Full Opinion

Filed 11/17/26 Anderson v. Edwards Lifesciences CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE KARI ANDERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, G065659 v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023- 01312130) EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES LLC, OPINION Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gassia Apkarian, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions. Brock & Gonzales, D. Aaron Brock and Andrew S. Pletcher for Plaintiff and Appellant. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Todd E. Lundell, Frances M.K. Hernandez, Kristi L. Thomas and Jason M. Guyser for Defendant and Respondent. Plaintiff Kari Anderson filed this action against her former employer, defendant Edwards Lifesciences LLC (Edwards), alleging claims for pregnancy discrimination and retaliation, as well as other violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.; FEHA), related laws, and public policy. Edwards moved for summary judgment, asserting it eliminated Anderson’s position for legitimate budgetary reasons. Prior to filing her response, Anderson moved to compel further response to a request for production (RFP) seeking all documents related to the budget. She also filed an ex parte application to advance hearing of the motion or continue summary judgment proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h) (437c(h)).1 The trial court denied Anderson’s ex parte application and subsequently granted summary judgment. It denied Anderson’s oral request for leave to amend her complaint and her written motion for new trial. Anderson contends the trial court erred in denying her section 437c(h) motion, denying leave to amend, granting summary judgment, and denying her motion for new trial. We conclude the court erred by denying the section 437c(h) motion. We accordingly reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the order granting Edwards’ motion for summary judgment and enter a new order denying the motion. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. COMPLAINT Anderson filed her complaint against Edwards in March 2023. Anderson alleged she was wrongfully terminated after notifying Edwards of 1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated. 2 her high-risk pregnancy and seeking related accommodations in November 2022. Anderson incorporated her factual allegations into eight causes of action: (1) discrimination in violation of the FEHA, on the basis of “disability and/or sex/gender and/or . . . pregnancy”; (2) failure to accommodate in violation of the FEHA; (3) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of the FEHA; (4) retaliation in violation of the FEHA; (5) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation in violation of the FEHA; (6) interference in violation of the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (Gov. Code, § 12945; PDLL) and/or the California Family Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 12945.2; CFRA); (7) retaliation in violation of the PDLL and/or the CFRA; and (8) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Anderson demanded a jury trial and sought compensatory and punitive damages and attorney fees. Edwards answered the complaint in April 2023. It generally denied the allegations and asserted 33 affirmative defenses, including “legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions toward Plaintiff.” II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT In November 2024, Edwards moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication of each cause of action and the request for punitive damages. The motion was set for hearing on April 29, 2025. In its separate statement, Edwards asserted the following facts were undisputed. Edwards hired Anderson as an at-will executive assistant in June 2021. Anderson worked in the strategy group and project management office, assisting senior vice president David Adelman and another individual, J.F. Beyrath. Anderson’s job duties included calendaring 3 and planning meetings, expense reporting, scheduling travel, facilitating team building efforts, attending trainings and conferences, assisting with audiovisual, procuring office supplies, and scheduling interviews and catering orders. Adelman and Beyrath were capable of doing their own calendaring, travel planning, and expense reporting. Adelman was responsible for determining the optimal composition of his team, within the confines of his operating budget. He was also primarily responsible for hiring and firing employees who directly report to him. In late July or early August 2022, while putting together the 2023 budget, Adelman considered eliminating Anderson’s position in favor of adding another project manager. Adelman’s team needed another project manager; the salaries of the two positions were comparable; and Adelman’s budget did not allow for both. Adelman considered eliminating other positions, but they did not make sense for his primary goal of allocating the right people to best support the business unit. Adelman consulted various stakeholders and staff members Anderson supported to understand the implications of eliminating her executive assistant position. Adelman also consulted with Edwards’ human resources (HR). Adelman concluded he and Beyrath could schedule their own travel and conduct their own expense reporting, and other executive assistants could take on Anderson’s other tasks. Adelman decided to eliminate Anderson’s position by September 26, 2022. HR asked him to provide a one-to-two-page slide explaining the decision. After speaking to his supervisor on November 4, 2022, Adelman provided the requested slide on November 15, 2022. Adelman provided HR with updated information on November 16, 2022, and on November 18, 2022, 4 he and HR discussed a target date of January 2023 for the elimination of Anderson’s