actual damages, attorney fees and costs, and equitable relief under CITA. 9 Tran argues that UHG has forfeited this argument, having failed to assert it at any time during the litigation in the trial court. However, Tran fails to support his forfeiture argument with relevant citations to the trial court record, and we decline to resolve the issue on this basis. 15 Giving the provision its “ ‘ “plain and commonsense meaning” ’ ” (City of San Jose, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 616), a victim of identity theft seeking to recover any of these forms of relief upon filing an action or cross-complaint under CITA must prove they have given notice to the claimant in one of two ways: by providing, (1) upon written request, a valid, signed Federal Trade Commission (FTC) identity theft report “completed at least 30 days before filing the action, or within their cross-complaint pursuant to this section,” or (2) a valid copy of a police report or of a Department of Motor Vehicles investigative report, filed pursuant to Penal Code section 530.5, “at least 30 days before filing the action or within their cross-complaint.” (§ 1798.93, subd. (c)(5).) UHG contends that the phrase “ ‘within their cross-complaint’ ” is ambiguous and “does not appear to fit” into CITA’s procedure to allow notice to the debt collector to conduct a reasonable investigation, whereas section 1788.18 provides more detail about the information required to notify of identity theft. We disagree that the notice timeline under CITA is unclear. The phrase “completed at least 30 days before filing the action, or within their cross-complaint” is repeated twice in describing the notice requirement for recovery of actual damages, attorney fees and costs, and equitable relief (§ 1798.93, subd. (c)(5)), and again (albeit not verbatim) in the next subpart on obtaining a civil penalty. (Id., subd. (c)(6)(A).) That provision authorizes the recovery of a civil penalty “if the victim establishes by clear and convincing evidence” three elements, the first being “[t]hat at least 30 days prior to filing an action or within the cross-complaint pursuant to this section, they provided written notice to the claimant at the address designated.” (Ibid.) In the latter usage, the reference to “within the cross- complaint” is plainly juxtaposed against the “30 days prior to filing an action” and allows notice to be given in two contexts—the first, when filing an action, 16 requires written notice to the claimant “at least 30 days prior to filing” the action, and the second, when bringing a cross-complaint, requires written notice “within the cross-complaint.” (Ibid.) Viewing together the various parts of the enactment, the phrase “within the cross-complaint” (§ 1798.93, subd. (c)(6)(A)) carries the same meaning when used in the prior subpart. When a victim of identity theft seeks actual damages, attorney fees and costs, or equitable relief against the claimant by way of a cross-complaint, notice of the identity theft must be given “within their cross-complaint.” (Id., subd. (c)(5).) Although UHG maintains this language “fails to address when debt collection ceases and can recommen[ce]” and “lacks provisions for notice to credit reporting agencies and notice to the victim/debtor regarding the results of the investigation,” those perceived shortcomings do not render the statutory language ambiguous, nor does applying the plain meaning result in absurd consequences. (City of San Jose, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 616.) We perceive no absurdity in the Legislature’s decision to require that a victim of identity theft who brings an affirmative, direct action for damages or other relief, supply evidence of an FTC or police report made at least 30 days prior to filing that action. By contrast, the Legislature has afforded a victim who has already been sued in a collection action the opportunity to provide notice of reporting the identity theft at the time of (or “within”) filing a cross- complaint. These different timelines reflect the possibility that the identity theft victim might not be aware of the alleged debt (or, as in this case, might be under the false impression that they previously resolved the issue with their former creditor) until they are sued. We are not persuaded by UHG’s unsupported assertion that “[s]ection 1798.93 appears to reflect a legislative intent to allow a creditor to conduct an 17 investigation before finding liability.” On the contrary, to secure a judgment—including declaratory and injunctive relief—section 1798.93 requires only that a person prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they are a “victim of identity theft” as that term is defined in the statute. (§ 1798.93, subds. (b), (c).) Although the statute adds a notice requirement when the victim pursues actual damages or attorney fees, this requirement merely premises liability for possible monetary damages or attorney fees on notice. (Id., subd. (c)(5).) Only in the context of a civil penalty pursuant to section 1798.93, subdivision (c)(6), does the statute reflect a clear legislative intent to consider a creditor’s investigation. Under that subpart, the creditor claimant may avoid civil penalties by conducting a diligent investigation and discontinuing its claim. (Ibid.) None of these provisions conflict with the Rosenthal Act. UHG points to a more “specific process” for notifying debt collectors of identity theft claims pursuant to section 1788.18 of the Rosenthal Act. Section 1788.18 provides a timeframe for debt collectors who receive proper notice of an identity theft claim to undertake several actions, including to (1) “cease collection activities” until completion of a specified review (id., subd. (a)), (2) notify the consumer credit reporting agency (if the debt was reported) that the account is disputed and initiate a review of all the information available on the claim, and (3) inform the debtor of its determination, allowing the debt collection to resume only if the debt collector has made a “good faith determination” that the debtor is responsible for the debt in question (id., subd. (d)). These processes protect consumers by requiring notice to the consumer credit reporting agencies when an account is disputed and restricting the resumption of collection activities subject to the outcome of the investigation. 