Villasenor v. Schneiter

Filed 10/26/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE ANA VILLASENOR, B337209 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC658964) v. KURT SCHNEITER, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Curtis A. Kin and Joseph Lipner, Judges. Affirmed. Matern Law Group, Matthew J. Matern, Debra J. Tauger, Julia Z. Wells; Altshuler Berzon, Michael Rubin; Pine Tillett, Norman Pine and Scott Tillett for Plaintiff and Appellant. Much Shelist and Ryan N. Burns for Defendant and Respondent. _______________________________  In this action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code section 12900 et seq., 1 we conclude FEHA does not alter the common law’s rebuttable presumption that a corporation exists separately from an alleged alter ego. We will refer to that presumption as “the presumption of corporate separateness.” (F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 797.) Defendant and Respondent Kurt Schneiter is the sole member of nonparty MMart 1, LLC. Through that company, Schneiter owns Defendant and Respondent SR Restaurant Holdings Group, Inc. (SR Holdings), which, in turn, owns Defendant and Respondent SR Long Beach FD, Inc. (SR Long Beach). SR Holdings and SR Long Beach employed Plaintiff and Appellant, Ana Villasenor, as a restaurant hostess from December 2015 to April 2016. At the first phase of a bifurcated trial, a jury found SR Long Beach and SR Holdings liable to Villasenor for sexual harassment and other FEHA violations. At the second phase, tried to the court, Villasenor alleged that Schneiter was liable as the corporate defendants’ alter ego. Applying the presumption of corporate separateness, the trial court found Villasenor failed to meet her burden to prove that the court should disregard the corporate defendants’ distinct identities. The trial court entered judgment for Schneiter, from which Villasenor appeals. Villasenor does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that she failed to rebut the presumption of corporate separateness. Instead, she argues the trial court committed legal error by applying the 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code. 2 presumption in the first instance. In Villasenor’s view, to effectuate the public policy behind FEHA, FEHA must be read to alter the presumption and establish a contrary presumption favoring alter ego liability in FEHA actions. We review the asserted legal error de novo. (Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, 652; Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527 (Reid).) For reasons we will explain, we conclude FEHA does not alter the presumption of corporate separateness. Accordingly, we affirm. BACKGROUND Because, as noted, Villasenor does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s factual findings, we omit discussion of the evidence and summarize the relevant procedural history. Villasenor filed a complaint against SR Long Beach, SR Holdings, and Schneiter (as the corporate defendants’ alleged alter ego). Villasenor alleged that during her employment, her supervisor, Steven Butler, sexually harassed her and retaliated against her for rejecting his advances, resulting in her constructive discharge. 2 The complaint contained causes of action under FEHA for gender discrimination; sexual harassment; retaliation; and failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Trial proceeded in two phases, commencing with a jury trial on Villasenor’s liability claims against SR Long Beach and 2 Villasenor voluntarily dismissed her claims against Butler without prejudice after Butler obtained a discharge in a bankruptcy court. 3 SR Holdings, followed by a bench trial limited to the issue of whether Schneiter was liable as those defendants’ alter ego. 3 At the liability phase, the jury returned verdicts against SR Long Beach and SR Holdings. The jury awarded Villasenor $345,061.17 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. At the alter ego phase, Schneiter cited authority establishing that a plaintiff alleging alter ego liability bears the burden to overcome a presumption that the corporation exists separately from an alleged alter ego. Without citing contrary authority, Villasenor argued that Schneiter’s authority was inapposite because the jury found Villasenor had suffered sexual harassment. 4 3 “ ‘A claim against a defendant, based on the alter ego theory, is not itself a claim for substantive relief . . . but rather, procedural, i.e., to disregard the corporate entity as a distinct defendant and to hold the alter ego individuals liable on the obligations of the corporation where the corporate form is being used by the individuals to escape personal liability, sanction a fraud, or promote injustice.’ ” (Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 516.) 4 Villasenor did not argue in the trial court, as she contends on appeal, that FEHA alters the presumption of corporate separateness and establishes a contrary presumption favoring alter ego liability. Thus, the trial court had no opportunity to address the issue. “[W]e have discretion to consider an issue not raised in the trial court to the extent it presents a pure question of law or involves undisputed facts.” (JPV I L.P. v. Koetting (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 172, 191 (Koetting).) Because Villasenor raises a purely legal issue, we consider the issue despite her failure to raise it below. 