position. Anderson learned she was pregnant on November 19, 2022. She informed coworkers and Adelman shortly thereafter. On November 29, 2022, Anderson notified Edwards she would need accommodations during her pregnancy. The following day, she submitted a doctor’s note recommending she limit her walking to less than one-quarter mile at a time or work remotely through January 13, 2023. Edwards granted the requested accommodation on December 8, 2022, allowing Anderson to work remotely. Anderson did not need further accommodation for her pregnancy or other disability and admitted the accommodation was adequate. On December 14, 2022, Edwards notified Anderson her position was being eliminated effective January 16, 2023. Edwards arranged for Anderson to interview for an open executive assistant position. Anderson interviewed for the position but did not get the job. In January 2023, Anderson requested and Edwards granted a medical leave of absence from January 3 to March 3, 2023. Anderson’s last day at Edwards was January 16, 2023. Edwards had not hired an executive assistant to replace Anderson and had no plans to do so. III. MOTION TO COMPEL AND EX PARTE APPLICATION On April 1, 2025, Anderson filed a motion to compel further response to RFP No. 58, which requested “‘ALL DOCUMENTS related to David Adelman’s 2023 budget, including, but not limited to, spreadsheets, reports, itemized lists, and analytics.’” Anderson asserted the request was relevant to her summary judgment opposition, because Edwards claimed it 5 began considering eliminating her position in summer 2022 but Adelman testified during his deposition that a budget spreadsheet dated November 7, 2022, did not reflect the elimination. The motion was scheduled for hearing September 23, 2025, approximately five months after the scheduled summary judgment hearing date. In a supporting declaration accompanied by exhibits, Anderson’s counsel set forth the efforts she had undertaken to obtain the discovery during January, February, and March 2025. Anderson concurrently filed an ex parte application for an order shortening time to hear the motion to compel or an order granting additional time to oppose the summary judgment motion under section 437c(h). Anderson represented she first learned of the November 7, 2022, spreadsheet during Adelman’s deposition, and served RFP No. 58 on Edwards on January 16, 2025. She further asserted Edwards responded on February 24, 2025, by objecting to RFP No. 58 and did not produce any documents despite her subsequent meet and confer efforts. Anderson stated good cause for the ex parte application existed, as she could not reserve an earlier hearing date and planned to use “the potential supporting documents [she] seeks to compel” to oppose Edwards’ summary judgment motion. In an accompanying declaration, Anderson’s counsel asserted the anticipated discoverable materials mentioned during Adelman’s deposition could establish a material question of fact regarding the timing of Edwards’ decision to eliminate Anderson’s position. Edwards opposed the ex parte application. It asserted there were no exigent circumstances, as its prior discovery responses, including document productions, and summary judgment filings apprised Anderson of Edwards’ budget rationale months earlier and it recently responded to RFP 6 No. 58. Edwards further argued the request was moot in light of its recent production. The trial court ruled on the ex parte application without oral argument. It denied the application without explanation in an April 2, 2025, minute order. IV. OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Anderson filed her opposition to Edwards’ motion for summary judgment on April 9, 2025. Anderson argued there were triable issues of material fact on her claims for sex and disability discrimination because Edwards was aware she underwent in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatments prior to becoming pregnant, and infertility is a disability and medical condition related to pregnancy. She further contended she could show Edwards’ budgetary explanation for eliminating her position was pretextual, citing evidence of temporal proximity and satisfactory job performance. Anderson also argued there were triable issues of material fact as to when Edwards decided to eliminate her position. She asserted Edwards’ evidence did not show the decision was made prior to her request for accommodations due to her IVF procedures, as the documents predating November 2022 showed only that elimination of an unspecified position might be needed and the November 7, 2022, budget did not reflect elimination of her role. In a footnote, Anderson renewed her request for additional time under section 437c(h), asserting Edwards’ response to RFP No. 58 was “tantamount to no response at all” was because it was not verified. She provided the court with a copy of the response, a three-page spreadsheet that Edwards claimed “also constitutes a report, itemized list, or document containing analytical information.” 7 Anderson supported her opposition with a 1,956-page separate statement. In that document, Anderson responded to virtually all of Edwards’ undisputed facts with a lengthy factual narrative stating she informed Edwards of various IVF-related procedures throughout 2022 and Edwards began to consider eliminating her position only after she notified it of an upcoming IVF transfer procedure in November 2022. Anderson reasserted the same facts individually in her statement of additional undisputed material facts. She also asserted she had a strong verbal and written performance record, and “was given a meets or exceeds expectations in most all of her categories” in her 2021 year-end review. V. REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT On April 18, 2025, Edwards filed a reply in support of its motion for summary judgment. Edwards argued Anderson improperly opposed summary judgment by relying on an unpleaded theory of liability, discrimination based on IVF treatment rather than pregnancy. It further argued undergoing IVF treatment was not protected activity under the FEHA, CFRA, or PDLL, and even if it was, Anderson failed to demonstrate a causal link between that activity and her termination. Edwards also contended Anderson failed to demonstrate its asserted reason for eliminating her position was pretextual. In a footnote, it asserted Anderson’s renewed section 437c(h) request was “wholly irrelevant” because Adelman “already admitted during his deposition that his budget did not reflect an elimination of Anderson’s role until after November 7, 2022.” Edwards did not respond to Anderson’s claim its response to RFP No. 58 was unverified. 