18 However, they do not mitigate or preclude potential liability for collection activities against a victim of identity theft, whether liability arises under the Rosenthal Act or CITA. Section 1788.18, subdivision (e) expressly disclaims such an effect: “The exercise or nonexercise of rights under this section is not a waiver of any other right or defense of the debtor or debt collector.” In addition, section 1788.18 specifically provides that the notice requirements therein “may also satisfy” the notice requirements of section 1798.93, subdivision (c)(5). (§ 1788.18, subd. (f).) The statute’s express recognition that notice under the Rosenthal Act may satisfy notice requirements for the recovery of actual damages or attorney fees under CITA suggests that the Legislature intended both statutory schemes to function together and undermines UHG’s argument that the Legislature intended for one scheme to take precedence over the other. In sum, we conclude that the relevant provisions of the Rosenthal Act and CITA are not conflicting but complementary. Therefore, section 1788.18 does not “prevail” over section 1798.93, and UHG’s purported compliance with section 1788.18 does not foreclose its liability under section 1798.93. D. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief UHG contends that the trial court awarded Tran declaratory and injunctive relief without addressing the underlying legal standards for them. UHG asserts that the court awarded declaratory relief “without addressing the uncontroverted evidence that the controversy was mooted” and there was “no actual or justiciable controversy.” UHG similarly asserts that the court awarded injunctive relief without addressing that the controversy was moot and that there was “no evidence that UHG will attempt to collect the debt” from Tran in the future. Tran counters that the court properly awarded declaratory and injunctive relief, as expressly provided in section 1798.93. 19  Because UHG does not dispute the trial court’s factual findings and challenges only the legal grounds for declaratory and injunctive relief, we treat the material facts as undisputed and decide UHG’s challenges as a question of law. (Connerly, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1175–1176.) Under CITA, a person who proves they are a victim of identity theft as to a particular claim, “shall be entitled to a judgment providing all of the following, as appropriate: [¶] (1) A declaration that they are not obligated to the claimant on that claim. [¶] (2) A declaration that any security interest or other interest the claimant had purportedly obtained in the victim’s property in connection with that claim is void and unenforceable. [¶] (3) An injunction restraining the claimant from collecting or attempting to collect from the victim on that claim, from enforcing or attempting to enforce any security interest or other interest in the victim’s property in connection with that claim, or from enforcing or executing on any judgment against the victim on that claim.” (§ 1798.93, subd. (c)(1)–(3).) The trial court found that Tran established by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a victim of identity theft as defined by the statute. It found, inter alia, that “Tran’s testimony and the weight of the evidence established that a theft of his identity occurred,” “Tran did not open or use the subject Citibank credit account,” and “Tran notified Citibank in 2020 that his identity had been stolen and that he did not make the charges on the subject Citibank account.” The court noted that UHG did not rebut these facts, which the court found more likely than not to be true, and concluded that Tran was accordingly entitled to judgment as appropriate under the statute. The court rejected UHG’s assertion that none of the enumerated remedies was appropriate “since UHG dismissed its lawsuit, ‘closed the 20 account,’ and there is no evidence that the conduct will be repeated.” It reasoned that, while the collection action had been dismissed with prejudice, that action did not preclude future collection activity or an attempt to collect. We decide that UHG has not established reversible error in the trial court’s decision to grant declaratory and injunctive relief. The statutory language is unambiguous. Section 1798.93 confers on Tran a right to any of the forms of relief set forth in subparts (1) through (5) of subdivision (c), limited only by the trial court’s discernment of whether such relief is “appropriate.” (See Abbett Electric Corp. v. Storek (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1469.) That UHG dismissed the collection action with prejudice, and UHG witnesses testified UHG would not attempt to collect on the debt in the future, did not eliminate grounds for