In re S.L. CA4/2

Filed 11/10/26 In re S.L. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ord ered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO In re S.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. E087084 RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, (Super.Ct.No. DPSW2500188) Plaintiff and Respondent, OPINION v. M.L., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean P. Crandell, Judge. Affirmed. 1  Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. The juvenile court removed S.L. (minor, born July 2018) from parents’ custody and bypassed reunification services to defendant and appellant M.L. (father) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(16) (parent required to register as a sex offender).1 On appeal, father contends that the court was estopped from and erred in bypassing his reunification services. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2010, father pled to one count of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) The victim was father’s four- year-old stepdaughter, who reported that father placed his penis on her vagina and made her orally copulate him when he babysat her while her mother was working. The court sentenced father to eight years in prison. (In re Lopez (May 14, 2025, E084939) [nonpub. opn.] (Lopez).) Father was released in August 2017 and ordered to serve a maximum term of 10 years on parole. His original parole terms included a condition that prohibited him from having any contact with any minor female (special condition No. 8). Father was required to register as a sex offender on the Megan’s Law database. (Lopez, supra, E084939.) 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated. 2  Father married a woman who gave birth to their daughter, minor, nearly one year after he was released. He disclosed his wife’s pregnancy to his parole officer. After mother gave birth to minor, father’s parole conditions were modified at his request to allow him to live with her. The terms were modified to include special condition No. 67, which provided: “You shall not have unsupervised contact with your biological daughter,… You shall make sure an adult family member is available [to] supervise contact at all times. Family members authorized to supervise contact are:” mother, the paternal grandfather, the paternal grandmother, and the paternal uncle. In August 2020, father, mother, the paternal uncle, and the paternal grandparents all signed a general affidavit acknowledging that they would ensure that father was not left alone with minor. (Lopez, supra, E084939.) In August 2023, special condition No. 9 was added to father’s parole terms. It provided: “You shall not have contact with your biological or adopted children. ‘No contact’ means no contact in any form, whether direct or indirect, personally, by telephone, in writing through electronic media, email, computer, or through another person, etc.”2 (Lopez, supra, E084939.) Father learned of the new condition from his parole officer in late July 2023. The following month, he submitted a grievance, challenging the decision to revoke the previous parole condition that allowed him to have supervised contact with minor. In October 2023, the grievance was denied. (Lopez, supra, E084939.) 2 No explanation for the additional term was apparently given. (Lopez, supra, E084939.) 3  Father appealed the denial of his grievance but was effectively denied any relief. Thereafter, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, which the court denied. (Lopez, supra, E084939.) In an opinion filed on May 14, 2025, on petition for writ of habeas corpus, this court held that special condition No. 9 was unconstitutionally overbroad because it prohibited father from having any direct or indirect contact or communication with minor, “not only in-person contact but also video calls, voice calls, and even written communication . . . .” Nothing in the record supported imposition of a complete ban on father’s contact with minor in 2023. “For example, assuming for the sake of argument that some change in [father’s] parole conditions was warranted by [minor’s] age, there is still no evidence that allowing supervised visits with [minor] in a public setting or supervised voice or video calls would fail to achieve the goals of protecting [minor] and preventing recidivism by father.” Thus, this court granted father’s petition, struck special condition No. 9, and ordered reinstatement of special condition No. 67, which allowed father to live with minor so long as his contact was supervised at all times by specified persons. (Lopez, supra, E084939.) On May 29, 2025, officers conducted a parole search of father’s residence.3 3 Although this court struck father’s parole condition prohibiting him from having contact with minor prior to the date of the search, this court’s opinion was not final until issuance of the remittitur on July 16, 2025. “The opinion is ‘not the writ itself,’ and it has ‘no effect’ until it becomes final as to the Court of Appeal and this court.” (People v. Superior Court (Mitchell) (2024) 17 Cal.5th 228, 251-252 [The status quo prior to the issuance of an appellate opinion remains in effect until issuance of the remittitur unless otherwise directed].) 