Anderson v. Edwards Lifesciences CA4/3
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketG065659
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Filed 11/17/26 Anderson v. Edwards Lifesciences CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
KARI ANDERSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G065659
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01312130)
EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES LLC,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Gassia Apkarian, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Brock & Gonzales, D. Aaron Brock and Andrew S. Pletcher for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Todd E. Lundell, Frances
M.K. Hernandez, Kristi L. Thomas and Jason M. Guyser for Defendant and
Respondent.
Plaintiff Kari Anderson filed this action against her former
employer, defendant Edwards Lifesciences LLC (Edwards), alleging claims
for pregnancy discrimination and retaliation, as well as other violations of
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.;
FEHA), related laws, and public policy. Edwards moved for summary
judgment, asserting it eliminated Anderson’s position for legitimate
budgetary reasons. Prior to filing her response, Anderson moved to compel
further response to a request for production (RFP) seeking all documents
related to the budget. She also filed an ex parte application to advance
hearing of the motion or continue summary judgment proceedings pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h) (437c(h)).1 The trial
court denied Anderson’s ex parte application and subsequently granted
summary judgment. It denied Anderson’s oral request for leave to amend her
complaint and her written motion for new trial.
Anderson contends the trial court erred in denying her section
437c(h) motion, denying leave to amend, granting summary judgment, and
denying her motion for new trial. We conclude the court erred by denying the
section 437c(h) motion. We accordingly reverse and remand with instructions
to vacate the order granting Edwards’ motion for summary judgment and
enter a new order denying the motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
COMPLAINT
Anderson filed her complaint against Edwards in March 2023.
Anderson alleged she was wrongfully terminated after notifying Edwards of
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
2
her high-risk pregnancy and seeking related accommodations in November
2022.
Anderson incorporated her factual allegations into eight causes of
action: (1) discrimination in violation of the FEHA, on the basis of “disability
and/or sex/gender and/or . . . pregnancy”; (2) failure to accommodate in
violation of the FEHA; (3) failure to engage in the interactive process in
violation of the FEHA; (4) retaliation in violation of the FEHA; (5) failure to
prevent discrimination and retaliation in violation of the FEHA;
(6) interference in violation of the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (Gov.
Code, § 12945; PDLL) and/or the California Family Rights Act (Gov. Code,
§ 12945.2; CFRA); (7) retaliation in violation of the PDLL and/or the CFRA;
and (8) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Anderson
demanded a jury trial and sought compensatory and punitive damages and
attorney fees.
Edwards answered the complaint in April 2023. It generally
denied the allegations and asserted 33 affirmative defenses, including
“legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions toward Plaintiff.”
II.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In November 2024, Edwards moved for summary judgment, or in
the alternative summary adjudication of each cause of action and the request
for punitive damages. The motion was set for hearing on April 29, 2025.
In its separate statement, Edwards asserted the following facts
were undisputed. Edwards hired Anderson as an at-will executive assistant
in June 2021. Anderson worked in the strategy group and project
management office, assisting senior vice president David Adelman and
another individual, J.F. Beyrath. Anderson’s job duties included calendaring
3
and planning meetings, expense reporting, scheduling travel, facilitating
team building efforts, attending trainings and conferences, assisting with
audiovisual, procuring office supplies, and scheduling interviews and catering
orders. Adelman and Beyrath were capable of doing their own calendaring,
travel planning, and expense reporting.
Adelman was responsible for determining the optimal
composition of his team, within the confines of his operating budget. He was
also primarily responsible for hiring and firing employees who directly report
to him.
In late July or early August 2022, while putting together the
2023 budget, Adelman considered eliminating Anderson’s position in favor of
adding another project manager. Adelman’s team needed another project
manager; the salaries of the two positions were comparable; and Adelman’s
budget did not allow for both. Adelman considered eliminating other
positions, but they did not make sense for his primary goal of allocating the
right people to best support the business unit.
Adelman consulted various stakeholders and staff members
Anderson supported to understand the implications of eliminating her
executive assistant position. Adelman also consulted with Edwards’ human
resources (HR). Adelman concluded he and Beyrath could schedule their own
travel and conduct their own expense reporting, and other executive
assistants could take on Anderson’s other tasks.
Adelman decided to eliminate Anderson’s position by September
26, 2022. HR asked him to provide a one-to-two-page slide explaining the
decision. After speaking to his supervisor on November 4, 2022, Adelman
provided the requested slide on November 15, 2022. Adelman provided HR
with updated information on November 16, 2022, and on November 18, 2022,
4
he and HR discussed a target date of January 2023 for the elimination of
Anderson’s position.
