K.S. v. County of Alameda

Filed 10/26/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR K.S., Plaintiff and Appellant, A174121 v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 22CV010599) Defendant and Respondent. Plaintiff K.S. 1 appeals a judgment entered in favor of the County of Alameda (County) on his claim for negligence based on sexual abuse he suffered while in foster care approximately 20 years ago. In his complaint, K.S. sought to hold the County vicariously liable for the negligence of its employees and/or agents in failing to create and implement reasonable polices to protect foster children from foreseeable sexual assault and abuse; failed to notice, identify, and/or respond to his sexual assault and abuse; and failed to investigate his express reports of sexual assault and abuse and take reasonable measures to protect him. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the County is immune from liability under Government Code 2 section 820.2 because K.S.’s claims were based on discretionary acts or omissions by the County’s agents and/or employees. On 1 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, we refer to some persons by first and last initials. No disrespect is intended. 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code. appeal, K.S. argues that the judgment must be reversed because it cannot be determined from the pleadings that all of the negligent acts or omissions alleged were necessarily discretionary within the meaning of section 820.2, let alone that they were the result of a considered exercise of that discretion by the County’s employees and/or agents. We agree and therefore reverse the judgment. BACKGROUND 3 During the relevant period, K.S. was in foster care under the custody of the County. In 2006, the County placed K.S. in a group home. From approximately 2006 to 2007, when K.S. was twelve to thirteen years old, K.S. was sexually abused and assaulted by an adult male staff member at the facility. The acts of abuse occurred in a quiet room at the facility. K.S. reported the childhood sexual assault and abuse to a supervisor at the facility, an agent of the County. Despite the report, “no action was taken, no investigation was completed, and [the perpetrator] continued to sexually abuse and assault Plaintiff.” According to K.S., “rather than protecting Plaintiff, Defendants penalized him by revoking his privileges, drugging and/or increasing Plaintiff’s medications, and putting Plaintiff in the quiet room, giving [the perpetrator] further unfettered access to Plaintiff where [the perpetrator] continued sexually assaulting and abusing Plaintiff.” In 2022, K.S. filed the present action alleging a single count of negligence against the County. 4 His second amended complaint (complaint) 3 Because our review of the propriety of an order granting judgment on the pleadings treats the motion as admitting all material facts properly pleaded (Aubry v. Tri–City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966–967), our factual background is drawn from the allegations of K.S.’s complaint. 4 K.S.’s claim against the County is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, which revived certain time-barred claims relating to 2 alleges that the County is vicariously liable for the negligence of its employees and/or agents who, with both actual and constructive knowledge of his abuse, “failed to notice, identify, and/or respond to sexual assault and abuse of Plaintiff, . . . failed to investigate express reports of sexual assault and abuse of Plaintiff, and . . . failed to use reasonable measures to protect Plaintiff from foreseeable sexual assault and abuse at the hands of [the perpetrator] as herein set.” The complaint adds that, “[a]mong other breaches, Defendants failed to protect Plaintiff from childhood sexual assault and abuse; failed to institute corrective measures and to exercise reasonable oversight of Plaintiff while in foster care; failed to advance policies, procedures, and/or training to prevent foreseeable sexual assault and abuse in foster homes, group homes, and temporary housing in Alameda County; and failed to remove Plaintiff from unsafe foster care placement.” The complaint alleges that the County and its employees and/or agents had notice of his sexual abuse as a result of his report to the foster home supervisor. The complaint alleges further that “in addition to actual notice [of K.S.’s abuse] having been provided to Defendants, at all times material and relevant hereto, there were substantial structural and systemic flaws and deficiencies in the foster care system designed and/or implemented by County, as well as in Facility, where sexual assault and abuse of children was systemic,” and that because of the “structural and systemic deficiencies in the foster care system, in addition to being on actual notice of sexual assault and abuse by Plaintiff, Defendants at all relevant times knew or should have known that children in their care were subject to a substantial risk of childhood sexual assault occurring before January 1, 2024, and exempted such claims from the claim presentment requirement set forth in the Government Claims Act. (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) The foster home is also named as a defendant but is not a party to this appeal. 