4 Mother and the paternal grandparents said that minor did not reside in the home. However, officers observed the paternal grandmother taking minor to the master bedroom during the search. They found minor hiding in a bathtub. The residence contained toys, a play tent, and a bed for minor. Officers arrested father for violating the terms of his parole. Minor reported that she lived with father, mother, and her paternal grandparents. She said she had her own room in the home. Minor denied ever living in another home or without father. She denied ever being touched inappropriately. Mother reported that she and minor did not live at the residence. Instead, she said that she and minor lived in another home with the maternal grandmother. Mother said she was aware of father’s parole condition providing that father could not be in contact with minor. The social worker asked mother why she was at the residence during the parole search; mother refused to answer. Mother refused to explain why mother’s and minor’s possessions were in the home. Father said he resided with the paternal grandparents. In June 2023, father’s parole agent changed the terms of his parole to require that he not have contact with minor. At that time, mother and minor moved out of the home. The paternal grandparents would watch minor after school. On the day of the search, father was unaware minor was at the home. He arrived home from work at 5:00 p.m., and the parole officer conducted the search shortly thereafter while minor was still in the home. 5  On June 9, 2025, the social worker contacted mother to schedule a home visit for that day. Mother said she was no longer living with the maternal grandmother, but that she was now staying with the paternal grandparents. The social worker asked if mother and minor had been living with the paternal grandparents the entire time; mother refused to answer. On June 11, 2025, the social worker visited the home of the paternal grandparents. They indicated they understood father’s criminal background and probation conditions. The paternal grandparents denied that mother and minor had been living with them. They reported that mother and minor had lived with them until June 2023, when father’s parole terms changed. The paternal grandparents reported that father had successfully challenged the new parole term. The maternal aunt and uncle reported the mother and minor moved out of the paternal grandparents’ home in the summer of 2022 or 2023 and moved in with the maternal grandmother. However, they moved back into the paternal grandparents’ home in the winter of 2024. Father’s parole officer said father had been charged with four counts of violating his parole. Father had a prior dependency history consisting of three prior referrals alleging sexual abuse and general neglect, including the behavior which led to defendant’s underlying arrest and conviction in Lopez. The sexual abuse allegation had been substantiated; the remaining allegations had been deemed unfounded or had been evaluated out. 6  On June 18, 2025, the department took minor into protective custody. On June 23, 2025, the department filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging that mother allowed father contact with minor in violation of his parole conditions (b-1 & d-1), that father had a criminal history including a conviction for lewd and lascivious behavior with a minor under the age of 14 (b-2), and that father had a prior child welfare history for substantiated allegations of sexual abuse against his stepdaughter (b-3). The court detained minor on June 24, 2025. In the jurisdiction and disposition report, the social worker recommended that the court find the allegations in the petition true, that minor be removed from parents’ custody, that mother receive reunification services, and that father’s reunification services be bypassed pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(16). The department had placed minor with the maternal aunt and uncle. Minor again acknowledged that she had contact with father. She said that her family was her strength and that they protected her. Minor said she felt safe in her placement but would prefer to go home with mother and father. The maternal uncle reported that mother was pregnant. “The maternal uncle believes the mother is going to continue to downplay the situation and try to appease the courts with what is requested of her but would still have contact with the father.” Father indicated he and mother had enrolled in a parenting class. Mother confirmed by email that she had enrolled in a parenting program. However, mother had not made herself available to the department for an interview. 7  On September 3, 2025, father filed a motion requesting reunification services. Father attached a copy of this court’s opinion in Lopez to the motion.4 Father noted that minor lived with him from birth until 2023, and that he was involved in every aspect of her life. Thus, father argued that it would be detrimental to minor to deprive her of her relationship with him. In an addendum report, the social worker reported she had interviewed mother. Mother indicated that they had a court order allowing the family to live together, that minor was never alone with father, and that father would never harm minor. Mother was due to give birth that month. The social worker opined, “The Department is concerned the father sexually molested his stepchild, spent time in prison for this crime and blatantly violated the terms of his parole, when he chose to live with his young child. The father, mother and his parents attempted to hide [minor] when law enforcement completed a Parole check,...” At a hearing on September 11, 2025, the court noted, “There are a lot of various issues that this case raises. One of the issues that we talked about at length is the fact that part of the Department’s petition relies upon the fact that there was a parole condition preventing [father] from having any contact with the minor and that, from the Court’s understanding of the timelines, there’s been a grievance filed. There had been an appellate tentative opinion issued that actually predated the parole search, but that opinion was not formally entered. And subsequent ... to the law enforcement search and 4 The department also attached a copy of Lopez to its addendum report filed on September 8, 2025. 