8 VI. HEARING AND RULING The trial court issued a tentative ruling granting the motion for summary judgment in advance of the April 29, 2025, hearing. At the hearing, Anderson disputed the court’s tentative conclusion that she failed to plead facts about her IVF treatments in the complaint and could not rely upon that theory to defeat summary judgment. She also requested leave to amend the complaint pursuant to section 473, subdivision (a)(1) to plead additional facts concerning her IVF treatments. The court orally denied the motion for leave to amend and adopted its tentative ruling as its final ruling. In that ruling, the trial court found Edwards met its initial burden on the first and fourth causes of action for violations of FEHA in two separate ways. First, Edwards demonstrated Anderson could not make a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation because it “had already begun the process of terminating Plaintiff’s position before Plaintiff informed Defendant that she was pregnant.” Second, Edwards “demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff irrespective of the timing of the termination”: budget constraints. The court found Anderson failed to show a triable issue of material fact under either theory, because she relied on her unpleaded IVF claims and her satisfactory job performance “does not establish pretext where the stated reason for termination was budgetary constraints.” The court found Anderson’s fifth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation and eighth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy failed as derivative of the first and fourth causes of action. The trial court found no triable issues of material fact on Anderson’s second and third causes of action, for failure to accommodate and 9 engage in the interactive process, because there was no dispute Edwards granted every accommodation Anderson requested. It also found this lack of dispute fatal to Anderson’s CFRA and PDLL claims, the sixth cause of action for interference, and the seventh cause of action for retaliation. The court further found: pregnancy was not a serious condition under the CFRA; Anderson’s theory she was denied future leave was not supported by authority; and both claims failed because Edwards presented undisputed evidence of a legitimate reason for eliminating Anderson’s position. The court took Anderson’s motion to compel off calendar. VII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Anderson subsequently filed a motion for new trial pursuant to section 657. She argued her complaint adequately apprised Edwards of her IVF treatments theory by clarifying during discovery that her legal claims encompassed her IVF treatments. Anderson asserted leave to amend should have been granted and would not prejudice Edwards due to its awareness of her claims. Anderson also argued the court’s denial of her ex parte application for additional time prevented her from securing essential discovery to oppose summary judgment. Two days after Anderson filed the motion, the trial court issued a minute order denying the motion with prejudice. It explained, “the motion is improper; no trial was held.” The court entered judgment for Edwards. Anderson timely appealed. DISCUSSION Anderson contends the trial court made a series of errors culminating in the grant of summary judgment and denial of her motion for 10 new trial. We need only address the first, her contention the court erred by denying her request for additional time for discovery under section 437c(h).2 Section 437c(h) provides, “If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just. The application to continue the motion to obtain necessary discovery may also be made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date the opposition response to the motion is due.” “The decision to grant or deny a continuance request under section 437c, subdivision (h), is vested in the trial court’s discretion [citation], and the court’s ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Braganza, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.) As with all exercises of discretion, the court “must be guided by applicable legal principles, . . . which are derived from the statute under which discretion is conferred.” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 96, 106.) The applicable statute here uses the mandatory language “shall” (§ 437c(h)) and governs summary judgment, a “high stakes” procedure. (Braganza, at p. 152.) Accordingly, “[c]ontinuance requests under section 437c, subdivision (h) are to be liberally granted” and indeed are “‘virtually mandated “‘upon a good faith showing by 2 Although it is not necessary to the resolution of this appeal, we also note it has long been established that a motion for new trial “is appropriate following an order granting summary judgment.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 858.) Such a motion may seek reversal of the summary judgment on any ground set forth in the statute governing new trial motions, section 657. (Braganza v. Albertson’s LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 144, 159 (Braganza).) 