Full Opinion

Filed 8/31/26 Certified for Publication 9/22/26 (order attached) IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE LAGUNA BEACH HISTORIC PRESERVATION COALITION et al., G065723 Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021- 01178477) v. OPINION CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH et al., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, William D. Claster, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Brandt-Hawley Law Group and Susan Brandt-Hawley for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Megan K. Garibaldi, City Attorney; Best Best & Krieger, Hannah S. Park, Tiffany M. Michou, and Antoinette Ranit-Mauro, for Defendants and Respondents. Plaintiffs Laguna Beach Historic Preservation Coalition, Preserve Orange County, and Village Laguna petitioned for a writ of mandamus challenging the City of Laguna Beach’s amendment of its Historic Resources Element to eliminate any reference to its 1981 Inventory of historic properties. The trial court denied their petition. We agree with the trial court that the properties on the Inventory qualify as presumptive historical resources under the California Environmental Quality Act1 and are thus entitled to certain protections. However, we conclude rebutting that presumption requires more than showing the Inventory as a whole is outdated, overbroad, or underinclusive; instead, the City was required to find that each and every property on the Inventory is not in fact historically significant. Because the City failed to conduct that analysis before amending its Historic Resources Element, because the amendment removed CEQA protections afforded to the Inventory properties, and because that will likely have a significant adverse effect on the environment, the amendment is invalid. We therefore reverse. FACTS From July 1980 to July 1981, at the City’s direction, a preservation planning firm performed a historic survey of Laguna Beach, identifying over 700 pre-1940 homes and structures that had retained their original appearance and architectural integrity. The resulting Inventory, which categorized each building as exceptional, key, or contributive based on 1 See Pub. Res. Code § 21000 et seq. All further statutory references are to this code. 2 its historical significance and condition, was used to develop the City’s General Plan’s Historic Resources Element in fall 1981. In 1982, in order to secure a grant to fund a historic preservation and housing rehabilitation program, the City Council passed a resolution formally recognizing the Inventory as “a listing of the best representative examples of historically significant architecture within the City of Laguna Beach.” In 1989, as part of its historic preservation program, the City established a voluntary historic property Register that was “independent of” the Inventory. The City gave Inventory property owners the option to list their property on the Register. Participation was entirely voluntary and came with various incentives. Over the next several decades, the Inventory allegedly became outdated. According to the City, it was simultaneously underinclusive and overinclusive: it did not include all the properties listed on the Register, yet it did include properties that had been demolished or altered. In the early 2010’s, the City hired a consultant to evaluate the Inventory properties and determine if they retained enough historic integrity to remain eligible for listing. According to the City, although the consultant took “preliminary steps” to update the Inventory in 2014 by performing a field survey of Inventory structures, the City “never finalized,” “adopted,” or “received” any update to the Inventory. Rather than update the Inventory, the City instead decided to update its historic preservation program. This involved amending the Municipal Code and Historic Resources Element to eliminate references to 3 the Inventory, clarify that owner consent is a criterion for Register eligibility, and expand historic preservation incentives. In 2020, a consultant for the City Council conducted an initial study concerning these updates and prepared a negative declaration2 concluding the changes would not have a significant adverse impact on historic properties. The negative declaration noted the Inventory would be eliminated because it was “more than 36−37 years old,” and explained that inventories “that do not meet the requirements of . . . section 5024(g), such as being updated every five years, do not create a presumption that identified properties are historic resources.”3 Later that year, the City Council approved the negative declaration, adopted the ordinance amending the Municipal Code, and approved the amended Historic Resources Element. In 2021, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandamus under CEQA to set aside the City’s approval of the updated program. They later narrowed their challenge to only the amended Historic Resources Element.4 2 A negative declaration is “a written statement briefly describing the reasons that a proposed project will not have a significant effect on the environment and does not require the preparation of an environmental impact report.” (§ 21064.) 3 The negative declaration did not discuss section 5020.1, subdivision (k), which sets forth another path to presumed historical significance, which we discuss below. (§ 21084.1.) 4 The other program amendments, which were certified by the Coastal Commission in 2022, are being separately litigated in San Diego County Superior Court. 