8 the parole arrest and the case being initiated, then the formal opinion was finalized which made that specific condition no longer constitutional and was deemed overbroad.” The court continued the matter to allow it sufficient time to further research the issue of what affect Lopez might have in the dependency proceeding. At the contested hearing on September 23, 2025, the court received Lopez and the remittitur into evidence. The department and minor’s counsel argued the court should follow the recommendation to bypass father’s reunification services. Minor’s counsel noted, “In looking at the statute, it does appear to me that this Court does have proof of clear and convincing evidence that the father is a registered sex offender. I understand that his parole conditions were changed after the home was searched by police, but I did find it very concerning that the child lives in the home with the mother and paternal grandparents and that the other adults in the home chose to hide my client in a bathtub which suggested to me that they knew it was inappropriate for father to be living with [minor].” Minor “does not seem to be deeply affected by not visiting with her father at this time.” Father’s counsel argued that, assuming the court took jurisdiction in the matter, since father and minor had a strong bond, it was in minor’s best interest to grant father reunification services. The department replied, “this case is not about punishment. It is not about the agreed terms of father’s plea.” “This case is about danger to the child. And it is very clear that, given father’s prior behavior, he sees children differently, and that creates a danger, that that danger is something that the adults in the child’s life need[] to 9 take into consideration in order to protect the child.” “The question before this court is not ... what the parole terms should be. That’s not the question we’re asking. It’s whether … there is a danger, and clearly there is. Then the question is … whether or not the adults in minor’s life are willing to accept that there is a danger and act to mitigate that.” Minor’s counsel replied that minor had not expressed any concerns about missing father; she only mentioned missing the paternal grandfather. Minor had told counsel that she had “been left alone with the father, that sometimes they lay in his bed and watch movies together.” Minor’s counsel believed father posed a risk to minor such that reunification services were not in minor’s best interest. Mother’s counsel conceded there was a violation of father’s parole conditions but argued that it had been deemed unconstitutional. With respect to this court’s opinion in Lopez, the juvenile court noted, “I don’t believe this Court can take judicial notice of all of the underlying factual determinations made by ... that court, in that those were engaged in a different court hearing, perhaps different burdens of proof, different standards.” “So I will receive that document or those documents, and I have reviewed them, but they will be received with that limitation.” The court noted, “I’m not punishing anyone … we never in this courtroom punish people for anything. The focus is on the best interests of the children. We don’t try and re-punish people a second time. And I understand the arguments from parents’ counsel that, from a layperson’s perspective, it would appear dad is accused and pled to 10 something from many years ago, and now he’s being punished for it again. Clearly, the Department’s actions are having negative ramifications on his life, but it would be incorrect to refer to those as punishment. They are separate and distinct focuses.” The court observed, “It happens all the time that a mother and a father engage in domestic violence, and there are reports of abuse. Police come out. Police investigate. The district attorney, who controls charging crimes, decides they don’t have enough evidence or they don’t want to prosecute, and they simply drop the case, and nothing ever happens in a criminal forum. And then The Department of Social Services here will file a petition saying, ‘That child is at risk of harm,’ or, ‘substantial harm.’ And parents come to court, and they’re sometimes confused and say, ‘But we were found innocent. The case wasn’t filed. How can we be here?’ And the response to that is they’re different cases with a different set of facts with different burdens of proof and different focuses. So what the DA does or does not do doesn’t control this court. We’re focused on different issues.”5 “So I understand that there was ultimately a court of appeals opinion that struck down the term of parole that prevented dad from having any contact with [minor]. They were focused on whatever rules relate to what ... parole [can] make you do in the confines 5 The court discussed two cases that it contended supported its ruling, and which both parties discuss in their briefs: Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 149 and Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 962. However, the court discussed the cases to support its jurisdictional findings; since no one on appeal challenges the court’s jurisdictional findings, the cases are irrelevant to the issues presented on appeal. 