Social Media Cases

Filed 11/5/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO SOCIAL MEDIA CASES B340661 SAN DIEGO UNIFIED JCCP No. 5255 SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. META PLATFORMS, INC. et al., Defendants and Respondents. [And three other related cases.] APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Carolyn Kuhl, Judge. Affirmed.  The School Board of Brevard County, Florida v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (No. B340659), Vancouver School District No. 37 v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (No. B340662), and West Warwick Public Schools, Kent County, State of Rhode Island v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (No. B340667)  Panish|Shea|Ravipudi, Brian J. Panish, Rahul Ravipudi, Jesse Creed; Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy, Shea S. Murphy, Kiran R. Iyer; Wagstaff & Cartmell, Austin Brane; Morgan & Morgan and Josh Autry for Plaintiff and Appellant San Diego Unified School District. Panish|Shea|Ravipudi, Brian J. Panish, Rahul Ravipudi, Jesse Creed; Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy, Shea S. Murphy, Kiran R. Iyer; Wagstaff & Cartmell, Austin Brane, Adam S. Davis; Morgan & Morgan and Josh Autry for Plaintiff and Appellant School Board of Brevard County, Florida. Panish|Shea|Ravipudi, Brian J. Panish, Rahul Ravipudi, Jesse Creed; Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy, Shea S. Murphy, Kiran R. Iyer; Keller Rohrback, Dean N. Kawamoto, Felicia J. Craick; Morgan & Morgan and Josh Autry for Plaintiff and Appellant Vancouver School District No. 37. Panish|Shea|Ravipudi, Brian J. Panish, Rahul Ravipudi, Jesse Creed; Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy, Shea S. Murphy, Kiran R. Iyer; Morgan & Morgan and Josh Autry for Plaintiff and Appellant West Warwick Public Schools, Kent County, State of Rhode Island. Munger, Tolles & Olson, Jonathan H. Blavin and Victoria A. Degtyareva for Defendant and Respondent Snap Inc. King & Spalding, Paul J. Watford, Bailey J. Langner, David P. Mattern and Geoffrey M. Drake for Defendants and Respondents TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Inc. Covington & Burling, Mark W. Mosier, Ashley M. Simonsen and Christian J. Pistilli for Defendants and Respondents Meta Platforms, Inc.; Facebook Holdings, LLC; Facebook Operations, LLC; Meta Payments, Inc.; Facebook Technologies, LLC; Instagram, LLC; and Siculus LLC. 2  Williams & Connolly, Ashley W. Hardin, George A. Borden and Neelum J. Wadhwani for Defendants and Respondents Google LLC and YouTube, LLC. ____________________ In recent years, various plaintiffs have brought numerous legal claims against social media companies. In this opinion, we address only two causes of action—negligence and public nuisance—in the context of the laws of California, Florida, Washington, and Rhode Island, brought by school districts. The holdings we reach here must be understood within that context. In this coordinated proceeding, four school districts1 (Plaintiffs) sued a group of social media companies2 (Defendants). Plaintiffs generally claimed Defendants created a “mental health crisis” among their students that harmed Plaintiffs by disrupting their educational mission, requiring them to spend more money and staff time to address student mental health and discipline, and causing students to vandalize their property. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s order sustaining Defendants’ demurrer to all four complaints on the ground they failed to allege any cognizable causes of action. 1 San Diego Unified School District (San Diego), School Board of Brevard County, Florida (Brevard), Vancouver School District No. 37 (Vancouver), and West Warwick Public Schools, Kent County, State of Rhode Island (West Warwick). 2 Snap Inc. (Snap); TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Inc. (collectively, TikTok); Meta Platforms, Inc., Facebook Holdings, LLC, Facebook Operations, LLC, Meta Payments, Inc., Facebook Technologies, LLC, Instagram, LLC, and Siculus LLC (collectively, Meta); and Google LLC and YouTube, LLC (collectively, YouTube). 3  We acknowledge the serious allegations of mental health harms experienced by many students and the impact of those harms on Plaintiffs’ schools and student bodies. We affirm the trial court’s ruling, however, because it follows existing precedents which we too are bound to follow, and which establish that these plaintiffs cannot proceed under the legal theories and factual allegations they have pled. FACTUAL BACKGROUND We draw this factual summary from the operative complaints. (See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 814; Wozniak v. YouTube, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 893, 907 (Wozniak).) According to Plaintiffs, “[s]chool districts across the nation are battling an unprecedented mental health crisis among their students and serious disruption to their educational public mission, fueled by Defendants’ creation and promotion of addictive and dangerous social media platforms.” Because “[s]tudents are now addicted to [those] platforms in droves,” districts have experienced a “substantial interference with [their] operations” and bear “a large burden” to provide mental health services to their students. Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendants liable, not for the harms allegedly imposed upon students, but for those imposed upon districts. Plaintiffs allege Defendants’ platforms are addictive and were “designed, developed, produced, operated, promoted, distributed, and marketed . . . to maximize the number of children, including [each] Plaintiff’s students, who download and use them compulsively.” Particular “design features” embedded in Defendants’ platforms are allegedly meant to “maximiz[e] youth engagement” 4 and profit Defendants via advertising revenue. For example, the complaints describe “an algorithmically-generated, endless feed to keep users scrolling in an induced ‘flow state’; ‘intermittent variable rewards’ that manipulate dopamine delivery to intensify use; ‘trophies’ to reward extreme usage; metrics and graphics to exploit social comparison; incessant notifications that encourage repetitive account checking by manufacturing insecurity; inadequate, essentially illusory age verification protocols; and deficient tools for parents that create the illusion of control.” Because of their young ages and developmental stages, “children and adolescents are uniquely vulnerable and easy targets” for these features and “tend to engage in addictive and compulsive use” of Defendants’ platforms. Defendants designed their platforms in this manner, “even though they knew or should have known [those] choices would have a detrimental effect on school operations and [students], including those in Plaintiff[s’] district[s], leading to serious problems in schools.” Plaintiffs allege large numbers of children and teens in the United States use Defendants’ platforms, many on a daily or more frequent basis, “including during the school day.” One survey of teenage girls who use social media indicated between 33 percent and 45 percent “felt addicted” to the platforms, and some Defendants were aware certain users felt the platforms were addictive and that compulsive use interfered with school and family responsibilities. Nevertheless, “Defendants wanted children using their [platforms] during the school day.” Internal documents showed some Defendants encouraged “use of their addictive platforms [in] entire school communities” including “during class.” 5  Plaintiffs further allege various research studies show the problematic “features engineered into Defendants’ platforms— particularly when used multiple hours a day—can have a ‘detrimental effect on the psychological health of [their] users,’ including compulsive use, addiction, body dissatisfaction, anxiety, depression, and self-harming behaviors such as eating disorders.” (Original brackets.) Each Defendant was “aware of research connecting use of their [platforms] with harm to [their] users’ wellbeing.” In that regard, some research has shown “addictive and compulsive use of Defendants’ platforms leads to negative mental and physical outcomes for kids,” and children and teens “addicted to [Meta’s platform] are more likely to engage in self-injurious behavior, such as cutting and suicide.” But social media addiction is not uniform across users: instead, it “is more prevalent among younger age groups.” Likewise, use of the platforms appears to have a significant effect on some female teens, particularly as it relates to negative body image. The overall mental health of American teens has decreased over the past 15 to 20 years, with more reporting “persistent sadness or hopelessness,” increased suicide rates, and increased emergency room visits for anxiety, mood, and attention disorders. Plaintiffs allege “Defendants’ platforms have triggered depression, anxiety, eating disorders, self-harm, and suicidality among thousands of children, including students in Plaintiff[s’] schools, to which Plaintiff[s] must respond.” As a result of Defendants’ actions, “[s]ocial media addiction is widespread within Plaintiff[s’] schools and has resulted in a myriad of harms to Plaintiff[s].” Plaintiffs allege they were harmed by Defendants’ conduct in three primary ways. 6  First, “[t]he mental health crisis caused and/or significantly contributed to by Defendants has caused an ongoing behavioral disruption in Plaintiff[s’] school[s], and Plaintiff[s] [have] had to take steps to mitigate [that] disruption” by, among other things: “hiring additional personnel”; “developing additional