S.N. v. Fresno Unified School Dist.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketF090794
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
S.N.,
F090794
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 22CECG02655)
v.
FRESNO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kristi C.
Kapetan, Judge.
Herman Law, Britt Lacey Karp and Blake Jarrod Woodhall for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Berger Milton, Bruce J. Berger and Joshua D. Milton for Defendant and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
This appeal arises from a summary judgment granted in favor of respondent, Fresno
Unified School District (District). Appellant S.N. filed this action under Code of Civil
Procedure former section 340.1, which revived otherwise time-barred claims for damages
arising from childhood sexual assault. (Code Civ. Proc., former § 340.1, subd. (q).) She
alleges that while she was a student at Vinland Elementary School she was sexually abused
by Maximo Parayno III, a teacher employed by District.
The first amended complaint alleged causes of action for (1) negligence against
District; (2) negligence against Does 2 through 251; (3) negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision against District; and (4) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against
Does 2 through 25.
District moved for summary judgment based on statutory immunity under
Education Code section 448082, asserting that S.N.’s 2024 deposition testimony showed
that every incident of sexual abuse alleged occurred off school property and outside of
school hours. In her opposition, S.N. attached 2003 police reports to show that she had
reported that the first instance of abuse occurred on school property, after school. District
objected to the admissibility of the evidence on grounds of lack of authentication and
hearsay.
S.N. sought to cure these foundational defects by filing an authenticated copy of the
2003 police report and a declaration stating that, following her 2024 deposition, she had
reviewed the 2003 police report, and that it had refreshed her recollection about the sexual
abuse occurring on campus. The trial court found S.N.’s foundational evidence untimely,
concluding there was no reason, other than counsel’s failure to anticipate the evidentiary
objections, why the evidence could not have been presented with S.N.’s opposition. The
court also sustained objections to evidence submitted by S.N. to show that District had
knowledge of the danger Parayno posed to students.
S.N. raises three arguments on appeal. First, she contends the trial court erred by
excluding evidence offered to show that some of the sexual abuse occurred on school
grounds. Second, she asserts that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of District’s
notice and knowledge of the danger Parayno posed to students. Finally, S.N. asserts that
1 Does 2 through 25 include individuals, businesses, and corporate entities whose true
names and capacities are unknown.
2 All further undefined statutory citations are to the Education Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2.
section 44808 does not bar liability where District’s negligence proximately causes off-
campus sexual abuse and contends that is the case here.
We agree with S.N. that the trial court erred in concluding that section 44808
immunity applied. Section 44808 withdraws immunity when a school district “has failed
to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” (§ 44808; Hoyem v. Manhattan
Beach City School Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 517 (Hoyem).) That clause is an
independent exception to the immunity under section 44808, and it applies whether the
resulting injury occurs on or off campus.
S.N. alleges that District failed to exercise reasonable care because its supervisory
personnel, on notice that Parayno posed a danger to students, left him in the classroom
without taking reasonable measures to protect the pupils in his charge. S.N.’s deposition
testimony, on which District relied, shows that Parayno drove her home from school and
abused her during those rides. If her notice evidence is admitted, a trier of fact could find
that District’s administrators knew Parayno continued to be alone with students and to
drive them home after being directed to stop, yet failed to enforce those directives, escalate
their response, limit his unsupervised access to students, or reassess his assignment after
District settled a 1999 lawsuit alleging that he had molested another student. District
therefore could not establish immunity merely by showing the abuse occurred off campus.
Under section 44808’s reasonable care clause, the off-campus location of the abuse would
not shield District from liability for those failures.
As the moving party, District bore the initial burden of production on summary
judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 850–851 (Aguilar).) District’s showing addressed only the location and
timing of the alleged sexual abuse, not whether District exercised reasonable care or
whether any failure of care caused S.N.’s injuries. It therefore did not carry its initial
burden, and as a result, the burden never shifted to S.N. to show a triable issue of material
fact. (Aguilar, at p. 850.)
3.
Because District was not entitled to summary judgment on the record it presented,
we need not decide whether the trial court erred in excluding S.N.’s evidence that some of
the alleged abuse occurred on campus, or the evidence she offered to show District’s
knowledge of Parayno’s prior conduct. The admissibility of that evidence remains for the
trial court to determine on remand.