3 maltreatment and abuse, including sexual assault and abuse.” The complaint adds, “Among the chronic problems and inadequacies of County’s foster care system, at all relevant times, County was failing to adequately supervise its contract agencies and group homes by, among other things, failing to impose and enforce appropriate standards for the safety and welfare of the children in County’s care; failing to ensure that caseworkers were adequately trained and supervised; failing to ensure that caseworkers had manageable caseloads; failing to ensure regular caseworker visits and unannounced visits in environments where the foster child would feel comfortable and unthreatened in disclosing abuse or maltreatment; failing to ensure that placement decisions were informed and safe; and failing to review and evaluate a foster care provider’s policies and procedures with regard to the safety of children, including without limitation, those to prevent sexual assaults.” As to the alleged failure to investigate and take corrective action after K.S. reported his abuse, the complaint alleges that “Defendants ignored Plaintiff’s reports of sexual assault and abuse at Facility; Defendants failed to investigate said reports of sexual assault and abuse, etc. Moreover, rather than removing Plaintiff immediately after his reports of sexual abuse and assault, Defendants left Plaintiff in Facility where the sexual assault and abuse continued after he reported it to Facility, an agent of County.” After filing an answer, the County moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that discretionary act immunity under section 820.2 barred K.S.’s claim against the County. The trial court granted the motion. The court concluded, based on the allegations in the complaint, that it was “ ‘a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context [citation]’ that the social worker in question exercised their discretion 4 to not investigate and take corrective action” so that the County was entitled to immunity under section 820.2. DISCUSSION “A trial court’s ruling granting judgment on the pleadings is ‘equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the same standard of review.’ [Citation] We review the trial court’s ruling independently, accepting [] factual allegations as true and giving them a liberal construction.” (Towery v. State of California (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 226, 231.) “ ‘[W]hen a complaint affirmatively alleges facts amounting to an affirmative defense, it is subject to a demurrer.’ [Citation.] ‘A general demurrer will lie where the complaint “has included allegations that clearly disclose some defense or bar to recovery.” [Citation.] Thus, a demurrer based on an affirmative defense will be sustained only where the face of the complaint discloses that the action is necessarily barred by the defense.’ ” (McKenney v. Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 78–79.) I. In California, governmental tort liability is based exclusively on statute. (B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 179.) In general, “public employees are liable for their torts except as otherwise provided by statute (§ 820, subd. (a)), . . . public entities are vicariously liable for the torts of their employees (§ 815.2, subd. (a)), and . . . public entities are immune where their employees are immune, except as otherwise provided by statute (§ 815.2, subd. (b)).” (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 980, italics omitted (Caldwell).) California’s common law has long provided “that a governmental official has personal immunity from lawsuits challenging his or her discretionary acts within the scope of authority.” (Caldwell, supra, 10 5 Cal.4th at p. 979.) This traditional immunity was codified in section 820.2, which provides that “a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” As noted above, where the public employee is immune, the public entity is also immune. (Caldwell, at p. 980; § 815.2, subd. (b).) In Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782 (Johnson), the California Supreme Court first addressed the scope of discretionary immunity under section 820.2. The court “reject[ed] a purely mechanical analysis of ‘discretionary’ in favor of greater reliance on the policy considerations relevant to the purposes of granting immunity to the governmental agency whose employees act in discretionary capacities.” (Johnson, at p. 789.) The court explained, “ ‘Although it may not be possible to set forth a definitive rule which would determine in every instance whether a governmental agency is liable for discretionary acts of its officials, various factors furnish a means of deciding whether the agency in a particular case should have immunity, such as the importance to the public of the function involved, the extent to which governmental liability might impair free exercise of the function, and the availability to individuals affected of remedies other than tort suits for damages.’ ” (Ibid.) The court concluded that a “workable definition” of immune discretionary acts draws the line between “planning” and “operational” functions of government. (Id. at pp. 793, 794.) Immunity is reserved for those “basic policy decisions [which have] . . . been [expressly] committed to coordinate branches of government,” and as to which judicial interference would thus be “unseemly.” (Id. at p. 793.) The court distinguished such decisions from “ministerial” decisions that merely implement a basic policy already formulated. (Id. at 6 p. 796.) Finally, the court emphasized that immunity applies only to deliberate and considered policy decisions, in which a “[conscious] balancing [of] risks and advantages . . . took place. The fact that an employee normally engages in ‘discretionary activity’ is irrelevant if, in a given case, the employee did not render a considered decision.” (Id. at p. 795, fn. 8.) When the matter was revisited in Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th 972, the court reiterated that “Johnson precludes a finding of immunity solely on grounds that ‘the [affected] employee’s general course of duties is “discretionary”. . .’ and requires a showing that ‘the specific conduct giving rise to the suit’ involved an actual exercise of discretion, i.e., a ‘[conscious] balancing [of] risks and advantages.’ ” (Id. at p. 983, italics omitted.) The court clarified, however, that “Johnson does not require a strictly careful, thorough, formal, or correct evaluation” because “[s]uch a standard would swallow an immunity designed to protect against claims of carelessness, malice, bad judgment, or abuse of discretion in the formulation of policy.” (Id. at pp. 983–984, italics omitted.) II. To plead a cause of action for negligence against the County, K.S. must allege that “(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, and (3) the breach proximately or legally caused (4) the plaintiff’s damages or injuries.” (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662.) As set forth more fully above, the complaint alleges that the County’s employees and/or agents “failed to protect Plaintiff or otherwise make the foster care placements safe for him” and that the County is vicariously liable under Government Code section 815.2 for his injuries proximately caused by the negligence or intentional misconduct of its employees and/or agents. The complaint further alleges that “[i]mmunity 7 does not bar liability under [section 815.2], as: (i) the acts and/or omissions at issue in this case did not involve policy decisions, but rather operational or ministerial decisions; and (ii) no employee consciously balanced risks and advantages, such that he or she engaged in discretionary activity.” The sole argument asserted by the County in its motion for judgment on the pleadings was that discretionary immunity bars K.S.’s claims relating to any act or omission made by County employees and/or agents, “as social services regularly involve the continuing exercise of discretion by the social workers.” Accordingly, for purposes of analyzing K.S.’s claims, we assume that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the County owed a duty of care to K.S. and that a negligent breach of that duty would result in liability. We focus on the County’s argument that it is immune from liability because the acts or omissions of its employees and/or agents were the result of an exercise of the discretion under section 820.2. (See Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1462 (Becerra).) III. There is no dispute that an initial investigation of allegations of child abuse and the decision of what action, if any, should be taken are discretionary decisions entitled to immunity under section 820.2. (Jacqueline T. v. Alameda County Child Protective Services (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 456, 463.) The parties disagree, however, to what extent, if at all, acts or omissions occurring after the child becomes a ward of the court and the County assumes custody are subject to immunity. For the most part, courts have concluded that the investigation of allegations that a child placed in foster care under a county’s supervision has suffered abuse, and decisions regarding what action, if any, should be taken, are discretionary decisions entitled to immunity under section 820.2. (See 8 D.G. v. Orange County Social Services Agency (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 465, 473 (D.G.); K.C. v. County of Merced (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 606, 617–618, review granted June 25, 2025, S290435 (K.C.).) Courts have also recognized, however, that not all elements of the county’s supervision of a minor’s foster placement necessarily involve the exercise of discretion required by section 820.2. (See Ronald S. v. County of San Diego (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 887, 897 (Ronald S.) [county’s obligation to supervise a minor in foster care “undoubtedly” includes some “simple and uncomplicated surveillance which reasonably could be characterized as ministerial,” but holding that “the pre- adoption work of the social service employees of the [c]ounty constituted discretionary activity protected by the immunity provision of section 820.2”]; Becerra, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1462–1466 [acknowledging that “some activities in monitoring a placement might be considered ministerial”]; Elton v. County of Orange (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 1053, 1056–1058 (Elton) [while decisions such as recommending a child be, or not be, declared a dependent child warrant immunity, “it does not follow its subsequent ministerial acts in implementing such decisions rise to the same level”]; see also Barner v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 686 [“Our decisions also have stated that a public employee’s initial decision whether to provide professional services to an individual might involve the exercise of discretion pursuant to section 820.2, but that once the employee undertakes to render such services, he or she is not immune for the negligent performance of professional duties that do not amount to policy or planning decisions”].) Here, K.S. contends that, in this case, the question of the County’s entitlement to immunity