resources”; and “increasing training for teachers and staff to identify” and “address mental, emotional, and social health issues” among students. Second, “Plaintiff[s’] educational mission [is] hindered” because staff must “spend[] more time addressing issues related to social media [and] less time teaching.” For example, some “teachers must interrupt or stop instruction frequently” to manage student cell phone use. “[D]isciplinary incidents tied to cell phones and social media” have “required [staff] to divert time from education . . . toward investigating and resolving [those] incidents.” This has led Plaintiffs to “increas[e] disciplinary services” and to “consider strategies like purchasing additional learning materials to aid students who are behind on their progress . . . and purchasing faraday bags . . . to disable phones.” Third, Defendants’ conduct “adversely impact[ed] Plaintiff[s’] use and enjoyment of [their] property,” in part by “interfer[ing] with the functions and operations of Plaintiff[s’] schools.” Some schools “have seen a rise in vandalism of school property coinciding with the youth mental health crisis,” and some school districts have had to “address[] property damaged as a result of students acting out because of mental, social, and emotional problems Defendants’ conduct caused,” or because of “students’ . . . compulsive participation in social media challenges that direct destruction . . . of school property.” With regard to the latter, “TikTok’s algorithms . . . promote challenges that 7 specifically target school districts” and encourage viewers to vandalize school property. That caused some schools to sustain damage to restroom fixtures. PROCEDURAL HISTORY The operative complaints in all four cases were filed in January 2024. San Diego’s operative complaint alleged causes of action for public nuisance, negligence and gross negligence under California law. (Case No. B340661.) Vancouver’s operative complaint alleged one cause of action for public nuisance under Washington law. (Case No. B340662.) West Warwick’s operative complaint alleged causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, and public nuisance under Rhode Island law. (Case No. B340667.) Brevard’s operative complaint alleged causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, and public nuisance under Florida law. (Case No. B340659.) These four complaints were “identified for the initial round of demurrer briefing” in this Judicial Council Coordinated Proceeding. Defendants duly filed an omnibus demurrer to all four complaints in February 2024. Among other things, they argued: Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries derived from those of their students and thus were not cognizable in nuisance or negligence; the nuisance claims were overly broad, failed to allege interference with any public right or the rights of an entire community, and Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring them; and Plaintiffs’ negligence claims failed because they did not allege a cognizable legal duty and were barred by the economic loss doctrine. The trial court granted the demurrer in its entirety in June 2024. Because Plaintiffs had “not expressly sought leave to 8 amend, nor . . . suggested a factual basis for further amendment,” the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. 3 Judgment was entered on July 16, 2024. Plaintiffs timely appealed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a).) We consolidated the cases for purposes of oral argument and decision. DISCUSSION I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review A. Standard of Review We review de novo the trial court’s decision a complaint fails to “ ‘allege[] facts sufficient to state a cause of action.’ ” (Wozniak, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 906.) We “give the complaint a reasonable interpretation,” assuming the truth of “ ‘all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusion of fact or law.’ ” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The plaintiff “ ‘ “must show the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action.” ’ ” (Wozniak, at p. 907.) We may affirm the trial court’s order “on any ground stated in the demurrer.” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 918, 934.) B. Negligence Causes of Action In this part, we first address a few principles common to the three negligence causes of action. Then, in parts II. through IV., we analyze each negligence cause of action under the law of the relevant state and explain why the trial court correctly determined each plaintiff failed to state a claim. 3 Vancouver is the only plaintiff that challenges the denial of leave to amend, with regard to the Washington public nuisance cause of action. 