We reverse the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
District moved for summary judgment solely on immunity, and its moving papers
addressed only when and where the alleged abuse occurred. The following background is
drawn from the first amended complaint, S.N.’s deposition, and the documents S.N.
submitted in opposition.3
1. Parayno’s Conduct Before 2001
Before teaching at Vinland, Parayno was employed as a teacher at Aynesworth
Elementary School, where Margaret Navarette was principal. Navarette later became
principal at Vinland while Parayno taught there.
In July 1998, Parayno became a suspect in a Fresno Police Department child sexual
assault investigation. The nine-year-old victim alleged that her third-grade teacher,
Parayno, touched her breasts inside a classroom adjoining his at Vinland. The victim
stated that Parayno continued to touch her nearly every other day during the school year, at
various locations on school premises. The victim also told police that Parayno would take
children off campus for lunch at McDonald’s or Taco Bell on a weekly basis, and that no
other adults were present during those trips.
The victim’s mother reported that Parayno often gave the victim rides home from
school when the victim stayed late for extracurricular activities. This continued until the
3 The trial court sustained District’s objections to many of those documents. Because
we do not reach their admissibility (see fn. No. 12, post), we describe them only as context
for the parties’ arguments and the court’s ruling, not as established facts.
4.
school principal called the victim’s mother toward the end of the school year, instructing
her to pick the victim up from school because “it just didn’t look right.”
During a police interview on September 23, 1998, Navarette expressed concern that
Parayno kept students alone in his classroom and drove them home after school, and that
he continued to do so after she told him to stop.
In October 1998, District retained a private investigator to investigate the nine-year-
old victim’s complaint, and others, about Parayno, including a report that he had behaved
in a sexual manner toward a male student in August 1997. That investigation was closed
for insufficient evidence.
On October 29, 1998, the private investigator wrote to District’s risk manager. The
letter relayed the investigating police detective’s view that Parayno was “a definite
candidate as a child molester.” The letter also reported that Parayno remained on campus
and had taken girls off campus to McDonald’s for lunch. The police did not pursue
charges, and Parayno remained in the classroom.
On December 2, 1998, Navarette emailed Parayno: “Due to recent investigation
where the allegations were unfounded, it would behoove you not to find yourself alone
with a student.”
On December 17, 1998, District’s risk manager wrote to Parayno with a list of
practices for avoiding “allegations of inappropriate sexual behavior towards students.”
The list included not bringing students home. That same month, Navarette found Parayno
alone in his classroom with a female student. She admonished him.
In March 1999, District reprimanded Parayno for taking six female students to
lunch off campus without permission from District or the students’ parents.
In April 1999, the nine-year-old victim from the 1998 Fresno Police Department
investigation sued District and Parayno. She alleged that he molested her during
counseling and tutoring sessions held after school, on school property, during the 1997-
1998 school year. District settled the lawsuit, and Parayno continued teaching at Vinland.
5.
In August 1999, District issued a memo to all staff advising them not to be alone
with students, to obtain permission slips and written approval before field trips, and not to
drive students home without another adult in the vehicle.
In August 2001, Vinland issued another memo advising staff not to be alone with
students in a classroom and not to drive students home.
2. Parayno’s Conduct Toward S.N.
S.N. attended Vinland from fourth through sixth grade. In the 2001-2002 school
year, when she was 10 and 11 years old, Parayno was her fifth-grade teacher and
basketball coach.
On February 13, 2003, when S.N. was in the sixth grade, she was interviewed by
Fresno Police Department detectives. She disclosed that Parayno had sexually assaulted
her.
In March 2003, Parayno was charged with 24 felony counts of sexual misconduct
against five children, including S.N. In April of 2004, District’s governing board voted to
dismiss him for the lewd touching of students.