11 of supervision in parole. That does not relate to the issues in this court which are is a child at substantial risk of harm? And, if so, the Court takes jurisdiction. There’s a whole set of rules about whether I find a child is at substantial risk of harm.” The court found that “at the time that it occurred, [it] was a valid parole condition that at that time was being violated. It’s been subsequently ruled to be unconstitutional,...” “There was an active parole condition, and even though that condition was subsequently deemed to be unconstitutional, it’s not in question. At the time of the search, it would be an accurate statement to say that there was a parole condition that prevented father from having any contact with [minor].” The court found that minor was living with father in violation of his parole condition, that parents knew they were violating the terms of father’s parole by allowing him to have contact with minor, that they attempted to hide her during the parole search, and that parents had been untruthful about where minor was living. The court found that defendant was required to register as a sex offender, and that father had failed to show it was in minor’s best interest to provide him reunification services. The court found the allegations in the petition true, sustained the petition, removed minor from parents’ custody, ordered reunification services for mother, and bypassed reunification services to father pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(16). The court ordered father to have monthly, one-hour visitation with minor. II. DISCUSSION Father contends “the juvenile court abused its discretion by ignoring the decision 12 of this Court overturning the 2023 parole modification and issuing dispositional orders which basically reinstated the parole provision just struck down by this Court.” Ergo, father maintains the juvenile court was estopped from bypassing father’s reunification services pursuant to the doctrines of law of the case and/or collateral estoppel. Further, father argues the court erred in bypassing his reunification services because reunification services were in minor’s best interest. We disagree. A. Estoppel Father maintains the juvenile court was estopped from bypassing father’s reunification services pursuant to the doctrines of law of the case and/or collateral estoppel.6 We disagree. “‘The law of the case doctrine states that when, in deciding an appeal, an appellate court “states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal … , and this although in its subsequent consideration this court may be clearly of the opinion that the former decision is erroneous in that particular.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 374, fn. 6; see People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 443 [The “‘law-of-the-case doctrine binds the trial court as to the law but controls the outcome only if the evidence on ... rehearing of an issue is substantially the same as 6 Neither the parties nor the court below expressly invoked or discussed the doctrines of law of the case or collateral estoppel by name; nonetheless, those doctrines were implicit in their discussions. 13 that upon which the appellate ruling was based. [Citations.]’”]; People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 253; People v. Vizcarra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 430 [The doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case bar a party from raising an issue that was raised and rejected in a prior appeal].) “‘In general, whether a prior finding will be given conclusive effect in a later proceeding is governed by the doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.’ [Citation.] ‘The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is firmly embedded in both federal and California common law. It is grounded on the premise that “once an issue has been resolved in a prior proceeding, there is no further factfinding function to be performed.” [Citation.] “Collateral estoppel ... has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 451 (Curiel).) “‘As traditionally understood and applied, issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues earlier decided “only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.”’ [Citation.] ‘The party asserting collateral estoppel 14 bears the burden of establishing these requirements.’ [Citation.]” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 451-452.) “‘“[T]here is no universally applicable definition of privity.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘In the final analysis, the determination of privity depends upon the fairness of binding appellant with the result obtained in earlier proceedings in which it did not participate. [Citation.]’” (Rodgers v. Sargent Controls & Aerospace (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 82, 91.) “‘One of the customary definitions is that “privity” denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same thing or right of property; it implies succession.” (Windham at Carmel Moutain Ranch Assn. v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1162, 1169-1170.) “‘[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel may not apply where two proceedings have differing burdens of proof.’ [Citation.]” (In re Sylvia R. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 559, 563; see In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 191 [The parties and remedies in criminal and juvenile dependency proceedings are not the same].) Contrary to father’s assertion, the juvenile court did not ignore this court’s decision in Lopez. On the day the matter was initially set for a contested hearing, the court observed that there was an issue of whether Lopez dictated the court’s ruling in the dependency matter. Thus, the court expressly set the matter over so that it could further research the issue. At the contested hearing thereafter, the court received Lopez into evidence. The court then discussed at length whether Lopez would affect its decision. Ultimately, the court simply found that because the issue in Lopez was “separate and distinct” from the 15 juvenile proceedings over which it was presiding, Lopez had no effect at all. We agree with the court’s determination. Lopez involved the issue of whether, in a criminal habeas proceeding in this court, a parole condition barring father from any contact with minor should be deemed unconstitutionally overbroad. Here, the issue is whether, in the juvenile dependency proceeding below, despite father’s requirement that he register as a sex