cannot be resolved on the pleadings because the allegations of the complaint do not establish that the negligent acts and omissions of the County employees were necessarily the result of the exercise 9 of discretion within the meaning of section 820.2. He disputes that the County has immunity for all acts and omissions of its social workers in response to express or constructive notice that a foster child in the County’s custody is in danger of sexual abuse in the child’s assigned foster home. He argues further: “Construing the allegations of the operative complaint liberally and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff’s asserted claims, there is no basis to find that a County employee made any decision in response to notice of Plaintiff’s abuse, no less a considered decision that consciously weighed risks and advantages, in leaving Plaintiff in the Group Home without taking any action to protect him from . . . continuing sexual abuse.” Citing Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at page 983, the County argues that a court may properly determine whether discretionary immunity applies under section 820.2 based on a “fair reading of the [operative] complaint.” In Caldwell, the complaint alleged causes of action for discrimination against three members of a school district’s board of education after they cast the deciding votes to terminate plaintiff’s employment as the district’s superintendent. (Caldwell, at pp. 976–977.) The court found that “the decision about who should serve as superintendent of a school district” is a discretionary decision under the reasoning of Johnson. The court rejected the court of appeal’s conclusion that the complaint failed “to disclose a conscious balancing of risks and benefits necessary to qualify for immunity under Johnson.” (Id. at p. 983.) The court explained: “A fair reading of the instant complaint reveals allegations that the Board made an actual, conscious, and considered collective policy decision to replace plaintiff as superintendent. The complaint admits of no theory that the Board acted unconsciously or failed to weigh pros and cons. On the contrary, it asserts that Board 10 members did purposefully employ standards they deemed relevant, but that the standards employed were wrong and impermissible. For reasons already stated, claims of improper evaluation cannot divest a discretionary policy decision of its immunity.” (Id. at p. 984, italics omitted.) Insofar as the plaintiff in Caldwell sought to hold the defendants liable for an actual, considered discretionary act (a vote to discharge the superintendent for an improper reason), it is distinguishable from the present case. (Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 977.) Here, K.S. alleges a broad failure to supervise, including but not limited to the failure to investigate and to take any action after the abuse was reported. Additionally, K.S. does not allege an improper investigation. K.S. alleges a lack of investigation. 5 On this issue, Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780 is arguably more helpful. In that case, the transit district was sued by passengers who were assaulted by fellow passengers on a public bus. (Id. at p. 783.) The complaint alleged that, “after being notified of the ‘violent argument’ among passengers, the bus driver ‘failed to take any precautionary measures and continued to operate the said bus’ and that, by their negligence, the [transit district] and the bus driver ‘[allowed] the passengers 5 Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, cited by the County, is not helpful. In that case, after a juvenile offender killed a five- year-old neighbor within 24 hours of his release to his mother’s custody, the victim’s parents filed a complaint against the county alleging that it negligently selected the juvenile’s mother as custodian and determined the appropriate level of governmental supervision. (Id. at pp. 745–746, 748.) The plaintiff’s only argument was that the decisions were ministerial, in response to which the court wrote that “[c]hoosing a proper custodian to direct the attempted rehabilitation of a minor with a prior history of antisocial behavior is a complex task” that “requir[es] . . . comparisons, choices, judgments, and evaluations.” (Id. at pp. 748–749.) As discussed above, the failures to act alleged in the complaint here did not necessarily require the exercise of discretion. 11 involved in the violent argument to engage in a violent physical fight.’ ” (Id. at p. 791.) The court rejected the transit district’s argument that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it is immune from liability under section 820.2. (Id. at p. 793.) The court reasoned that “an individual bus driver’s decision concerning what form of protective action to take in a particular case” is not a discretionary decision for purposes of section 820.2. (Lopez, at p. 794.) The court then added, “Moreover, even if a bus driver’s decision concerning what kind of protective action to take could be considered a ‘discretionary’ one, it would be improper to sustain [the transit district’s] demurrer on the basis of Government Code section 820.2. Section 820.2 provides immunity only for the acts or omissions that are ‘the result of the exercise of the discretion’ vested in a public employee (italics added). Therefore, the court in Johnson held that to avail itself of the discretionary immunity provided by section 820.2, a public entity must prove that the employee, in deciding to perform (or not to perform) the