3. Proceedings in the Trial Court
a. Complaint
On August 29, 2022, S.N. filed a complaint for damages resulting from Parayno’s
conduct, which constitutes “childhood sexual assault” as defined by Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.1.4
On February 17, 2023, S.N. filed the first amended complaint against District and
Does 2 through 25 for negligence and for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. She
4 Under Code of Civil Procedure former section 340.1, subdivision (q), a childhood
sexual abuse claim “that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be
barred as of January 1, 2020, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim
presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived” and may be
commenced “within three years of January 1, 2020.” (Code Civ. Proc., former § 340.1,
subd. (q), as amended by Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2020.)
6.
alleged that in 2001, Parayno had repeatedly sexually abused her over the course of her
fifth-grade school year. The alleged abuse included incidents during rides home after
school and at a movie theater, where Parayno took her after picking her up at her home on
a weekend. S.N. further alleged that a former Vinland student had sued District and
Parayno in 1999, alleging that Parayno molested her during counseling and tutoring
sessions after hours on school property, and that District settled the lawsuit and left
Parayno in the classroom.
S.N. alleged that District, through its employees, knew or should have known of
Parayno’s propensity to abuse children, failed to investigate or take corrective action, and
retained him without adequate supervision. As a basis for District’s liability, the first
amended complaint invoked Government Code sections 815.2 [vicarious liability for
public entities], 815.4 [public entity liability for tortious act by its independent
contractors], and 815.6 [public entity liability for failure to discharge a mandatory duty].
b. Motion for Summary Judgment
On June 20, 2025, District filed a motion for summary judgment, or alternatively,
summary adjudication on the sole ground of immunity under section 44808. In support, it
submitted the first amended complaint and the certified transcript of S.N.’s 2024
deposition. Relying upon that deposition, District asserted as an undisputed fact that each
act of abuse occurred off campus and outside of school hours. Its moving papers offered
no evidence concerning District’s supervision of Parayno or its response to earlier
complaints about him.
On August 22, 2025, S.N. filed an opposition to District’s motion with an appendix
of exhibits from District which had been produced in discovery, including the February
7.
2003 police report evidencing S.N.’s statements to police that she had been sexually
assaulted by Parayno both on campus and off.5
On August 29, 2025, District filed objections to S.N.’s evidence, asserting the
police reports were hearsay and had not been authenticated.
On September 11, 2025, S.N. filed a “Notice of Errata” regarding the appendix of
exhibits filed on August 22nd in support of her opposition to District’s motion for
summary judgment. The notice attached an authenticated and unredacted copy of Fresno
Police Report No. 02-101905, which documented an investigation into Parayno’s reported
acts of child molestation between November 2001 and June 2002.
That same day, the day of the hearing, S.N. filed her declaration and a request for
judicial notice of the 1999 civil complaint against District and Parayno for sexual assault.
4. The 2003 Police Report
On February 13, 2003, when S.N. was in the sixth grade, police interviewed her
about Parayno’s behavior. S.N. recounted that Parayno had taken her to the movies,
bowling, a carnival, and the mall to buy her clothes. S.N. told police that Parayno would
rub her legs when he gave her rides home from school. She demonstrated the rubbing on
her upper thighs, moving her hands toward her crotch. During these rides home, he would
also kiss her on the cheek.
S.N. stated that the first time Parayno touched her was when she stayed after school
to assist him. During this incident, Parayno hugged her and placed his hand on her breasts.
S.N. also stated that sometimes at school, Parayno would come up behind her and give her
5 The appendix of exhibits included the first amended complaint; excerpts from
S.N.’s deposition; documents from District produced in discovery, including Parayno’s
personnel file, which contained the 1999 civil complaint filed against him, the
investigator’s letter to District’s risk manager, District’s risk manager’s letter to Parayno,
Navarette’s email to Parayno, and documents pertaining to Parayno’s placement on leave
in 2003 for sexual misconduct; excerpts from Parayno’s criminal records, excerpts from
S.N.’s diary, and excerpts from the deposition of Margaret Navarette.
8.
a firm hug. “[S]he could feel his hard privates as he hugged her” while “moving his pelvis
around.”
Once, when S.N. wore a genie costume to school, Parayno told her she looked
“sexy” and took a photograph of her. S.N. documented this incident and some of
Parayno’s other inappropriate behavior in a journal that she provided for copying.6
5. S.N.’s Deposition and Later Declaration7
On May 1, 2024, S.N. was deposed. At the time of her deposition, she stated that
none of the abuse occurred in the classroom.