9  1. A Duty of Care Is an Element of Negligence In each state at issue, a required element of negligence is the existence of a duty of care by the defendant to the plaintiff. In considering the existence of a duty, “ ‘[t]he foreseeability of a particular kind of harm plays a very significant role.’ ”4 (Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp. (R.I. 1987) 522 A.2d 1222, 1224, 1226; see also Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142; Gas Leak Cases, at pp. 398, 400; McCain v. Florida Power Corp. (Fla. 1992) 593 So.2d 500, 502–505 (McCain).) Nevertheless, a court is not tasked with “ ‘decid[ing] whether a particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant’s conduct, but rather . . . whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed.’ ” (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 772; Banks, at pp. 1226–1227; see also Williams v. Davis (Fla. 2007) 974 So.2d 1052, 1056, fn. 2 (Williams) [the defendant’s activity must have “created a general zone of foreseeable danger of a certain type of harm to others”].) Here, Plaintiffs allege they suffered three general kinds of harm: (1) “incur[ring] significant financial costs” to address the youth mental health crisis allegedly created by Defendants’ platforms; (2) “frustrat[ion] [of their] pedagogical mission” in diverting staff time and resources from education to counter the disruptive effects of the crisis; and (3) property damage inflicted 4 Other factors may also bear upon duty (see Flynn v. Nickerson Community Center (R.I. 2018) 177 A.3d 468, 479 (Flynn); Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 398–400 (Gas Leak Cases)), but we focus on foreseeability. 10 by students. In part V., we conclude Plaintiffs’ allegations their missions were frustrated do not state a cognizable negligence claim, and in part VI., we conclude Defendants have immunity from liability arising from Plaintiffs’ alleged property damage. That leaves Plaintiffs with only alleged financial harms— which we conclude in parts II. through IV., post, are not recoverable in negligence in these circumstances under California, Rhode Island, or Florida law. Thus, Plaintiffs have not adequately pled any of the Defendants owed them a duty of care under the laws of their respective states.5 The trial court properly sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the negligence causes of action.6 2. In General, Purely Economic Harms Are Not Recoverable The crux of the negligence causes of action is the applicability of the so-called “economic loss rule.” Our Supreme Court has described the rule as “deceptively easy to state: In 5 Our conclusion likewise forecloses Plaintiffs’ argument Defendants owed a duty to warn them of harms posed by Defendants’ platforms. Defendants have no duty to warn of a purported peril they have no duty to prevent. (See Jane Doe No. 1 v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 410, 424; Saunders v. Baseball Factory, Inc. (Fla.Ct.App. 2023) 361 So.3d 365, 368, 370–371 (Saunders); Thomas v. Amway Corp. (R.I. 1985) 488 A.2d 716, 718, 722.) 6 San Diego and West Warwick do not appeal the dismissal of their gross negligence causes of action. Brevard does not argue its gross negligence claim should survive if its negligence cause of action fails. We therefore affirm the judgment on Brevard’s gross negligence cause of action for the reasons discussed in part IV., post. 11 general, there is no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted ‘purely economic losses,’ meaning financial harm unaccompanied by physical or property damage.” (Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 922 (Sheen).) While that may seem straightforward, the reasoning underlying the application of the rule can vary, and different jurisdictions recognize different exceptions to it. For example, some courts use the term “economic loss rule” to describe a principle “bar[ring] claims in negligence for pure economic losses” among parties in contractual privity. (Sheen, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 922–923; see also Franklin Grove Corp. v. Drexel (R.I. 2007) 936 A.2d 1272, 1275 (Franklin Grove); Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC (Fla. 2010) 39 So.3d 1216, 1223 (Curd), receded from on other grounds by Lieupo v. Simon’s Trucking, Inc. (Fla. 2019) 286 So.3d 143, 144–145.) In California, we refer to this facet of the “rule . . . as the ‘contractual economic loss rule.’ ” (Sheen, at p. 923.) That doctrine is motivated by the principle that in contractual disputes, the scope of duty is better defined by the provisions in the parties’ agreement. (Ibid.; Franklin Grove, at p. 1275.) That facet is not relevant to this case. Instead, we are concerned here with a facet of the economic loss rule arising from courts’ efforts to impose “[m]eaningful limits on [the scope of] tort liability.” (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 414; see Sheen, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 922; Monroe v. Sarasota County School Bd. (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1999) 746 S.2d 530, 534–535 (Monroe); Builders Specialty Co. v. Goulet (R.I. 1994) 639 A.2d 59, 60 (per curiam) (Builders Specialty).) Our Supreme Court described the need for those limits more than 30 years ago with the following illustration: “[A]ssume[] a defendant negligently causes an automobile accident that blocks 12 a major traffic artery such as a bridge or tunnel. Although defendant would be liable for personal injuries and property damage suffered in such an accident, it is doubtful any court would allow recovery by the myriad of third parties who might claim economic losses because the bridge or tunnel was impassible.” (Bily v. Arthur Young and Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 400, fn. 11.) The economic losses suffered by those third parties may theoretically be foreseeable, but more is required to impose a duty of care in that context. (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 401.) While “foreseeability ‘ “may set tolerable limits for most types of physical harm, it provides virtually no limit on liability for nonphysical harm” ’ because “on ‘ “clear judicial days,” ’ courts ‘ “can foresee forever.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, even though “denying recovery for purely economic losses” may appear somewhat arbitrary, this “admittedly imperfect legal regime . . . governs in most jurisdictions.” (Id. at p. 412.) Because that legal regime applies in California, Rhode Island, and Florida, Plaintiffs’ negligence causes of action were properly dismissed. C. Public Nuisance Causes of Action Nuisance suits are generally either public or private. (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1103 (Gallo); see also Prior v. White (Fla. 1938) 180 So. 347, 355 (Prior); State v. Lead Industries, Ass’n, Inc. (R.I. 2008) 951 A.2d 428, 443 (Lead Industries); see also Animal Legal Defense v. Olympic Game Farm (Wash. 2023) 533 P.3d 1170, 1172 (Animal Legal).) “[A] private nuisance is a civil wrong based on disturbance of rights in land[,] while a public nuisance is [based] upon an interference with the rights of the community at large.” 13 (Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 116, 124; see also Gallo, at p. 1103.) “Nuisance has been described as an ‘impenetrable jungle’ ” that “ ‘mean[s] all things to all people’ ” and “ ‘is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition.’ ” (City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 575, 585 (U.S. Gypsum).) Thus, while nuisance is often defined broadly, many courts have limited its scope in practice. (See id. at p. 586; Animal Legal, supra, 533 P.3d at pp. 1172, 1175.) For example, the Washington Supreme Court expressly limits nuisance claims “to property infringement [and] threats to health and safety.” (Animal Legal, at p. 1175.) Some of our fellow Courts of Appeal have prohibited bringing products liability claims in the guise of public nuisance actions. (U.S. Gypsum, at p. 586; City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 28, 39, 42–43; but see People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 51, 91; County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 309 (Atlantic Richfield).) Such limits are often imposed because of a concern that “nuisance ‘would [otherwise] become a monster that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort.’ ” (U.S. Gypsum, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 586.) In the products liability context, “ ‘[a]ll a creative mind would need to do is construct a scenario describing a known or perceived harm . . . that can somehow be said to relate back to the way a company . . . makes, markets and/or sells its non-defective, lawful product or service, and a public nuisance claim would be conceived and born.’ ” (Lead Industries, supra, 951 A.2d at p. 457.) The trial court concluded Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead public nuisance because the harms alleged to have befallen 14 individual student users of Defendants’ platforms did not amount to a public nuisance, even when “considered collectively.” While our analysis may differ from the trial court’s in some particulars, we ultimately agree Plaintiffs’ efforts to state a cause of action for public nuisance fail under the laws of California, Washington, and Florida.7 (See pts. VII.