4 According to plaintiffs, the City was required to prepare an environmental impact report5 (EIR) before it could approve the amended element. After a hearing on the merits, the trial court found the Inventory properties are presumptively protected under CEQA because they are listed on the Inventory. However, it further concluded the City had shown the Inventory was “no longer effective” because it miscategorized certain properties, included structures that had been demolished or altered, and omitted historical properties that should have been included. The court therefore entered a judgment denying the petition in its entirety. DISCUSSION I. CEQA PROTECTIONS FOR HISTORICAL RESOURCES CEQA is a comprehensive legislative scheme designed to provide long-term protection to the environment. (Historic Architecture Alliance v. City of Laguna Beach (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 186, 201 (Laguna Beach).) Before a public agency can undertake a “project”—that is, an agency activity that may cause either a direct or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment (see § 21065, subd. (a))—CEQA requires the agency to determine if the project may have a significant effect on the environment; depending on the answer to that question, CEQA then requires the agency to prepare either an EIR, a negative declaration, or a mitigated 5 “An EIR is viewed as the ‘heart’ of CEQA.” (Georgetown Preservation Society v. County of El Dorado (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 358, 368.) “The purpose of an EIR is to inform the agency and the public, in detail, about the effect the project is likely to have on the environment and the ways available to minimize that impact.” (Friends of Sierra Madre v. City of Sierra Madre (2001) 25 Cal.4th 165, 184–185 (Sierra Madre).) 5 negative declaration.6 (Sierra Madre, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 184–185; Protect Tustin Ranch v. City of Tustin (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 951, 959.) Although CEQA is “directed primarily to ecological concerns and preservation of the environment,” it also aims to “‘preserve . . . examples of the major periods of California history.’” (Sierra Madre, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 183–184; see § 21001, subd. (c).) Its protections thus also extend to historical resources, such as certain historic structures, sites, and objects. (Sierra Madre, at p. 186.) If a project may cause a “substantial adverse change”7 in a historical resource’s significance, the project may have a significant effect on the environment and warrant the preparation of an EIR or a mitigated negative declaration. (§§ 21084.1, 21080, subd. (d), 21151; see Laguna Beach, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 195.) “A structure’s status as a historical resource for purposes of CEQA is either mandatory, presumptive, or discretionary, depending on whether it has been or could be listed on various registers of historical 6 A mitigated negative declaration is “a negative declaration prepared for a project when the initial study has identified potentially significant effects on the environment, but (1) [certain] revisions . . . would avoid the effects or mitigate the effects to a point where clearly no significant effect on the environment would occur, and (2) there is no substantial evidence in light of the whole record before the public agency that the project, as revised, may have a significant effect on the environment.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15369.5.) 7 “‘Substantial adverse change in the significance of an historical resource means physical demolition’ or other adverse effects, such that the significance of the historic resource ‘would be materially impaired.’” (Architectural Heritage Assn. v. County of Monterey (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1118.) 6 resources.” (Laguna Beach, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 203, fn. 5; see § 21084.1.) Plaintiffs contend the Inventory properties are presumptively historical, so we focus on that category alone. A property is “presumed to be” historically significant under CEQA if it meets either one of two criteria: (1) it is “included in a local register of historical resources, as defined in subdivision (k) of Section 5020.1”, or (2) it is “deemed significant pursuant to criteria set forth in subdivision (g) of Section 5024.1.” (§ 21084.1.) The trial court correctly found that section 5024.1, subdivision (g), is inapplicable, and the parties rightly concede as much.8 We therefore limit our focus to section 5020.1, subdivision (k). This provision defines a “‘[l]ocal register of historical resources”’ as “a list of properties officially designated or recognized as historically significant by a local government pursuant to a local ordinance or resolution.” (§ 5020.1, subd. (k), italics added.) “The use of the disjunctive ‘or’ has been interpreted to mean that a building is [a presumed] historic resource if it is either ‘designated’ to a local register or ‘recognized’ as historically significant 8 Section 5024.1, subdivision (g), provides that a “resource identified as significant in an historical resource survey may be listed in the California Register if the survey meets [four] criteria,” one of which is: “(4) If the survey is five or more years old at the time of its nomination for inclusion in the California Register, the survey is updated to identify historical resources which have become eligible or ineligible due to changed circumstances or further documentation and those which have been demolished or altered in a manner that substantially diminishes the significance of the resource.” Because the Inventory has not been updated, its properties are not deemed historically significant under section 5024.1, subdivision (g). 