offender, he satisfied his burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that providing him reunification services was in minor’s best interest. Thus, the issue in this case was not “raised and rejected” or “earlier decided” in Lopez because, as the juvenile court aptly noted, the issues were “separate and distinct.” The issues are neither identical nor even substantially similar. Moreover, in the instant matter, the worst-case scenario for father is the denial of reunification services; in Lopez, father faced potential incarceration. Thus, the dependency matter does not involve the “subsequent progress” of the habeas proceeding. Furthermore, the parties in the two proceedings are neither the same nor are they in privity with one another. In Lopez, the People sought enforcement of the new parole condition in a criminal case. Here, the department seeks to bypass father’s reunification services in a juvenile dependency proceeding. In Lopez, the People had neither standing nor incentive to litigate whether, if minor became the subject of a subsequent dependency proceeding, father would be denied reunification services. Indeed, it is father’s sex offender registration requirement, not the condition that he not have contact with minor, 16 which made him presumptively ineligible for reunification services below. Similarly, here, the department has no jurisdiction or incentive to enforce any parole conditions. Thus, there is no succession between the People and the department, and it would be unfair to bind the department with the result obtained in Lopez in which it did not participate. Therefore, Lopez did not estop the juvenile court from bypassing father’s reunification services. We also note that contrary to father’s contention that the bypass order “basically reinstated the parole provision just struck down by this Court[,]” the juvenile court permitted father to have monthly, one-hour continued visitation with minor. Thus, unlike the parole provision this court struck in Lopez, which did not allow any contact with minor, the juvenile court’s order permitted continued visitation. Although in Lopez this court directed parole to reinstate father’s condition allowing him to live with minor, Lopez implicitly acknowledged that under certain circumstances, parole could limit father’s contact with minor. Lopez simply held that nothing at that time and under those circumstances supported a complete ban on contact: “Nothing in the record supports [parole’s] imposition of a complete ban on [father’s] contact with [minor] in 2023.” “Special condition no. 9 is not narrowly tailored to . . . [father’s] constitutionally protected right to familial association. [Citation.] It is extremely broad and prohibits [father] from have any contact with [minor]—not only in- person contact but also video calls, voice calls, and even written communication—despite the absence of any evidence of problematic behavior during their years of supervised in- 17 person contact.” (Lopez, supra, E084939.) Thus, here, where circumstances have changed, as shall be discussed post, and the juvenile court’s order permitted continued visitation, the court’s order is not the functional equivalent of the reinstatement of the stricken parole condition. B. Bypass of Father’s Reunification Services Father argues the order bypassing his reunification services was not in minor’s best interest.7 We disagree. “Generally, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification services to a child and the child’s parents when a child is removed from parental custody under the dependency laws. [Citation.] The purpose of providing reunification services is to ‘eliminate the conditions leading to loss of custody and facilitate reunification of parent and child. This furthers the goal of preservation of family, whenever possible.’ [Citation.] It is also the legislative intent, ‘that the dependency process proceed with deliberate speed and without undue delay.’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, the statutory scheme recognizes that there are cases in which the delay attributable to the provision of reunification services would be more detrimental to the minor than discounting the competing goal of family preservation. [Citation.] Specifically, section 361.5, subdivision (b), exempts from reunification services “‘those parents who are unlikely to benefit’” [citation] from such services or for whom reunification efforts are likely to be “fruitless” [citation].’ [Citation.]” (In re I.A. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 19, 23.) 7 Father does not challenge the fact that he had been required to register as a sex offender. 18  The bypass provision of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(16) applies to all parents or guardians required to register as sex offenders in any jurisdiction. (In re S.B. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 612, 621.) “Once it has been determined one of the situations enumerated in section 361.5, subdivision (b), applies, ‘“‘the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental resources. [Citation.]’” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] Thus, if the juvenile court finds a provision of section 361.5, subdivision (b), applies, the court ‘shall not order reunification for [the] parent ... unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.’ [Citation.] ‘The burden is on the parent to ... show that reunification would serve the best interests of the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.A., supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 24.) “We review an order denying reunification services under subdivision (b) of section 361.5 for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Under such circumstances, we do not make credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Rather, we ‘review the entire record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings to determine if there is substantial evidence in the record to support those findings.’ [Citation.] In doing so, we are mindful of the higher standard of proof required in the court below when reunification bypass is ordered.” (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121-1122.) 19  Here, father was required to register as a sex offender. Thus, father was presumptively ineligible for reunification services unless he proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that such services were in minor’s best interest. Father failed that burden. Overwhelming evidence supported the court’s findings that minor was living with father in violation of his parole condition, that parents knew they were violating the terms of father’s parole by allowing him to have contact with her, that they attempted to hide her during the parole search, and that parents had been untruthful about where minor was living. First, as noted in footnote 3 ante, although this court struck father’s parole condition prohibiting him from having contact with minor prior to the date of the search, this court’s opinion was not final until issuance of the remittitur on July 16, 2025. “The opinion is ‘not the writ itself,’ and it has ‘no effect’ until it becomes final as to the Court of Appeal and this court.” (People v. Superior Court (Mitchell), supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 251-252 [The status quo prior to the issuance of an appellate opinion remains in effect until issuance of the remittitur unless otherwise directed].) Thus, minor’s presence in father’s home violated an active term of father’s parole. Second, the relatives acted deceptively with respect to minor’s presence in the home. Officers observed the paternal grandmother attempting to hide minor in the master bedroom during the search. They found minor hiding in a bathtub. The paternal grandparents denied that mother and minor had been living with them. They reported 20 that mother and minor had lived with them only until June 2023, when father’s parole terms changed. Nonetheless, the paternal grandparents indicated they understood father’s criminal background and parole conditions, and they reported that father had successfully challenged the new parole term. Thus, the paternal grandparents, who were parties designated as permitted to supervise father’s contact with minor in order to protect her, demonstrated ignorance or even indifference to enforcement of father’s parole condition. The social worker asked mother why she was at the residence during the parole search; mother refused to answer. Mother refused to explain why mother and minor’s possessions were in the home. Mother reported that she and minor did not live at the residence. Instead, she said that she and minor lived in another home with the maternal grandmother. Nevertheless, shortly thereafter, when the social worker attempted to conduct a visit of mother and minor’s ostensible home with the maternal grandmother, mother reported she was living with the paternal grandparents. The social worker asked if she and minor had been living with the paternal grandparents the entire time; mother refused to answer. Father said he was unaware that minor was in the home when he came home from work. Thus, the court could rationally conclude that the relatives’ failure to be truthful with the department and comply with father’s parole condition could prove detrimental to minor and that reunification services would be “fruitless” and “an unwise use of governmental resources.” 21  Indeed, minor twice reported that she lived with father, mother, and her paternal grandparents. She said she had her own room in the home. Minor denied ever living in another home or without her father. The residence contained toys, a play tent, and a bed for minor. Minor had told counsel that she had “been left alone with the father, that sometimes they lay in his bed and watch movies together.” The maternal aunt and uncle reported the mother and minor moved out of the home in the summer of 2022 or 2023, and moved in with the maternal grandmother. However, they moved back into the paternal grandparents’ home in the winter of 2024. All this despite mother’s statement that she was aware of father’s parole condition providing that father could not be in contact with minor, which she later contradicted when she stated they had a court order allowing the family to live together. At the contested hearing, mother’s counsel conceded there was a violation of father’s parole conditions. Third, by all appearances, this was not a single instance of a violation of father’s probation condition; rather, it appears to have been an extended, years-long continued violation of the no contact parole term. Thus, the court could reasonably conclude that mother, father, and the paternal relatives not only violated the no contact condition, but that they may also have violated the condition that any contact be supervised. Fourth, although there was some evidence of a bond between minor and father, none of the relatives testified as to the strength of that bond. Minor’s counsel noted minor “does not seem to be deeply affected by not visiting with her father at this time.” 22 Minor’s counsel indicated that minor had not expressed any concerns about missing father; she only mentioned missing the paternal grandfather. Therefore, father failed to prove that reunification services were in minor’s best interest. III. DISPOSITION The juvenile’s court’s order bypassing father’s reunification services is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS McKINSTER _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________ Acting P. J. We concur: CODRINGTON ______________________________________________________________________________________