11 affidavit that a continuance is needed to obtain facts essential to justify opposition to the motion.’”’” (Ibid., quoting Bahl v. Bank of America (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 389, 395; see also Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 634 [“the interests at stake are too high to sanction the denial of a continuance without good reason”].) An affidavit making the tripartite showing that (1) the facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion, (2) there is reason to believe such facts exist, and (3) there is an explanation for why additional time is necessary to discover the facts is generally sufficient to support the grant of a continuance under section 437c(h). (Braganza, at p. 152; see also § 437c(h).) Here, Anderson’s counsel submitted declarations supporting the motion to compel and ex parte application. These declarations “followed the statutory mandate to the letter.” (Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506, 520.) They set forth the anticipated discoverable facts, reason to believe such facts exist, and an explanation for why additional time was necessary to obtain them. Good reason therefore was necessary to support denial of the continuance. The record does not establish the existence of good reason, and Edwards’ arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. Edwards first contends the requested budget documents were not necessary to oppose the summary judgment motion because “Edwards had already conceded that Adelman’s budget at the time . . . did not reflect that elimination” via Adelman’s deposition testimony. This is a narrow characterization of the testimony and discovery request. Adelman testified that a single spreadsheet did not reflect the elimination of Anderson’s role as of November 7, 2022. This testimony sheds no light on additional budget documents or when the role elimination was finalized. Indeed, Adelman 12 testified the omission from the November 7, 2022, spreadsheet was intentional because he “didn’t want the information about eliminating this position to be—kind of to get out, if you will, before it was final.” That testimony, along with additional testimony regarding a “net swap between the head-count expense and other expense,” implies there were other documents, whether concurrently existing or later prepared, addressing or finalizing the decision. Any concession regarding the November 7, 2022, spreadsheet did not moot Anderson’s request for those other documents, which could well have established a triable issue of material fact as to the precise date the decision was made. Edwards next contends no continuance was necessary because it already produced the requested documents—a single, three-page spreadsheet it asserted “also constitutes a report, itemized list, or document containing analytical information.” But as Anderson apprised the trial court in her renewed request for continuance, and Edwards acknowledged during oral argument, the production was not verified as required by section 2031.250. It is well-established “that an unverified response is tantamount to no response at all.” (Melendrez v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1348.) Edwards’ eleventh-hour document production thus did not constitute a response to Anderson’s discovery request or obviate her need for a continuance. Finally, Edwards contends the trial court “properly denied Anderson’s ex parte requested continuance due to Anderson’s lack of diligence in seeking the discovery.” It asserts she “waited over eight weeks after Edwards filed its summary judgment motion to even request the discovery at issue,” then “delayed months more before moving to compel.” It suggests the timing of these events, and the filing of the ex parte application 13 one week before the opposition deadline make “clear that Anderson’s ex parte application was an unsubstantiated attempt to delay Edwards’ successful MSJ.” Anderson responds the delay was due to Edwards’ “own meet-and- confer delay” and points to numerous emails from Edwards promising to review, look into, and work on the request, and “‘circle back’” with Anderson. There is a split of authority regarding the extent to which diligence is relevant to a section 437c(h) continuance request. (See Braganza, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 156–157.) This court previously has held “the court’s discretion to deny a continuance is strictly limited” even when a party “has not been diligent in searching for the facts through discovery.” (Bahl v. Bank of America, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 398; see also Frazee v. Seely, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 635.) Even if we were to depart from that holding and join other courts in holding that a party seeking continuance under section 437c(h) “must show why the discovery necessary to oppose the motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication could not have been completed sooner” (Braganza, at p. 156), Anderson made the requisite showing here. Her counsel’s declaration set forth a timeline of events relevant to RFP No. 58, and it is undisputed Edwards failed to provide a substantive response for months—and then provided an unverified response only after Anderson filed her motion to compel and ex parte application. On this record, we conclude the continuance was virtually mandated, and the trial court exceeded the bounds of its discretion by denying the request. We therefore reverse the judgment. 14 DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with the instructions to vacate the order granting summary judgment and enter a new order denying Edwards’ motion for summary judgment. Anderson shall recover her costs incurred on appeal. SERVINO, J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J. GOODING, J. 15