On September 11, 2025, she submitted a declaration stating that she had reviewed
the 2003 police report, which refreshed her recollection about Parayno abusing her on
school premises.
6. The Trial Court’s Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment
On September 12, 2025, the trial court issued an order granting summary judgment.
The court acknowledged that District moved only on section 44808 immunity, and that the
parties did not otherwise dispute District’s duties. It found that District met its initial
burden by showing that immunity applied, as each alleged incident of sexual abuse
occurred off school property and after school hours.
6 In an undated diary entry, S.N. wrote about the incident at the movies in which
Parayno rubbed her legs. She also stated that he held her hand. S.N. also documented his
comment that her Halloween costume was “sexy,” car rides home where Parayno touched
her breasts, and him touching her buttocks with his groin while hugging her.
7 During her deposition, S.N. testified that early in the school year, Parayno began
driving her home from school, which he did on more than 10 occasions. The first time he
touched her was during one of these car rides, when he touched her thigh. During another
car ride, he touched her breasts over her clothing. Parayno also took S.N. to McDonald’s,
the mall, a bounce house at an outdoor recreational park, and to the movies. At the
movies, he rubbed her thigh and kissed her on the cheek. At the bounce house, he touched
her breasts. When asked whether Parayno ever touched her inappropriately in the
classroom, S.N. answered, “No.”
9.
The court sustained District’s hearsay and authentication objections to the 2003
police report, its hearsay objections to the notice documents, and its objections to other
categories of S.N.’s evidence. It added that the notice evidence would not defeat immunity
in any event because section 44808 immunity “necessarily must extend to negligent hiring,
supervision, and retention,” citing Mosley v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist.
(2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1264–1265 (Mosley).
The court declined to consider the authenticated 2003 police report, S.N.’s
declaration, and her request for judicial notice of the 1999 civil complaint, because they
were filed the day of the hearing, after the court’s tentative ruling. Other than counsel’s
failure to anticipate District’s objections, it found no reason the foundational evidence
could not have been presented with S.N.’s opposition on August 22, 2025, and it found
that S.N. had not satisfied the requirements for a continuance under Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h).
7. The Motion for Reconsideration
On September 24, 2025, S.N. filed a motion for reconsideration. She argued that
the excluded documents were nonhearsay or fell within hearsay exceptions. She also
sought relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), because counsel
had inadvertently filed unstamped copies of police reports. The court denied the motion.
Judgment was entered on October 3, 2025.
A timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) We review the grant of
summary judgment de novo. (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 338.) In so doing,
we apply the same three-step analysis as the trial court. We identify the issues framed by
10.
the pleadings, determine whether the moving party has made a showing that justifies
judgment in its favor, and if it has, determine whether the opposing party has shown a
triable issue of material fact. (Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1602
(Brantley).)
A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that
there is no triable issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) It also bears an initial burden of production to
make a prima facie showing that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action
cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Ibid.;
Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) How each party carries its burden depends on
which party would bear the burden of proof at trial. (Aguilar, at p. 851.)
Because a defendant bears the burden of proving an affirmative defense at trial,
including statutory immunity (Evid. Code, § 500; Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire
Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 809), a defendant moving for summary judgment on
that defense must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact to find the
defense established. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 851; Jessen v. Mentor Corp. (2008)
158 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1484.) Only if the defendant makes that showing does the burden
shift to the plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to the defense.
(Aguilar, at p. 850; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party, “liberally
construing [its] evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing [the moving party’s] own
showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in [the opposing party’s]
favor.” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) We do not
consider evidence to which objections were made and sustained. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (c).)
11.
Here, District’s motion rested entirely on immunity under section 44808. Because
the scope of that immunity determines what District was required to show, we first address
section 44808 and then consider whether District carried its initial burden.
II. IMMUNITY UNDER EDUCATION CODE SECTION 44808
District contends that it is immune from civil liability under section 44808 because
“all of the incidents of abuse occurred off campus and not during school hours, and there
was no undertaking by [District] to provide for [S.N.’s] transportation home or otherwise
provide for her safety after hours and/or off campus at the time the alleged molestations
occurred.” Even assuming all of the abuse occurred off campus, we are not persuaded that
immunity applies under the circumstances.