4  The trial court issued a statement of decision in Schneiter’s favor. In summarizing general principles of alter ego liability, the statement of decision stated: “It is important to note that ‘alter ego is an extreme remedy’ and should be sparingly used. (Sonora [Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000)] 83 Cal.App.4th [523,] 539 [(Sonora)].) At trial, defendants are entitled to a presumption of the separate existence of the corporate entity. It is the plaintiff’s burden to overcome that presumption. (Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Gardner (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1212-1213 [(Mid-Century)].)” After a detailed analysis of the evidence, the trial court’s statement of decision concluded: “Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to establish either (1) that a unity of interest and ownership between Schneiter and the entity defendants existed such that their distinct identities should be disregarded; or (2) that any unjust or inequitable result would occur in treating the entity defendants as separate, distinct legal entities.” “The Court does not find that application of the alter ego doctrine is required for justice to be done here. To the contrary, it would be unjust under the circumstances to impose alter ego liability and ignore the corporate form. Simply put, Schneiter is a business owner who appears on balance to have availed himself appropriately of the protections of the Corporations Code. Further, the Court is unpersuaded by the evidence presented that plaintiff’s judgment against the entity defendants will necessarily go unsatisfied.” 5 5 At trial, Schneiter estimated the corporate defendants had approximately $720,000 in liquid assets available to satisfy the judgment (which then included approximately $450,000 in 5  The trial court entered judgment for Schneiter and against SR Long Beach and SR Holdings. In an amended judgment, the trial court awarded Villasenor $949,672.50 in attorney fees and $103,241.65 in costs against the corporate defendants. Villasenor filed a timely notice of appeal. DISCUSSION A. Under the alter ego doctrine, a plaintiff bears the burden to rebut the presumption of corporate separateness. “Under the alter ego doctrine, ‘[a] corporate identity may be disregarded—the “corporate veil” pierced—where an abuse of the corporate privilege justifies holding the [owner] of a corporation liable for the actions of the corporation.’ ” (Alexander v. Community Hospital of Long Beach (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 238, 255 (Alexander).) “ ‘Two requirements must be met to invoke the alter ego doctrine: (1) “[T]here must be such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that the separate personalities of the corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist”; and (2) “there must be an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone.” ’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.) “The principle that alter ego is an extreme remedy, sparingly used, originated in Sonora, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at page 539, . . . and has often been quoted by the courts of this state. [Citations.] Other formulations of the same principle damages but did not yet include the subsequent awards of approximately $950,000 in attorney fees and $100,000 in costs). 6 urge courts to exercise caution and restraint in disregarding the corporate form.” (Koetting, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 189- 190.) “ ‘Because society recognizes the benefits of allowing persons and organizations to limit their business risks through incorporation, sound public policy dictates that imposition of alter ego liability be approached with caution.’ ” (Gopal v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 425, 431 (Gopal).) Consistent with those principles, “[c]orporate entities are presumed to have separate existences, and the corporate form will be disregarded only when the ends of justice require this result.” (Laird v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 727, 737 (Laird), italics added, abrogated on another ground in Reid, supra, 50 Cal.4th 512; accord, Gopal, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 431-432; United California Bank v. Maltzman (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 41, 53.) “It is the plaintiff’s burden to overcome the presumption of the separate existence of the corporate entity.”6 (Mid-Century, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1212.) 6 The issue of whether a plaintiff rebutted the presumption of corporate separateness “is one for the trier of fact and is reviewed on appeal according to the usual standards for sufficiency of the evidence to support the conclusion.” (Mid- Century, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1213; see also Misik v. D’Arco (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1072 [“the conclusion of the trier of fact will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence”].) Here, although Villasenor argues that the trial court committed legal error by applying the presumption in the first instance, she does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that she failed to rebut the presumption. We need not address whether 7 B. FEHA does not alter the presumption of corporate separateness. Alter ego liability is a common law doctrine. (See Corp. Code, § 17703.04, subd. (b) [“A member of a limited liability company shall be subject to liability under the common law governing alter ego liability”].) “In deciding whether a statutory scheme alters or displaces the common law, we begin with a presumption that the Legislature did not so intend.” (McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 241, 249 (McMillin).) “[T]he presumption against displacement of the common law is strong . . . .” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “ ‘A statute will be construed in light of common law decisions, unless its language “ ‘clearly and unequivocally discloses an intention to depart from, alter, or abrogate the common-law rule concerning the particular subject matter.