act which led to plaintiff’s injury, consciously exercised discretion in the sense of assuming certain risks in order to gain other policy objectives. . . . Such a showing was not and could not have been made by [the transit district] at the demurrer stage. [Citations.] It therefore would be error to sustain [the transit district’s] demurrer based on Government Code section 820.2.” (Ibid.) In Elton, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d at pages 1056 to 1058, the court reversed an order sustaining a demurrer on the ground that the county was immune under section 820.2 for the discretionary decisions that formed the basis of the plaintiff’s negligence claim. There, the plaintiff alleged that the county probation department negligently placed and supervised her in a foster home where she was abused. (Elton, at p. 1056.) Initially, the court held that “[d]ecisions made with respect to the maintenance, care or supervision of 12 plaintiff, as a dependent child, or in connection with her placement in a particular home” were not discretionary decisions within the meaning of section 820.2. (Elton, at p. 1058.) The court added that the requisite showing “by the public agency” that “its employee in fact consciously exercised discretion in connection with the negligent acts or omissions” alleged “was not and could not have been made by the county at the demurrer stage and the trial court’s ruling sustaining the demurrers by reason of the immunity provisions of Government Code section 820.2 was also erroneous for this reason.” (Elton, at p. 1058.) Since Elton was decided, courts have recognized the difficulty in determining a government entity’s immunity at the pleading stage. In Becerra, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pages 1462 to 1466, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the county, finding that the county was immune under section 820.2 for its placement of a child in a foster home and in its subsequent supervision of the child. The court distinguished Elton, in part, on ground that in Elton “the [c]ounty attempted to assert immunity at the demurrer stage, where the facts supporting the discretionary decisions by county employees were not before the court.” (Becerra, at p. 1464.) Similarly, in Ronald S., supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at pages 891 to 892, the court reversed a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff on his claim for negligence arising out of his adoption by abusive parents. As noted above, the court concluded that “the pre-adoption work of the social service employees of the [c]ounty constituted discretionary activity protected by the immunity provision of section 820.2.” (Ronald S., at p. 897.) With respect to its prior decision in Elton, the court noted that, unlike Elton, which was decided on demurrer, in the case before it judgment was rendered after a full trial. (Id. at p. 898.) The court explained that the county’s obligation to 13 supervise a minor in foster care “undoubtedly” includes “simple and uncomplicated surveillance which reasonably could be characterized as ministerial. It is understandable, then, that a complaint which in general terms alleges damage from negligent management and supervision of the foster home could be deemed adequate to withstand a general demurrer.” (Ibid.) Here, the complaint alleges a range of conduct in support of the negligence claim, some of which might be considered discretionary. Other acts or omissions, however, might be characterized as ministerial. While a decision to commence an investigation and a decision to remove a minor following a report of sexual abuse might be entitled to immunity, other conduct alleged in the complaint, such as the failure to notice and identify sexual assault, to execute proper background checks on employees, and to use reasonable measures to protect minor from foreseeable sexual assault and abuse, might reasonably be considered ministerial. Because the County is asserting immunity at the demurrer stage, there is no factual record on which we can determine that the only omission at the heart of K.S.’s complaint is the failure to investigate and/or remove K.S. from the placement. (Cf. Becerra, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1466 [“Even if some activities in monitoring a placement might be considered ministerial (an issue we do not decide), the ultimate decision about which appellant complains here, whether to intervene and discontinue a child’s placement, is a discretionary placement decision”].) Even if it could be determined that K.S.’s primary complaint is with the County’s failure to investigate and remove him from the abusive situation, we cannot determine from the allegations of the complaint that the County’s employees or agents made an actual, conscious decision in that regard. (See 14 D.G., supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 474 [declarations submitted by county in support of motion for summary judgment insufficient to show that social worker exercised discretion as described in Johnson and Caldwell].) The County contends that an employee’s failure to investigate necessarily includes a considered decision “ ‘whether to investigate or not.’ ” We disagree. Courts have held that facts sufficient to demonstrate a “considered decision” include, for example, evidence of interviews (Ortega v. Sacramento County Dept. of Health & Human Services (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 713, 721, 733), collective votes (Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 984), face-to-face meetings (Christina C. v. County of Orange (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375), and medical evaluations (ibid.). Deciding not to act in response to a report of abuse requires consideration of the report and a conscious choice to forgo investigation. This is not equivalent to receiving a report of abuse and simply setting it aside without any deliberation. Unless a complaint alleges an improper evaluation, we cannot determine based on the pleadings alone whether an employee rendered a conscious decision. While the failure to investigate may imply a decision not to investigate, it does not always warrant such an assumption. The County’s reliance on the allegation in the complaint that K.S. was punished after making the reports does not alter our conclusion. The complaint alleges that “rather than protecting Plaintiff, Defendants penalized him by revoking his privileges, drugging and/or increasing Plaintiff’s medications, and putting Plaintiff in the quiet room, giving [the perpetrator] further unfettered access to Plaintiff where [the perpetrator] continued sexually assaulting and abusing Plaintiff.” The County argues that the reasonable inference to be drawn from this allegation “is that County considered and evaluated the information Appellant provided reporting 15 sexual abuse and determined the information was inadequate or false to such a degree that it warranted punishment and resulted in numerous penalties against Appellant, and that removal from Facility or further action was unwarranted.” K.S. argues that this “represents a gross and extreme alternative interpretation of the facts, requiring aggressive inferences in the County’s favor to manufacture, from nothing, a ‘considered’ decision consciously weighing risks and advantages.” We agree. Punishment does not necessarily demonstrate a considered decision relating to the adequacy or validity of the report. K.S. could have been punished in response to the report for a number of reasons, none of which are explained in the pleadings. Nor can they be fully explained until a proper examination of the facts has occurred. Such an examination cannot be made at this stage of the present proceeding. Accordingly, the trial court erred in sustaining the County’s demurrer. To the extent the court in K.C. v. County of Merced, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th 606, reached a different conclusion on similar facts, we decline to follow it. In that case, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff “repeatedly reported that she was being sexually abused and/or assaulted to her social worker” and that, despite the disclosures, “no corrective action was taken to Plaintiff and Plaintiff remained in Foster Home 1 where she continued to be sexually assaulted and abused.” (Id. at p. 611.) With respect to a second foster home placement, the complaint alleged that the County was again on notice of the foreseeability of abuse and “failed to take reasonable steps and/or implement safeguards to avoid such acts of childhood sexual assault and abuse.” (Id. at p. 612.) After concluding that section 820.2 applied to immunize the conduct alleged in the complaint, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the “demurrer should have been 16 overruled because the operative complaint did not indicate ‘an employee of the [c]ounty made a considered . . . decision’ or ‘actually exercised’ ‘discretion . . . by the weighing of risks and benefits in deciding on the challenged course of action.’ ” (Id. at p. 619.) Citing Caldwell, the court explained: “Here, under a ‘fair reading’ of the complaint [citation], K.C. essentially alleged [c]ounty’s social workers were confronted with reports of sexual abuse that should have prompted investigative or corrective action, but they failed to properly exercise their discretion to do so. ‘[C]laims of improper evaluation cannot divest a discretionary policy decision of its immunity.’ ” (Id. at pp. 619–620.) We disagree that the complaint in this case can be boiled down, based on a “fair reading,” solely to a claim that the County’s employees or agents failed to properly exercise their discretion when confronted with allegations of sexual abuse. As set forth above, the County’s supervision may involve both discretionary and ministerial acts and/or omissions, and the allegations of the complaint are broad enough to assert a claim of negligence based on both. Likewise, while courts are to give a complaint a “reasonable interpretation,” that rule does not mean we supply unpled facts to meet the County’s burden of proving that its employees made a conscious decision as a result of the exercise of discretion. 6 6 In light of this conclusion, we do not reach K.S.’s additional argument that the court in K.C. v. County of Merced, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th 606 improperly extended absolute immunity for all acts and omissions of its social workers in supervising foster care when responding to reports of abuse in a foster home. 17  DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed. GOLDMAN, J. WE CONCUR: BROWN, P. J. GORDON, J. * * Judge of the Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 18 Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court Trial Judge: Honorable Sarah Sandford-Smith Counsel for Plaintiff and Herman Law, Ryan J. Jones, Carina Appellant: Nixon Counsel for Defendant and Bertrand, Fox, Elliot, Osman & Wenzel, Respondent: Michael C. Wenzel, Amy Leifur Halby, Matthew J. Bertini 19