A. Section 44808 and Its Predecessor
Section 44808 was originally enacted in 1972 as former section 13557.5 by
Assembly Bill No. 1326. (Stats. 1972, ch. 979, § 1.) As introduced on March 15, 1972,
the bill provided:
“No … school district … shall be responsible or in any way liable for
the conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools at any time
when such pupil is not on school property or, if on school property,
while not under the immediate and direct supervision of a certificated
employee of a school district, city or county board of education, or
county superintendent of schools.” (Assem. Bill No. 1326 (1972 Reg.
Sess.) as introduced Mar. 15, 1972, § 1.)
The Assembly then narrowed immunity to pupils not on school property, added
three exceptions for undertakings by the district, and added a second paragraph limiting
liability for those undertakings. (Assem. Bill No. 1326 (1972 Reg. Sess.) as amended in
Assem. June 15, 1972, § 1.)
The phrase “has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances” (the
reasonable care clause) was added later by Senate amendments. It was first placed in the
second paragraph as a condition on liability for an undertaking:
12.
“In the event of such a specific undertaking, the district … shall be
liable or responsible for the conduct or safety of any pupil only while
such pupil is or should be under the immediate and direct supervision
of an employee of such district or board, and the entity or person has
failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” (Assem.
Bill No. 1326 (1972 Reg. Sess.) as amended in Sen. July 12, 1972, §
1, italics in original.)
Then the reasonable care clause was moved to the first paragraph as an independent
exception:
“unless such district … has undertaken to provide transportation for
such pupil to and from the school premises, has undertaken a school-
sponsored activity off the premises of such school, or has otherwise
specifically assumed such responsibility or liability or has failed to
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.
“In the event of such a specific undertaking, the district,…shall be
liable or responsible for the conduct or safety of any pupil only while
such pupil is or should be under the immediate and direct supervision
of an employee of such district or board, and the entity or person has
failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” (Assem.
Bill No. 1326 (1972 Reg. Sess.) as amended in Sen. July 31, 1972,
§ 1, italics and strikeout in original.)
When the Education Code was reorganized in 1976, section 13557.5 was
renumbered as section 44808 without substantive change. (Stats. 1976, ch. 1010, § 2;
Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 516.)
Section 44808 now provides, in relevant part:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, no school district
… shall be responsible or in any way liable for the conduct or safety
of any pupil of the public schools at any time when such pupil is not
on school property, unless such district … has undertaken to provide
transportation for such pupil to and from the school premises, has
undertaken a school-sponsored activity off the premises of such
school, has otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or
liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances.
“In the event of such a specific undertaking, the district … shall be
liable or responsible for the conduct or safety of any pupil only while
13.
such pupil is or should be under the immediate and direct supervision
of an employee of such district or board.”
B. Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District
In Hoyem, our Supreme Court first construed section 44808, which became
operative April 30, 1977 (Stats. 1976, ch. 1010, § 2). There, a 10-year-old boy attending
summer school left campus before classes ended and was struck by a motorcycle at a
public intersection. (Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 512.) Authored by Justice Tobriner,
Hoyem held that a district must exercise reasonable care in supervising pupils on its
premises, and that a district that fails to do so does not “automatically escape liability
simply because the student’s ultimate injury occurs off school property.” (Id. at pp. 513,
515.)
The court concluded that section 44808 did not bar the plaintiff’s claim for
negligence for two reasons. First, the statute withdraws immunity when a district “has
failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” (Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at
p. 517; see 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Torts, § 390.) Second, the
decisions preceding section 44808 showed that the Legislature was “principally concerned
with limiting a school district’s liability for injuries to pupils either before or after school
hours while children were either going to school or coming home after school.” (Hoyem,
at p. 517.) The court drew that concern from Kerwin v. County of San Mateo (1959) 176
Cal.App.2d 304 (Kerwin) and Girard v. Monrovia City School Dist. (1953) 121
Cal.App.2d 737, both involving pupils injured en route home after release from school.