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Presbyterian Camp & Conference Centers, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493, 503 (Presbyterian).) “[I]n order to depart from or abrogate common law rules, statutory language must ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘clearly and unequivocally disclose[] an intention to’ ” ’ ” ’ do so.” (Id. at p. 508, original italics.) Nevertheless, “abrogation of the common law does not require an express declaration; it is enough that ‘the language or evident purpose of the statute manifest a legislative intent to repeal’ a common law rule.” (McMillin, at p. 249.) The parties cite no authority—and our research has uncovered none—addressing whether FEHA alters the presumption of corporate separateness. In one FEHA case, an appellate court recognized and implicitly applied the substantial evidence supports that finding. (See Rice v. Downs (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 213, 228, fn. 5.) 8 presumption in holding that a FEHA plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding whether her corporate employer’s parent corporation was the employer’s alter ego. (See Laird, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 737, 741-742.) The Laird court at least implicitly assumed that FEHA did not alter the presumption. No appellate court has suggested otherwise. For the reasons explained below, we conclude FEHA does not alter the presumption of corporate separateness. 1. FEHA’s language and purpose do not manifest a legislative intent to alter the presumption. FEHA does not expressly address alter ego liability. (§§ 12900-12999.) Because FEHA does not expressly declare a legislative intent to alter the presumption of corporate separateness, we inquire whether its language or purpose nevertheless manifests such intent. (See McMillin, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 249.) Villasenor relies on language in two FEHA provisions. First, section 12920 provides, in relevant part: “It is hereby declared as the public policy of this state that it is necessary to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridgment on account of [enumerated protected characteristics]. [¶] It is recognized that the practice of denying employment opportunity and discriminating in the terms of employment for these reasons . . . substantially and adversely affects the interests of employees, employers, and the public in general. [¶] . . . [¶] It is the purpose of this part to provide effective remedies that will eliminate these discriminatory practices . . . .” (Italics added.) Second, section 12993, subdivision (a), provides: “The provisions of this part shall be 9 construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes of this part.” 7 We conclude the quoted language does not “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘clearly and unequivocally’ ” ’ ” ’ ” disclose a legislative intent to alter the presumption of corporate separateness. (Presbyterian, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 508.) Section 12993, subdivision (a), which directs courts to construe FEHA’s provisions liberally, has little relevance to our inquiry in the absence of any FEHA provision addressing alter ego liability (or enforcement of judgments generally). Section 12920 declares FEHA’s purpose to provide effective remedies to eliminate the specified discriminatory practices. That purpose is “ ‘fundamental.’ ” (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 485.) We conclude FEHA’s stated purpose does not manifest a legislative intent to alter the presumption of corporate separateness, because the presumption is compatible with FEHA’s purpose to provide effective remedies. Where a FEHA plaintiff fully collects a judgment from a corporate defendant, the plaintiff need not collect any portion of the judgment from an alleged alter ego. Even where a corporate defendant is unable to satisfy the judgment in full or in part, the presumption does not 7 Section 12993, subdivision (a), further provides: “This part does not repeal any of the provisions of civil rights law or of any other law of this state relating to discrimination because of [enumerated protected characteristics], unless those provisions provide less protection to the enumerated classes of persons covered under this part.” Villasenor does not argue that the presumption of corporate separateness is a law “relating to discrimination” and less protective than FEHA within the meaning of section 12993, subdivision (a). 10 preclude collection from an alleged alter ego if the plaintiff rebuts the presumption. (See Gopal, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 431-432.) That the trial court found Villasenor’s evidence insufficient to rebut the presumption in this case—a factual finding she does not challenge—does not establish that the presumption renders FEHA’s monetary remedies ineffective generally. Indeed, as Villasenor herself observes, “ ‘[t]here is no litmus test to determine when the corporate veil will be pierced; rather[,] the result will depend on the circumstances of each particular case.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘[I]t is an issue of whether in the particular case presented and for the purposes of such case justice and equity can best be accomplished and fraud and unfairness defeated by a disregard of the distinct entity of the corporate form.’ ” (Mid-Century, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1212, italics added.) The presumption of corporate separateness does not negate the alter ego doctrine’s focus on achieving equity on the particular circumstances of each case. (See ibid. [recognizing presumption].) Villasenor does not persuasively explain why altering the presumption in all FEHA cases as she proposes would be necessary to ensure that FEHA provides effective remedies. Nor does Villasenor cite any statutory text, legislative history, or case law suggesting that the Legislature perceived the presumption of corporate separateness as incompatible with FEHA’s purpose to provide effective remedies. As discussed in the next section, the case law she relies on is inapposite. 11  2. FEHA’s asymmetrical standard for recovery of attorney fees and costs does not establish that the Legislature intended FEHA to alter the presumption of corporate separateness. Former Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b) (former section 12965(b)) provided: “In civil actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party . . . reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including expert witness fees.” Relying on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of a similar federal statute in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1978) 434 U.S. 412, California courts interpreted former section 12965(b) as implicitly incorporating the asymmetrical Christiansburg standard for recovery of attorney fees. (E.g., Cummings v. Benco Building Services (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1386-1387; Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 984-985.) Specifically, “a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover attorney fees unless special circumstances would render the award unjust, whereas a prevailing defendant may recover attorney fees only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or brought in bad faith.” (Chavez, at p. 985, some italics omitted, citing Christiansburg, at pp. 416-417, 421-422.) In Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 104-115 (Williams), the California Supreme Court held that former Government Code section 12965(b) was an express exception to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 (the general costs statute), and that former Government Code section 12965(b) incorporated the asymmetrical Christiansburg standard as to costs in addition to attorney fees. Relying on 12 Williams, the Court of Appeal in Arave v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 525, 552-554 (Arave) held that Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (c)— which permits the augmentation of costs awarded pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032—did not authorize costs that former Government Code section 12965(b) (as an express exception to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032) prohibited. (Accord, Huerta v. Kava Holdings, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 74, 84.) Effective in 2019, the Legislature codified Williams’s and Arave’s holdings by amending former section 12965(b) to add the following italicized language: “In civil actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party . . . reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including expert witness fees, except that, notwithstanding Section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a prevailing defendant shall not be awarded fees and costs unless the court finds the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 955, § 5, italics added; see also Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 918, 949 (Pollock) [amendment’s legislative history indicated it codified existing case law].) The Supreme Court subsequently held that former section 12965(b) (as amended), rather than the general Judicial Council rule regarding appellate costs, governed appellate costs in FEHA actions.8 (Pollock, at pp. 947-951.) 8 Effective in 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section 12965(b) to current section 12965, subdivision (c)(6). (Stats. 2021, ch. 278, § 7.) 13  Villasenor argues that the foregoing case law supports her contention that our court should “harmonize FEHA law and alter ego law” and should decide that FEHA requires courts to depart from the presumption of corporate separateness. Contrary to Villasenor’s characterization of those cases, however, they did not apply a “common law asymmetry doctrine.” (Italic added.) Instead, they interpreted former section 12965(b)—FEHA’s express provision regarding attorney fees and costs—and its interplay with other statutes or rules. They did not consider whether FEHA modifies any common law rule, and FEHA contains no statutory provision addressing alter ego liability. “[C]ases are not authority for propositions not considered.”9 (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1160.) Further, the public policy considerations that informed the courts’ interpretation of former section 12965(b) (together with 9 Appellant cites Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 507-512, in support of her argument that FEHA’s asymmetric fee provisions “supersede provisions of other statutes in cases where conflicts existed” and also supersede California’s “detailed scheme governing arbitration (both statutory and common law).” By “parity of reasoning,” she contends, “the general presumption against alter ego findings” should also be overridden. In Ramirez, the Supreme Court held that an attorney fee provision in an employer’s mandatory arbitration agreement was unconscionable “because it unambiguously violate[d] FEHA” by authorizing attorney fee awards against plaintiffs that section 12965, subdivision (c)(6) (which expressly incorporates the asymmetrical Christiansburg standard) prohibits. Ramirez did not consider alter ego liability, and as noted, FEHA contains no provision addressing such liability. 