Anderson learned she was pregnant on November 19, 2022. She
informed coworkers and Adelman shortly thereafter.
On November 29, 2022, Anderson notified Edwards she would
need accommodations during her pregnancy. The following day, she
submitted a doctor’s note recommending she limit her walking to less than
one-quarter mile at a time or work remotely through January 13, 2023.
Edwards granted the requested accommodation on December 8, 2022,
allowing Anderson to work remotely. Anderson did not need further
accommodation for her pregnancy or other disability and admitted the
accommodation was adequate.
On December 14, 2022, Edwards notified Anderson her position
was being eliminated effective January 16, 2023. Edwards arranged for
Anderson to interview for an open executive assistant position. Anderson
interviewed for the position but did not get the job.
In January 2023, Anderson requested and Edwards granted a
medical leave of absence from January 3 to March 3, 2023. Anderson’s last
day at Edwards was January 16, 2023. Edwards had not hired an executive
assistant to replace Anderson and had no plans to do so.
III.
MOTION TO COMPEL AND EX PARTE APPLICATION
On April 1, 2025, Anderson filed a motion to compel further
response to RFP No. 58, which requested “‘ALL DOCUMENTS related to
David Adelman’s 2023 budget, including, but not limited to, spreadsheets,
reports, itemized lists, and analytics.’” Anderson asserted the request was
relevant to her summary judgment opposition, because Edwards claimed it
5
began considering eliminating her position in summer 2022 but Adelman
testified during his deposition that a budget spreadsheet dated November 7,
2022, did not reflect the elimination. The motion was scheduled for hearing
September 23, 2025, approximately five months after the scheduled summary
judgment hearing date. In a supporting declaration accompanied by exhibits,
Anderson’s counsel set forth the efforts she had undertaken to obtain the
discovery during January, February, and March 2025.
Anderson concurrently filed an ex parte application for an order
shortening time to hear the motion to compel or an order granting additional
time to oppose the summary judgment motion under section 437c(h).
Anderson represented she first learned of the November 7, 2022, spreadsheet
during Adelman’s deposition, and served RFP No. 58 on Edwards on January
16, 2025. She further asserted Edwards responded on February 24, 2025, by
objecting to RFP No. 58 and did not produce any documents despite her
subsequent meet and confer efforts. Anderson stated good cause for the ex
parte application existed, as she could not reserve an earlier hearing date
and planned to use “the potential supporting documents [she] seeks to
compel” to oppose Edwards’ summary judgment motion. In an accompanying
declaration, Anderson’s counsel asserted the anticipated discoverable
materials mentioned during Adelman’s deposition could establish a material
question of fact regarding the timing of Edwards’ decision to eliminate
Anderson’s position.
Edwards opposed the ex parte application. It asserted there were
no exigent circumstances, as its prior discovery responses, including
document productions, and summary judgment filings apprised Anderson of
Edwards’ budget rationale months earlier and it recently responded to RFP
6
No. 58. Edwards further argued the request was moot in light of its recent
production.
The trial court ruled on the ex parte application without oral
argument. It denied the application without explanation in an April 2, 2025,
minute order.
IV.
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Anderson filed her opposition to Edwards’ motion for summary
judgment on April 9, 2025. Anderson argued there were triable issues of
material fact on her claims for sex and disability discrimination because
Edwards was aware she underwent in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatments
prior to becoming pregnant, and infertility is a disability and medical
condition related to pregnancy. She further contended she could show
Edwards’ budgetary explanation for eliminating her position was pretextual,
citing evidence of temporal proximity and satisfactory job performance.
Anderson also argued there were triable issues of material fact as
to when Edwards decided to eliminate her position. She asserted Edwards’
evidence did not show the decision was made prior to her request for
accommodations due to her IVF procedures, as the documents predating
November 2022 showed only that elimination of an unspecified position
might be needed and the November 7, 2022, budget did not reflect
elimination of her role. In a footnote, Anderson renewed her request for
additional time under section 437c(h), asserting Edwards’ response to RFP
No. 58 was “tantamount to no response at all” was because it was not
verified. She provided the court with a copy of the response, a three-page
spreadsheet that Edwards claimed “also constitutes a report, itemized list, or
document containing analytical information.”
7
Anderson supported her opposition with a 1,956-page separate
statement. In that document, Anderson responded to virtually all of Edwards’
undisputed facts with a lengthy factual narrative stating she informed
Edwards of various IVF-related procedures throughout 2022 and Edwards
began to consider eliminating her position only after she notified it of an
upcoming IVF transfer procedure in November 2022.
Anderson reasserted the same facts individually in her statement
of additional undisputed material facts. She also asserted she had a strong
verbal and written performance record, and “was given a meets or exceeds
expectations in most all of her categories” in her 2021 year-end review.