(Hoyem, at pp. 517–518.) Neither of those decisions nor section 44808 “limits a school
district’s responsibility to supervise students during school hours on school premises.”
(Hoyem, supra, at p. 518.) The district’s liability rested not on a failure to supervise off
campus, but on a failure of supervision on school premises. (Id. at p. 523.)
Hoyem concerned the school district’s supervision of a pupil, not of an employee.
However, our Supreme Court later relied on that duty of supervision, together with the
special relationship between school personnel and pupils, in recognizing a district’s
14.
liability for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of its employees. (C.A. v. William
S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869–871 (C.A.), discussing
Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 513.)
C. Decisions After Hoyem
Since Hoyem, most Courts of Appeal have declined to follow its interpretation of
the reasonable care clause from section 44808. They reason that an immunity that
disappears whenever a school district is negligent would protect against nothing and
therefore read the reasonable care clause as the standard of care for the enumerated
undertakings in section 44808. (Torsiello v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1987) 197
Cal.App.3d 41, 47–49 (Torsiello); LeRoy v. Yarboi (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 737, 743–744
(LeRoy).) On that reading, “school districts are not responsible for the safety of students
outside school property absent a specific undertaking by the school district and direct
supervision by a district employee.” (Cerna v. City of Oakland (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th
1340, 1357 (Cerna).)
Courts have nonetheless continued to apply Hoyem’s second ground: a district may
be liable for off-campus injuries resulting from “the [d]istrict’s negligence occurring on
school grounds.” (Guerrero v. South Bay Union School Dist. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 264,
269; Brownell v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 787, 795; see
Perna v. Conejo Valley Unified School Dist. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 292, 294–296 [teacher
kept pupil after school until crossing guard had left].)
Vallejo City Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2025) 118 Cal.App.5th 139
applies a different test. It looks not to where the negligence occurred but to whether the
student was, or should have been, under the district’s supervision when the harm occurred.
(Id. at pp. 143–144.) There, a student bullied at school committed suicide at home during
winter break. The court held the district immune for her death “even if the [d]istrict
breached a duty” owed to her. However, it allowed the survival claim for harm she
suffered on campus. (Id. at pp. 152–154.)
15.
The decisions discussed so far treat the location of the injury, the location of the
district’s negligence, or the pupil’s supervisory status at the time of the injury as
dispositive of whether section 44808 applies. The reading we adopt below asks a different
question: whether the district failed to exercise reasonable care. That question arises most
directly where, as here, the plaintiff alleges that a district negligently hired, retained, or
supervised an employee who harmed a pupil. We now turn to the decisions addressing that
theory.
D. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision of Employees
A school district may be vicariously liable under Government Code section 815.2
when its administrators or supervisors negligently hire, retain, or supervise an employee
who harms a student. (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 865–866.) In C.A., the employee was
a guidance counselor who sexually abused a student. (Ibid.) The court held, “[i]f a
supervisory or administrative employee of the school district is proven to have breached
that duty by negligently exposing [a] plaintiff to a foreseeable danger of molestation by his
guidance counselor, resulting in his injuries, and assuming no immunity provision applies,
liability falls on the school district under [Government Code] section 815.2.” (Id. at pp.
865–866.)
C.A. did not address section 44808. However, two decisions have addressed
whether a negligent supervision theory overcomes section 44808 immunity when an
employee harms a student off campus.
In Mosley, a student died at 2:00 a.m. after falling from a van driven by her
basketball coach. (Mosley, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262.) Her parents filed a
wrongful death action against the school district under a negligent hiring and supervision
theory. (Id. at pp. 1262–1263.) On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court’s order
sustaining the district’s demurrer. (Id. at pp. 1262, 1265.)
Mosley concluded that because the student died off campus and her “injuries were
not incurred during any official school-sponsored or sanctioned activity,” immunity
16.
applied. (Mosley, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1264.) The court further held that section
44808 barred the claim that the district negligently hired and supervised the coach. A
contrary rule, the court reasoned, would expose the district to liability for any act of a
teacher “so long as it may be traced back to negligent hiring and supervision.” (Id. at p.
1265.)