14 statutory text and legislative history) do not, standing alone, persuade us that the Legislature intended FEHA to alter the presumption of corporate separateness. Public policy supported the courts’ conclusion that the Legislature intended former section 12965(b) to incorporate the Christiansburg standard because if the statute had not done so, the risk that unsuccessful plaintiffs would routinely be held liable for defendants’ attorney fees and costs—including potential costs awards “in the tens of thousands of dollars” and even larger attorney fee awards— would chill FEHA litigation. (Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 113; see also id. at pp. 112-114.) “ ‘Any other standard would have the disastrous effect of closing the courtroom door to plaintiffs who have meritorious claims but who dare not risk the financial ruin caused by an award of attorney fees if they ultimately do not succeed.’ ” (Rosenman v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 859, 874; see also Williams, at p. 103; Travis v. Brand (2023) 14 Cal.5th 411, 423 (Travis).) In contrast, the presumption of corporate separateness does not threaten to impose any monetary liability on unsuccessful FEHA plaintiffs—the presumption becomes relevant only when a plaintiff prevails and seeks to enforce the judgment against a corporate defendant’s alleged alter ego. The Legislature reasonably could believe that few prospective plaintiffs and attorneys would refrain from litigating FEHA claims solely because they might be unable to collect a judgment from a corporate defendant and unable to rebut the presumption. Moreover, the Legislature reasonably could believe that altering the presumption and requiring courts to apply a contrary presumption favoring alter ego liability in 15 FEHA actions, as Villasenor proposes, would undermine the public policies that the presumption serves. 10 (See Gopal, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 431 [“ ‘Because society recognizes the benefits of allowing persons and organizations to limit their business risks through incorporation, sound public policy dictates that imposition of alter ego liability be approached with caution’ ” (italics added)].) Villasenor quotes Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 583, for the proposition that “[a]ttorneys considering whether to undertake cases that vindicate fundamental public policies may require statutory assurance that, if they obtain a favorable result for their client, they will actually receive the reasonable attorney fees provided for by the Legislature and computed by the court.” (Italics added by Villasenor.) Flannery interpreted former section 12965(b) as vesting ownership over attorney fees in the attorneys rather than the client (absent a contrary contractual provision). (Id. at pp. 577-590.) In context, 10 Although Villasenor proposes an exception to the presumption of corporate separateness “for FEHA plaintiffs only,” her proffered reasons for the exception would appear to apply equally in actions brought under other statutes that incorporate the Christiansburg standard. (See Hay v. Marinkovich (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 707, 725-727 [Christiansburg standard applies to attorney fees in civil actions under Penal Code section 502 for unauthorized uses of computer systems]; Travis, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 426 [“our application of the Christiansburg standard in Political Reform Act cases is consistent with the standard used for numerous public laws designed to be enforced by individuals acting as private attorneys general and in other similar contexts”].) Altering the presumption in additional statutory actions would further jeopardize the public policies underlying the presumption. 16 the quoted proposition merely supported the court’s conclusion that the Legislature intended, through FEHA’s express attorney fee provision, to assure counsel that to the extent anyone “actually received” attorney fees, the recipient would be the attorneys rather than the client. (Id. at p. 583.) Flannery did not suggest the Legislature intended to assure FEHA plaintiffs and counsel that they could collect attorney fees—as well as damages and costs—from a corporate defendant’s alleged alter ego without rebutting the presumption of corporate separateness. Indeed, it did not consider alter ego liability. Villasenor also relies on two Supreme Court cases expressing concern that if trial courts lacked authority to award attorney fees incurred in seeking fees, fee awards might be “ ‘diluted or dissipated by lengthy, uncompensated proceedings to fix or defend a rightful fee claim.’ ” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1134, quoting Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 632.) Those cases did not interpret FEHA. (See Serrano, at pp. 623-624 [private-attorney-general theory codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 generally permits recovery of attorney fees incurred in seeking fees]; Ketchum, at pp. 1135-1139 [anti-SLAPP statute authorizes trial court to enhance lodestar in awarding attorney fees].) They did not consider whether FEHA—or any other statute—alters the presumption of corporate separateness to facilitate plaintiffs’ collection of attorney fees, damages, and costs from corporate defendants’ alleged alter egos. As noted, “cases are not authority for propositions not considered.” (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1160.) In short, we conclude FEHA does not alter the presumption of corporate separateness. Thus, we further 17 conclude the trial court did not err by applying the presumption. Villasenor asserts no other error. Accordingly, we affirm. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (See Pollock, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 950- 951.) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION M. KIM, J. We concur: ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J. 18