V.
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On April 18, 2025, Edwards filed a reply in support of its motion
for summary judgment. Edwards argued Anderson improperly opposed
summary judgment by relying on an unpleaded theory of liability,
discrimination based on IVF treatment rather than pregnancy. It further
argued undergoing IVF treatment was not protected activity under the
FEHA, CFRA, or PDLL, and even if it was, Anderson failed to demonstrate a
causal link between that activity and her termination. Edwards also
contended Anderson failed to demonstrate its asserted reason for eliminating
her position was pretextual. In a footnote, it asserted Anderson’s renewed
section 437c(h) request was “wholly irrelevant” because Adelman “already
admitted during his deposition that his budget did not reflect an elimination
of Anderson’s role until after November 7, 2022.” Edwards did not respond to
Anderson’s claim its response to RFP No. 58 was unverified.
8
VI.
HEARING AND RULING
The trial court issued a tentative ruling granting the motion for
summary judgment in advance of the April 29, 2025, hearing. At the hearing,
Anderson disputed the court’s tentative conclusion that she failed to plead
facts about her IVF treatments in the complaint and could not rely upon that
theory to defeat summary judgment. She also requested leave to amend the
complaint pursuant to section 473, subdivision (a)(1) to plead additional facts
concerning her IVF treatments. The court orally denied the motion for leave
to amend and adopted its tentative ruling as its final ruling.
In that ruling, the trial court found Edwards met its initial
burden on the first and fourth causes of action for violations of FEHA in two
separate ways. First, Edwards demonstrated Anderson could not make a
prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation because it “had already
begun the process of terminating Plaintiff’s position before Plaintiff informed
Defendant that she was pregnant.” Second, Edwards “demonstrated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff irrespective of
the timing of the termination”: budget constraints. The court found Anderson
failed to show a triable issue of material fact under either theory, because she
relied on her unpleaded IVF claims and her satisfactory job performance
“does not establish pretext where the stated reason for termination was
budgetary constraints.” The court found Anderson’s fifth cause of action for
failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation and eighth cause of action
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy failed as derivative of
the first and fourth causes of action.
The trial court found no triable issues of material fact on
Anderson’s second and third causes of action, for failure to accommodate and
9
engage in the interactive process, because there was no dispute Edwards
granted every accommodation Anderson requested. It also found this lack of
dispute fatal to Anderson’s CFRA and PDLL claims, the sixth cause of action
for interference, and the seventh cause of action for retaliation. The court
further found: pregnancy was not a serious condition under the CFRA;
Anderson’s theory she was denied future leave was not supported by
authority; and both claims failed because Edwards presented undisputed
evidence of a legitimate reason for eliminating Anderson’s position. The court
took Anderson’s motion to compel off calendar.
VII.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Anderson subsequently filed a motion for new trial pursuant to
section 657. She argued her complaint adequately apprised Edwards of her
IVF treatments theory by clarifying during discovery that her legal claims
encompassed her IVF treatments. Anderson asserted leave to amend should
have been granted and would not prejudice Edwards due to its awareness of
her claims. Anderson also argued the court’s denial of her ex parte
application for additional time prevented her from securing essential
discovery to oppose summary judgment.
Two days after Anderson filed the motion, the trial court issued a
minute order denying the motion with prejudice. It explained, “the motion is
improper; no trial was held.”
The court entered judgment for Edwards. Anderson timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
Anderson contends the trial court made a series of errors
culminating in the grant of summary judgment and denial of her motion for
10
new trial. We need only address the first, her contention the court erred by
denying her request for additional time for discovery under section 437c(h).2
Section 437c(h) provides, “If it appears from the affidavits
submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but
cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion,
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had,
or make any other order as may be just. The application to continue the
motion to obtain necessary discovery may also be made by ex parte motion at
any time on or before the date the opposition response to the motion is due.”
“The decision to grant or deny a continuance request under
section 437c, subdivision (h), is vested in the trial court’s discretion [citation],
and the court’s ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Braganza, supra,
67 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.) As with all exercises of discretion, the court “must
be guided by applicable legal principles, . . . which are derived from the
statute under which discretion is conferred.” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v.
Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 96, 106.) The applicable statute here
uses the mandatory language “shall” (§ 437c(h)) and governs summary
judgment, a “high stakes” procedure. (Braganza, at p. 152.) Accordingly,
“[c]ontinuance requests under section 437c, subdivision (h) are to be liberally
granted” and indeed are “‘virtually mandated “‘upon a good faith showing by
2 Although it is not necessary to the resolution of this appeal, we
also note it has long been established that a motion for new trial “is
appropriate following an order granting summary judgment.” (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 858.) Such a motion may seek
reversal of the summary judgment on any ground set forth in the statute
governing new trial motions, section 657. (Braganza v. Albertson’s LLC
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 144, 159 (Braganza).)