7 by local ordinance or resolution.” (Valley Advocates v. City of Fresno (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1054 (Valley Advocates).) This presumption of historical significance is rebutted if “the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the resource is not historically . . . significant.” (§ 21084.1; see, e.g., Coalition for Historical Integrity v. City of San Buenaventura (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 430, 434–435 (Coalition) [consultant’s report that statue is not historical constituted substantial evidence supporting city’s decision to remove statue’s historic status and relocate it]; Valley Advocates, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1065– 1066 [architect’s statements on lack of historical significance of apartment buildings constituted substantial evidence supporting city’s decision to not list them in local register]; contrast League for Protection of Oakland’s etc. Historic Resources v. City of Oakland (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 896, 908 [“the presumption of historic status has not been rebutted by any evidence in the record”].) This standard is not onerous. (See, e.g., Coalition, at p. 435 [consultant’s report rebutted presumption, even without evidence its author was qualified as an expert; “municipal agencies can properly consider and base decisions on evidence that would not be admissible in a court of law”].) Indeed, sometimes “attitudes and values change,” and a place or object that once was deemed a historical resource might later be found to have no historical significance. (Id. at pp. 432–433, 435–436 [affirming city’s decision to relocate statue of historical figure that was subject of protests].) We review an agency’s finding that a property is not a historical resource for substantial evidence. (Coalition, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 435; Friends of Willow Glen Trestle v. City of San Jose (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 457, 467–468, 473 (Willow Glen).) But if “‘the resource has been determined to be 8 an historical resource, then the fair argument standard applies to the question whether the proposed project “may cause a substantial adverse change in the significance of an historical resource” (§ 21084.1) and thereby have a significant effect on the environment.’” (Willow Glen, at p. 472.) That standard is met if the initial study “produces substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the proposed project may have a significant adverse effect on the environment.” (Citizens for the Restoration of L Street v. City of Fresno (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 340, 364, italics removed; see § 21080, subd. (d).) II. THE CITY’S AMENDMENT TO ITS HISTORIC RESOURCES ELEMENT IS INVALID We agree with the trial court that the Inventory properties each qualify as presumptive historical resources under CEQA.9 Properties on a “local register”—that is, properties appearing on “a list of properties officially designated or recognized as historically significant by a local government 9 We also conclude the amendment to the City’s Historic Resources Element qualifies as a “project.” The amendment eliminated CEQA protections for Inventory properties, making it reasonably foreseeable at least some of them will be physically altered in the future. (Black Property Owners Assn. v. City of Berkeley (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 974, 985 [“the adoption and amendment of general plans and their elements are projects within the meaning of CEQA”]; see Friends of the Sierra Railroad v. Tuolumne Park & Recreation Dist. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 643, 653–654 [“project” is broad; examples include amending building regulations, approving regional transportation plan, and increasing bus fare]; accord, Sierra Madre, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 171, fn. 1, 181 [assuming without deciding that delisting buildings from list of historic properties constitutes a “project” under CEQA].) 9 pursuant to a . . . resolution”—are “presumed to be historically . . . significant.” (§§ 21084.1, 5020.1, subd. (k).) The Inventory properties are recognized as historically significant by the Inventory, which the City Council formally approved by resolution in 1982. As the trial court put it, “It is hard to imagine a more direct way to formally recognize the historical significance of the properties on the Inventory.” The Inventory properties are therefore presumptively historic. Indeed, just three years ago, a different panel of our court held that a Laguna Beach house listed on the Inventory was “considered a presumptive historical resource under” CEQA. (Laguna Beach, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 195.) We see no reason to reach a different conclusion here concerning all the other properties on the Inventory.10 Because the Inventory properties each qualify as presumptive historical resources, we must determine whether there is substantial evidence that those properties are not in fact historically significant. (§ 21084.1.) We cannot find any such evidence. While the City does not necessarily agree that the Inventory grants presumptive historic status,11 the City is quite clear that it believes it 10 We attach no significance to a statement in the 1982 resolution staff report that a property’s inclusion on the Inventory will not impose any special obligations on the property owner, or that section 21084.1 (which took effect in 1993) did not yet exist when the City officially recognized the resolution in 1982. The fact remains that, regardless of what the expectations were when it was created, the Inventory is “a list of properties officially . . . recognized as historically significant by a local government pursuant to a . . . resolution” within the meaning of section 5020.1, subdivision (k). 