–IX., post.) II. San Diego Did Not State a California Negligence Cause of Action A. The Economic Loss Rule Bars San Diego’s Negligence Cause of Action Our Supreme Court has recognized that while a defendant may have a general duty to guard against causing “actionable physical, emotional or reputational injury to persons or physical injury to property,” he typically “ha[s] no tort duty to guard against purely economic losses.” (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 398; Sheen, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 920.) In general, “there is no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted ‘purely economic losses,’ meaning financial harm unaccompanied by physical or property damage.” (Sheen, at p. 922; see also Gas Leak Cases, at p. 398 [“We use that term as a shorthand for ‘pecuniary or commercial loss that does not arise from actionable physical, emotional or reputational injury to persons or physical injury to property.’ ”].) Here, because San Diego failed to allege cognizable physical or property damage, its negligence cause of action fails. 7 At oral argument, West Warwick withdrew its Rhode Island public nuisance cause of action. 15  B. No Exception to the Economic Loss Rule Applies Here San Diego argues the economic loss rule should not apply “because the ‘considerations’ justifying [it]—preventing indeterminate liability, disproportionate liability, and over- deterrence—are ‘weak’ or ‘absent’ ” here. We disagree. First, assuming without deciding that Gas Leak Cases’ references to the Restatement Third of Torts’ approach to negligence claims apply equally to California law (see Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 407–408), we find those considerations present here. San Diego argues making an exception to the economic loss rule for its claim would “not threaten ‘indeterminate’ liability [citation] because its allegations could only be made by a limited set of potential plaintiffs.” But just as in Gas Leak Cases, we must consider not only the “limited class” currently before us, but rather “the full universe of potential claimants whose pocketbooks were adversely (and foreseeably) affected by” Defendants’ platforms. (Id. at p. 410.) As the trial court recognized, the universe of entities who may have suffered (or will suffer) some sort of financial loss because of the platforms is virtually unlimited, and could include “private and parochial schools,” “[c]olleges,” “[e]mployers,” and “public health services” that incurred increased expenses to treat alleged user health problems. As with the proposed class of plaintiffs in Gas Leak Cases, there is no viable geographic (spatial) or temporal limitation on who could seek remedies for their economic losses. (Id. at pp. 408–411.) In fact, the geographic and temporal scope is much broader than in Gas Leak Cases. Second, San Diego argues not creating an exception to the rule here will insufficiently deter Defendants’ conduct. But our 16 Supreme Court rejected a similar concern in Gas Leak Cases because the defendant still faced liability for many other claims arising from property damage. (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 413.) Likewise, Defendants may still face individual personal injury lawsuits from their users, claims for statutory violations, and actions in abatement from appropriate government authorities. And given the severe consequences alleged, “the Legislature can . . . craft a solution in tune with public demands,” possibly through “further industry-specific legislative or regulatory action.” (Ibid.) Third, San Diego’s brief repeatedly attributes a degree of intentionality to Defendants by arguing they “targeted schools with their platforms” and committed “deliberate misconduct,” citing cases holding the economic loss rule does not apply in the context of intentional torts. (See, e.g., Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 38 [“the economic loss rule does not apply to limit recovery for intentional tort claims like fraud”].) San Diego contrasts Defendants’ purported intentional acts against the random “ ‘man-made disaster’ ” at issue in Gas Leak Cases. But unlike the plaintiffs in In re JUUL Labs, Inc., Marketing, Sales Practices (N.D.Cal. 2020) 497 F.Supp.3d 552, 611–612 (In re JUUL), San Diego did not plead any intentional torts in its operative complaint, and we are concerned here with its cause of action for negligence. (See Fisher v. Fisher (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 899, 917 [the “scope of liability is broader for intentional torts than for negligence”].) Even assuming San Diego is correct that Defendants’ knowledge of the effects of their platforms on schools shows the harm was foreseeable, this branch of the economic loss rule requires “more than mere foreseeability” 17 to impose liability for purely economic loss. (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 401; see also id. at pp. 402–403.) San Diego urges us to join a federal district court that declined to apply the economic loss rule to a similar negligence claim. (See In re Social Media Adolescent Addiction (N.D.Cal. 2024) 754 