11
affidavit that a continuance is needed to obtain facts essential to justify
opposition to the motion.’”’” (Ibid., quoting Bahl v. Bank of America (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 389, 395; see also Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 634
[“the interests at stake are too high to sanction the denial of a continuance
without good reason”].) An affidavit making the tripartite showing that (1)
the facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion, (2) there is
reason to believe such facts exist, and (3) there is an explanation for why
additional time is necessary to discover the facts is generally sufficient to
support the grant of a continuance under section 437c(h). (Braganza, at
p. 152; see also § 437c(h).)
Here, Anderson’s counsel submitted declarations supporting the
motion to compel and ex parte application. These declarations “followed the
statutory mandate to the letter.” (Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West
Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506, 520.) They set forth the
anticipated discoverable facts, reason to believe such facts exist, and an
explanation for why additional time was necessary to obtain them. Good
reason therefore was necessary to support denial of the continuance. The
record does not establish the existence of good reason, and Edwards’
arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.
Edwards first contends the requested budget documents were not
necessary to oppose the summary judgment motion because “Edwards had
already conceded that Adelman’s budget at the time . . . did not reflect that
elimination” via Adelman’s deposition testimony. This is a narrow
characterization of the testimony and discovery request. Adelman testified
that a single spreadsheet did not reflect the elimination of Anderson’s role as
of November 7, 2022. This testimony sheds no light on additional budget
documents or when the role elimination was finalized. Indeed, Adelman
12
testified the omission from the November 7, 2022, spreadsheet was
intentional because he “didn’t want the information about eliminating this
position to be—kind of to get out, if you will, before it was final.” That
testimony, along with additional testimony regarding a “net swap between
the head-count expense and other expense,” implies there were other
documents, whether concurrently existing or later prepared, addressing or
finalizing the decision. Any concession regarding the November 7, 2022,
spreadsheet did not moot Anderson’s request for those other documents,
which could well have established a triable issue of material fact as to the
precise date the decision was made.
Edwards next contends no continuance was necessary because it
already produced the requested documents—a single, three-page spreadsheet
it asserted “also constitutes a report, itemized list, or document containing
analytical information.” But as Anderson apprised the trial court in her
renewed request for continuance, and Edwards acknowledged during oral
argument, the production was not verified as required by section 2031.250. It
is well-established “that an unverified response is tantamount to no response
at all.” (Melendrez v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1348.)
Edwards’ eleventh-hour document production thus did not constitute a
response to Anderson’s discovery request or obviate her need for a
continuance.
Finally, Edwards contends the trial court “properly denied
Anderson’s ex parte requested continuance due to Anderson’s lack of
diligence in seeking the discovery.” It asserts she “waited over eight weeks
after Edwards filed its summary judgment motion to even request the
discovery at issue,” then “delayed months more before moving to compel.” It
suggests the timing of these events, and the filing of the ex parte application
13
one week before the opposition deadline make “clear that Anderson’s ex parte
application was an unsubstantiated attempt to delay Edwards’ successful
MSJ.” Anderson responds the delay was due to Edwards’ “own meet-and-
confer delay” and points to numerous emails from Edwards promising to
review, look into, and work on the request, and “‘circle back’” with Anderson.
There is a split of authority regarding the extent to which
diligence is relevant to a section 437c(h) continuance request. (See Braganza,
supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 156–157.) This court previously has held “the
court’s discretion to deny a continuance is strictly limited” even when a party
“has not been diligent in searching for the facts through discovery.” (Bahl v.
Bank of America, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 398; see also Frazee v. Seely,
supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 635.) Even if we were to depart from that holding
and join other courts in holding that a party seeking continuance under
section 437c(h) “must show why the discovery necessary to oppose the motion
for summary judgment or summary adjudication could not have been
completed sooner” (Braganza, at p. 156), Anderson made the requisite
showing here. Her counsel’s declaration set forth a timeline of events relevant
to RFP No. 58, and it is undisputed Edwards failed to provide a substantive
response for months—and then provided an unverified response only after
Anderson filed her motion to compel and ex parte application.
On this record, we conclude the continuance was virtually
mandated, and the trial court exceeded the bounds of its discretion by
denying the request. We therefore reverse the judgment.
14
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial
court with the instructions to vacate the order granting summary judgment
and enter a new order denying Edwards’ motion for summary judgment.
Anderson shall recover her costs incurred on appeal.
SERVINO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
15