In Taylor v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 769 (Taylor),
a district employee allegedly killed a pupil while babysitting him at the employee’s home
during winter break. The court held section 44808 immunity barred the claim because the
death “did not arise from a negligent act directly concerning [the pupil] while on school
premises, which carried over into off campus harm.” (Taylor, at p. 776.) The court
reconciled C.A. with section 44808 as “immunizing school districts for harm to students
that occurs entirely outside the school environment.” (Taylor, at p. 777.)
In both Mosley and Taylor, the off-campus location of the harm defeated a claim
that the district negligently hired or supervised its employee. Neither court considered
whether the reasonable care clause independently withdraws immunity. And Taylor
suggested that the result might differ where on-campus negligence causes off-campus
harm. (Taylor, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 776.)
E. Victor Valley
The Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, recently addressed whether section
44808 immunizes a district from liability for on-campus negligence that causes an off-
campus injury in Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Superior Court (2026) 121
Cal.App.5th 901, review granted September 23, 2026, S298193 (Victor Valley). A former
high school student sued the school district for negligently supervising and protecting her
from sexual abuse by a teacher. (Id. at pp. 902–904.) The alleged assaults occurred off
campus, including at the teacher’s residence. (Id. at pp. 903–904.) The district moved for
summary judgment, contending section 44808 immunized it from liability because the
student’s injuries occurred off school premises. The trial court denied the motion, finding
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a triable issue as to whether the district negligently supervised the student while she was
on campus. (Victor Valley, at p. 905.) The district petitioned for a writ of mandate, which
the Court of Appeal denied. (Id. at pp. 903, 912.)
Relying on Hoyem, the court held that section 44808 turns on the location of the
negligent act, not the location of the resulting injury. A district may therefore be liable for
on-campus negligence that proximately causes an off-campus injury. (Victor Valley,
supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at pp. 906–907, review granted.) The plaintiff presented evidence
that, after an ROTC activity, the teacher walked with her through the school, passed
another school employee, escorted her to the school parking lot, and left campus with her
in his personal vehicle. He drove the student to his residence, where he sexually abused
her. (Id. at p. 903.) The district presented no evidence concerning measures it had in place
to prevent employees from transporting teenage students off campus. The court concluded
that a trier of fact could find that the absence of such measures fell below the standard of
care. (Id. at p. 907.) The court declined to follow Mosley, LeRoy, and Vallejo to the extent
they treated the location of the injury as controlling. (Victor Valley, supra, at pp. 910–
912.)
In a concurring opinion, Justice Raphael would have gone further. He concluded
that section 44808’s “reasonable care clause” constitutes an independent basis for liability,
not merely an exception that applies when the district has otherwise assumed responsibility
for a student off campus. He relied on the statute’s use of the disjunctive “or” and on
Hoyem’s statement that the statute’s immunity “evaporates” when a district fails to
exercise reasonable care. (Victor Valley, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at pp. 913, 914 (conc.
opn. of Raphael, J.), review granted.)
Justice Raphael further explained that section 44808 distinguishes between
vicarious liability for an employee’s off-campus conduct, which the statute limits, and
direct liability for the district’s own negligence, such as negligent hiring, training, or
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supervision.8 In his view, the latter remains viable even when the resulting injury occurs
off campus, subject to ordinary principles of proximate cause. (Victor Valley, supra, 121
Cal.App.5th at pp. 915–917 (conc. opn. of Raphael, J.), review granted.)
We find Justice Raphael’s reading of section 44808’s reasonable care clause more
faithful to the statutory text and to Hoyem and therefore adopt it.
F. Our Construction of Section 44808
Section 44808 withdraws immunity when a district (1) “has undertaken to provide
transportation for such pupil,” (2) “has undertaken a school-sponsored activity off the
premises,” (3) “has otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or liability,” (4) “or
has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” (§ 44808, italics added.)
The clauses are joined by the disjunctive “or,” which ordinarily signals “an alternative
such as ‘either this or that.’ ” (Houge v. Ford (1955) 44 Cal.2d 706, 712.)
Justice Raphael’s reading of section 44808 in Victor Valley is illustrated by
breaking the statute’s exceptions into separate lines:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, no school district,
city or county board of education, county superintendent of schools,
or any officer or employee of such district or board shall be