F.Supp.3d 946, 978–979 (In re Social Media).) But that court focused largely on proximate cause and derivative injury arguments that are not at issue here. (Id. at pp. 964–972.) Its analysis of the economic loss rule was truncated, no doubt in part due to the court’s observation that the parties’ briefing on the topic was brief and provided “little more than case citations.” (Id. at p. 978.) The court concluded neither of the two “ ‘recurring . . . circumstances’ ” in which the rule applied “is argued or appears to apply.” (Id. at pp. 978–979.) We do not find this analysis persuasive and are bound instead to follow our Supreme Court’s admonition that “liability in negligence for purely economic losses . . . is ‘the exception, not the rule’ ” in California. (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 400.) III. West Warwick Did Not State a Rhode Island Negligence Cause of Action The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held “[t]he economic loss doctrine provides that ‘a plaintiff is precluded from recovering purely economic losses in a negligence cause of action,’ ” and thus, “may not recover damages under a negligence claim when the plaintiff has suffered no personal injury or property damage.” (Franklin Grove, supra, 936 A.2d at p. 1275.) The rationale provided—that “ ‘it is appropriate for sophisticated commercial entities to utilize contract law to protect themselves from economic damages’ ” (ibid.)—demonstrates that in Rhode Island, cases discussing the economic loss rule are focused on the 18 “contractual economic loss rule” as we described in part I.B.2., ante. Nonetheless, in reaching its decision, the Franklin Grove court cited approvingly a New Jersey case for the broader proposition that “[g]enerally speaking, tort principles, such as negligence, are better suited for resolving claims involving unanticipated physical injury, particularly those arising out of an accident.” (Id. at p. 1276, quoting Spring Motors Distributors v. Ford Motor Co. (N.J. 1985) 489 A.2d 660, 672.) Rhode Island has carved out an exception to the rule whereby certain consumers are not foreclosed from seeking economic damages in tort: “When a cause of action arises under a contract and a consumer lacks privity of contract with the offending party, an action in tort remains available, even if the damages are purely economic.” (Rousseau v. K.N. Const., Inc. (R.I. 1999) 727 A.2d 190, 193 (per curiam).) The court referenced its long tradition of providing an opportunity for recovery in cases in which consumers deal with commercial entities, such as implied warranties of good workmanship and habitability. (Ibid.) Because this case does not arise under a contract, there is no need to address West Warwick’s argument that the consumer exception applies here. The question remains whether Rhode Island permits recovery for economic losses under a negligence theory in any other context. West Warwick points to no case outside of the contractual context in which a plaintiff was permitted to sue for purely economic injuries. To the contrary, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has expressed skepticism of expanding tort liability for economic losses in unprecedented directions that is identical to the concerns articulated by our Supreme Court in Gas Leak Cases. 19 For example, in Builders Specialty, the plaintiff company’s employee was injured by the negligence of a defendant driver, an employee of defendant company operating a vehicle on the plaintiff’s property. (Builders Specialty, supra, 639 A.2d at p. 60.) The plaintiff employer brought a negligence action to recover its financial losses “in the form of pension contributions on [its employee’s] behalf, increased workers’ compensation insurance premiums, and other related costs.” (Ibid.) The court refused “to extend the scope of tort liability to include an employer’s business losses associated with bodily injury to an employee,” because that “expansion could lead to devastating results which could only be dimly perceived and would be practically unlimited.” (Builders Specialty, supra, 639 A.2d at p. 60.) The financial losses sustained by the plaintiff employer “were ‘beyond the scope of foreseeability, and . . . no duty was owed by [the defendants].’ ” (Ibid.; see also John Rocchio Corp. v. Pare Engineering (R.I. 2019) 201 A.3d 316, 321, fn. 5, 322–323 [despite holding the contractual economic loss rule does not apply given the absence of a contract, it would be “absurd” to hold that “all engineers contracted by project owners owe a duty to all general contractors that could possibly submit a bid on any given request for proposal”].) While the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Builders Specialty did not label this an aspect of the “economic loss rule,” it was motivated by the same concern about the practically unlimited scope of financial harms that drove our Supreme Court’s discussion of that rule in Gas Leak Cases. We conclude Rhode Island does not allow recovery for the purely economic losses alleged by West Warwick here. We are reluctant to create a new cause of action in Rhode Island that has 20 not previously been recognized. (Flynn, supra, 177 A.3d at p. 481.) Whether framed as a lack of duty or as another facet of the economic loss rule, the result is that under Rhode Island law, Defendants owed no duty to West Warwick to avoid the purely economic losses it alleged. IV. Brevard Did Not State a Florida Negligence Cause of Action In Florida, a duty exists when a defendant’s “activity . . . created a general zone of foreseeable danger of a certain type of harm to others.” (Williams, supra, 974 So.2d at p. 1056, fn. 2; see also McCain, supra, 593 So.2d at p. 502.) Because we conclude Defendants’ conduct did not create a foreseeable zone of risk of any cognizable harm to Brevard, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Brevard’s negligence cause of action. A. The Same Principles Underlying the Economic Loss Rule Apply in Florida Florida also recognizes a “general principle of common law negligence” that precludes “recovery for purely economic losses when the plaintiff has sustained no bodily injury or property damage.” (Curd, supra, 39 So.3d at p. 1223; see also Monroe, supra, 746 S.2d at p. 531 [“we continue to hold, as a general rule, that bodily injury or property damage is an essential element of a cause of action in negligence”].) While the court in Curd did not expressly use the phrase “economic loss rule,” it went on to analyze whether the commercial fishermen plaintiffs before it “f[e]ll into a recognized exception to that general rule.” (See Curd, at p. 1224.) We conclude Brevard’s negligence cause of action was correctly dismissed because no exception applies (see pt. IV.B., post). 21  1. The Contractual Economic Loss Rule Is Irrelevant In addition to the general principle discussed above, Florida also has what it does call the economic loss rule, which is essentially the contractual economic loss rule we have already discussed, as well as an application of that same rule in the products liability context. Brevard argues this doctrine, excluding claims for “purely economic losses,” pertains only to “ ‘ “disappointed economic expectations” ’ ” and does not apply here. Brevard draws its understanding from the Florida Supreme Court’s discussion of the economic loss rule in the contexts of a contractual relationship or products liability action. (See Indemnity Ins. Co. v. American Aviation (Fla. 2004) 891 So.2d 532, 536–538 (Indemnity); Tiara Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Co. (Fla. 2013) 110 So.3d 399, 400.) But as noted above, we are not applying the contractual economic loss rule here, nor does this case arise in the product liability context. The rule identified by Indemnity is conceptually distinct from the more general tort law concern about amorphous and indeterminate liability. (See Curd, supra, 39 So.3d at p. 1223 [distinguishing “the economic loss rule,” which did not apply, from “general tort law principles” barring recovery for “ ‘purely economic interests’ ”].) Indemnity reiterated that cases not falling into the contract or product liability contexts should still be decided on traditional negligence principles of duty, breach, and proximate cause, and the Supreme Court returned the case to the Eleventh Circuit, noting only “[i]f [the defendant] owed [the plaintiff] a duty, then [the plaintiff] is not prevented from recovering for purely 22 economic injuries.” (Indemnity, supra, 891 So.2d at pp. 543–544; see also id. at pp. 544–546, conc. opn. of Cantero, J. [“[O]ur limitation of the rule will not open the gates to widespread tort recovery for purely economic losses. . . . [P]laintiffs whose cases fall outside of the economic loss rule must still prove ‘duty, breach, and proximate cause.’ . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . The ‘duty’ prong remains a strong filter in these cases—virtually as strong as the rule itself.”].) B. Defendants Did Not Have a Duty to Prevent Brevard’s Economic Harms Both parties claim that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Curd provides support for their position. In Curd, plaintiff commercial fishermen sued a polluter whose wastewater killed various marine life in Tampa Bay, damaging the reputation of the fishery products and resulting in lost income. (Curd, supra, 39 So.3d at pp. 1218–1219.) The court held that while the (contractual and products liability) economic loss doctrine as described above did not apply, the proper analysis, consistent with its previous decision in Indemnity, was to consider whether defendant owed the fishermen a duty