11 The City acknowledged at oral argument that it did not file a cross-appeal challenging the trial court’s decision that the Inventory conveyed presumptive historic status. 10 could revoke the entire Inventory (whatever its effect) without individually analyzing the historical status of any property listed on it. As the City put it in its brief, the Inventory “as a whole is no longer a valid or trustworthy indicator of historic status”; as such, the City need not “undertake a case-by-case reassessment of each individual structure on the Inventory.” At oral argument, the City confirmed its position that revoking the Inventory “doesn’t require the City to adjudicate the historical status of hundreds of individual properties in the abstract . . . .” We thus appropriately turn our focus to the propriety of revoking the Inventory as a whole. (See People v. Richardson (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 360, 368 [“in both civil and criminal cases . . . we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision”; “the parties know what is best for them”].) In our view, the City’s admitted failure to conduct an individualized analysis of Inventory properties is dispositive. Section 21084.1 extends CEQA protections to the individual properties (the “historical resources”) on the Inventory (the “local register of historical resources”). (§§ 21084.1, 5020.1, subd. (k).) To overcome the presumption that each of those properties is historically significant, the City needed to find that a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates all those properties are not in fact historically significant. The City refused to consider that question and instead focused on perceived inaccuracies in the Inventory as a whole, engaging in a blanket delisting of hundreds of presumptively historical resources.12 12 The City directs us to no case upholding an agency’s decision to invalidate an entire local register of historic resources, and we have found none. 11 What’s more, the City’s rationale for the blanket delisting is questionable. For example, the City asserts the Inventory is outdated because it includes properties that have been demolished or altered since the Inventory was created in 1981. But that does not detract from any historical significance of the hundreds of other properties on the Inventory that have retained their structural integrity. If properties built in the 1920’s and 1930’s were deemed historically significant in 1981, they may well be even more historically significant in 2026. The City similarly asserts the Inventory is underinclusive because it does not catch all Laguna Beach properties that might be historic. But the fact that certain historic properties are not included on the Inventory does not detract from the historical significance of the properties that are on the Inventory. Finally, the record supports a fair argument that the amendment may have a significant adverse effect on the environment. By removing the presumed historic property status of Inventory properties, the amendment enables the City to treat those properties as not historic for purposes of CEQA review, leaving them less protected from modifications or demolition. The City insists that many properties retain their presumed historical resource status because they are listed on the Register. But the Register is not an exhaustive list of Laguna Beach’s historically significant properties, as confirmed by the fact that inclusion is voluntary and subject to the owner’s consent. As there is no guaranty the owners of Inventory properties have added or will add their homes to the Register, doing away with the Inventory would amount to removing CEQA protections for many Inventory properties. 12 “‘“CEQA is to be interpreted ‘to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.”’” (Laguna Beach, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 201.) Consistent with that mandate, we reverse the judgment. On remand, the trial court should enter judgment for plaintiffs and issue a peremptory writ ordering the City to set aside approvals of its revised Historic Resources Element pending the preparation of an EIR or a mitigated negative declaration as is appropriate under CEQA. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).) SCOTT, ACTING P. J. WE CONCUR: SERVINO, J. SCHWARM, J.* *Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 13 Filed 9/22/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE LAGUNA BEACH HISTORIC PRESERVATION COALITION et al., G065723 Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021- 01178477) v. ORDER GRANTING CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH et al., REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION Defendants and Respondents. Laguna Beach Historic Preservation Coalition, Preserve Orange County, Village Laguna, San Francisco Heritage, and the California Preservation Foundation have requested that our opinion filed August 31, 2026, be certified for publication. It appears that our opinion meets the standards set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c). The request is GRANTED. The opinion is ordered published in the Official Reports. SCOTT, ACTING P. J. WE CONCUR: SERVINO, J. SCHWARM, J.* *Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 2